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Reputation - we all have one. We do not completely comprehend its workings 
and are mostly unaware of its import until it is gone. When we lose it, our traditional 
laws of defamation, privacy, and breach of confidence rarely deliver the vindication and 
respite we seek due, primarily, to legal systems that cobble new media methods of 
personal injury onto pre-Internet laws. This dissertation conducts an exploratory study 
of the relevance of law to loss of individual reputation perpetuated on the Internet. It 
deals with three interrelated concepts: reputation, privacy, and memory. They are 
related in that the increasing lack of privacy involved in our online activities has had 
particularly powerful reputational effects, heightened by the Internet’s duplicative 
memory. The study is framed within three research questions: 1) how well do existing 
legal mechanisms address loss of reputation and informational privacy in the new media 
environment; 2) can new legal or extra-legal solutions fill any gaps; and 3) how is the 
role of law pertaining to reputation affected by the man-computer interoperability 
emerging as the Internet of Things? Through a review of international and domestic 
legislation, case law, and policy initiatives, this dissertation explores the extent of 
control held by the individual over her reputational privacy. Two emerging regulatory 
models are studied for improvements they offer over current legal responses: the 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, and American Do Not Track 
policies.  Underscoring this inquiry are the challenges posed by the Internet’s unique 
architecture and the fact that the trove of references to reputation in international 
treaties is not making its way into domestic jurisprudence or daily life. This dissertation 
examines whether online communications might be developing a new form of digital 
speech requiring new legal responses and new gradients of personal harm; it also 
 iii 
proposes extra-legal solutions to the paradox that our reputational needs demand an 
overt sociality while our desire for privacy has us shunning the limelight. As we embark 
on the Web 3.0 era of human-machine interoperability and the Internet of Things, our 
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CHAPTER 1        REPUTATIONAL RISKS ON THE INTERNET  
 
1.0         Introduction 
 
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls: 
Who steals my purse steals trash[.]1 
 
Reputation is something we all have, treasure beyond wealth, and barely 
understand. It is a social construct, emerging from our interaction with others. Its loss  
provokes a profound sting to our sensibilities, but it is our society that feels most 
betrayed in their misplaced esteem and trust. Reputation poses several ironies: while we 
consider it our property, its control rests primarily with others. We strive to cultivate 
favourable impressions through our social interactions, but also crave that private space 
that hides from public view our more socially undesirable traits. We instinctively look 
to our laws for vindication and to make our reputation whole when it is injured: law is 
meted out in a very public forum, however, and so attracts the very publicity we shun. 
Law takes a somewhat circumspect interest in reputation, contextualizing it within our 
“family, home and correspondence”2 or looking for confidential relationships in order to 
allocate blame. We are expected to provide proof of its loss, and a measure of our lost 
opportunities when we enter the legal forum, but are usually unaware of its value until 
it is gone. It is that drunken image the morning after, those shameful headlines that 
grow more painful with each detail, that tell us we no longer have the jobs, friends, or 
financial future we possessed the night before.  
The Internet should have the capacity to make reputational damage go away.3 
After all, it can take our explanations to most corners of the geophysical world and 
convey our apologies in seconds. It can keep our denials and retractions available 
indefinitely and for any viewer. It can even publicize our own version of events, 
highlight our most admirable accomplishments, and manage our own rehabilitation 
                                                
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO: THE MOOR OF VENICE, Act III, Sc III, ll 155-157 (per 
Iago) as reprinted in The Oxford Shakespeare, Stanley Wells ed. (2008) (Othello). 
2 International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, S. Executive Rep. 102-23, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, Dec. 16, 1966, Article 17 (ICCPR). 
3 ‘Internet’ indicates a networking infrastructure connecting millions of computers. The World 
Wide Web is an information-sharing model that is built on top of the Internet and uses only 
one of the languages spoken over the Internet. ‘New media’ is used broadly herein to include 
any means of mass communication using digital technologies. 
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campaign. All on an anonymous basis if we no longer seek the limelight.  Why, then, is 
the Internet a contributory cause rather than the definitive answer to the most 
undesirable of human commodities, the stained reputation? 
Our general familiarity with the Internet suggests that the qualities of digital 
media that make them most attractive for every kind of informational exchange also 
contribute to the permanence and severity of reputational damage. The offending story 
or image is conveyed instantaneously, anonymously if desired, in a fragmented fashion, 
indiscriminately if not directed to selected recipients, without editorial or managerial 
interception, and without significant cost. The purpose in choosing the Internet or other 
digital media for inflicting reputational damage is its guarantee of desired results: 
negative imputations go ‘viral’, are likely permanent, and appear unlikely to reflect 
badly on the anonymous perpetrator as forensic efforts at identification are time-
consuming, expensive, and can involve even further invasions of the victim’s privacy. 
Such efforts are, on balance, litigation-proof as victims of reputational damage are 
reluctant to admit their own indiscretions or their lack of privacy mechanisms for their 
online accounts.  
Options for self-help are equally limited: containment (asking the author or 
photographer or news source to stop the story) is not feasible in light of ubiquitous 
distribution. Compensation is unlikely if the author of our misfortune is unknown, 
unrepentant, or without deep pockets. Vindication is chancy if we must reveal more of 
our private selves in order to prove the story’s falsity; and erasure is beyond the 
technological capabilities of individuals and takes time if requested of the Internet 
Service Provider (Bell Mobility, for example) or social networking service (Facebook, 
for one). So we might be left to live with our past mistakes or vulnerabilities at the 
hands of advancing technologies. 
 
1.1 The Challenge 
 
            Close to half the inhabitants of this planet communicate through the Internet, an 
information and communications system that, within the context of the planet’s 
history,4 has only been with us for a very few seconds.5 Understandably, then, we have 
                                                
4 Paul S. Braterman, How Science Figured Out the Age of Earth, SCI. AMER. (20 Oct. 2013), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-science-figured-out-the-age-of-the-
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yet to devise a uniform code of online social behavior, either personal or communal. 
There circulates throughout the new media environment6 much more of our private 
information than we would recognize or ever sanction: we find ourselves in distinctly 
new technological, cultural, and legal terrain.  Online defamation and data disclosure 
test our laws because their technologies are so novel and their damage so profound.  
            This dissertation examines individual reputation on the Internet using a wide 
lens and an exploratory approach. More precisely, it sets as its aim the rethinking of the 
role of law as a response to online breaches of our reputational privacy. I devise that term 
to define a space we envision where our personally related information and data are kept 
undisclosed to the wider public in order to avoid any compromising of our future 
opportunities - social, professional, or financial. I consider two types of reputational 
harm that might result from our activities or those of others: our exposure through 
online postings that result in defamational harm; and the disclosure of our personally 
identifying information7 or data without our knowledge or consent that impede our 
privacy. While recognizing that not all reputational impacts are related to privacy 
breaches, the latter are considered by this study because they put our private lives at 
increased online risk, particularly in the hands of the state and other authorities.  
              This study deals with three interrelated concepts: reputation, privacy, and 
memory. Those concepts are related in that the increasing lack of privacy involved in 
our online activities has had particularly powerful reputational effects, heightened by 
the Internet’s susceptibility to misuse by those in authority, among others. In short, 
                                                                                                                                            
earth/http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-science-figured-out-the-age-of-the-earth/ 
(National Sciences Foundation in 1926 adopted the radiometric timescale with which the age 
of the earth was calculated as 4.55 billion years). See further Appendix B, Map 1. 
5 Timeline of Computer History, computerhistory.org, 
http://www.computerhistory.org/timeline/?category=cmptr (reporting the first modern 
computer was built in 1939, was employed for Allied intelligence at Bletchley Park, England, 
during World War 2, became available for office use in developed nations in 1966 and for 
retail sales as a “personal computer” or PC in 1977). 
6 An emergent, more inclusive term than Internet or the Web would be “new media”, defined 
by the New Media Institute as “all that is related to the internet and the interplay between 
technology, images and sound.” See Bailey Socha and Barbara Eber-Schmid, Defining New 
Media Isn’t Easy, NEW MEDIA, http://www.newmedia.org/what-is-new-media.html. 
7 See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel L. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of 
Personally Identifiable Information, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 (2011) (pointing out that Personally 
Identifiable Information, the test for privacy protection under US law, is a concept exhibiting 
a more nuanced meaning than legislators intended).  
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when it comes to individual reputation, the fact that information is accessed online 
makes a difference. 
               My focus is the reputation we exhibit when among the larger public, the 
“front stage” presentation of self that, with the emergence of our online 
communications, seems to be invading our backstage life as well. 8  That 
reconceptualization of the public/private divide is necessary because we are now in a 
communications era where the Internet has added a layer of technological and 
conceptual complexity for any user making best efforts to manage her social self.   
             Online reputational privacy presents a novel challenge for the legal profession 
as well. For judges, lawyers, and legislators, the task of allocating liability regarding 
breaches of reputational privacy involves a working knowledge of the online roles of 
Internet companies, search companies, government regulators, third party Internet 
users, and the individual cyber-citizen. Web behavior and digital speech present 
policymakers with completely novel challenges: how to come to terms with a culture of 
impetuous, unmediated, fractured, hyperbolic communications expressed on devices 
with duplicative memory and global distribution.   
             This dissertation poses three research questions: 1) how well do existing legal 
mechanisms address loss of reputation and informational privacy in the new media 
environment; 2) can new legal or extra-legal solutions fill any gaps; and 3) how is the 
role of law pertaining to reputation affected by the man-computer interoperability 
emerging as the Internet of Things?9 I draw my legal analyses from international 
treaties and case law related to the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) 
and EU members. I choose those jurisdictions for three reasons: 1) the US and EU are 
the current prominent players in the digital economy; 2) they stem from very different 
cultural-legal traditions regarding reputation and privacy; and 3) they are under intense 
political pressure to collaborate in finding solutions to new privacy demands for 
individual Internet users now that we have entered the era of man-machine 
interoperability and wearable technologies.  
                                                
8  As explored in the pre-Internet world by sociologist ERVING GOFFMAN, THE 
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). 
9 John Naughton, The Internet of Things: It’s a Really Big Deal, GUARDIAN (14 June 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/15/networker-internet-of-things-john-
naughton-hacking (providing a workable definition of the Internet of Things as a “machine-to-
machine” connectivity without human interaction).  
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               The question of whether victims of reputational harm perpetrated on the Web 
or the Internet would benefit from a discrete legal system, or would prefer a response 
outside of the legal system altogether, has received relatively little academic attention. 
Such an inquiry involves theoretical questions about the nature of reputation and how it 
is affected by concepts of memory and privacy. It also raises practical legal questions 
about proof of injury, choice of forum, and allocation of liability among Internet users 
and corporate intermediaries such as Internet companies, advertisers, and content 
carriers. The particular idiosyncrasies of Internet architecture play a significant part in 
defining the measure of control the individual Internet user can achieve over her 
reputation. It follows that the role of law regarding reputation calls out for 
reexamination. It is my purpose in this inquiry to expand on the observation of Internet 
scholar David Ardia, that “It’s time again to rethink defamation law.”10 As we have 
moved out of the role of information acquisitor to content generator, and now face the 
novel role of computer companion, it is time again to rethink law’s role involving 
reputational privacy.  
 
            1.2         The Medium: A (very) Brief History of the Internet 
 
The computer in the modern world emerged as an answer to such visions as a 
“World Brain” by H.G. Wells in the 1930s,11 an “arithmetical machine of the future” by 
Vannevar Bush in the 1940s,12 and an arrangement of “man-computer symbiosis” 
predicted by J.C.R. Licklider in the 1960s.13 Those pioneers of modern communications 
envisioned man-computer cooperation beyond the mere compilation and storage of very 
                                                
10 David Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of Defamation Law, 
45 HARV. CIV. RTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 261, 262 (2010).  
11 H.G. Wells, World Brain: The idea of a Permanent World Encyclopaedia, ENCYCLOPEDIE 
FRANCAISE (Aug. 1937), https://sherlock.ischool.berkeley.edu/wells/world_brain.html (calling 
for a “unified, if not a centralized, world organ to ‘pull the mind of the world together’”).  
12 Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, ATLANTIC (1 July 1945), 
http://www.theAtlantic.com/magazine/archive/1945/07/as-we-may-think/303881/. Bush was an 
American engineer, inventor, and head of the US Office of Scientific Research and 
Development during WW2. 
13 Internet Pioneers, http://www.ibiblio.org/pioneers/licklider.html (describing Licklider as a US 
computer scientist and psychologist who foresaw the need for networked computers with easy 
user interfaces, such as point-and-click interfaces, digital libraries, e-commerce, online 
banking, and software that could migrate to wherever it was needed.  
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large masses of information, what today we unimaginatively label Big Data. Licklider in 
particular advocated collaboration between man and computer that would enable 
decision-making as problems and variables emerged, not as a pre-set computer 
function.14 He examined his own work habits and determined that “Much more time 
went into finding or obtaining information than into digesting it”.15 Man-computer 
symbiosis could augment human intellect by relieving it from mundane, administrative 
tasks. Wells presciently foresaw that, “The whole human memory can be, and probably 
in a short time will be, made accessible to every individual.”16 
 The most referenced beginnings of the Internet are the 1970s experiments by 
the US Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Administration (ARPA) 
to connect the military, defense contractors, and university researchers through 
dedicated telephone lines with direct access to a few key computers throughout the 
country.17 That collaborative approach reflected the perception of American scientists 
who contributed their expertise to the World War 2 effort that winning the war was “a 
battle of scientific wits in which outcome depends on who can get there first with 
best.”18  
The ARPANET continued to support the development of communications 
protocols19 in order to transfer data between computer networks. It was just one of 
many private and public initiatives, however, to shape the Internet. For example, in the 
1970s numerous defence networks, the SAGE program that comprised the first airline 
reservation systems, and the remote computer services industry all contributed to 
                                                
14  J.C.R. Licklider, Man-Computer Symbiosis, IRE Transactions On Human Factors In 
Electronics, 4-11(March 1960), http://groups.csail.mit.edu/medg/people/psz/Licklider.html. 
15 Id.  
16 Wells, supra fn 11. 
17 This account is informed by the decision in Shea on Behalf of American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. 
Supp. 915, 925-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) and A Brief History of the Internet & Related Networks, 
Internet Society, http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-
history-internet-related-networks. An account by JOHNNY RYAN, A HISTORY OF THE 
INTERNET AND THE DIGITAL FUTURE, 8, attributes the origins of the modern Internet and 
computer to the technological expertise that fueled President D. Eisenhower’s military 
industrial complex during WW2. 
18 Johnny Ryan, How the atom bomb helped give birth to the Internet, ARS TECHNICA (21 Feb, 2011), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/how-the-atom-bomb-gave-birth-to-the-internet/3/. 
19 A protocol is a set of rules for transmitting data between electronic devices, such as 
computers. In order for computers to exchange information using the same sized packets of 
information, there must be a preexisting agreement as to how each side will send and receive it. 
Protocols are established by international or industry-wide organizations. 
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Internet development. The emergence of the persona computer (PC) in the 1980s 
brought a basic online email service, information providers such as Lexis and Dialogue, 
and the first global data communications networks to connect individual users to those 
services.20 Compuserve and Prodigy represented the first generation of consumer 
networking services for personal computers in the 1980s. Videotext services formed the 
basis for national information infrastructures in many countries during the same 
period.21 Those examples point to the simultaneous development of many networking 
activities, both commercial and private, and contribute to a more nuanced 
understanding of the origins of the Internet.   
As several universities and commercial entities began to link their computers to 
various types of computer networks using OSI protocols,22 funds from the US National 
Science Foundation as well as commercial communications enterprises helped build a 
high speed dial-up ‘backbone’ (Sprint and IBM for example) to form a series of linked, 
overlapping networks, the NSFNet.23 In Europe, major international backbones such as 
NORDUNET provided similar connectivity to a growing number of computers on a 
large number of networks.24 In Europe and elsewhere, support came from cooperative 
international efforts or consortium networks and through national research 
organizations, mostly non-profit entities with focused ideals about how the Internet 
should run. Within the United States, much of this support came from the federal and 
state governments for public access, but a considerable contribution was increasingly 
                                                
20 Martin Campbell-Kelly & Daniel Garcia-Swartz, The History of the Internet: The Missing 
Narratives, SSRN, http://ssrn.com/abstract=867087 (2 Dec. 2005).  
21 “A means of providing a written or graphical representation of computerized information on 
a television screen”. (Dictionary.Com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/videotext.) 
22 Perhaps the most important computer protocol is OSI (Open Systems Interconnection), a set 
of guidelines for implementing networking communications between computers. The most 
important sets of Internet protocols are TCP/IP, HTTP, and FTP. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/410357/protocol.) 
23 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the U.S. Department of 
Energy contributed additional backbone facilities in the form of the NSINET and ESNET 
respectively. 
24 Over 100,000 by 2014. The system of protocols which was developed over the course of this 
research effort became known as the TCP/IP Protocol Suite, after the two initial protocols 
developed: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP). An Internet 
protocol (or communicating systems using formats for exchanging messages) delivers packets 
of data from the source host to the destination host solely based on the IP addresses contained 
in the packet headers. Communications protocols have to be agreed upon by the parties 
involved. 
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made by industry for customer consumption. Private and public infrastructures were 
not interconnected: frequently, however, public information services, available to any 
organization with public members, could not afford to link to each potential customer 
and had to rely on data communications supplied by private telephone and telegraph 
monopolies.25  
The original innovators, scientists, and agencies assembled the various 
components of the Internet with very public goals in mind: the advancement of science 
and national security.26 Early enthusiasts envisioned a virtual frontier, what cyber 
libertarian John Perry Barlow would describe as a terrain “with no elected government, 
no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks”, and a “global 
social space…independent of the tyrannies [government seeks] to impose”.27 That 
idealistic rhetoric has been repeated as recently as 2010 with the description of the 
Internet as “a centrifugal force, user-driven and open.”28  
For other observers, however, such democratic promise quickly dissipated in the 
early 1990s when The National Science Foundation was dismantled and the US 
government “handed over the running of the Internet backbone to commercial Internet 
service providers,”29 almost all of which locate their corporate headquarters in the 
continental US. It was, in the words of venture capitalist John Doerr, “the largest legal 
creation of wealth in the history of the planet.” 30  Also provoking considerable 
controversy for its American power-hold on the assignment of names and numbers to 
Internet sites is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
that “coordinates these unique identifiers across the world” in furtherance of a global 
Internet.31 Standing at the forefront of the “thought experiment”32 that is the Internet is 
                                                
25 Campbell-Kelly & Garcia-Swartz, supra fn 20 at 13. 
26 Michael Harris, Book review: ‘The Internet is Not the Answer’ by Andrew Keen, WASH. POST (2 
Jan. 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/book-review-the-internet-is-not-the-
answer-by-andrew-keen/2015/01/02/8627999a-7973-11e4-9a27-6fdbc612bff8_story.html. 
27 John Perry Barlow, Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, (8 Feb. 1996) as reproduced 
by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
28 Ryan, supra fn 18 at 8. 
29 Harris, supra fn 26. 
30 As related by Bill Davidow, The Internet Is the Greatest Legal Facilitator of Inequality in Human 
History, ATLANTIC (28 Jan. 2014), http://www.theAtlantic.com/business/archive/2014/01/the-
internet-is-the-greatest-legal-facilitator-of-inequality-in-human-history/283422/. 
31 ICANN website at https://www.icann.org. 
32 ANDREJ SAVIN, EU INTERNET LAW, x (2013) (Internet). 
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US industry; most of what other countries do is a response or reaction to that 
dominance. The EU has responded to most of those challenges in ways that are 
uniquely harmonized within its borders.33 
The Internet of the early 1990s has been described as “a gray and dreary place 
devoid of content – like a TV station without programs”.34 The emergence of the World 
Wide Web in the mid-1990s, a multimedia interface that allows for the transmission of 
text, pictures, audio, and video collectively known as web pages, popularized and 
enlivened the Internet with search functions that could retrieve information on just 
about any topic imaginable. With the arrival of commercial entities such as Netscape, 
Microsoft, AOL, and Yahoo! the Web was transformed from “an amateur enterprise to a 
robust commons”.35 For the individual user, the Internet had expanded its information 
storage function to unlimited research capabilities and democratized information access. 
In terms of its operating systems to serve individual users, the computer evolved 
from a system of “punching up cards to feed into someone else’s mainframe”36 into a 
network of PCs available on each worker’s desk or in individual homes, with installed 
software that enabled users to give orders to the computer’s hardware. Files could be 
saved on the PC’s desktop, distributed throughout the network, or copied onto an 
external disc and distributed to others. While some owners showed initiative to 
program their own computers, most simply bought software programmed by others and 
downloaded it onto their PCs. Generally the computer was function specific, achieving 
one task for its duration. It was prone to crash if too many complex commands were 
inputted at too fast a rate. Jonathan Zittrain coined the descriptor “tethered” to 
characterize the individual’s reliance on the network and pre-programmed software, 
operations we have come to refer to as the Web 1.0. We can characterize the human 
component in that era as primarily information gatherers. 
                                                
33 For example, the EU has directives regulating e-privacy (2002/58/EC), legal protection of 
databases (96/9/EC), distance selling (97/7/EC), data retention (2006/24/EC), electronic 
commerce (2000/31/EC), data protection (95/46/ED), access to, and interconnection of, 
electronic communications networks, domain name regulation (EC/733/2002), and 
implementation of the European Top Level Domain <.eu> (EC 733/2002).  
34 Campbell-Kelly & Garcia-Swartz, supra fn 20 at 4. 
35 Id. at 5 (suggesting that the Web won out over several competitors).  
36 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET – AND HOW TO STOP IT, 2 
(2008) (Future of Internet). 
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The next stage, what has been coined the age of Web 2.0, is marked by its 
generativity. All users can assume the role of content publisher. Three interlinked 
trends have emerged featuring the individual during that second more interactive or 
generative phase: 1) the evolution of the individual from passive consumer to 
participatory contributor of content; 2) increasing hazards to one’s good name prompted 
by the regeneration of user information by third party users that is enabled by a 
relatively open or unregulated Internet; and 3) the resultant tension between the 
individual’s need for privacy and the constitutionally recognized right of others to free 
expression. Regarding the first, individual access to content moved from mainframes 
located at public institutions to independent network functioning.37 PCs defined their 
individual owners as consumers whose tastes influenced a digital market and gave birth 
to behavioral advertising, or the tracking of individual online search habits as indicators 
of consumer preferences. In that way, the individual user became a principal component 
of the digital economy with every excursion online. While those coordinates were 
presented in code, they nonetheless provided key personal information to commercial 
interests and to governments alike who sought to study and profile the interests, buying 
preferences, and illicit intentions of online participants. 
The Internet evolved during the 1990s and early years of the new millennium 
from a limited operating system to one that encouraged generativity or user 
interactivity. With the later arrival of social media, individuals became publishers in 
their own right, often without mediation from traditional editing sources.38 They 
comprised the “essential quality animating the trajectory of information technology 
innovation”.39 PCs were connected to, and users communicated with, any possible 
network of other PCs over the Internet. That generative quality Harvard University’s 
Jonathan Zittrain defines as “a technology’s overall capability to produce unprompted 
change driven by large, varied, and uncoordinated audiences.”40 When these “highly 
adaptable machines” are linked to a network with limited centralized control, we get  
                                                
37 Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HAR. L. REV. 1 (1974) (Generative). 
38 See contra, Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated 
Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697 (2010).  
39 Zittrain, Generative, supra fn 37 at 1980. This paragraph follows Zittrain’s explanation on 
the openness of the Internet.  
40 Id. 
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…a grid that is nearly completely open to the creation and rapid distribution of 
the innovations of technology-savvy users to a mass audience that can enjoy 
those innovations without having to know how they work.41  
 
            That development from information acquisitor to content publisher has involved 
the innovation of numerous communications platforms (social media such as emails, 
Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter and Instagram, as well as blogs and videoblogs such as 
YouTube and Snapchat) and the use of a variety of individually owned devices for 
searches and transmission (such as laptops and mobile phones). The openness and trust 
preferred by users of such devices provides a formidable market force that resists 
regulatory attempts at Internet control. However, as Zittrain observed as early as 1974, 
that system is “increasingly at odds with itself”.42     
           As individual users become publishers of their own content, much of it 
autobiographical and revealing, that information is consumed and retransmitted by 
third parties with little regard for the context in which it was created. The ease with 
which photographs can be taken on mobile phones, tagged with our names, and 
transmitted to third parties, many of those recipients unknown to us, creates high risks 
of reputational harm through embarrassment, shame, or the inability to stop an 
unfavourable image from viral distribution across cyberspace. On the criminal side, the 
hacking of websites using malicious code causes wide exposure of personally identifying 
data by state and ‘dark net’ actors. As a result, the very users who benefit from the open, 
generative Internet simultaneously seek stability through a more locked down system. 
That creates an online environment that is the antithesis of that which fostered our 
original participation. Rather than functioning on trust and collaboration, then, we as 
consumers find ourselves losing control and demanding locked down encryption, 
regulation, and the limiting of innovative participation.43 
American Internet scholar Lawrence Lessig recognized as early as 2000 that 
individuals could not have it both ways: untrammelled privacy and unlimited access and 
innovation. Users would have to decide whether they desired a regulated Internet and, 
if so, regulated by whom. In his words, 
                                                
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 1977. 
43 The Internet governance debate, while critical to state and industry participation, constitutes 
a very broad literature and, as such, is beyond the scope of this dissertation 
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Under the influence of commerce, cyberspace is becoming a highly regulable 
space, where behavior is much more tightly controlled than in real space. But 
that's not inevi either. We can-we must-choose what kind of cyberspace we want and 
what freedoms we will guarantee. These choices are all about architecture: about 
what kind of code will govern cyberspace, and who will control it.44 [emphasis 
added] 
 
While Lessig attributes human choice with shaping the Internet in a major way, 
commerce and institutions still contribute to the mounting tension between personal 
privacy needs and the growing inventory of platforms available for online expression. 
That tension encapsulates the third trend affecting the reputation of individual users: 
the constant need to balance their need for privacy and the constitutionally recognized 
right of others to speak their minds freely. Increasingly we look to law, rather than 
computer code, to conduct that function.  
The sudden growth of the Internet initially caught the American legal system 
somewhat unprepared.45 Prior to 1986, the US Congress had introduced very little 
legislation on electronic forms of telecommunication.46 In that year, Congress passed 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)47 that made illegal certain types of 
electronic eavesdropping on private communications, such as unauthorized reading of 
private emails as they were stored in transit. The ECPA extended to electronic mail 
most of the protections already granted to conventional mail and encompassed radio 
and data transmissions. Thus began a legislative practice of appending onto extant 
legislation Internet and Web uses. Almost a decade later the US Senate, in turn, 
introduced the Communications Decency Act in February of 1995 to target “obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, or indecent electronic communications”. That aim to protect the 
individual Internet user from online obscenity was later found unconstitutional by the 
US Supreme Court; similarly no was the impact of section 230 of the Act that 
                                                
44 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, VERSION 2.O, 1-8 
(2000) (Code). 
45 This paragraph is informed by The Internet, Encyclopedia.Com, 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/the_Internet.aspx. 
46 See further Gina Marie Stevens & Charles Doyle, Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes 
Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, Report of the Congressional Research Service 
of Congress (3 Dec. 2009), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/98-326.pdf (detailing US 
legislative efforts to keep up with electronic communications innovation since the 1928 
Olmstead wiretapping decision).  
47 Electronic Communications Privacy Act 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701ff [1996] (ECPA). 
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determined operators of Internet services were not to be construed as publishers and 
hence not legally liable for the words of third parties who use their services. That 
exemption would eventually transform into the widest possible exemption from liability 
for Internet Service Providers (ISP)s regarding illegal or socially objectionable material 
it disseminated over the Internet.48  
It is important to point out that Internet regulation addresses two components: 
the content that is transmitted, and the infrastructure on which content is transmitted. 
The above legislation addresses the former and provides the subject of this dissertation 
while a separate and relatively complex system of telecommunications law addresses the 
latter and will not be covered herein. As suggested by one scholar of EU Internet law, 
there is a conceptual difference between the regulatory environment which applies to 
the wires as opposed to that which applies to the content and, although other media, 
such as television or radio, share many features with the Internet, they are “non-
interactive and distributed from the centre to the periphery and therefore subject to 
different principles.”49  
Lawmaking within the EU took a more administratively uniform and less 
derivative route to Internet regulation than that of the US. Rather than applying 
“inherited concepts to the digital world”, EU lawmakers showed recognition of the need 
for “new rules, a new language and a new social context which do not easily lend 
themselves to traditional legal classification.”50  The result of those intentions is a rich 
compendium of directives and national laws that address many aspects of electronic 
communications. That compendium is nonetheless confusing: “instruments are 
numerous, policies difficult to distinguish, court decisions conflicting” and official 
statements contradictory and often incoherent. 51   While the larger political and 
economic framework is focused on a single market phenomenon, harmonization policies 
are pursued within the EU not out of fear that disparity in laws between Member States 
                                                
48 Section 230, discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 infra. 
49 Savin, Internet, supra fn 32 at x. 
50 Id. at viii.  
51 Id. at x. 
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would slow economic development of the whole union but rather to achieve a coherent 
vision to steer policy development.52  
The Internet today is a very different space than that envisioned by its creators 
and scholars – more regulated, more complex, and more integrated into our daily 
interactions. In fact, the Internet has become so crucial to our knowledge-based 
economy that “its preservation and operation is now an issue through which we see our 
political, social and economic freedoms.”53 Dual expectations of unfiltered content and 
security are high: as members of western democratic states, we look to our legal 
systems for unrestricted Internet access and simultaneously for protection of every 
private detail.  
Efforts to produce a single worldwide Internet policy to address those risks have 
not met with resounding success. Internet policy is comprised of myriad political and 
economic interests that respond to local, national and international pressures.54 In the 
real world, it is highly unlikely that Internet activities can be subjected to a single 
policy framework across geopolitical boundaries. The EU has played a crucial part in 
Internet regulation in Member states, however, and maintains a quasi-federal status and 
so could potentially play a unique role if global regulation becomes the model.  
The interests of individual users cannot always compete with those of industry 
or other sectors. That fact is illustrated in the uneven progress of the US Congress and 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to enact laws addressing privacy and 
Do Not Track mechanisms that would unite all states in a uniform, centralized response 
to threats to individual online privacy.55 As well, US federal policies do not flow from 
one source but receive input and pressure, for example, from offline mass media (print 
                                                
52 Savin points out, nonetheless, that the European Commission often cites Article 114 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as legal basis for regulating the Internet 
(ix). 
53 Andrej Savin, How Europe formulates internet policy, 3 INT. POL. REV.  (26 Feb. 2014), 
http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/how-europe-formulates-internet-policy. 
54 For an examination of the pitfalls of modern policy making in the UK, see Michael 
Hallsworth et al., Policy Making In The Real World: Evidence And Analysis, Report of the Institute 
For Government (Apr. 2011) (urging the construction of “a resilient process that can handle 
such challenges and pressures. Such a process would be realistic enough to have a chance of 
being followed in practice. In contrast, the current processes are too brittle – they break rather 
than bend when put to the test.”)  
55 See further Ch. 5 infra. In general, the FCC oversees Internet infrastructure while the FTC 
regulates content. There is some confusion of roles when dealing with net neutrality. 
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or broadcast) as well as utilities (telecoms, radio, cable and satellite). That fact is also in 
evidence within the EU, where “different policy making efforts have taken place at 
different directorates” within each member state.56 While recent harmonization agenda 
in Europe are prioritizing Internet protections and data privacy, such efforts have 
historically proceeded with little coordination. For both the US and Member States of 
the EU, then, while changes to Internet technology and uses are rapid, policy changes 
require political consensus and hence move at a slower and more cautious pace.  
 
1.3            Law’s Purpose in Online Societies 
 
                       Law in the service of Internet activity currently serves many purposes, 
from pre-emptive action (perpetuating the status quo, standardizing industrial practices, 
or protecting cultural norms) to post facto objectives (penal sanctions, remediation, or 
ending high risk practices). The principal new question this dissertation asks is in what 
way can law assist our reputational integrity as individuals regarding online activity. In 
other words, as we enter an era of human-machine interconnectivity, what can law 
contribute to our need for reputational privacy? While not all intrusions of privacy will 
result in harm to our reputations, much of the activities involved in data collection and 
use have to potential to reveal aspects of our private life that could diminish our future 
opportunities if they are revealed. Within that frame, I ask two more specific questions: 
1) in what ways do current legal systems respond to reputational risks; and 2) how can 
we best engage the law and extra-legal mechanisms in maintaining our control over our 
reputational privacy as we enter the era of the Internet of Things? I pursue two lines of 
inquiry in order to establish where this dissertation might make a meaningful 
contribution: 1) I review academic literature that builds a conceptual basis for the 
interlinked notions of reputation, privacy, and memory; and 2) I examine policy 
statements and memoranda, the text of specific laws, government debates, traditional 
and new media accounts and analyses, empirical studies commissioned by governments 
or privately conducted, and case studies (both in law reports and as discussed in new 
media) that reveal doctrinal and legal reasoning as well as judicial decision-making at 
the international, regional, and national levels.  
                                                
56 Id. 
 16 
The key values that comprise the focus of my investigation – reputation, privacy, 
memory – are social constructs, like law, and hence mu and in some state of flux. So, 
too, is the technological infrastructure of new media whose rate of development is 
frequently described as “exponential”. In fact, Internet technology might be 
outstripping its own rules in terms of the pace of innovation and change.57 As much as 
possible, then, I have selected observations and opinions that describe more general 
trends than particular technological advancements. That treatment of the subject 
matter results in coverage that is more inclusive than comprehensive. In other words, 
this research casts its net of inquiry quite wide for contributions and possible influences 
rather than delving more deeply into a smaller range of technologies or opinions.  
 
1.4 Limits to the Study: Of Apples and Oranges 
 
It is important at this juncture to establish what this inquiry is not. Its unit of 
study is the individual: reputations of corporations, institutions, and state and 
government entities are not the primary focus. Their activities are included, however, in 
the context of their impact on an individual’s reputation and primarily through their 
misuse of personally identifiable data. This dissertation also does not deal extensively 
with state surveillance, but only as those activities constitute a backdrop to institutional 
incursions on personal reputational privacy. This dissertation does not provide a 
detailed analysis of the current status of Internet governance, although its infrequent 
consideration is important to an understanding of the complexity of Internet regulation.  
Further, this is not a major comparative study of two legal and political models: 
one American and the other from the EU. While both models involve liberal 
democracies with the largest stakes in the digital economy, and hence represent 
important examples of different cultural approaches to reputation and Internet privacy 
issues, they are not comparable in terms of political structures, constitutional make-up, 
or legal systems. The US is a federal democracy, with power divided between a central 
                                                
57 The reference is to the observation of Intel Corporation co-founder Gordon E. Moore that, 
over the course of development of computer hardware, the number of transistors in a dense 
integrated circuit would double approximately every two years (Moore’s Law). That 
prediction has been interpreted in the non-scientific community as reflecting the general 
progress in capacity of computer technology. See further Gordon E. Moore, Cramming more 
components onto integrated circuits, ELECTRONICS MAGAZINE, 4 (1965).  
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or national government and 50 States in the Union.58 It was established in 1789 as a 
participatory democracy with a common law system and federal constitution. It has a 
bicameral legislature comprised of the House of Representatives (Congress) and the 
Senate.59 A similar system is engaged within each state (Lower House or Chamber and 
State Senate). Each state has its own legal system, judicial system, and case law as 
mandated by the US Constitution. Judicial decisions from the highest court level in each 
state can be appealed to the US Supreme Court; those rulings are binding on lower 
courts regarding federal laws, such as the US Constitution.60  Although laws of 
Congress can be overridden by executive order of the President, they seldom are.61 
Federal laws address trans-state issues within the country such as transportation and 
communications, but states exercise considerable autonomy to implement their own 
laws covering the same subject matter. As will be seen, that extra layer of legislative 
action provides citizens with additional recourse if their first attempt at a federal bill is 
defeated.62  
Politically and constitutionally, the EU is more complex. It was created in the 
aftermath of the Second World War to foster economic cooperation, primarily by 
pooling coal and steel resources, and to reduce political conflict between nations within 
Europe. It evolved from the European Economic Community (EEC) of 1958, with six 
founding member states: Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands. Those states were known as the ‘inner six’ to distinguish them from the 
‘outer seven’ states who formed the European Free Trade Association rather than 
engage in supranational European integration: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The EU emerged from that 
arrangement in 1993 as an organization sharing policy development on a variety of 
issues from justice to the environment. It is now a political and economic union of 28 
countries (excluding Norway and Switzerland) each with its own constitution. It is not a 
                                                
58 There are also five territories and one Federal District (Columbia).  
59 The Legislative Process, United States House of Representatives, 
http://www.house.gov/content/learn/legislative_process/. 
60 For greater clarity, US Supreme Court decisions are binding on federal and state courts, 
only regarding federal laws. 
61 The US President has ten days to sign or veto a bill. See further The Legislative Process, supra 
fn 59. 
62 As will be seen in California’s implementation of Kids Do Not Track laws when similar 
national laws failed to pass in Congress. 
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federation in the strictest sense, but not just a free-trade association either. The EU has 
certain attributes of an independent nation: its own flag, currency for most members, 
and lawmaking structures. It also enjoys diplomatic representation and a common 
foreign policy when dealing with states external to the EU.63 The EU operates through 
a system of supranational institutions and intergovernmental negotiated decisions by 
the Member States. Within the EU, many policies are formulated as directives that 
serve as guidelines for national laws. Regulations, such as the proposed European 
General Data Protection Regulation (EUDR)64 are mandatory in law and are formally 
incorporated into national law in each Member State without the need for debate or 
ratification within those states. 
The EU is based on the rule of law and created by statute.65 It is foremost an 
economic union (hence the ‘euro zone’ of 19 EU member states that have adopted the 
euro (€) as their common currency and sole legal tender). It has created its own Central 
Bank. It harmonizes national laws in areas of business, free trade, and the security of EU 
citizens, but has so far been unsuccessful in harmonizing private laws, particularly in the 
areas of contract, family, and property rights.  Although both European and national 
legislators share the legislative responsibilities, neither of those bodies has final 
responsibility for the whole. There is no superior political authority which has the final 
say on who is responsible for what, that is, no overarching authority over the European 
                                                
63 The World Factbook: European Union, Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html. ‘Associated States’ 
lacking full EU membership include: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Faeroe Islands, Iceland, 
Israel, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Norway, Republic of Moldova, Switzerland, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey. 
64 J. P. Albrecht, Report On The Proposal For A Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The 
Council On The Protection Of Individuals With Regard To The Processing Of Personal Data And On The 
Free Movement Of Such Data. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
%2F%2FEP%2F%2FNONSGML+COMPARL+PE-
501.927+04+DOC+PDF+V0%2F%2FEN . 
65 The Maastricht Treaty (formally the Treaty on European Union) created the European 
Union on Feb. 3 1992; an amended version was signed into effect on 1 Nov. 1993 due to the 
need for a referendum (Denmark) and confidence vote in the UK parliament. The Treaty also 
created a central banking system for EU members, paved the way for the adoption of the Euro 
as the common currency strengthened the EU’s influence regarding foreign policies of its 
members. Euro Zone members include: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. Four countries have formal agreements to use the euro as their 
official currency: Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City. Kosovo and Montenegro 
have adopted the euro unilaterally. There is no statutory exit provision. 
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and national legislators. The European Court of Justice may, however, determine the 
extent of harmonization when determining cases.66 The EU passes regulations that 
substitute European law for some national laws.67 The legal system might be under 
common law or civil law system. If the latter, precedent is not binding but case law is 
taken into account by the courts. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is 
located in Luxembourg and interprets EU treaty law to make sure it is applied in the 
same way in all EU Member States.68 It also settles legal disputes between EU 
governments and EU institutions. Individuals, companies or organizations can bring 
cases before the Court if they feel their rights have been infringed by a EU institution. 
The bench is comprised of one Judge per Member State and eight Advocates-General. 
Two other courts are located in Europe but are not EU courts. The European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) located in Strasbourg, France is an international court 
set up under the Council of Europe that currently has 47 Member States. The Court 
enforces the European Convention on Human Rights. The International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), located in The Hague in the Netherlands, was founded in 1945 by United 
Nations Charter. Its main functions are to settle legal disputes submitted to it by states 
and to provide advisory opinions on legal questions submitted to it by authorized 
international branches, agencies, and the UN General Assembly. Its jurisdiction 
includes questions relating to the UN Charter, the interpretation of international 
treaties, questions of international law, and the nature and extent of compensation in 
the event of a violation of an obligation under international law. Only states can be 
parties in cases before the Court. The US withdrew from compulsory jurisdiction of the 
court in 1986 after the court ruled its covert war against Nicaragua violated 
international law. The US now accepts the court’s jurisdiction only on a case-by-case 
basis.   The ICJ is not a supreme court for appellate decisions from national courts; it 
does not act as a court of last resort for individuals.  Nor is it an appeal court for any 
international tribunal.  The court has no true compulsory jurisdiction, a matter that is 
                                                
66 See further Martijn Hesselink, The Ideal of Codification and the Dynamics of Europeanisation: The 
Dutch Experience, in STEFAN VOGENAUER AND STEPHEN WEATHERILL (eds), THE 
HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE LAWS, BUSINESS AND LEGAL PRACTICE (2006).  
67 The legal system of the European Union, Europedia, 
http://www.europedia.moussis.eu/books/Book_2/2/3/3/index.tkl .  
68 Its court of first instance is the General Court of the European Union. 
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often challenged by respondents. Enforcement is by the UN Security Council but weak 
in that its five members can veto enforcement.  
There are four institutional components to the EU. The Council of the European 
Union (the Council) is called the Council of Ministers and is the central legislative and 
decision-making body in the EU (comprised of one representative at ministerial level 
from each Member State with the authority to commit their government, a composition 
that varies depending on the subject on the agenda). In contrast, the European Council 
consists of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, its President, the 
President of the Commission, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. It has no law-making powers but sets the EU's broad 
priorities through national and EU-level leaders. The European Parliament represents 
all European citizens through elected members. The European Commission addresses 
the interests of the EU as a whole through members appointed by national 
governments.69 Any regulation, such as the EUDR, must have the approval of the 
European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council in order to become 
law. In principle, the Commission proposes new laws, and the Parliament and Council 
decide on their adoption. The Commission and the member countries then implement 
them, and the Commission ensures that the laws are properly applied and implemented. 
  1.5   Methodology 
  
  Through a review of international and domestic70 legislation, jurisprudence, 
and policy initiatives, as well as news accounts, studies, and current legal practices, this 
dissertation explores the extent of control held by the individual over her reputational 
privacy. This is an exploratory study in that it involves a search of an array of sources 
dealing with reputation and Internet activities. It examines two emerging regulatory 
models, the EUDR, and American Do Not Track (DNT) policies to assess the 
improvements and challenges they pose over current legal responses. In order to stay 
current with the pressing issues regarding individual reputation affected by new media, 
I examine unmediated sources such as blogs, videoblogs, and other online peer 
                                                
69 EU Institutions and Other Bodies, Europa.eu, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-
bodies/index_en.htm. 
70 ‘Domestic law’ is used herein to indicate the laws of a country or member state of the EU or, 
in the US context, federal laws in contrast to state laws. 
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contributions by a range of contributors from Internet scholars to professional 
journalists to law firms to private citizens. Secondary sources include books and journal 
articles, case commentary and book reviews, as well as online sources of traditional 
news reportage and opinion, and online dictionaries and encyclopedia. To support 
particular points I employ government, non-governmental (NGO), institutional and 
commercial empirical study results, often in chart and graphic form as primarily 
contained in the Appendices. 
Since case law analysis forms an essential component of this inquiry, I will use 
defamation and privacy cases decided by courts of all levels in EU Member States and 
the US (both state and federal levels). Given the impossibility of covering all cases that 
address harms to reputational privacy within the US and in Member States of the EU, I 
will select where available decisions of the US Supreme Court and the CJEU, the 
highest appellate court for EU member countries.71 I will make my case selection based 
on two methods: an online law report search of cases featuring “defamation”, 
“reputation”, and the “Internet”, followed by a review of high profile cases suggested by 
traditional press and new media. Those cases will, in turn, refer me back to an online 
law report search. That broad base of research method will produce a wider range of 
cases that fit within the research agenda. In analyzing the cases, I will test those 
selected for what they tell us about jurisprudential principles in the digital environment, 
keeping in mind the balance judges must seek between legal tradition that affirms law’s 
legitimacy and the “incrementalism” with which they approach new legal concepts.72 
My analysis will lead to an exploration of emergent legal proposals, such as the EUDR 
and DNT models I choose to analyze with closer scrutiny in Ch 4.73   
I hope to discover information on how Internet companies make decisions on 
takedown requests of subscribers in relation to the guidelines suggested by such 
                                                
71  See further Ch. 5 herein and Court of Justice of the European Union, Europa.Ca, 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm. 
72 “Incrementalism” is used here to indicate the gradual expansion of legal principles from one 
case to the next. It does not suggest the taking of each case solely on its own merits without 
consideration for similar cases that have preceded it. See further Lawrence B. Solum & Minn 
Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, University of San Diego School of 
Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper 55, 34 (June 2003). 
73 Proposal For A Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council On The 
Protection Of Individuals With Regard To The Processing Of Personal Data And On The 
Free Movement Of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation) 2012/0011 (COD) (1 
Jan. 2013) (EUDR). 
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decisions as the CJEU’s influential Google Spain ruling. I also anticipate, from current 
news accounts of European reaction to behavioral advertising and online harassment 
and luring of underage Internet users, a cross-cultural and transnational receptivity to 
the DNT legislative prototype that is attracting considerable institutional attention 
within the EU. Finally, I consider extralegal solutions to reputational privacy issues and 
evaluate whether those remedies can assist us in handling the reputational privacy 
paradox as we enter the Web 3.0 era of interconnectivity.  
 
1.6     Scope and Outline 
 
The subject scope of this dissertation with respect to technology and to legal 
principles and practices is what is extant midway through the second decade of the 21st 
century.  The unit of study is the individual; 74 the “society” I study can be our real time 
community or our online collection of peers, anyone who has significant influence over 
the esteem in which we are held regarding our future opportunities. Similarly, I leave 
open the possibility that we might have many reputations, one for each society within 
which we function. I remain mindful, as privacy scholar Julie Cohen has noted, of the 
socially constructed self “who is the real subject of privacy law- and policy-
making…emerging gradually from a preexisting cultural and relational substrate”.75 
My principal interest is in how our social presentation of self, as negotiated through 
language, dress, and other cultural symbols within our personal control, becomes 
vulnerable to the plasticity and tentative nature of online society.76 I am therefore 
focusing on the individual who is tasked with balancing the new demands of an age of 
technological interoperability with the need for personal control over the delicate 
balance of self-imaging. My inquiry considers to what extent that control is forfeited to 
a global, faceless, unknowable public whose impersonal curiosity and collective 
judgment define our social significance. That question is later reframed within the 
emerging world of “the Internet of Things”, man-machine collaborations where 
integrated form and function complicates presentation of self as never before. When 
                                                
74 For a broadly based introduction to the reputation of nations within international law 
commitments, see George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and 
International Law, 32 J. L. STUDIES, S95 (2002), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302031 
75 Julie Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2 (2013). 
76 See further Ch 2, 2.1. 
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that codependency goes awry, and exposes our more private self to public scrutiny, I 
question whether law can play a useful role in its reordering. I consider that occurrence, 
to some extent, in legal systems in Asia, South America, and Canada but primarily focus 
on the United States and select state members of the European Union.   
This dissertation proceeds in six parts: Chapter 1 provides background on the 
evolution of the computer from a compendium of readable electronic documents (Web 
1.0) to an interactive space of peer-generated contributions (Web 2.0) to a network of 
human-machine interoperable systems (Web 3.0); Chapter 2 reviews the 
interdisciplinary literature that conceptualizes reputation, privacy, and memory, calling 
on contributions from disciplines as diverse as anthropology, urban geography, legal 
informatics, legal theory, computer science, information systems, behavioral 
psychology, and cultural studies; Chapter 3 provides an inventory of technical methods 
and extreme online behavior by which our reputations can be harmed on the Internet 
and the personal and professional cost of such invasive actions. I analyze two cases, the 
Mosley case in Europe and the Martin case within the US, to personalize the ways that 
legal systems respond to disclosures and exposure of personal information. I aim to 
discover any differences in principles and practice shown in the different jurisdictions. I 
also examine procedural considerations in choosing jurisdiction and law systems for 
such cases. Chapter 4 provides a more in-depth and methodical examination of legal 
responses at the international and national level, utilizing private and public law. It 
considers less universally accepted responses, such as criminal defamation and insult 
laws employed in non-democratic regimes, and employs a variety of cases to animate 
particular legal principles or practices and their effect on individual suffering. In that 
chapter I introduce the possibility of a discrete law of digital speech and non-legal 
responses. In Chapter 5 the US Do Not Track model and the European Union Data 
Protection model are analyzed more thoroughly for what they convey about preferred 
policies and cultural-legal norms, focusing on unique mechanisms such as rights of 
erasure and notice-and-choice self regulation. I consider what a new digital law would 
look like in theory and practice, and pose new non-legal responses that are already in 
use in some jurisdictions. In Chapter 6, I consider the emerging era of man-machine 
inter-operability, as currently observable in technologies that are wearable and that 
enhance human biophysical, sensory, and cognitive functioning. I suggest future 
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research that examines computer enhancement as it relates to the societal presentation 
of the individual. I conclude by considering whether the tyranny of the reputational 
paradox needs to continue into a future of digital communications where public and 
private are embedded, inter-operative, and collaborative.  
 
1.7 Importance of the Study 
 
This study is important for the individual because reputation is the grease in the 
wheels of social acceptance and professional opportunity. We also accept its measure as 
our self worth. It is important for our society of peers because, when it is gone, they 
suffer the loss of trust they have invested in us.   While reputation engages considerable 
study within the corporate and international relations fields, individual reputation as it 
relates to law receives less attention from academic thinkers, and individual reputation 
in the digital world even less so. Its study is pursued somewhat obliquely within the 
context of law and technology, defamation law, communications, computer design, and 
privacy. This is not to say there is not a burgeoning academic literature on a wealth of 
imaginable aspects of the digital environment and new technologies, whose 
contributions are most no in their inter-disciplinarity.  
This work differs from preceding academic literature in its combination of topics 
around individual reputation and the Internet. Those topics include: a conceptual study 
of reputation as it relates to memory and privacy; a consideration of new and extra-legal 
mechanisms to address novel forms of speech existing in social media spaces; and the 
contextualization of reputational privacy within the man-machine interconnectivity 
















CHAPTER 2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 2.0 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I review the literature on the conceptualization of three 
interlinked entities: reputation, memory, and privacy. I will integrate into this review a 
brief historical account of the societal values upon which reputation used to be 
measured, first against the overreaching curiosity of one’s community members and 
secondly regarding the non-consensual probing of the state into private affairs in the 
name of security and sovereignty. My review of literature indicates that, while America 
was familiar with the idea from France and Germany that a person had a right of 
personality that the law could legitimate, Americans generally took a more proprietary 
view of one’s name as an intangible but marketable commodity. As a result, the legal 
systems in European states and in America to enable that process were quite different, 
as was the jurisprudence that emerged. As well, the role of the state in recognizing such 
rights was disparate from one side of the Atlantic to the other.  
 
2.1 Theorizing Reputation 
 
 
                Character is much easier kept than recovered.77 
 
      *** 
                     O, I have lost my reputation! I have lost the immortal part of myself                                 
                 and what remains is bestial.78                              
 
                          *** 
                       You are what Google says you are.79  
 
Those who deliberate on the nature of reputation often comment on its 
contingent quality.  For Shakespeare’s Othello, for example, a good name was all that 
stood between our human endeavours and the soulless morass of our baser natures. For 
contemporary author Michael Iapoce, reputation is “character minus what you’ve been 
caught doing,” – or what is left of your good name after society has caught you in all 
                                                
77 THOMAS PAINE, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE, vol. 1 (available 
online from General Books LLC, 1870). 
78 OTHELLO, supra fn 1 at Act II, Scene III, ll 265-7.  
79  Megan Angelo, You Are What Google Says You Are, WIRED (2 Nov. 2009). 
http://www.wired.com/business/2009/02/you-are-what-go/.  
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your indiscretions.80 Recognition of reputation as a social construct dates back at least 
to the early Greek philosopher Socrates who is reputed to have advised, “The way to a 
good reputation is to endeavor to be what you desire to appear.”81 In a similar vein, 
George Washington has been attributed with the advice that it is better to be alone than 
found in bad company. A good reputation, then, can turn bad if secrets of our baser 
natures emerge, our usual discretion fails, our public mask slips, or our companions 
prove unsavory to public opinion. 
Most factors that shape reputations are external to the individual: societal 
perceptions, moral judgments of our peers, and public challenges to our honour and 
dignity. The paradox or “mysterious thing”82 about reputation is that, as a social entity, 
its worth to the holder resides in the estimation of others. It is that external element of 
control that argues against treating reputation as personal property. We possess it, and 
are ultimately responsible for its nature, but its creation and destruction can be 
instigated without our consent or even knowledge. We might spend a lifetime, 
therefore, striving to structure our behaviors according to certain externally determined 
standards, only to have its ultimate shaping change course in an instant, leaving us 
defenceless. Reputation can be a social good in that we emulate those noble attributes 
assigned to us by others; it can also be subject to vicious and annihilating commentary 
that, if untrue, moves us to legal action and other vindications.83 Additionally, the sting 
we suffer is not only a sense of injustice and privacy deprivation but also our painful 
awareness of all we have lost in social or moral status.84 To witness the diminution of our 
                                                
80 MICHAEL IAPOCE, A FUNNY THING HAPPENED ON THE WAY TO THE BOARDROOM: 
USING HUMOR IN BUSINESS SPEAKING, 129 (1988). 
81 EDWARD PARSONS DAY, DAY’S COLLACON: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PROSE 
QUOTATIONS, (1884) as reproduced by Digital Commons, 
http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2009&context=wordways. 
82 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 
CAL. L. REV. 691, 692 (1986). 
83 The preferred legal recourse is an action in defamation, defined by Black’s Law Dictionary 
as “The taking from one’s reputation; the offense of injuring a person’s character, fame, or 
reputation by false and malicious statements.” Criminal libel does not recognize a defence of 
truth and comprises a controversial area of law in various jurisdictions. See infra CH IV 
sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
84 Julian Sanchez, Book Review: The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy Online by D. 
Solove, ARS TECHNICA (6 Oct. 2008), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2008/10/future-of-
reputation/.  
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own esteem in the eyes of our significant peers can provoke the ultimate social 
isolation.85  
Our awareness of our need for a good reputation shapes our presentation of self 
within that society. American social theorists George Herbert Mead and Erving 
Goffman contribute to our understanding of the sociological underpinnings of 
reputation. For Mead, the mind and self emerges out of the social process of significant 
communication.86 A man’s society exists a priori: the man emerges from that society, not 
the other way round. "In that way, the development of the individual's self, and of his 
self-consciousness within the field of his experience" is preeminently social and cannot 
be understood outside of that social context.87 According to Mead, our significant 
communication is achieved through gestures (unconscious communications) and 
language (conscious) wherein we can change the attitudes and positions of another. Our 
role is not passive: we play the game in light of the attitudes of others.88 We maintain 
control to the extent that the indeterminacy of others’ responses “gives the sense of 
freedom, of initiative."89 
To Goffman, our face-to-face interactions are theatrical performances wherein 
we negotiate our control over the impressions others have of us. We accomplish this 
through our choice of setting, appearance, and manners. 90  We live out our more 
personal, idiosyncratic tendencies backstage. On stage, we keep “face”, that is, the 
positive social value we claim for ourselves that shapes our roles during a particular 
                                                
85 As expressed by the wife of disgraced NFL football star Ray Rice upon the release of a video 
revealing he knocked her unconscious: “If your intentions were to hurt us, embarrass us, make 
us feel alone, take all happiness away, you've succeeded on so many levels.” See Wife defends 
disgraced NFL star Rice after brutal video, Yahoo! Sports (9 Sept 2014), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/knockout-victim-wife-defends-rice-firing-214526513--nfl.html 
86 Defined by Mead as the comprehension by the individual of the meaning of her gestures and 
her ability to evoke an appreciation of that meaning in those to whom she speaks.  See further, 
George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) Internet Encyclopedia Of Philosophy, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/mead/ - 5h3a. 
87 GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY, 42, 43 (1934), comprised of 
students’ transcriptions of Mead’s lectures at the University of Chicago). 
88 Id. at 160. Mead identifies our society as comprised of the ‘generalized other’ who assist in 
our self realization by observing our role-playing. They use social control to bring our acts into 
alignment with their societal objectives.  
89 Id. at 177. 
90 Goffman, Presentation, supra fn 8. 
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contact.91 Our dramaturgical decisions comprise our performance that others see, just as 
similar choices by others form their front stage presentation of self. Together, we agree 
on the social limits of our performances and agency, and do our best to avoid 
embarrassment. Goffman’s stigma arises from our inability to meet social standards, 
something outside of each of us. We could say that Mead and Goffman believe we are 
who we think other people think we are.  
As we migrate online, elements from our backstage move to front stage, blurring 
the limits of our public/private selves. In the absence of face-to-face communications 
and immediacy of responses, our sense of social interaction is dulled. For example, in the 
real world a social visit might include the sharing of conversation and a cup of coffee 
simultaneously. It is generally clear that “the 'point' of the interaction is the discussion, 
not the coffee making.”92 Online exchanges lose that element of richness and caring that 
the mundane task of coffee making provides. We need to find other cues or gestures 
(Mead) whereby we give off an impression (Goffman) of our sociality while online.  
Psychology professor Hugh Miller of Nottingham Trent University suggested 
as early as 1995 that there is liberation that comes with online communications, a 
crossing of status lines allowing entry to “power bases” that might not be available to us 
offline.93 Writing in an era that predated social media, he noted that access comes with 
email and the creation of our own web pages, the latter being open for anyone’s 
browsing. Our online interactions, however, might involve more circumspect 
‘backstage’ preparations for self-presentation through our increased access to 
information on our contact person’s institution, department, special knowledge, or 
hobby interests.94 We are also less aware of any rebuffs to our invitations to interact; we 
are also less likely to have anyone correct the gaffes we make in our online 
communications. In that way, Miller notes, “It is easy to make a fool of yourself on the 
Web” but “doing it will cause you little pain” because you are not routinely aware of 
who is accessing your webpage.95   
                                                
91 ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS ON FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR, 5 
(1982). 
92 Hugh Miller, The Presentation of Self in Electronic Life: Goffman on the Internet, Paper for 
Embodied Knowledge And Virtual Space Conference, University of London (June 1995). 
93 Id. Ethan Zuckerman, the creator of Facebook, makes a similar claim. See infra fn 440.  
94 Id. at 1. 
95 Id. at 3. 
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Reputation – good reputation – depends on our compliance with social or moral 
norms that are never static in any complex society. So while legal, religious or social 
institutions are instruments to protect the status quo, the existing order works best for 
the wealthy, Miller’s “power base”, whose values are perpetuated through those 
institutions. As Lawrence Friedman summarizes, “The status quo freezes a certain 
distribution of wealth and influence, of standing, reputation, and social capital.”96 Digital 
communications are liberating us, through the particularities of their architecture, from 
some of those social constraints.  
Daniel Solove of George Washington University Law School has written widely 
on reputation within the legal context. He offers the oft-quoted distinction, “a man’s 
character is what he is, while a man’s reputation is what other people may imagine him to 
be.”97 That assessment has also been attributed to Lord Denning of England’s Court of 
Appeal. It is telling of the present day confusion over what constitutes reputation that, 
in his 2007 text The Future of Reputation, Solove does not offer his own definition.98 The 
author emphasizes that much rests on a good name: one false rumour can prove deadly, 
as seen in the European witch hunts between the 14th and 17th centuries where over 
500,000 people, mostly women, were burned at the stake on the hearsay of their 
neighbours. Our efforts at reputational control are limited, argues Solove, as we are 
jousting with innuendo, “a bundle of half-truths and incomplete tales.”99  
Solove has observed the permanence of access that the Internet lends to personal 
information, transforming it from something “forget and localized within small local 
groups” into details of our private lives that are “becoming widespread, permanent and 
searchable.”100 Historically reputation has been assailable in three principal ways: 
through our own actions or revelations, by surveillance, and by third party disclosure of 
concealed information. Those behaviors persist into the Web environment. In the end, 
                                                
96  LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY, 15 (2007). 
97 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR AND PRIVACY ON 
THE INTERNET, (2007) (FUTURE). The author, in turn, attributes the quotation to Theodore 
Tilton whose wife, Elizabeth Tilton, had a scandalous extramarital affair with the preacher 
Henry Ward Beecher in the 19th century as contained in Richard Wightman Fox, Trials Of 
Intimacy: Love And Loss In The Beecher-Tilton Scandal, 33 (1999). 
98 Solove, id. at 4, 11.  
99 Id. at 189. 
100 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE, 8 (2004).  
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the personal damage is the same: inhibition, further self-censorship, embarrassment, and 
a profound sense of lost self worth. 
In theorizing reputation with a legal lens, we need to consider the nature of the 
interest that we ask the law to protect. 101  The European law on the rights of 
personality provides a conceptual starting point for how the law has dealt with the 
increasing societal pressures to protect one’s good name. Concepts suggested by the 
terms ‘inviolate personality’, the ‘rights of reputation’ and ‘rights to privacy’ all capture 
the idea of individual and societal pressures on the law to recognize such interests as of 
right. In this section Roscoe Pound and Robert Post provide much of the groundwork 
on reputational theory as it began in Europe and influenced privacy law in America. In 
this section, the contributions of Lawrence McNamara and Giovanni Sartor bring a 
historical perspective to how reputation has been treated by law in European nations, 
and Internet scholars Viktor Mayer-Schoenberg and dana boyd analyze how those ideas 
have transformed with the migration online of many social communications. Those 
authors represent an emergent literature on the interconnectedness of Internet 
reputations and changing perceptions of the public/private divide. The ideas of Stijn 
Smet and Laura E. Heymann are introduced for their questioning of that link between 
reputation and privacy, a relationship that the Internet has recalibrated in light of the 
widely expanded online audience to our communications.  
Former Harvard Law Dean Roscoe Pound’s 1915 article Interests of Personality 
can be considered one of the earliest serious investigations of reputation in the 
American legal tradition. 102 It examines not the law itself, but the interests around 
reputation that the law seeks to protect. Pound, like his Harvard contemporaries Louis 
Brandeis and Samuel Warren, looks for inspiration to the principles of law on reputation 
and privacy long developed within the European tradition. He concludes, however, that 
each society translates into law very different interests it considers most worthy of 
protection. 
                                                
101 Black’s Law Dictionary Online (2nd) (defining reputation of a person as “the estimate in 
which he is held by the public in the place in which he is known” as first pronounced in Cooper 
v. Greeley, 1 Denio 347, 358 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1845) or as a “person's credit, honor, character, good 
name.” Reputation is identified as a personal right that can be injured through defamatory and 
malicious words, libels, and malicious indictments or prosecutions.) 
102 Roscoe Pound, Interests Of Personality, (parts 1, 2) 28 HARV. L. REV. 343 (1915).  
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The safeguarding of man from direct or indirect physical injury has historically 
been one of law’s primary interests. In those situations, law is designed to ward off harm 
and to maintain social order.103 Where individual, rather than societal, interest is 
involved, Pound notes that the intangible quality of honour is the primary interest of 
man: the “standing among brave men regardful of their honor” is an interest for law that 
supersedes mere physical integrity.104   Pound suggests individual rights of privacy 
were the first in western history to be recognized by law, primarily through the 
personal interests of the sovereign.105 That concept became somewhat muddled in 
European countries, Pound notes, when the sovereign simultaneously juggled 
individual interests and societal interests as a regime head. Pound reminds us that 
recognition of individual rights, which originated in ius natural or the natural law of 
classical Rome, formed only the first step in protecting a societal interest in security of 
the person. Up to the end of the eighteenth century, the whole course of the law had 
been to disentangle individual interests from group or societal interests and to use the 
law to secure those rights. Pound stresses that a bill of rights formalizes the assertion of 
individual rights against those of the state and defines societal rights. 106 
Natural rights are interests Pound feels the law should protect. But how, he asks, 
do we construct a law that will protect the natural rights of honour or personality? 
Here Pound calls on the German law’s concept of persönlichkeitsrechten that can be 
translated variously as individual rights, rights of personhood, personal freedom, right 
to personal privacy, or personality rights.107 The judiciary in Germany has played a 
prominent or active role in the development of the law of personality. That development 
has been the envy of, and inspiration for, some America legal thinkers. 108  An 
examination of decisions of the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Constitutional 
Court, both of Germany, shows a most critical role in the development of a right of 
                                                
103 Id. at 356. 
104 Id. at 357. 
105 Harvard Law Dean Prosser would later distinguish social interests, public interests and 
individual interests as rights to personality that the law addresses.  
106 Pound, supra fn 102 at 349.  
107 Harry D. Krause, The Right to Privacy in Germany – Pointers for American Legislation? DUKE L. 
J., 481 (1965).   
108 Paul M. Schwartz and Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser's Privacy and the German Right of 
Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept? 98 CAL. L. REV. 1925, 1947 
(2010). 
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personality through their interpretations of the Basic Law109 and the Civil Code. We 
will develop that comparison more fully in Chapter 4 infra.  
The thoughts on personhood and personal dignity as presented by Immanuel 
Kant (1724-1804) have had a key influence on the German, and wider European, 
concept of persönlichkeitsrechten. Briefly, as a disciple of humanism, Kant believed that 
every rational creature exists as a goal onto himself, not as a “means for optional use by 
this or that volition.”110 Kant conceived of what he called a Kingdom of Ends where all 
inhabitants are treated as their own end, rather than as at the whim of other people’s 
expectations or desires. That process is a rational one.  Within the Kingdom of Ends, 
Kant suggested, people could be treated with respect regarding their personhood and 
dignity, and always as an end in themselves.111 
Kant’s conceptualization of personhood or persönlichkeitsrechten found favour with 
Brandeis and Warren in late 19th century America.112 In attempting to find a right, 
beyond a proprietary one, that would forestall publication of personal secrets, the 
authors promoted the principle of an inviolate personality.113 They argued such a right 
already existed in the common law as a right of privacy, “as a part of the more general 
right of immunity of the person – the right to one’s personality.”114 Those ideas found 
renewed favour with legal thinkers in the aftermath of the Second World War in the 
context of the horrors to human dignity perpetrated by Hitler’s regime and the 
holocaust. As stated by German’s Federal Constitutional Court, citizens cannot be made 
the mere object of the state, for “the intrinsic dignity of the person consists in 
recognition of him as an independent personality”.115 
                                                
109 Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB). 
110  IMMANUEL KANT, THE GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, 
(Grundlegung Zur Metaphysik Der Sitten,) (1785) as reproduced and edited by Thomas E. 
Hill, et al.  and translated by Arnulf Sweig (2002).  
111 Id. This paragraph is informed by the Kant text.   
112 Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren, The Right to Private Property, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193.  
113 Id. at 205. “The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal 
productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any form, 
is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality.” 
114 Id. at 207. 
115 Federal Constitutional Court BVerfGE 45, 187, 228, finding unconstitutional a life sentence 
without any chance for parole. See further Schwartz and Peifer, supra fn 108 at 1948-1950 
(proposing that such a concept is more egalitarian than the racially based right of personality 
of the German people or Volk as promoted by the National Socialist Party during the Third 
Reich.) 
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Pound’s Interests of Personality was published during the first World War,  
however, and a right of privacy was not codified in America until 1974. Pound found 
ways to subsume privacy rights in other causes of action. He separated interests in 
honour or personality from what he called interests in substance or property. For 
example, if an author uses real names and actual details about a third person in his work 
of fiction, that third person has two interests: the personality interest in not having his 
intimate life detailed in a work of fiction (related to honour or personality) and the 
proprietary interest in the use of his name (substance or reputation).116  Pound 
recommended the first set of rights be asserted through the emerging law of torts, 
following the recommendation of Warren and Brandeis, in order to protect the privacy 
of man’s inviolate personality, and the latter rights through laws of property.117  
Pound reminds us that American law, unlike European legal tradition, was slow 
to recognize wrongs against one’s sensibilities, what in Roman law was termed 
contumelia or injury to honour through insult. In the very early European tradition,  
  
…the beginnings of [defamation] law measured composition not by the extent 
of injury to the body, but the extent of injury to honor and the extent of desire 
for vengeance thus aroused, since the interest secured is really the social interest 
in preserving the peace. 118 
 
Thus were linked the individual and societal interests in reputation. The law was also 
protective of individuals suffering coercive actions that forced their will. One could be 
coerced, for example, by having his honour tested, in which case he would be forced to 
act out of revenge to recover that honour. The law of equity arose to deal with what the 
Romans called metus or duress on the human will imposed by such coercive action.  
As early as 1826 in England, lawyer and jurist Thomas Starkie challenged the 
idea that law should confine itself to tangible property. He argued that reputation, as an 
object of injury, owes its existence and importance to the various “artificial 
relationships” that are created as society evolves.119 Attacks on reputation could thereby 
create causes of action for injury within the professional sense, what Post identified as 
any endeavor involving talent or industrious will. That theme was repeated in America 
                                                
116 Pound, supra fn 102 at 358. 
117 Id at 344. 
118 Id at 357. 
119 As discussed in Post supra fn 82 at 693. 
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by pastor Joel Hawes in his 1828 address to the young men of Hartford and New Haven. 
He proposed that character is not inherited from parents nor is it a “necessary 
appendage of birth, or wealth, or talents, or station; but the results of one’s own 
endeavors.” 120  Armed with “good principles” as revealed through virtuous and 
honourable action, men’s character can be viewed as a form of capital that builds societal 
worth for garnering “patronage and support”.121  
By Pound’s time in America, the early 20th century, legal recognition of 
intangible harm was not formalized. In order to be recognized in law, such harm had to 
be appended to actions for physical injury. Pound continued to promote reputational 
rights when he spoke of having an interest in preventing “private personal affairs…laid 
bare to the world”.122 For Pound, “a man’s feelings are as much a part of his personality 
as his limbs” 123 and equity law should step in to safeguard feelings, primarily through 
the granting of injunctions.  
Throughout the 20th century, European efforts to protect reputation produced a 
more uniform body of law than in America.124 The persistent influence over the ages of 
the Roman principle of ius natural (natural justice) and laws on (insult) can be seen as an 
enduring theme in the harmonization of laws requisite for the formation of the 
European Union. Today, Europeans continue to look to statute law to protect their 
fundamental privacy interests.125  
 In America, by contrast, the US Constitution does not directly address either 
rights to privacy or reputation, although some state constitutions do. Reputational 
privacy is dealt with through a more sector-by-sector and industry-specific body of 
consumer laws, what co-authors Meg Ambrose and Jef Ausloos have called “situational 
regulations”.126 As a result, reputational privacy is addressed through the tort of 
defamation that deals with untrue statements and the later emerging privacy torts of 
                                                
120 JOEL HAWES, ADDRESS TO THE YOUNG MEN OF HARTFORD AND NEW HAVEN, 
Lecture 4, Formation And Importance Of Character 91 as reproduced by Princeton University 
Library (1828). 
121Id. 
122 Id at 362. 
123 Id at 364. 
124 Schwartz & Peifer, supra fn 108 at 2010.  
125 We will examine those instruments in detail in Ch. 4 infra.  
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false light, public disclosure of private facts, intrusion upon seclusion and 
misappropriation.127  
 Yale Law Dean Robert C. Post recognizes the proprietary aspect of reputation as 
one of three categories addressed by the law of defamation. The other two are 
reputation as honour and as dignity.128 Reputation has rarely been defined at common 
law and Robert Post suggests it resides in the “social apprehension we have of each 
other.”129 Post advises that we can come closer to a definition by examining the nature 
of the injuries that defamation law is meant to redress as well as the nature of the social 
relationship that reputation is meant to uphold.  
Reputation as property encompasses the notion of one’s name as a marketable 
commodity, what Post defines as “intangible property akin to goodwill”.130 Such 
favourable reputation is usually gained through manifestation of particular skills or 
abilities and is developed through one’s efforts and labours.131 The conceptualization of 
reputation as property was first explored at English common law in Gee v. Pritchard, a 
case involving a threat of exposure by a son of his mother’s private letters.132 The case 
stood for the proposition that there was relief in property, but not in equity, for injury 
to personality. The court of Chancery granted the mother an injunction against their 
publication.  
Today, according to Post, reputation as property is based on the belief that 
community members are linked to each other through the workings of the market. The 
market determines the value of each person’s talents or labours. To untruthfully attack 
another’s reputation within that context is to unjustly destroy the marketable worth of 
one’s labour.133 Within that economic construct, Post points out that one can always 
create a new reputation, given that our good name is our own creation in the first place. 
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The making of reputation via the market is open to all; the evaluation of one’s 
reputation on the market determines who shines, whose worth is more or less, and 
whose name is devalued. Compensation is due directly to the person offended, but only 
to the extent that the injury to reputation can be measured by market standards.  
By contrast, reputation as honour captures the idea that our value is determined 
by our personal identification with the normative characteristics of a particular societal 
role. In return, we personally receive from others the regard, status, and estimation that 
society accords to that role.134 We are not all equal under this scheme, unlike in the 
reputation-as-property construct. Our reputation becomes tied to institutional roles 
society assigns to us and is, therefore, not capable of change at our own hands. Our 
value cannot be converted into a medium of exchange. Further, injury to one’s honour 
creates injury to our societal status and thus to our entire social system.135 Post 
analogizes that to challenge one’s honour through accusations is akin to defaming the 
honour of the King that, at early common law, would have been viewed as an attack on 
the entire government and on the relationship the monarch held with his subjects.136 
Just as we cannot create our own societal worth, it is not in our hands to alter it 
singlehandedly. Society has just as significant a stake in keeping our reputation 
unsullied as we do as individuals.137 Post criticizes the judiciary for focusing, not on 
pecuniary compensation, but on restoring our honour through apologies, retractions 
and the publicity generated by the court decisions themselves. Most such activities have 
been redressed in criminal courts “where the truth of the statement is immaterial and 
the plaintiff’s redress is vindication” imposed through incarceration or hefty fines.138 
Reputation as dignity focuses on the relationship between our public and private 
selves, in Post’s view.139 As we connect socially to our communities, we internalize 
those relationships to build our private selves. Public and private dignities are thereby 
intertwined. Under the reputation-as-dignity construct, defamation law is the right tool 
to address reputational damage, unlike in the honour scenarios.  In the face of attacks on 
our dignity, the law of defamation aims to (1) keep our dignity intact to maintain a 
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positive personal identity while (2) protecting society’s communal identity.140 In that 
respect, reputation as honour and reputation as dignity are similar, although the former 
is framed as a social good and focuses on the individual’s contributing role to his society 
while reputation-as-dignity is all about the individual’s inherent membership in the 
community. Dignity in Post’s lexicon is not viewed as an acquisitive concept but 
inherent or  ‘intrinsic in every human being’.141 Compensation for defaming our dignity 
must be of the rehabilitative kind, therefore, of giving back what we have always had. 
That can be achieved legally through a declaratory judgment, to confirm our 
membership within our community.142 
Post also reminds us of the crucial role played by the 1964 US Supreme Court 
judgment in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan as the first to bring defamation within the 
wider framework of the First Amendment right of free speech.143 Defamation litigation 
has been dominated by considerations of basic expressive freedoms ever since.144 
Sullivan had the potential to change the course of defamation law because the trial judge 
instructed the jury that such statements were “libelous per se”, that legal injury could be 
implied without proof of actual damages, and that compensatory damages could be 
awarded because malice was presumed if unsavory statements were found to have been 
published by the defendant relating to a public figure. The US Supreme Court disagreed, 
however, holding that actual malice or knowledge that the statements are false or a 
reckless disregard of the truth, must be proven to establish a case of defamation.  
 According to media rights scholar Lawrence McNamara of Reading University, 
any development of the law of reputation is hampered by a lack of “sufficient attention 
paid to the nature of reputation or to the relationship between reputation and 
defamation.”145 How can the law protect what it has not defined? He focuses not only on 
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the legal tests as a means to that definition but also on the moral challenge such inquiry 
sets. Regarding the former, a defamatory statement was determined at common law to 
be one “calculated to injure the reputation of another by exposing him to hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule.”146 Into the twentieth century, the House of Lords modified the 
severity of that test to a requirement that the plaintiff be lowered “in the estimation of 
right-thinking members of society generally.”147 McNamara would agree with Post that 
reputation is “intimately related to the concept of community” but focuses on the moral 
values by that community.148 He reminds us of the more vernacular tone of the test in 
Australia, that of the “ordinary decent or ‘right-thinking’ folk” who influence our 
reputation depending on whether our statements or image would make them think the 
less of us as a person.149  
McNamara offers the following definition of reputation: a social judgment of the 
person based upon facts that are considered relevant by a community.150 Unlike other 
definitions that he believes focus on either property or personality, McNamara stresses 
four components: judgment indicates a communal evaluation of the person; a focus on 
facts encompasses both implications of something a person has done (such as taking a 
bribe) or a characteristic they possess (such as sexuality); a reputation is social because it 
is a product of association; and those facts must be considered relevant by a community. 
McNamara reminds us that, prior to the age of Enlightenment of the 18th century, 
knowledge about how one ought to live “the good life” was derived from traditional 
institutions, most notably those focusing on religion.151 Moral judgments, and hence 
reputation, were tied into how closely one aligned her daily life and deeds with the 
precepts of the prevailing creed. The Enlightenment moved the fundamental source of 
knowledge about the physical world to reason, with its emphasis on independent and 
critical thought. People began to pursue individual freedoms of thought and action that, 
in turn, reshaped their relationship with their communities. In practical terms, that 
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pursuit led some to found the democratic community of early America, based on the 
pursuit of human liberties and an escape from the older moral and societal tethers of 
traditional Europe. Underscoring that transition was the technological advances that 
re-defined working and socializing on both sides of the Atlantic. Looked at from 
McNamara’s perspective, modernity was “an advance in the project of human 
freedom.”152  
McNamara suggests that moral judgment and the composition of community is 
still crucial to our reputations because morals become visible when norms are contested. 
Employing the example of homosexuality,153 socially transmitted diseases,154 and sexual 
assault,155 he illustrates that values are not uniform from one community to another. 
When comments are made or images created that raise allegations of defamation, a 
court must form a view about who are the decent, right -thinking people who can serve 
as a legal standard in that community. He rejects the older legal tests of defamation that 
measured how a person’s actions caused his community to shun and avoid him, or to 
ridicule him because those tests lack a moral component. The law can therefore only 
protect reputation if it exists in a genuine moral community. The problem with late 
modern life in western societies is that there exist competing moral taxonomies to 
reflect moral diversity. Based on that shift, McNamara approves of the American 
approach that a statement is defamatory if it would tend to prejudice the plaintiff in the 
eyes of a substantial and respectable minority.”156 
McNamara has developed his theories of reputation within the digital age; it is 
significant to the import of his analysis, therefore, that his primary work, Reputation and 
Defamation, published in 2007, makes no direct reference to the Internet community or 
online social networks. He might be making oblique reference to online communities 
when he concludes:   
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…the courts are required to form a sense of how the jurisdiction forms a 
community. This may not be straightforward because contemporary Western 
jurisdictions are not easily seen as sharing a commitment to common values. 
…They are not self-evidently ‘communities’. 157 [emphasis added] 
 
Within the digital communications environment, reputation is integrally linked 
to trust, according to Giovanni Sartor, Professor of Legal Informatics at European 
University Institute. He finds an interesting, nurturing relationship between the two; 
trust is necessary because social rules online are weak, especially between parties who 
are distant in space and culture.158 Sartor defines reputation as “the evaluative opinion 
people have of us, and the social mechanism that produces such an opinion”.159 Due to 
the superficial nature of online conversations, and the fact that contacts are often not 
likely to be repeated, we seek a rational basis for reliance on such contacts. That comes 
from information about the individual counterpart, particularly reference to his or her 
social consideration, that is, to reputation. Reputation emerges from shared beliefs that, 
as McNamara warned above, are increasingly rare in the moral sphere of postmodern 
life. Sartor advises we particularly need to rely on such reputational information as 
specific attitudes and capacities (such as technical competence of a professional) and the 
person’s propensity to act in a certain way, through indications of prior cooperation, 
reciprocity, respect for existing conventions, and of other people’s interests. By relying 
on an individual’s reputation, we gain a cognitive basis for our decisions to trust that 
individual, and we induce that person to behave in a certain way, and to do so 
consistently, so we can rely on his continued participation. 
 Sartor enters the robust debate about online rights of erasure by arguing 
against an absolute right of the data subject to determine which data is made public. If a 
person has an absolute right to self-determination over her data, that could “impair the 
correct formation of reputation” by blocking the circulation of any negative information 
regarding her, thereby making “reliable reputation unavailable”. Those who become 
aware of the filtering of personal details will tend not to develop trust in her as a 
resource of accurate information.  
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Sartor cites US Court of Appeal Justice Richard Posner who views informational 
privacy as an inappropriate subject of legal protection because, by allowing the data 
subject to pick and choose the personal information about her that is released to others, 
it encourages a type of self censoring that projects a false or incomplete reputation and 
hence engenders fraud. That would amount, in Posner’s view, to a right to privacy 
giving legal protection to deception. Further, it would lead to an erosion of trust and 
would assert a paternalistic intervention that threatens the autonomous functioning of 
the markets in a free market system. Sartor agrees: he sees a “double noxious effect” of 
self-censoring: on the one hand it permits a person to manipulate his personal image, 
and on the other it impedes the “autonomous formation of social opinion” that shapes 
reputation. 
Sartor admits that favouring privacy-as-data control protects certain important 
legal values, such as freedom, intimacy and dignity. As well, it ensures the possibility 
that one can change and that keeping certain personal information private can prevent 
discrimination. The latter is particularly important for avoiding stigmatization, a 
shunning that can influence others to discriminate, often based on erroneous 
information. As well, Sartor sees virtue in controlling the revelation of certain data 
about oneself to people who are able to put them into context. On the other hand, too 
much context is the online norm when we just use a cursory search to familiarize 
ourselves with a person and their deeds. With an overabundance of information 
available, what Thierer recognizes as “an increasingly intractable information control 
problem”,160 we tend to settle for just a few search entries that might give an incomplete, 
biased or even false representation. More information might put those impressions in 
context but it might, just as well, confuse or further bias the reader. Without individual 
data control, warns Sartor, the sheer barrage of information overwhelms us or demands 
too much time to sort through, so we revert to accepting the first few ‘facts’ and 
descriptions to come to an assessment of a stranger’s reputation. 
Internet scholar Mayer-Schonberger focuses on the negative effects brought to 
reputation by the heightened visibility of the Internet. “Consider that in the analog age, 
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if one had a dark side, he could hide it”.161 He agrees with author and legal historian 
Lawrence Friedman’s aphorism “if you can’t be good, be careful”162 to point out the 
enhanced transparency offered by the Internet. That has societal benefits for learning 
more about each other and reducing people’s inclination to hide their dark sides. Mayer-
Schonberger proceeds to show, however, that deception and creating a false reputation 
is just as easy online as offline. Although digital memory is static and constant, and so 
perpetuates any errors about our histories, we can easily manipulate our reputation by 
selecting what information about us we post online in the first place.163  We therefore 
retain some control over our public selves, although we lose the power balance when it 
comes to the unilateral data collection by governments and corporations.  
Reputation management has emerged as one solution to that control dilemma.164 
As anyone exposed to digital natives will quickly affirm, “major aspects of their lives – 
social interactions, friendships, civic activities – are mediated by digital technologies.”165 
John Palfrey and Urs Gasser distinguish between a person’s personal identity and social 
identity. Within the life of a 16 year-old girl, her personal identity might be 
controllable, through her self-expression and interests. Her social identity, however, is 
primarily beyond her control. Her social identity is visible to onlookers at any moment 
from associations she makes on Facebook, MySpace and other social networking spaces 
or links in blogs that become links in other people’s blogs. In turn, “the actions of her 
friends, and their shifting reputations, can affect her identity and reputation in ways that 
third parties can observe.”166 
While messaging, posting and other user-generated activities have, to date, 
come with little cost or apparent supervision, Internet scholars complain of one’s loss of 
control of online identity. As social image-making migrates to the Internet, gossip and 
shaming are shifting dimension. Particularly influenced are young Internet users who 
rarely distinguish “the online and offline versions of themselves” when thinking about 
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peer opinion of their identities.167 Coupled with the instantaneous and worldwide 
accessibility offered by digital media, the functional fluidity between real world and 
virtual presentation of self creates new kinds of opportunities for youth to “connect, 
communicate and develop their public identities”.168 Mizuko Ito et al. studied young 
Americans under 25 over a 3-year period to learn how they were integrating new media 
into their everyday agenda and practices, and how that changed their negotiations with 
adults over literacy, learning and authoritative knowledge. 169  They found online 
socializing connected peers through niche interests, but also afforded opportunities to 
publicize themselves through their creative work, hence gaining new forms of visibility 
and reputation.  
Marwick et al., in their literature review of Youth, Privacy, and Reputation, found 
young people were quite sensitized to reputational risks from marketers, online 
predators, identity thieves, and future employers. They seemed less aware that their 
private data could be manipulated or transferred from one source to another. While 
acknowledging that young people go online to seek validation by their peers, they also 
crave new spaces for socialization, exploration and experimentation. Those objectives 
pose high reputational risks. Marwick et al. noted that youth’s perception of online space, 
unlike that of their parents and other adults, is of a private social space; they regard 
Facebook and other net platforms as virtual corners to hang out, engage in personal 
talk and gossip, flirt, share secrets, and conduct all the other social behaviors that they 
engage in offline.  They therefore view any attempts at access or oversight by those 
adults as a clear invasion of their private space. Palfrey and Gasser worry about youth’s 
inability to distinguish between “the online and offline versions of themselves” as they 
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establish and communicate their identities simultaneously in the physical and digital 
worlds.”170 
Social media scholar dana boyd points out that online networking is based on  
the profile system, a use of the individual home page that allows users to create a 
persona they choose to present publicly. Those data include a referential list of friends 
and ample opportunity to comment on others’ profiles, friends, opinions, images and 
other components of reputation building. The significance of those aspects of online 
interaction is that they are very public in nature: “friends are publicly articulated, 
profiles are publicly viewed, and comments are publicly visible.”171 The result is that, in 
all cultures where Internet access is possible, every user has the potential to be a 
celebrity. Consider the few who gained such fame or notoriety in Brandeis’ day: one had 
to be significantly in the public eye through professional achievements, or the 
vicissitudes of fame and notoriety. Only those few were gossiped about in any 
significant public way: today all of us are learning to expect the scrutiny that was once 
reserved for the “famous and infamous”.172 “You have movie-star issues,” commented 
one such social media user, “and you’re just a person.” The sobering cultural impact of 
such unprecedented voyeurism, exhibitionism and inadvertent publicity is that the 
Internet’s constant remembering threatens, “at an almost existential level”, our ability 
to reinvent ourselves and overcome our miscues of the past.173   
Laura E. Heymann notes that beyond plaintiff and defendant, another interested 
party in the matter of reputation is the audience or society whose judgments mold those 
reputations.174 She observes that society holds a responsibility for the stability of 
reputations and for encouraging community cohesion or in curbing the flow of false or 
hyperbolic information. In Heymann’s words, “an audience-focused theory helps explain 
the importance of truth to the construction of reputation.”175 It is socially problematic 
for a society’s members to be generating false information about themselves or other 
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members. Society also plays a role in fine tuning what speech it will tolerate in order 
not to chill democratic participation: mere opinion, satire, and defamatory statements 
about public figures will be tolerated to the extent they are not done with malice or they 
do not incite violence.176   
Finally, the ideas of Stijn Smet regarding the relationship between free speech 
and individual reputation are important for what they reveal about adjudicating 
opposing fundamental rights. Smet gives the example of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) that guarantees both the right of free expression177 and the 
right to protection of one’s reputation.178 That information is important for the clarity it 
can bring to judicial reasoning when both rights are recognized as having value. Smet 
proposes a three-step model: first, determine whether the case presents a “false 
conflict”.179 Such a situation might occur when, for example, one party is under 
procedural pressure that compromises his ability to adequately present his case. The 
necessity to bring an action within a reasonable time might be represent such pressure. 
A judge in that case can show some latitude in the procedural rules, thereby averting a 
false conflict. Secondly, determine whether a compromise is available that will keep both 
rights intact as much as possible.180 If no compromise exists, a judge must compare the 
rights according to the following criteria: 1) which right, if denied, would create the 
most serious impact; 2) does the infringement affect a core or periphery aspect of the 
right; 3) are there additional rights in the balance for either party; 4) does either right 
involve a general interest shared by other members of society; 5) is either right to be 
exercised in a manner that is contrary to the very aim it is designed to achieve; and 6) 
are both rights being exercised responsibly.181 Those concepts illuminate the values a 
court would assign to reputation and free expression when faced with their conflict. 
 
 
                                                
176 A testing of those limits could be observed in the January 2015 murders of journalists at the 
Paris satire magazine Charlie Hebdo. 
177 Article 10, para 1.  
178 Id. at para 2. 
179 Stijn Smet, Freedom of Expression and the Right to Reputation: Human Rights in Conflict, 26 AM. 
U. INT’L REV., 183, 184 (2010). 
180 The German Constitutional Court recognizes that doctrine as the Praktische Konkordanz, id at 
189.  
181 Smet, supra fn 179 at 191. 
 46 
 2.2 Theorizing Memory 
 
Has it ever struck you, Connie, that life is all memory, except for the one      
present moment that goes by you so quick you hardly catch it going?182  
 
                                             *** 
  The beauty of the human mind and human forgetting is that, as we forget,            
  we’re able to generalize, to abstract, to see the forest rather than the individual     
  tree.183 
 
                In this section we call on various theorists of memory, from both the 
individual and collective perspective, to build an appreciation of the new face of memory 
in the digital terrain.  First, we consider the creative process involved in memory as set 
out by British psychologist Reginald Bartlett in the early 20th century and how that 
process reaches dramatic results in the 21st century with the activities that produce 
false memory. Next, legal historian Inga Markovits develops a theory that our 
memories, particularly as they recreate prominent people and events, are shaped and 
manipulated by the powerful and political. Gary Fine, as behavioral scientist, illustrates 
how moral entrepreneurs can manufacture disparate reputational fates for two historical 
figures who, by all accounts, are very similar in make-up, experience and abilities. 
Jonathan Zittrain shows how video images can distort memory and perpetuate 
embarrassing or false stories that are best left unexposed. The work of Liam Bannon 
discusses how both memory and forgetting are necessary to avoid the banality 
introduced into our lives by man-machine interactivities. Perfect remembering is a 
concept addressed by Internet scholar Viktor Mayer-Schonberger who emphasizes the 
tasks required of online functioning that call on a healthy dose of daily forgetting. For 
Canadian scholar Patrick Macklem, law is memory, as exemplified by the struggles of 
the Brok family to gain restitution for property they owned in pre-war Prague.  What 
these various accounts tell us is that the way we remember might be as significant to 
reputation as what we remember.  
Liam Bannon admonishes us as individual Internet users for not fully 
appreciating the beneficial necessity of forgetting. His studies focus on social and 
cultural nuances that could keep our highly technologically-infused lives in the future 
from a banal and barren pre-occupation with machines. Bannon suggests that we can 
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fight such banality by grasping “the duality of human memory,” the equal importance of 
forgetting and remembering.184 As a balance to the information processing skills that 
we have all been taught since the arrival of the computer, Bannon sees a dire need for a 
“judicious forgetting” that can ease our immersion into a future world where human 
intervention in the interconnectivity of machines will be negotiated on a daily basis.185  
Bannon frames his considerations of forgetting as a positive feature of present 
and future life, not a default mechanism within the emerging technologies of ambient 
intelligence and ubiquitous computing. The latter advances in communications 
technology have the potential to enable most of our future functioning in society via 
machines talking to machines, ideally in our service but without much human 
intervention.  That development, argues Bannon, has us thinking that forgetting is a 
passive activity, something that occurs when there is a default in our abilities to amass 
and remember unquantifiable amounts of information. Forgetting, Bannon argues, is an 
active pursuit, not a mechanical erasure or failure to retrieve.186 He presents, as support, 
the commentary of early 20th century British psychologist Sir Frederick Bartlett on the 
less-than-perfect virtues of human remembering: 
Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and 
fragmentary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or construction,  
built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of  
organized past reactions or experience, and to a little outstanding detail which 
commonly appears in image or in language form. It is thus hardly ever really 
exact, even in the most rudimentary form of rote recapitulation, and it is not at 
all important that it should be so. 187 
 
Bartlett’s thesis is that not only is human remembering imperfect but it is not a 
full-package experience stored in the brain. It is comprised of various images that are 
constructed in the moment. Remembering is a creative act, seldom a “fixed, lifeless” 
copy of the original experience as was earlier thought. 
 Bannon concludes that forgetting is good for human well-being as it overcomes 
the stultifying and paralytic effects of amassing so much accurately retained data. He 
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recommends several technical solutions that will help Internet users to forget: marking 
private emails and messages so that permission is required before anyone can pass them 
on; constructing digital shelters within our community where electronic signals are 
blocked within the shelter and people can gain some reprieve from always being 
plugged in;188 creating personal sweeper technologies that would hinder the pickup of 
meaningful signals from particular sites, akin to military jamming technologies; and 
electronic tagging of information with ‘sell-by’ dates, after which the information would 
self-destruct. Bannon is most insistent that, whatever our choice of technology to take 
us away from total remembering, our ability to live in the moment indicates our comfort 
with submitting to temporary oblivion which he holds as having positive benefits to our 
social and economic lives.  
 Peter Fleischer, Chief Privacy officer for Google, suggests that seeking a clean 
digital slate marks an attempt to let people “wash away digital muck”, or to “delete the 
embarrassing stuff”.189 He plays down claims to a right to oblivion as a mere fashion, 
what he calls the “new black of censorship fashion”. From his corporate perspective, 
Fleischer sees privacy being used as a screen to justify online censorship or, in the case 
of journalists and the First Amendment right, what used to be achieved by crying libel 
or defamation.  He warns that recognition of the right to censor opens up the floodgates 
to Internet regulation, a possibility that the public have, to this point, ardently rejected 
as repressing free speech. 
False remembering is another facet of memory that draws suspicion and distrust, 
and can be catastrophic for reputations. In the alternative, it can be met with 
understanding or a willingness to explore further the processes of memory.190 Similar 
experiences of two American public figures make the case. NBC Nightly News anchor 
Brian Williams “misremembered” actual events when he reported being on a Chinook 
helicopter in Iraq in 2003 that was forced to land under enemy fire. Further 
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investigation in 2015 reveals Williams was on another helicopter that arrived one hour 
after the event.191  Similar claims of having a different memory than the official story 
were made by then-US First Lady Hillary Clinton in 2007. She stated she had been the 
victim of sniper fire while disembarking from a plane in Bosnia; videos of the event 
show no such disturbance.192 When faced with widespread journalistic accusations of 
filing a false report 193  or “concocting war stories” 194  (in Williams’ case) or of 
“mischaracterizing” or “overstating” her foreign political experiences (in 
Clinton’s),195both public figures admitted to telling and retelling the story over the 
years to the point of believing their false accounts.  
Similar observations were made of President Ronald Reagan who, according to 
biographers, gave others the impression that he had been at Normandy and at the 
liberation of the Nazi death camps when he had, in fact, spent the war making movies in 
Hollywood. Reagan reportedly later told an associate, "Maybe I had seen too many war 
movies, the heroics of which I sometimes confused with real life."196 While Brian 
William’s employers speak of his “inexcusable” behavior and distance themselves from 
his story by placing him under a period of suspension, Williams speaks of the incident as 
where “we were all I think - scared…and it all became a fog of getting down on the 
ground.” Regarding his false story, he stated, “I don’t know what screwed up in my 
mind that caused me to conflate one aircraft from the other [sic]”197 
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  Clinton defends her recreated memory of the Bosnia event by stating she was 
merely mistaken and subject to human error.198 Both explanations, if true, support 
Frederick Bartlett’s assertion that memories are dynamic and mu reconstructions of 
disruptive events, not static copies of their elements. Proof is elusive, however, as 
memories can only be communicated through the holder’s recall, a process that is little 
understood by medical science. Cognitive psychologist Christopher Chabris of Union 
University in New York explains how memory distortion occurs: “each time you are 
telling a story you are not pushing play on a cd player but reconstructing the event” and 
the “information is assembled from different sources. You insert that into your story.”199 
So you lose the ability to tell which part is false.  The lesson overall is that memory is 
less reliable than we think.  
Julia Shaw, professor of forensics at the UK University of Bedfordshire agrees 
that memory is constructive and might not signify an attempt to deceive or behave in a 
way that is less trustworthy. 200 Shaw and Stephen Porter of the University of British 
Columbia have implanted complex false memories of committing crimes into subjects 
through guided imagery. In a recent experiment, they determined that of 30 
participants who were falsely told they had committed a crime as a teenager 21 (71%) 
were classified as having developed a false memory of the crime. 
  False memory research has contributed in some respects to our understanding 
of our memory recreation processes. We are learning, for example that memory is 
greatly affected by the choice of wording used by another when he questions our version 
of events,201 and that false conclusions can be convincingly implanted for an event that 
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never happened.202 The implications of such massaging of memories are profound for 
our reputations and careers. Further research might help ease public suspicions of 
memory that is inconsistent with the original event, such as learning that a good mood 
is more likely to colour memory than sadness,203 or that false memory can be triggered 
by sleep deprivation.204 For now, our understanding as a western society of the psycho-
chemistry of memory, like the sociality of reputation, is disappointingly rudimentary. 
Mayer-Schönberger posits that the difference between how humans remember 
and how the Internet remembers is deep and fundamental: humans forget, or remember 
selectively, while the Internet remembers everything in perpetuity.205 He points to time 
and money as the factors that, in the pre-digital age, discouraged the storage of large 
masses of information. With the arrival of digital acquisition and cloud computing, 
storage of limitless amounts of data is possible. In the pre-digital era, storage of analog 
information meant costly physical space, and costly retrieval. All of those objections 
have been met by digital technology that compresses data infinitesimally, and makes 
accessing that information far easier.  
Mayer-Schönberger comments on the sheer bilge of online data that has 
accumulated as a result: “now we are steeped, not just in knowledge, but in memory”.206 
That development comes with problems of its own; primarily the difficulty of achieving 
any systematic, depersonalized retrieval or analysis of such Big Data. Mayer-
Schönberger highlights what we have lost in the progression to digital memory. Human 
forgetting, he reminds us, both on the individual and societal level, allowed us to act and 
think in the present rather than being tethered to an ever-more-comprehensive past.  
For legal historian Inga Markovits, we can have private memories and public 
memories. The law plays an important role in how we remember. It shapes our 
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recollections of the past to fit those who dominate the present.207 She points out that, as 
individuals, we have no control over our memories. “We forget what we would like to 
remember, remember what we would like to forget”, have memories triggered by what 
we smell and taste, and must accept that “events become important because we 
remember them”.208 For private, individual memory the past rules the present. With 
Markovits’ public memory, however, the converse rules: the present rules the past. 
Powerful public figures in each era determine which names and events survive as 
worthy of remembrance. She gives the example of public monuments, which are chosen 
by the political elite and strategically placed to perpetuate the public memory of a 
particular individual and his/her particular deeds. No society prefers to memorialize its 
bad deeds (slavery in the US) or people (holocaust perpetrators in Germany). Those acts 
are excised as mistakes of history. In that respect, public memory legitimates selective 
past acts and personalities.209     
Law seems a likely candidate to assist with memory, argues Markovits. It has a 
lot to do with legitimacy and it proto-typifies model citizens, such as the ‘prudent’ or 
‘reasonable’ man and the ‘reckless’ driver. Informed by our likes, dislikes, moral wishes 
and concepts of the norm, the law validates those past events of which we approve, and 
punishes those we do not. Law, therefore, has developed rules on how to investigate the 
past by discriminating what is legally ‘reliable’ from what is not.210 Law accomplishes 
that objective by setting requirements for standards of proof, burdens of proof, fictional 
ideals such as the ‘reasonable man’ or ‘right thinking person’, theories of the case and 
stringent legal tests. Law has highly influential filtering powers when it comes to 
memory. As such, it is an important medium for defining our past.  
Markovits suggests that East Germany’s role in the holocaust is an apt example 
of how collective memory can reshape history and dictate how we remember and forget. 
There has been much recent talk in Germany about the Aufarbeitung, or ‘working over’ 
of past events of the Nazi regime. That word has become synonymous in modern 
Germany with coming to terms with the past, or rethinking events that portray 
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Germans in a negative light. Such an act calls on selective forgetting and remembering 
that remakes the German national character like making old garments into new.211 In 
other words, the past that Germany is trying to come to terms with has already been 
preemptively construed by those in positions of influence.  
Jonathan Zittrain notes, like Markovits, that it is the higher rung on the socio-
political ladder that most influences what is retained and ‘remembered’ on the 
Internet.212 He asks, what about historical events that, in retrospect, turn out to be 
untrue; when an Internet user logs on twenty years after the posting of the inaccuracy 
and there is no overriding notice that the account is in error? It is presented as if it just 
occurred, and in a false light or with factual inaccuracies. The erroneous event has been 
archived online in perpetuity, without any reference to its inaccuracy or 
misrepresentation.  
Zittrain gives as example a series of YouTube video stills portraying a bombing 
in the Middle East that were photo-shopped to deceive the viewer; many years later 
they persist online with no corrections or other indication that the representations are 
inaccurate. The video stills show a rescuer, in a baseball cap, pulling the injured victims 
of a bombing out of a rubble site. A second video still shows the same rescuer, himself 
now a fatality, being lifted out of a similar pile of rubble. Through close examination, 
Zittrain determines that the latter video was taken before the first still. In other words, 
the photo of his removal from the rubble has been altered by photo finishing software; it 
is a false portrayal of what happened. One detail that gives the duplicity away is that the 
baseball cap, in the photo of the rescuer as a dead victim, is under the man’s arm and 
quite obviously tightly pressed to his side. That erroneous series was posted and 
distributed by Reuters, a reputable news service. Zittrain shows how, shortly after the 
posting on YouTube, the fake series of images were removed from view, but are still 
present in the online video archives and thereby, with a little work for the viewer, 
accessible to the public. Zittrain concludes that, if it is privacy or accuracy we seek, the 
Internet is not the place to find it. Even so, the offending or erroneous images persist 
online into the future.  
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Northeastern University behavioral scientist Gary Fine speaks of “reputational 
entrepreneurs”, that powerful elite that are able to control public memory of historical 
figures using their narrative facility and institutional placement.213 Fine compares 
Warren Harding and John F. Kennedy, both American presidents: the former was rated 
the lowest in the estimation of historians and the public for his presidential abilities, the 
latter rated near the top. Political opponents and the press set that agenda, Fine insists, 
while neither colleagues nor public have risen to defend Harding.  Both men were 
outgoing, personally charming, popular in their roles as US Senators prior to their 
terms as president, accused of sexual improprieties while in the White House, and 
viewed as too close to their Attorneys General who were therefore considered political 
liabilities. Both died during the third year of their presidencies. History judges Kennedy 
as one of the best presidents in terms of civil rights record and overall popularity, 
although Harding was equally so viewed during his tenure. In hindsight, however, 
Harding is maligned as a failed president, the worst chief executive in US history.214 
Fine reminds us of Durkheim’s principle at work here: that images of a highly 
successful or a deeply flawed leader rallies social cohesion and communal solidarity. The 
nature of that image is shaped by what Fine terms “reputational politics”. Reputations 
are grounded in a social construction of character, subsequently generalized to policy 
and thence to the character of the society itself.215 What politicians, competitors and 
journalists determine to be the prevailing reputation of a public figure is generally the 
persona adopted by historians and therefore by the public for succeeding generations. 
Such manipulation constitutes collective memory.  
Fine also speaks of moral entrepreneurs, those arbiters of social mores that 
determine whether a historical figure has promoted or defiled the values that their 
community holds dear. Over time, the evaluation of the moral worth of our leaders rests 
less on their individual attributes or triumphs and more on the causes of their successes 
or failures. To be recognized as a failure suggests the absence of supporters who would 
propose a historical justification for a positive reputation. “[T]hus the figure is an 
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‘orphan’, scorned by rivals and neglected by ostensible allies”. 216  The prevailing 
impression of Harding was that he was an unintelligent man, too trusting of his cronies, 
a passive leader, indifferent to corruption, and passive in execution of his duties when 
the nation needed active leadership during the post World War I period. That 
perception is achieved by attacking Harding’s agenda through his character, and by 
controlling memories of Harding through those in command of public, collective 
memory. 
For Patrick Macklem of the University of Toronto, law is memory. He has 
studied the struggles of the Brok family to gain restitution for property they owned in 
the old city of Prague, Czechoslovakia prior to the communist takeover during the 
1930s.217 The Broks owned the building and operated a textile business out of the 
ground floor. They lived in a spacious apartment within the building and rented out the 
remaining apartments to employees. As the Nazis began their ‘reconfiguration of 
Europe’ in the 1930s, they confiscated the Brok property at Rybna 9 and transferred 
title to a Slovakian company. The Broks emigrated to Canada, except for one son who 
remained in the building as a tenant. After the war, Rybna 9 was treated as state 
property by the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and, in 1990, sold as part of the post-
communist, liberal democratic reforms, to an offshore holding company. One of those 
reforms included an initiative to return property, taken by the Nazi and Communist 
regimes, to their original owners.218  
In contemporary Europe, post war restitution claims can be brought either 
before the ECtHR or the United Nations Human Rights Committee (‘the Committee’). 
The Brok family took the Czech government to court and their case was eventually 
settled by the Committee in their favour under the guarantees of equality enshrined in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Macklem’s conclusion after 
reviewing several restitution cases that have been decided by either fora is that the 
ECtHR approaches its cases with “a modernist impulse to repudiate history” because it 
refuses to entertain any equality claim under the European Convention on Human 
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Rights (ECHR) regarding restitution rights in post-Communist Europe. The 
Committee, however, is willing to “remember certain pasts as a matter of equality”.219 
Macklem observes through the Brok case that international human rights law is 
beginning to “construct legal spaces for the expression of collective memory”.220 Law 
has the capacity to memorialize shared memories, a role that takes on particular 
significance when a minority community is under pressure to put aside the social, 
political and economic pressures of its shared past. In that sense law is “dialogical, 
exercising an active and ongoing engagement with the past”. That role can justify 
minority rights and prompt the larger community to respect a minority’s collective past 
and present identity.221 
In contrast, the ECtHR guarantees non-discriminatory enjoyment of rights and 
freedoms as enshrined in Article 14 of the ECHR. The Court has long taken the narrow 
view that, in order for judicial recognition as an equality right, claims must address only 
those rights contained within the four corners of the Convention. By denying restitution 
claims for the confiscation of property by the Nazi regime, the ECtHR has shown “a 
modern impulse to repudiate Europe’s burden of the past”222 and a willingness to forget. 
Macklem points out the danger in such forgetfulness: that the burden of Europe will 
become heavier as it becomes “cloaked in darkness”, to the point where Europeans 
might forget who they are. 
In summary, the foregoing academic sources illustrate the intricate correlation 
between the concepts of reputation and memory, whether within the context of a 
community’s opinions that shape our individual good name or the societal and political 
pressures to either remember or forget our collective pasts in order to address the 
stigma created by a dark history. The significance of that symbiotic exchange is that 
memory can be determinative of reputation, whether of an individual or a collective. If 
those memories are complimentary, we tend to favour perpetuating them; if 
unfavourable, we might seek forgetfulness or the right of erasure. In the next section, 
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we explore literature that defines the role of law in protecting our privacy interest by 
choosing those to whom we would reveal our personal identities and memories. We 
begin with the efforts of Harvard law alumni Brandeis and Warren to import into 
America the European right of privacy, with significant implications that endure into 
the digital age.    
 
2.3 Theorizing Privacy 
 
 
      Now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life, 
   - the right to be left alone.223 
 
              *** 
 
        Privacy is shorthand for breathing room to engage in the processes  
                  of boundary management that enable and constitute self-development.  
                                So understood, privacy is fundamentally dynamic.224 
 
There is a considerable lack of clarity within American legal and philosophical 
discourse regarding how to define privacy. American jurist Richard Posner noted in 
1977 that the concept is “elusive and ill-defined”.225 Academics continue to disagree over 
whether privacy is an instrumental term designed to protect core values or whether 
there is something intrinsic in the concept itself that needs to be respected.226  To add to 
the confusion, privacy as an academic consideration is often included under the rubric of 
security, justice, liberty, or human rights.  
The disparity in perceptions of the place of privacy in our lives is further 
revealed by juxtaposing the above quotations, the first made in fin de siècle America by 
Harvard law colleagues Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren, showing hopeful 
determination that one can reap the full enjoyment of life by closing one’s doors to 
prying intrusions of press and government. The second quotation reveals the post-
modern angst and nihilistic realism around the subject of privacy as provoked by our 
entry into the digital age. Julie Cohen, in the third excerpt, is more hopeful as she 
present privacy as a subjective entity we can manage and mold. In the simpler world of 
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Brandeis and Warren, there is a clear public/private divide; in the 21st century view 
that divide has collapsed or been eroded by technological gains in online 
communications. Cohen speaks for the more cosmopolitan view227 that privacy is ours to 
define but also to safeguard. 
This section will examine that development, commencing with the seminal  
contributions of Brandeis and Warren, of privacy as a legal right in America. We will 
then move to Harvard Law Dean William Prosser in codifying those principles into tort 
law. Prosser’s formulation will then be compared to the European, more unified 
approach as exemplified in the German concept of personality rights. James Q. 
Whitman will explain that comparison as the difference between a European respect for 
personal dignity and the American safeguarding of personal liberty. Daniel Solove and 
Lawrence Friedman comment on observable transitions between the analog and digital 
worlds and the privacy challenges they pose. Helen Nissenbaum worries that the digital 
world has erased context, a factor also incorporated into Jeffery Rosen’s discussion 
about how one must jeopardize more of one’s privacy by revealing sufficient information 
to contextualize inaccuracies that affront reputation. Dana boyd reveals a personal 
digital experiment with her DNA that unwittingly exposes her extended family, 
including the unborn, to unnecessary reputational invasion. She asks whether privacy is 
an outdated concept that has no currency in an age of dystopian excess. Canadian 
surveillance scholar David Lyon picks up that query and toys with the concept of 
turning the state’s probing eye back on itself. He warns that surveillance is no longer 
perceived as the horror we previously envisioned: for willing purveyors of others’ 
secrets, it is at worst an annoyance that has to be negotiated.  
Any thorough conceptualization of privacy as a fundamental right within the 
American tradition begins with two seminal articles: the first by American jurist Louis 
Brandeis and journalist Samuel Warren, who urged in 1890 that privacy be cherished as 
an individual civil right and its breach be a recognizable cause of action through US tort 
law; and a comparative piece in 2004 by James Q. Whitman of Yale University whose 
thesis is that cultural differences account for widely divergent views of privacy on each 
side of the Atlantic. While American’s perception of the privacy right was founded on a 
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culture of liberty, privacy advocates in Europe focus on the right to retain one’s 
dignity.228 In Whitman’s words: 
What is at stake are two different core sets of values: On the one hand, a 
European interest in personal dignity, threatened primarily by the mass 
media; on the other hand, an American interest in liberty, threatened 
primarily by government.229 
 
Those cultural distinctions define two very different expectations of privacy. 
Brandeis and Warren remind us that the framers of the US Constitution introduced the 
Fourth Amendment to protect individuals from unreasonable searches and the 
unwarranted intrusion of the state into citizens’ property and private effects.230 To the 
early framers of the constitution, such protection provided liberty. Those rights could 
not be infringed by the state without a judicial warrant and probable cause, a 
constitutional reminder that governors served at the will of the people. The roots of 
privacy needs in colonial America began with conceptualizing the family home as “a 
heaven for solitude and intimacy”, a barrier against the intrusion of unwanted outsiders, 
including the state.231  
In the early days of the American republic, expectations of privacy outside the 
home were not high. With the mails as the primary communication method in the new 
colony, citizens had dim hopes that their mail would arrive unopened. As first colonial 
postmaster, Benjamin Franklin insisted on mail carriers swearing on oath not to open 
the mails.232 Franklin’s replacement, however, in the face of the rising revolutionary tide 
of 1776, warned that all mails were subject to inspection by ministerial mandate if 
treason was suspected. Hence a system of Warrants of Assistance was implemented that 
gave the young government wide powers of search and seizure. It was those excesses 
that gave rise to the constitutional entrenchment of the Fourth Amendment and the 
impetus for defining a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ for the private citizen. 
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Through common law challenges, the public/private line has progressively blurred over 
the intervening years to the point that, with the 21st century invention of wearable 
technologies such as Google Glass, we can spy on each other with immunity, adopting 
“participatory surveillance” that could render moot any privacy questions we might 
have.233 
Free speech, as protected by the First Amendment, provides the most formidable 
challenge to privacy rights in America. Its development over the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries has occurred primarily through the common law. Laws have lagged 
behind the development of institutional ways to access our private affairs, to the point 
where technological advancement leaves our expectations acutely compromised, most 
prominently by government and commercial institutions. That right is expanded by the 
interpretation by American courts of the First Amendment as extending to 
entrepreneurial rights as commercial free speech.    
Another impediment to recognition of a right to privacy in American law was 
the fact that privacy is an intangible, inchoate privilege, without physical attributes like 
property, what Brandeis and Warren called the “products and processes of the mind”.234 
The authors spoke of a growing desire for “the right to be left alone” from the prying 
lens of photography and reportage of the news media. They had a particular aversion to 
misuse of the photographic image; they were well aware of the ability of such images in 
the wrong hands to foment gossip and defamatory statements.   They justified their 
increased need for solitude by reference to “the intensity and complexity of life, 
attendant upon an advancing civilization”.235 
Brandeis and Warren proceed to establish that the law of defamation, focused as 
it is on a person’s interrelations with his community, proves an effective legal 
instrument to address injuries to reputation as a property claim, but insufficient to 
shield a person whose feelings for privacy have been offended and who therefore seeks 
to be left alone.236 They maintain that the common law protects a person’s right to 
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determine when or if they wish to communicate their private thoughts and to whom.237 
They insist such rights are distinct from copyright law and property law and allow for a 
person to refuse publication or publicity and enjoy the “peace of mind or the relief 
afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at all”.238 Brandeis and Warren call 
that allowance the right of “inviolate personality” and equate it to the “right to the 
immunity of the person” or the German-based “right to personality”.239  
Brandeis and Warren’s article is generally regarded as the impetus behind the 
creation of the four privacy torts as set out in Dean Prosser’s Restatement of Tort.240 
They envisioned tort law as the appropriate mechanism for asserting those rights 
because the victim in a tort action could gain some satisfaction with remedies like 
injunctions or monetary compensation through damage awards, unless the matter was 
found to be so trivial that the court showed a preference for honouring free speech. 
The interesting subtext of the article is that a seminal right to be forgotten is 
being recognized and encouraged by an American jurist and a journalist as early as 
1890, even if couched in the proprietary aphorism that a man’s home is his castle, a place 
of respite from the public eye of the state and the media. To this day, the heart of 
American privacy rights resides in protecting the sanctity of the home.   
By the 1960s, Prosser had organized over 300 tort law decisions into four 
discrete causes of action for breach of privacy, built upon the work of Brandeis and 
Warren:  1) intrusion upon seclusion, 2) appropriation of the name or likeness of 
another, 3) public disclosure of private facts “not of legitimate concern to the public”, 
and 4) disclosure of private facts that portray the victim in a false light.241 Prosser 
concluded that privacy law in America was best founded upon:  
...four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which 
are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in 
common except that each represents an interference with the right of the 
plaintiff…"to be let alone."242 
That observation determined that the course of privacy law would be through four 
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disparate actions under tort law, not tightly bound to each other through any single 
concept.  
In commenting on Prosser’s achievement in clarifying privacy law, author 
Samuel J. Hofstadter noted that, “the doctrine has had a checkered career”.243 Prior to 
Prosser’s text, states differed not only in their view of the scope of the right of privacy 
but even with respect to its existence. Prosser's classification proved “extraordinarily 
persuasive for wavering state courts and legislatures”.244   
Daniel Solove has been considered the modem heir to Prosser’s 
deliberations.245In Understanding Privacy,246 he conceives of information privacy, a 
broader field than tort privacy, in terms similar to Prosser’s approach but incorporating  
“a plurality of different things” as inspired by interactions on the Internet and social 
media. 247 Unlike Prosser, who imposed a pre-conceived framework of privacy principles 
on different fact situations, Solove starts from the ground up, identifying the range of 
harmful actions perpetuated online and arranging them into a taxonomy comprising 
four privacy concepts:  (1) information collection; (2) information processing; (3) 
information dissemination; and (4) invasion. Each of those groups leads in turn to 
“different related subgroups of harmful activities.”248 For example, subcategories of 
harm relating to information collection are (1) surveillance, and (2) interrogation.  
Solove holds the belief, shared with Prosser, that privacy law concerns a range of 
interests to be protected, only some of which overlap and only in certain ways.249  
With the assistance of Brandeis and Warren’s historical perspective, the first 
tort above, intrusion upon seclusion, tells of a right to be free from unreasonable search 
and seizure (as encoded in the Fourth Amendment); the second tort, the appropriation 
of the name or likeness of another, suggests data appropriation that offends a right to 
oblivion; the third tort, public disclosure of private facts is the clearest statement of a 
civil right to privacy; and the fourth grounds, disclosure of private facts that portray the 
                                                
243 SAMUEL H. HOFSTADTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN NEW 
YORK, 53 (1954). 
244 Id.  
245 Schwartz & Peifer, supra fn 108 at 1941. 
246 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008).  
247 Id at 101. 
248 Id at 103. 
249 Schwartz & Peifer, supra fn 108 at 2010.   
 63 
victim in a false light, suggests potential grounds for civil defamation suits and could 
provide grounds for a right to be forgotten. Those actions are based in private law, 
however, and are not actions against the state. Americans are therefore still left with no 
definitive legal protection against challenges to personal privacy conducted by 
government action. 250 
James Whitman observes that continental European ideas of privacy even today 
“are just not much at home in American legal culture”.251 While he views the Brandeis 
and Warren article as an attempt to transplant a continental-style privacy law into the 
American context, Whitman judges it a failure because the culture of privacy, and the 
systems of law, rest on disparate principles on each side of the Atlantic. Such 
discrepancies impede efforts to arrive at a definition of privacy that would be acceptable 
on both continents.  
Whitman reveals that the impetus for Brandeis and Warren’s article was a 
report by the “yellow press” in its gossip column of a private party at the Warrens’ 
house, media coverage that the authors found very intrusive.252 He suggests that 
Brandeis and Warren, frustrated by the lack of protections in the extant American 
common law for such intrusions on their privacy, researched the law then in vogue in 
Europe and learned how it defined similar intrusions as insults to honour in French and 
German law and provided grounds for offences against personality.   
According to Whitman, Brandeis and Warren were aware that continental laws 
could not be incorporated directly into America’s laws due to the different common law 
and civil law traditions but, aware that privacy laws were not abundant in America,253 
they nonetheless suggested that affronts to personality, artistic feelings and sensibilities, 
like affronts and insults to one’s honour on the continent, justified actions for injury to 
privacy. Tort law was the preferred forum, due to the growing reference in courts to 
emotional and moral harms.254  
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Whitman’s basic thesis is that American and European efforts to enact a 
transnational law of “privacy” is deeply hampered by the deep-routed differences in how 
privacy is perceived: in European culture it is based on a societal reverence for a 
person’s dignity, closely tied to honour and addressed historically through the law of 
insult, while in America privacy’s limits extend to one’s liberty and the public right to 
know, as reinforced in the constitutional devotion to “life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness” and reflected in the common law and the First Amendment claims of free 
expression.   
Whitman points out that the cultural difference can be seen in something as 
seemingly benign as the propensity of Americans to share trivial details of their private 
lives to complete strangers. He cites as example the Monica Lewinski affair wherein the 
most graphic details of then-American President Clinton’s extra-marital sexual 
activities were front-page news. In Europe, such indiscretions by state leaders are 
treated as private and not open to media exposure, unless criminal behavior is alleged.255  
A more recent example that underscores Euro-American cultural differences 
regarding the boundaries of private actions can be seen in the European reaction to the 
New York arrest of Dominique Strauss-Kahn for sexual assault on a Sofitel domestic 
worker.256  Responding to the television coverage of his arrest in handcuffs and his 
parading in front of the press, Strauss-Kahn commented, “Beyond the fantastic - and 
therefore incorrect - nature of this story, this is a despicable affront to my private life 
and dignity”.257 To Strauss-Kahn, his reputation is tied into his dignity and honour, 
matters directly connected to his private life. 
A journalist for Le Nouvel Observateur, Laurent Joffrin, comments on the added 
tension in France between a person’s right to privacy and the public’s right to know.258 
That right to privacy instills in journalists not just a passive obligation to avoid stories 
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that intrude on one’s privacy but an active responsibility to “protect people’s private 
lives”.  Strauss-Kahn was targeted by the press, not because of his sexual indiscretion or 
even his alleged criminal intentions, but because his attitude toward sex and women 
“smacked of a kind of ‘droit du seigneur’, a license for powerful men to have their way.”259 
The line is crossed, Joffrin emphasizes, when an editor tells a journalist “to go 
investigate a private life.” In America, by contrast, digging into the deepest recesses of a 
public figure’s personal history for a story is just considered competent journalism.   
In a similar vein, Whitman notes that Europeans perceive as crass and 
outspoken the propensity of Americans to speak openly about money: salaries, property 
values, business investments, to persons they have just met. The practice of reporting 
credit information of private citizens to credit agencies particularly rankles the 
European sense of propriety and privacy. Talking about money, and showing a 
willingness to reveal very intimate information to people on the first encounter, shows 
the reverence with which Americans hold rights of free speech and the primacy they 
award to free enterprise and the public’s right to know, the latter usually with respect to 
public figures. And yet, Americans seem deeply offended by nudity on public beaches, a 
practice Europeans have taken for granted for generations. 260 
In his conclusions, Whitman summarizes that Europeans value personal dignity 
above all else, an intangible quality severely threatened by today’s mass media, while 
Americans treasure liberty, threatened primarily by their government. Whitman 
cautions that those values are neither absolute nor mutually exclusive. Nothing 
prohibits safeguarding how we present ourselves while inhibiting the investigative and 
regulatory excesses of the state.  
Concepts of privacy continue to differ on each side of the Atlantic, however: that 
might be because privacy law is the product of local anxieties and ideals. In America, 
those anxieties focus on the police and other authorities who are viewed as the enemies 
of personal liberty; in Europe, “they focus on the ambition to guarantee everyone’s 
position in society, to guarantee everyone’s honor”, a fact about the Continent as true 
today as it was in the time of the French Revolution. Whitman cautions that, whatever 
position we support, we must urge jurists and lawmakers to move beyond the “shallow 
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intuitionism” of decrying every invasion of privacy as “evil or horrible”. 261 In order for 
law to function as law, it must work to protect what social tradition tells it is worth 
safeguarding. That tradition simply does not recognize personal dignity in America nor 
anti-statism in Europe.  
The Internet activity of citizens of both jurisdictions does not alter those basic 
values, but intensifies the opportunities for defying them through indiscriminate 
voyeurism. As Solove states:  
 
When it comes to gossip and rumor on the Internet, the culprit is ourselves. 
We’re invading each other’s privacy, and we’re also even invading our own 
privacy by exposures of information we later regret. 262 
 
UCLA author Lawrence Friedman would agree that traditional patterns of 
communication and hierarchies of control are no longer. As early as 1999, he observed  
the passing of traditional societies, typified by European states, whose relationships 
were strongly vertical and whose identity was fixed by one’s birth or social position.263 
In its place was what he saw as a “horizontal society” with flattened relationships 
between authority and the rest of society, and between the former titular and functional 
tiers in society.  People were feeling freer to choose who they are and to form 
relationships on a plane of equality, choices that relate to the former identity 
determinants such as race, gender, ethnicity, and religion and that affect one’s relations 
to politics, social structure, and the law. Over time, Friedman has noticed an 
intensification of that horizontal reshaping of traditional life due to the Internet and the 
social media networking it affords. As individuals now connect with like-minded others 
across barriers of space and time, claims Friedman, global mass culture is redefining 
community and replacing old loyalties and allegiances.  
Similarly David Flaherty points out the linguistic complexity of thinking about 
privacy in the digital age and calls for a semantic distinction between privacy protection 
(a ‘broad, all-encompassing concept that envelopes a whole range of human concerns) 
and data protection (a legal concern for our personal identifying data, such as birthdate, 
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social insurance number, passport or credit card numbers, for example).264 With respect 
to the latter, Flaherty has conducted a comprehensive study of five western democratic 
states regarding the efforts of public sector institutions to protect individual privacy 
from “the massive surveillance capacities of governments and corporations”.265 Countries 
were chosen for their leading approach to privacy protection. He concluded that, despite 
having the oldest national data protection laws, Sweden is the prototype of the 
surveillance state; Germany has the most effective national privacy laws of the five 
countries on the subject; Canada has the most developed system of data protection in 
North America while America’s various privacy legislation is seen as practically 
toothless in protecting individuals from growing personal data collection.   
Privacy, Flaherty concludes, is a major human concern and people want to be 
left alone with their secrets but, paradoxically, do not seem particularly vigilant in 
exercising due care to protect them. Throughout the 1990s, privacy activists grew 
increasingly concerned about the security of online transactional data available through 
web browsing, credit-card use and intelligent highways. Today privacy scholars are 
calling for a total reconsideration of the concept of privacy to reflect the increasing 
technological impossibility of closing down all online platforms to the peering eyes of 
corporations and the state in the name of enterprise or national security.266 
The question of whether privacy matters anymore in the era of online image 
management is tackled by a new breed of media scholars, well-represented by former 
Microsoft researcher dana boyd. She has decided to test the limits of her networked 
world “where boundaries are not so coherently defined and where entities are not so 
easily articulated”.267 In a recent experiment, she provided a saliva sample for DNA 
analysis. A digital reading of boyd’s DNA indicated some of her forebears probably had 
origins “distinct from the family narrative”, that is, were secretly integrated into the 
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family tree and contributed to the familial gene pool through extra-marital, 
unacknowledged births. Biological indicators also told of disease probabilities that made 
family medical stories either inaccurate or “statistically curious”.  
In the process, boyd realized that her methodology compromised the privacy of a 
large contingent of her family. By subjecting her DNA to laboratory scrutiny, she had 
put not only herself under the microscope but the medical and other personal data of all 
members of her extended family including children she had yet to produce. As her 
biomedical data were part of the mega data aggregation that is archived within public 
data collections, she had unwittingly exposed people she had never met to the prying 
eyes of the curious. As boyd concluded, “[I]n doing so, I learned information about 
them that they may not wish to know and may not wish me to know”.268  
Boyd’s DNA experiment shows the heightened networked character of our 
decisions and actions and the permanency of their results in the digital age. It illustrates 
that pre-Internet concepts of privacy belong irrevocably in the past. As boyd notes 
about personal links, “sometimes, as with DNA testing, we are linked by immu factors” 
while other connections are social or locational.269The latter suggests we have a choice 
in the matter, but boyd insists choices are long gone now that third parties can access, 
copy, transfer or otherwise manipulate our data. “Learning algorithms” or programs 
that carry out binary sorting without human prompting can collect and collate digital 
information about us that can predict our tastes, habits and decisions about friends and 
purchases and create our online personae.  “How machines see us depends on how our 
data connects to others,” boyd advises.270 
Boyd warns that any model of privacy that depends on the individual’s control of 
information will fail, because in current online environments users do not have enough 
information of online interconnectivity to decide which data should be shared with 
whom and when. Users also are aware that Internet companies like Google and 
Facebook have limitless ways to share data without our approval. As well, given the 
prevalence of data leakages and the architectural tendencies of the Internet to 
arbitrarily link one piece of datum with others, absolute control is not possible. It is as 
futile as trying to contain the poisonous ink from an octopus as it infuses surrounding 
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waters. “Expecting that people can assert individual control when their lives are so 
interconnected is farcical,” boyd asserts.271 The DNA experiment shows how people 
who are not even born can be affected by online data creation. Social media is 
particularly vulnerable to unconsented sharing, profile creation and aggregated linkage 
of the sender with non-intended recipients.  
Today’s privacy can best be approached by stepping outside of our obsession 
with the individual as the appropriate unit of analysis in any privacy discussion. Of far 
greater import on the Internet are groups, communities, relationships and networks. 
According to boyd, only through the collective lens can we begin to model, and to 
advise, with whom we wish to share and to understand how to share without 
jeopardizing the privacy of others.272 
Helen Nissenbaum of New York University agrees that the contours of our 
privacy rights in the digital age are quite different from what we have come to expect of 
our communications when offline.273 She characterizes our new right to privacy neither 
as a right to control information nor a right to have its access restricted but the 
qualified right to have our expectations about the flow of information met. The issue is 
no longer should we share, because the architecture of the Internet and its governing 
algorithms dictate that sharing is inevitable. Nissenbaum tells us that the direction of 
sharing is guided by “key organizing principles of our social lives, including moral and 
political ones”.274 It will be guided, not by our static expectations of privacy, nor by 
societal norms, but by contextual norms. She invokes us to insist on “contextual 
integrity”, the right to know in what context our data will be disseminated and re-sent, 
so that we can request correction when that context misrepresents our image or other 
personal data. She rejects the public/private divide of past times as a basis for what 
should be kept private; old standards of what should be categorized as “sensitive 
information demanding special consideration” have been swept aside by our need to 
share openly online.275  
Nissenbaum’s insistence on the critical importance of contextualization finds a 
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precursor in the 2001 debate on the relationship between privacy and context among 
Professors Robert C. Post, Lawrence Lessig and Jeffrey Rosen as sponsored by 
Georgetown University School of Law.276 Both Post and Lessig propose that using 
another’s private information out of context, and thereby misrepresenting some aspect 
of another person’s character or personality, does not lead to an invasion of privacy, just 
a misunderstanding on the facts as presented. They suggest, as corrective, adding 
further information about the subject to enlarge the context and no harm is done.  They 
give the example of a requirement by the United States Supreme Court that journalists 
who wish to cover trials must stay for the entirety of the trial so as not to misrepresent 
the narrative, the parties or witnesses by cherry-picking certain information for their 
publications.  
Jeffrey Rosen counters that the only way to correct misrepresentation of another 
person through a public account based on private information is to provide more private 
information in order to create a broader context, to enlarge what the public knows 
about a person’s life or circumstance.277 In that way, the harm of the original exposure 
and misrepresentation is compounded by the addition of yet further information that the 
subject would prefer to keep private and that creates harm to that person’s dignity and 
sense of autonomy. One’s autonomy is involved because the subject is forced to lose 
control over another piece of his private life in order to set straight the mistaken 
perception created by the first revelation. In Rosen’s words, privacy as autonomy 
presumes a “self-actualized individual self” as defined by its differences from, rather than 
its similarities to, the relevant community. The injury to privacy is thereby compounded 
by adding further context and that is contingent on more personal revelations.   
Privacy, to Rosen, becomes the control of personal information we do not wish 
others to know. The violation to privacy is the involuntary wrenching of that 
information and dropping it into another context of information that might paint it in a 
more accurate light. That offends the subject’s dignity, autonomy and wish to be 
understood.278 Rosen defines autonomy as the private right to act outside of social 
norms. He gives the example of President Clinton’s public display of infidelity while in 
office via the Monica Lewinsky affair.  Had the Clintons been allowed to resolve the 
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matter outside the public eye, any range of solution could have been exercised. The 
President’s publicists insisted, however, on the production of a video of the Clintons 
dancing on a beach, in order to air the apparent resolve of the couple to work things out. 
In addition, Hillary Clinton was booked on talk show circuits to discuss her decision to 
stand by her husband. By playing out those choices in public, the Clintons were forced 
to discuss the possibility of divorce in order to satisfy the public that they were 
contemplating the normative solution to marital infidelity.  A respect for their privacy 
would have allowed them to structure their most intimate relations out of the confines 
of social norms in a way that gave them autonomy over their reputations and public 
image.279 Rosen argues that such exposure constitutes an offence against liberal freedom 
in that it does not respect public/private boundaries.280 
Canadian surveillance researcher David Lyon of Queens University joins the 
conversation about changes to the public/private divide by agreeing with boyd’s 
assertion that digital architecture is an uncompromising arbiter of how our online 
identities are identified. Lyon reminds us that the starting point must be our assumption 
that state and corporate surveillance is constant and all pervasive.281  Data are 
aggregated, he explains, to compare populations, to sort people so they can be treated 
differently. State and corporate profiling is a given, in the name of free enterprise and 
national security. “So in a sense you are already a suspect,” Professor Lyon said. He 
marvels that most people seem enthusiastic about submitting themselves to those 
surveillance regimes, from personal updates online to customer loyalty programs. 
“We’re going through a cultural change,” he notes, where “big surveillance is still there, 
but we need to be aware of our own responses and our participation in surveillance.” He 
says further, “The social calculus is in flux…and the boundary between accep and 
intrusive surveillance is fluid and dynamic”.282 
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Lyon also addresses what he calls the “fun surveillance” of social media, what 
Mann et al. saw as the more fanciful aim of sousveillance. 283  The surveillant 
opportunities afforded through the workings of social digital messaging can 
“domesticate” other more nefarious forms of state monitoring of its citizens that we 
might want to challenge on civil liberties grounds. We are thereby lulled, says Lyon, 
into that erroneous aphorism that we have nothing to hide and therefore nothing to fear. 
Lyon is critical of the blasé attitude many assume regarding government surveillance: 
“For many people…surveillance is at worst an annoyance that has to be negotiated,” he 
says.284 In the next section, we explore how a in very different culture, that in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), individual Internet users are beginning to respond to 
the intensifying prying by the state into online activities. 
 
2.4 Privacy as a Social Construct  
   
If you don’t want anyone to know, don’t do it.285 
  
A reputable text on Chinese architecture advises that concepts of privacy, or yinsi, 
have been part of discourse in China from the earliest recorded times to the present, 
with varying functions and values.286 Such discourse has found little reflection, however, 
in the laws of China until very recently.287 The term ‘yinsi’ carries treasonous or 
criminal overtones, indicating undesirable behavior such as the harbouring of illicit 
secrets or selfish and conspiratorial actions. Such connotations suggest that the concept 
of privacy has long been suspect in China.288  
In a practical comparison of Western and Chinese concepts of privacy, someone 
from the US or Europe might be offended at practices at Chinese public lavatories that 
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are “open-plan affairs” where locals unconsciously squat elbow-to-elbow. Similarly with 
Chinese hospital treatments that are carried out amid crowds of observers; people think 
nothing of asking strangers about myriad details from their incomes to their weight 
that in Western societies are perceived as no one’s concern.  
With rapid commercial and residential development and hence with the 
proliferation of intrusive employers, data-mining marketers and invasive surveillance 
cameras, modern China is witnessing invasion of privacy Western-style. Stories are 
legend of state use of Yahoo! and other Internet companies for censorship activities and 
for delivering up people sought for criticizing the state.  US Internet company Google 
became aware of such state intrusion on individual Internet users in the PRC when 
Chinese officials requested the US company hand over information on individual social 
media communications; Google subsequently withdrew its holdings from the PRC to 
Hong Kong in April of 2010.289  
State spying enjoys a long history in the PRC: when Communist leaders first 
came to power in 1949, they exercised limitless prying into civilian affairs. State 
intrusions that would never have been acceptable in the West were commonplace: for 
example, women of childbearing age had their menstrual cycles recorded by state 
authorities to monitor whether they were getting pregnant without state permission. 
This became particularly critical during implementation of the one-family-one-child 
state policy. More recently, police have come under particular regulatory scrutiny in 
cities like Nanjing where a municipal law requires that they report when they marry, 
divorce, travel outside the country, purchase a car or invest in property.290 
The PRC also must deal with the socio-economic pressures of a population 
growth that outstrips all other countries in the world, challenging all aspects of state 
rule, from feeding its people to maintaining a probing eye on all citizen actions that 
reveal even a whiff of individual dissidence.291 Massacres at Tiananmen Square signaled 
the winds of political dissidence in the PRC and its iconic message is not lost on privacy 
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and human rights advocates around the rest of the world. Throughout its comparatively 
long history, the PRC has shown only brief interludes of open foreign policy that have 
afforded western eyes a glimpse of the intense authoritarian practices and iron rule of 
the PRC.  
Chinese individuals increasingly express their concern that privacy rights enjoy 
only the flimsiest of legal protections in their country. Privacy is mentioned little in 
China's constitution, labour law or medical law, and the few provisions are vaguely 
worded and are all subject to the “notoriously arbitrary workings of the Chinese legal 
system”. 292  Under government pressure, employers continue to monitor their 
employee’s activities on the Internet and marketers document potential customers’ 
buying preferences and credit ratings. In response, individual citizens are voicing their 
displeasure.  
Surveillance is both an internal practice and a trans-state activity in China. In 
imitation of Britain’s prodigious use of surveillance cameras, China is installing security 
and traffic-monitoring cameras on all its main streets. Most Beijing cameras have night-
vision capabilities that can track speeding drivers and notify them of their infractions 
via text messages sent to their mobile phones. China’s practice of hacking foreign 
computer systems was recently documented by surveillance scholar Ron Deibert, 
former director of University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab. He conducted studies into the 
Stuxnet virus that crippled Iran’s nuclear program and temporarily disabled State data 
collection functions in several countries including Canada.293 Deibert traced the massive 
hacking activities to a location in rural China.294  
Kenneth Farrell of the University of Pennsylvania’s Communications faculty  
tackles the “dynamic interrelationship between American and Chinese cultural and legal 
approaches to privacy”.295 Global privacy, he insists, is under threat, but simply 
equating the English “privacy” with the Chinese yinsi restricts dialogue between the two 
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cultures.296 Much more meaningful is to examine cross-cultural differences regarding 
individual expectations of privacy and discrepancies between the public/private 
divide.297  
Differences in public/private concepts of privacy can be culturally determined as 
we see with semantics. For example, unlike the “public square” implications of the word 
public in English speaking cultures, the equivalent gong in Chinese refers to shared 
societal interests, a difference that might indicate a more shared privacy interest in the 
PRC. 298  Farrell cites the concern amongst Chinese citizens about unauthorized 
transference of their personal data to authorities and corporations, compounded with 
the worry about cell phone and Internet spam, as more conducive to fashioning national 
legal solutions than in America where “business interests have a more direct claim on 
politics”.299  
In summary, distinctions between perceptions of the public/private divide in the 
lives of individual Internet users in China and in America can be attributed to cultural 
expectations and societal conditioning. Despite the ready inclination among pre-
Internet Chinese citizens to share what, in the western view, is very private information 
in public situations Farrell sees such communal openness waning as communications 
move online. Whether that observation can be linked to the accelerated growth of 
consumerism and private ownership, or to the growth in new media use, are questions 
that await further empirical studies.  
In America, individual perceptions of privacy are changing as well. In a 2009 
academic collaboration between political scientists at the University of Connecticut and 
the University of Rhode Island, public opinion about state intrusions on personal 
privacy since 1990 was surveyed and support was found to be in decline, despite a 
prominent surge around the 9/11 terrorist attacks.300 Farrell believes there is room for 
a “common, abstract principle of privacy” that Chinese and American Internet users can 
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share, but it must continuously negotiate the tension in personal privacy versus the 
need for information. As more Chinese gain affluence and thus access to physical 
property, the possible expansion of an expectation of privacy to include that tangible 
space is very real. Americans, in contrast, have seen concepts of real space diminish as 
perceptions of virtual space grow in what Farrell describes as an “intensifying rupture” 
between territorial and informational privacy.301  
 
2.5 Gaining Oblivion: The Right to be Forgotten  
 
Spirits they are, to whom second bodies are owed by Fate, and at the water of        
Lethe’s stream they drink the soothing draught and long forgetfulness.302 
 
In Virgil’s mythical world set out in the Aeneid, souls of the dead are led 
through a cleansing of memories of the present world prior to their entry into the next. 
They readily drink of the waters of Lethe to wash clean the memory slate of past cares. 
In a striking example of life imitating art, the concept of forgetfulness has arisen in legal 
drafting circles as a solution to the alleged permanence of our digital footprints.303 
There is an emergent literature that debates the contours of a right to be forgotten and 
a corollary right to oblivion. The concept of a human right to disassociate oneself from 
past mistakes or misrepresentations can be seen as both “intuitive and appealing” in 
Europe;304 so too in America, given that the possibility of second chances was an ethos 
from which the new nation was forged.305   The legal form that forgetfulness will take, 
however, and its practical implications, are issues currently under vigorous debate by 
governments, Internet companies, and academics on both sides of the Atlantic.306 Such 
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activity has been spurred by the proposal to update existing European law on data 
retention practices in light of the emergence of the Internet and other new media. Those 
revisions are highlighting the differences in US and EU concepts of privacy and free 
speech and their interaction, particularly online. Any meeting of the minds promises to 
have profound consequences on the American participation in the digital economy and, 
on the individual level, on the reputational risks to which we are exposed when online. I 
will now outline the conceptual background of forgetfulness and then detail its practical 
application and criticisms. 
The French concept droit à l’oubli has a longer history than its English 
counterpart,307 as does the Italian notion of reinventing oneself or il diritto all'oblio. At 
its most basic, forgetfulness allows us to revise our past in light of present knowledge or 
perceptions. Promotion of the concept of forgetfulness appeared in law and technology 
literature as far back as the 1990s in what David Flaherty called “one of the admirable 
products of European thinking and lawmaking”. 308 Those who write of Internet 
regulation, however, are not in accord as to whether forgetfulness should be a “right, 
interest or value”.309 The conceptual distinctions between the ‘right to be forgotten’ and 
the ‘right of oblivion’ have also not been clarified nor related to the right of personality 
or the right of reputation. Pere Simon Castellano suggests the important distinction 
that will influence any law of forgetfulness is that Europeans tie the right to the issue of 
consent to use one’s personal data while Americans focus on the societal entitlement to 
second chances.310 Nor does there even appear to be a satisfactory English translation of 
le droit à l’oubli.311 Ausloos suggests that the French term encompasses both forgetting 
and oblivion into the notion of  ‘forgetfulness’. In summary, it is not clear whether any 
of the foregoing concepts exist in law (de lege lata) or whether they are best debated as a 
future right (de lege ferenda or the law as it should/could be). 312   
The debate about the legal status of the right to be forgotten and the right to 
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oblivion is quite active, driven perhaps by a considerable lack of legal clarity around the 
concepts. Is it a natural right, inchoate but recognized, or a legitimate interest, an 
ethical aim or social value313 or a virtue or policy objective? All that is certain is that the 
concept has not crystallized as a generally accepted legal principle in either the 
American or the European legal tradition.314  
As early as 1972 and long before the introduction of the PC, Alan Westin and 
Michael Baker of the University of Michigan recognized that the American value of 
allowing a fresh start was under siege because of the immense and accelerating storage 
capacities of computers.315 They observed that anyone seeking to reform their lives for 
“religious, humanistic and psychiatric” reasons would be “barred by their past mistakes” 
because of the indelible memory of computers. 316  “The computer is assumed not to lose 
records,” they observed, “to forward them efficiently to new places and organizations” 
and to “create an appetite in organizations for historically complete records.”317 It is 
those organizations’ voracious appetite for our personal facts, then, and their 
institutional preference to “preserve and evaluate” that poses the major threat to any 
forgiveness principle.318 In hindsight, as became clear in the analysis of the intelligence 
failure around the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the evaluation or analysis function fell victim 
to the sheer bulk of preserved data by the NSA and other authorities.  
In a 1998 policy paper on forgetfulness, American science and technology 
scholars Jean-Francois Blanchette and Deborah Johnson presented the issue as one 
involving the obligation of the state to deliver social goods. 319 They identified the 
principal social goods that needed balancing against individual rights of privacy as the 
efficiency that computerized data collection brought to law enforcement, government 
service, and national security. Blanchette and Johnson conclude there is a general 
consensus in America that “too little is being done to stop the onslaught of personal 
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data collection” and that privacy protection policy has been ad hoc and piecemeal. It is 
the act of retention, not the ubiquity of surveillance, they worry about, the social 
implications of a lack of institutional forgetfulness.  They note that if a cost benefit 
analysis were conducted of personal privacy versus national security, institutional needs, 
law enforcement or government efficiency, privacy would be the loser.320  
Police scholar Gary Marx takes a more cultural-historical perspective. He has 
noted that ‘starting over’ or moving to a new frontier is a powerful concept in American 
culture, given the history of the nation’s founding.321 “The beliefs that once a debt has 
been paid to society it is forgotten and that people can change are important American 
traditions.” 322  He worries that surveillance information obtained via computers 
transcends time in that “it is available for analysis many years after the fact, and in 
totally different interpretive contexts.”323 With the “mass of easily accessible files, one’s 
past is always present” and that undesirable permanence applies to erroneous or 
sabotaged data, as well as debts that have been paid.324 Marx warns that such hoarding 
of data can create a class of permanently stigmatized persons within society.  
The practical urgency in understanding the precise parameters of the 
forgetfulness right is that, as Jeffrey Rosen warns,  
Unless the right is defined more precisely when it is promulgated over the next 
year or so, it could precipitate a dramatic clash between European and American 
conceptions of the proper balance between privacy and free speech, leading to a 
far less open Internet.325 
 
Georgetown University Professor of Law Franz Werro perhaps comes closest to 
linking forgetfulness with reputation when he considers such a right to be encompassed 
within the more general right to personality, to demand the erasure of archived data by 
authorities once they are not longer of legitimate use in order to “keep their activity 
trails private”.326  
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In terms of the individual user and forgetfulness, authorities in the European 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) worry that privacy advocates’ promotion of 
the concept creates unrealistic expectations in the public of revisionist possibilities. 327 
Instead, suggests the ICO, the focus should be on the ‘right to object’ to how personal 
data is used, as that emphasis would place the onus on the collector, primarily the 
corporate and security sectors, to justify their collection and transfer policies regarding 
citizens’ data:  
It is a reversal of the burden of proof system used in the existing process.  
It will strengthen the person's position but it won't stop people processing their 
data.328 
 
A further objection of the ICO is that the right to be forgotten is currently unworkable 
given disagreement from one country to the next on how to define sensitive personal 
data, a term used in explanatory literature accompanying the proposed EUDR text.329  
In the area of collective memory, there exists some resistance to revisionism as well.330  
The interest in forgetfulness has proven to have more currency in Europe than 
in America, perhaps because “Europeans concede more than Americans to the public 
realm and look to the state to secure more of their rights and liberties”.331 For example, 
in a 2004 selection of civil service personnel in Greece, the country’s Data Protection 
Authority recommended to the national selection committee that only the names of 
successful candidates for appointment to public service positions be publicized, not the 
names or details of those who were rejected.332 Specifically, the Authority reasoned that 
it would be disproportionate to the aim of government transparency to publish exam 
failures that could come to public notice by pure chance. In addition, the Authority has 
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generally recommended a time restriction on the publication via Internet of 
unfavourable administrative acts such as demotions, suspensions and dismissals.333  
 Another example is the decision by French courts to anonymize their published 
decisions by deleting reference to the parties and other personally identifying  
information before it is made public. The CNIL, as oversight authority,334 has also 
invoked the violation of the right to be forgotten in the inclusion of litigant’s names on 
a webpage available to the public335 as well as dissemination of litigants’ identification 
via publicly available legal databases.336  
The enthusiasm in Europe over the EUDR, and the equally vocal opposition 
expressed by American observers, (as will be developed further in Chapter V infra) 
indicates that deep-seated cultural differences could delay any meeting of the minds.. 
Adding to that potential impasse is the paradoxical relationship presented in the 
twenty-first century between privacy and publicity. In the last century, “the golden age 
of public relations”, publicity and engaging the attention of the press came to be 
something that many private citizens sought out and even paid for.337 This has led in 
present times to an American culture obsessed, at once, with being seen and being 
hidden, “a world in which the only thing more cherished than privacy is publicity.”338 
Further to certain public policy concerns, forgetfulness is considered not only 
acceptable and socially useful, but necessary. The prospect of having a criminal record 
for life provides one example. European criminal law and regulations provide for the 
erasure or at least a public ban on access to records of minor offences through the 
regime of pardons. Similarly, American criminal records for youth are routinely 
abbreviated and accessible only to government officials in some states. In certain EU 
Member States, such as Germany and France, criminal records are automatically 
removed from the public record after a pre-set length of time and remain unavailable to 
prospective employers and credit rating agencies so as not to taint their future 
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success.339 The rationale is that minor or youthful mistakes should not interfere with 
one’s social and professional opportunities. It offers an escape from “the persecution of 
the past”.340  
The right to oblivion, in contrast, is known within data retention practices as 
tied to unwarranted data retention. Conceptually it does not differ from the French le 
droit a l’oubli, according to University of East Anglia Professor Paul Bernal; it relates to 
the right to silence on past events in life that are not longer occurring, primarily in the 
criminal sanction context.341 It is mainstream media, in Bernal’s view, that has added a 
more alarmist interpretation involving historical revisionism, Internet censorship, and 
the suppression of free speech. The real evil that legislative mechanisms are meant to 
address is the languishing online of digital evidence of who we are and where we 
navigate; that information is of immense value to hackers, over-zealous bureaucrats, and 
others of indifferent or adverse interests.342 Bernal illustrates how easily such data is 
accessed: he cites the 2011 mining by a PhD student of personal information of 35 
million Google users from its databases, including names, email addresses and 
biographical details. The mining did not break any of Google’s posted rules and was 
assessed by the student as “completely trivial” in terms of the technological skill 
required.343 Shortly thereafter, Google introduced a social networking platform that 
turns users into gleaners of friends’ personal information and compilers of such profiles, 
all in the search for social “circles” and without the illegal hacking implications.344  
In light of the unwitting and seemingly benign ‘outing’ by new media users in 
search of social connection, the distinctions between various types of forgetfulness fade 
in significance. More pressing are current hurdles to protection of the individual user: 
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the practicalities of acquiring consent, detecting misuse, and enforcing workable privacy 
standards.                                                                                                                           
 The concept of forgetfulness has some detractors and William Dutton of Oxford 
University’s Oxford Internet Institute expresses the most frequently voiced objections: 
that “erasing history is not only Orwellian and unfeasible, given the scale of the web, 
but it will have a chilling effect on freedom of expression,” legitimizing government’s 
role in censorship in liberal democratic societies.345 It will also create a “legal swamp” in 
the privacy and data protection area that is already fraught with uncertainties. Dutton 
argues that privacy and data laws already cover any abuse of personal privacy that is the 
target of right to be forgotten rules. In Dutton’s words:  
[Y]ou are asking for a right to purge a service of all information they  
[service providers] might hold about you. I don’t think this policy  
would or should reach so far.346 
 
In practical terms, debates over the nuanced meanings and historical referents of 
a right to be forgotten have cast a shadow of uncertainty that extends over more 
altruistic digital activities such as data conservation and digitization projects.  Its 
practical significance to memory and reputation will expand as the EUDR enters force 
and implements a right to erasure, as will be discussed further in Chapter 5.2. The need 
for forgetfulness to protect reputation and status could become increasingly undermined 
by the tyranny of online architecture that enables some of the more invasive misuses of 














                                                




CHAPTER 3    THE TECHNOLOGY AND SCOPE OF REPUTATIONAL  
   HARM  
 
 3.0 Introduction       
 In this section I examine how our reputations are damaged online – the inner 
workings of the Internet and the Web that make reputational damage possible. I first 
consider the idiosyncratic features of new media that achieve the type of harms I will 
further describe, with legal responses, in chapter 4. Next I canvass various actions, by 
ourselves and by third parties, that compromise our reputational privacy. I organize 
those actions into exposure harms (involving online personal content) and disclosure 
harms (representing non-consensual data collection and dissemination). This section 
concludes with two cases, the Mosley case tried in various EU member state 
jurisdictions and the Martin case in the US. Those cases illustrate the discrepancies 
between a plaintiff’s expectations that extant laws will restore lost status and the legal 
and personal-life repercussions that fall short of those goals. I incorporate into those 
considerations a discussion of whether digital speech is a profoundly different method of 
communication online than off, warranting a different legal or other response as 
explored in Chapter V. 
  
3.1 Technological Idiosyncrasies of Digital Media 
a Reconfiguring of Information Bits 
Digital information is aspatial and hence easily transported. That is why 
material that is stored on a computer on the other side of the world can be accessed as 
easily as material located next door. Digital information is divided into packets of binary 
digits (‘0’s and ‘1’s in computer code) known as ‘bits’; packets comprise the smallest unit 
of transfer, which are disseminated in any order and recombined at the receiving end. 
That system of transmission facilitates a much speedier conveyance of message than the 
analogue system that must be sent and received in the same sequence of information. 
Transmission can also be described as non-rivalrous, meaning that its consumption by 
one person does not diminish the possibility of its subsequent (or simultaneous) use by 
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others.347  Digital transmission also provides easier access to the individual user; one 
way to measure the effort that we expend to access information on the Internet is to 
consider its ‘ontological friction’ or the forces that create resistance to information 
flow.348 Analogue means of transmission involves a much higher ontological friction 
than that for digital information. It has been argued that easier access through a lower 
ontological friction means increased risks to personal privacy.349  
As each packet travels through the network, it passes through a series of 
specialized computers or ‘routers’ that determine the most direct path for the packet to 
travel from sender to receiver. Routers must make a copy of each packet in order to read 
and direct it. The life-span of these copies is limited to a fraction of a second. When we 
search information, we enter search words into a search engine, such as Google, Yahoo! 
or Mozilla Firefox. Those Internet service providers (ISPs) have an allocated website 
with a domain name, such as <http://images.google.ca> that serves as the entry point 
to information stored on Google as contained on the World Wide Web (www).350 The 
Domain name is an alias for a number which is what the computer uses to find the 
location of the website, such as <www.1acc.com = 207.159.89.66>. Once the website 
has a domain name it can then be accessed by any user on the World Wide Web (www). 
In theory, search results are non-discriminatory: any user should be able to  
enter the domain name above, type in a search word or phrase, and receive the same 
search listings in the same order as any other user who enters those search words. The 
search engine even autocompletes partial entries and suggests the highest-ranked 
responses to those search words, even those we have not anticipated. Through auto-
correction and search order a serendipity factor is introduced into online searches that 
expand our bank of desired information.  Such autonomous architectural features can 
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have dire consequences, however, for individuals who are misrepresented in web 
searches, as will be discussed further under Chapters 3 and 4.351 
Access is augmented within the digital world for audio and video information 
stored online because it can be stored in greatly compressed files on a user’s hard drive. 
When using file-sharing hardware such as Napster or Netflix, an audio or video file can 
be ‘virally’ shared with unlimited users within seconds.352  Once downloaded, those files 
can be ‘burned’ onto blank CDs or DVDs for offline use, for redistribution, or illegal 
sale. Unlike real time sales, digital products can be offered in a wider selection because 
storage is cheaper and of much increased capacity than when dealing with physical 
storage space in the offline world. Content can be kept temporarily or permanently, or 
be accessed when the user is mobile through mobile devices or por flash drives (USB 
keys) to be accessed through other devices, either wired or wireless. Users may also 
choose to stream audio or video offerings without storing them at all. Streaming 
services can also be interactive, allowing the receiver to choose which audio or video 
streams she wishes. All of those affordances illustrate the growing ease of distribution of 
content from one source to many, a key factor in the dissemination of prejudicial, secret, 
or defamatory content. In that way, the same technologies that enable wide 
accumulation, access, and distribution are the ones that service the viral dissemination 
of content the data subject would find objectionable. 
With the amount of traffic generated by steady growth in Internet use 
worldwide,353 network breakdown is avoided through the technique of ‘caching’ or the 
automatic storage of material searched by a user.354 When a user first accesses a 
webpage offered by a server, key elements of that page are retained and more easily 
                                                
351 Ch. 3 under Lingering Data, Autocorrection, and the Power of Internet Companies, and 
Ch. 4 under ISP Liability. 
352 Michael A. Einhorn, Bits, Bots, and Crackups: Life on the Information Superhighway’, (11 Oct. 
2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract=332700. Stored bits must be converted from digital to analogue 
signals before they can be heard through speakers. 
353 Almost 3 billion users by the end of 2014, according to the United Nations ITU: the number 
of mobile phone users will reach almost 7 billion within the same time span. See further Number 
of Internet Users Worldwide Approaching 3 Billion, Voice Of America News (6 May 2014) 
http://www.voanews.com/content/number-of-internet-users-worldwide-approaching-3-
billion/1908968.html. 
354 This paragraph is informed by Internet Technology Explained: Hosting, Caching, and Mirroring, 
Eurim.org.uk Background Paper How Data is transmitted over the Internet, Network 
Governance Working Party, https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/34086341/how-data-
is-transmitted-over-the-internet-eurim. 
 87 
produced the next time the user requests the same information. On the second try, it is 
not necessary to transmit the data packets all the way from the original hosting 
computer, and very little demand is placed therefore on capacity in the core network. 
Caching can be managed through the use of metatags, inserted into a document’s 
URL355 that describe its attributes and which can create a set of instructions for a search 
engine or Web server on retrieving the desired content. Meta tags can also be used to 
mark a document as uncache-able, so that a web server will not save or archive the 
document, or will cache it for a specified period of time, so it is not used when it is too 
old. It has been suggested that Internet companies could meet obligations under the 
EUDR principle of the right to be forgotten through expiry dates set on cached data.356 
Generally, data subjects should have concern over online data that has been ‘de-
contextualized, distorted, outdated, no longer truthful (but not necessarily false)’.357 
 
 b      Cloud Storage, Anonymity, and Attribution  
 
Digital data is capable of cloud computing, a concept with three components: 
storage on a location independent of the device from which it is generated; sharing of 
that storage as a fungible resource358 with other customers; and charging for access 
based on resources used.359  Responding to user demand often involves an overlay of 
those services, a process not always known to that user. For example, a user might 
subscribe to the data storage services of Dropbox that, behind the scenes, uses 
Amazon’s infrastructure or those of other commercial service providers.  The user 
herself might combine services, such as when involved in analytics monitoring or cloud-
                                                
355 A URL (Uniform Resource Locator) indicates the location of a file on the web. When you 
type the address of a web page into your browser, you are typing a URL, such as 
<http://www.eurim.org.uk/activities/netgov/9911paperinternettech.pdf> used to retrieve the 
article in the previous footnote (339). 
356 Mayer-Schonberger, supra fn 161. 
357 Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Oblivion: the Right to be Different from Oneself’, Reproposing 
the Right to Be Forgotten, in VII International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics, Net 
Neutrality and other challenges for the future of the Internet, 13 Revista De Internet, Derecho 
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358 Goods or elements are fungible when they are capable of being substituted for another. 
359 See generally Kuan Hon et al., The Problem of ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing – What 
Information is Regulated? Cloud Legal Project Paper, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, 
University of London (2011). 
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based billing, creating an integration of systems that shows the growing 
interconnectivity of cloud services. The precise nature of services becomes critical when 
attempting to define a ‘controller’ of digital data, as required by both US legislation on 
data protection and the EUDR.  
There are three general types of data that might be involved in cloud computing: 
anonymized and pseudonymized data, encrypted data, and sharded or fragmented data. 
Those distinctions will be considered in turn as they are important in determining 
whether data should be treated in law as ‘personal data’.360  
 
i Anonymity and Attribution 
There are two principal ways in which a user can be identified: through her IP 
address361 and through her digital search history. Here is how it is done: a user enters 
search terms into an Internet search engine, such as Google. The query terms are 
logged or tracked by the search engine. The log data also includes such items as the 
type and version of web browser of the user, her IP address, and other information 
gleaned by cookies that are inserted each time the user conducts a search. That 
information routinely includes an ID for the computer, the date and time and duration 
of each site visit, the path to and from the site, the time spent on each page, and the 
links that are clicked during each visit.362 Cookies retain that information about 
previous searches for speedier access each subsequent visit. That information can be 
combined with other fragments of personally identifying data to arrive at a more 
accurate profile of the user. Anonymization removes information obtained from cookies 
as well as from the IP address.  
Anonymizing and pseudonymizing processes conceal the data subject’s identity. 
To anonymize a person’s identity is to remove sufficient identifiers so that identification 
                                                
360 Id. at 8. 
361 IP address, or Internet Protocol address, is a computer acronym for a set of rules or 
standards that are used by computers to communicate with each other across a network, such 
as the Internet. Computer protocols govern the standards used to enable the connection, 
communication and data transfer. Each computer has a distinct IP address. See further What 
does IP address stand for? English Language Terminology, 
http://www.englishlanguageterminology.org/acronyms-initials-abbreviations/what-does-ip-
stand-for.htm. 
362 Nichoel Forrett, Cookie Monster: Balancing Internet Privacy with Commerce, Technology and 
Terrorism, 20 TOURO L. REV. (2004), 
http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1749&context=lawreview  
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is not possible through discrete bits of information. To pseudonymize an identity is to 
substitute one ingredient - a name, for instance - with numbers or other characters that 
can deflect direct identification. Identities are disguised, therefore, not removed. That 
process is of particular interest to researchers and statisticians, as they are able to 
collect different information relating to the same individual without having to know her 
name, thereby complying with privacy laws.  
Those processes are conducted before data is stored or otherwise dealt with in 
the cloud. Data is frequently anonymized or pseudonymized before sharing or selling it 
to another entity, although much personal data sold to commercial advertisers do not 
go through such preliminaries. For example, some US companies that sell health related 
data would anonymize or pseudonymize such personal data prior to selling it to 
research companies, but others would not. In another example, the EU company 
HipSnip enables mobile phone users to ‘snip’ and save offers from consumer product 
brands, a process that permits owners of those products to trace the consumer due to a 
lack of anonymizing activity.363  Often only part of the data is altered or deleted, 
however, and only some identifiers are disguised or altered by cryptography. Other 
information, such as a usage trail or test results associated with a name are left intact, a 
matter of concern to privacy advocates and policymakers. The degree of anonymizing 
and pseudonymizing becomes a critical factor in determining what is ‘personal data’, 
‘personally identified information’, or ‘personally identifiable information’ when 
constructing privacy or data protection legislation. Those definitions, and hence the 
type of data that is regulated, differ from one country to the next, a matter of grave 
concern to privacy scholars like Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove.364 
Technology that enables deanonymization, or the reversal of the anonymization 
and pseudonymization process, is now readily available. That reality has mobilized 
legislative efforts at data protection. De-anonymization is achieved by assigning 
sufficient identifiers (numbers or other symbols) that disclosure of an individual is 
achieved. Identifiers can also be comprised of different pieces of information about a 
person which, when taken individually, would not lead to her identification. So 
removing direct identifiers, (such as names, email addresses, IP addresses, or medical 
                                                
363 Id. at 9. HipSnip’s terms of service permit it to ‘share, rent, sell, or trade aggregated or 
anonymized data.’ See HipSnip’s Legal Statement at https://angel.co/hipsnip.  
364 Schwartz & Solove, The PII Problem, supra fn 7.  
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device identifiers) might not achieve complete anonymity if indirect identifiers can be 
collected that, in the aggregate, lead back to identification.  
The concept of attribution is simply the determination of user actions online as 
can be traced to that user. Anonymity and pseudonymity would be used, therefore, to 
escape our attribution by a third party. Our vulnerability to invasive technology at the 
hands of the state is accelerating at an alarming pace in the digital era. Through use of 
deanonymizing technology and the combination of seemingly discrete bits of 
information,365 data analysts can pierce the public/private divide we believe we enjoy as 
citizens of a democratic state. For example, we have been told that our gender and 
sexual preferences can now be ascertained from a mere examination of our use of the 
‘like’ function on Facebook.366  Similarly we have been alerted that we are only four 
mobile phone conversations away from government identification.367  
 
ii Encoding, Encryption, and Hashing 
The principal function of encoding, encryption and hashing is to transform data 
into another format.  The first two methods are reversible; hashing is not.368  A user 
would encode data to ensure its consumption, in a proper and safe format, by a different 
type of system.369  The algorithm used is publicly available, so secrecy is not the 
objective. For example, if you are trying to submit your curriculum vitae in application 
for a job and the intended recipient asks for the document in ASCII, he is asking for 
plain text without formatting such as pre-set tabs, bolding, or italics, in order to 
                                                
365 Daniel J. Solove, Justice Scalia’s Dossier: Interesting Issues about Privacy and Ethics,” 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (29 Apr. 2009) 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/04/justice_scalias_2.html.   
366 Rebecca J. Rosen, Armed with Facebook ‘Likes” Alone, Researchers Can tell Your Race Gender and 
Sexual Orientation, ATLANTIC (12 Mar. 2013) 
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367 Matt Warman, Online anonymity: impossible after four phone calls, TELEGRAPH (25 Mar. 2013), 
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368Paulan Korenhoff, Forgetting in Bits and Pieces: an exploration of the ‘right to be forgotten’ as 
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369 Daniel Miessler, The Difference Between Encoding, Encryption and Hashing, Daniel Miessler Blog,  
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smoothly facilitate importing your information into his applications. Encoding does not, 
as a rule, involve privacy issues and hence does not pose a risk to personal content or 
reputation.  
Encryption, on the other hand, strives for secrecy. Encrypted messages can only 
be accessed via a de-encryption key and involves the transforming or converting of an 
entire data set in order to keep it secure from unwanted access. It is achieved by 
applying an algorithm to the data, which functions as a ‘foreign language’ that remains 
inaccessible to those who do not speak that language. The popularity of the BlackBerry 
mobile phone, for example, particularly within political and corporate sectors, was due 
in large part to the encryption system that was sourced offshore. Only designated 
recipients with the de-encryption key could return a message to plaintext. Blowfish is 
an example of an encryption cipher, available in the public domain; the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) is another. Encryption malfunctions pose a serious risk to 
data security and, hence, to reputation.  
Hashing is a system that allows detection of any tampering with the integrity of 
your data. In order to establish that data has not been modified, methods are used to 
compare data input with data output. The sender performs a ‘hash’ function by taking a 
group of characters and mapping it to a value of a certain length, called a ‘hash value’ 
that represents that string of characters. The intended recipient uses the same hash 
function to generate the hash value and compares that to the one received with the 
message.370 Hashing is critical in detecting efforts at identity theft, hacking, and 
nonconsensual surveillance. On an individual level, hashing names or passwords can 
make theft of passwords more difficult, even for users who employ  weak or identical 
same passwords for several accounts. While the process will not render their database 
or website any more secure, it offers some damage control in the event of a security 
breach.  
iii   Sharded or Fragmented Data 
 
Those terms refer to an automated procedure of breaking up data into fragments 
for storage in different storage facilities or locations. The procedures depend on the 
                                                
370 What is Hash Function? Technopedia, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/19744/hash-
function. 
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storage provider’s sharding policies; cloud storage providers can usually meet requests 
for storage within a desired geographic area, such as within continental Europe.371  Kuan 
Hon et al. raise an issue of interpretation that is critical to the EUDR: if unencrypted 
data uploaded to the cloud is automatically sharded for distributed storage, can a cloud 
user who accesses or uploads the personal data, and who might run applications in the 
cloud that operate on, and change that data, be considered a ‘processor’ of personal data. 
The EUDR potentially imposes strict accountability on that user-producer regarding 
the protection and retention of that data.372  
 
c Geo-location and Other Surveillance Capabilities 
 Keeping in mind that the focus of this dissertation is the individual Internet user 
and her reputational privacy, I include this section on state surveillance methods to 
review ways the state can collect and use personal data that creates privacy risks for the 
individual.  
 Many of our digitized devices have built-in geo-location mechanisms that 
autonomously map our usage through the location of our devices. Those capabilities 
allow benign uses such as device location when we have misplaced our mobile phones or 
ts, or mapping services to direct our travels from one physical location to another. They 
also, however, form part of a larger data collection program by state authorities under 
the rubric of national security. It is known, for example, that since 2011 Apple iPhones 
and iPads routinely record the position of our devices and save the data in individual 
files at Apple Inc. storage facilities for the growing circumstances that allow 
warrantless searches by government.373 Such accessibility has privacy and personal 
security implications, as that data is apparently unencrypted and hence unprotected 
from third party access. That digital disclosure extends to any device with which we 
synchronize our mobile phones, such as our laptop computers or t devices.  
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore the political agenda 
behind such activities, we will provide a brief description regarding US government 
                                                
371 Kuan Hon, supra fn 359 at 11. 
372 Id. at 31. 
373 Alasdair Allan & Pete Warden, Got an iPhone or 3G iPad? Apple is recording your moves’, O’Reilly 
Radar Blog (20 Apr. 2011), http://radar.oreilly.com/2011/04/apple-location-tracking.html 
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surveillance and identification practices involving our digital device communications 
that has an impact on access to our personal data.   
 Historically, state surveillance has been concerned with “ascertaining and using” 
specific information about targeted individuals who are of political or criminal menace 
to public order or safety.374  State authorities accomplish that by watching us, through 
human agents and digital monitoring of our “data doubles”, created via the mandatory 
disclosure of such personal information as our banking activities or use of government 
services. With the expansion of national security agenda in western states leading up to 
the new millennium, as expanded by the need for a formalized internal and foreign 
policy response to the Twin Towers attacks in 2001, governments in the US and EU 
have taken unprecedented steps to monitor, identify, and profile users of digital 
communications. That security net has scooped up not only foreign communications 
transmitted to the US but, within the continental US, communications between and 
among American citizens. How is that technically accomplished? 
Since 2005, the US government has required major telecommunication 
companies in the country to hand over the call-detail records of their customers.375   
Such data includes customers’ names, street addresses, times of calls, and other personal 
information including “detailed records of calls they made – across town or across the 
country – to family members, co-workers, business contacts and others.”376 Further, the 
National Security Agency (NSA) is reported to be in receipt of copies of American 
citizen’s telephone and other communications records.377 Such surveillance activity is 
conducted primarily using devices called fiber optic splitters that make copies of all 
emails, web browsing activity, and other Internet traffic to and from its customers and 
provides those copies directly to the NSA.378  This copying includes both domestic and 
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international Internet activities of phone customers. The disclosures of whistleblower 
Edward Snowden identify PRISM as an NSA program devised to receive such copies 
taken from “emails, video clips, photos, voice and video calls, social networking details, 
logins and other data held by a range of US internet firms.”379 A leaked government 
PowerPoint presentation identifies the Internet firms as Microsoft and its Skype 
division; Google and its YouTube division; Yahoo; Facebook, AOL, Apple, and chat 
service PalTalk.380 
The British news media reported similar activities by Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), based in Cheltenham, through access to the 
NSA system employed since at least June of 2010. That piggybacking on NSA 
capabilities reportedly generated 197 UK intelligence reports in 2012 alone.381 Such 
access would appear to “allow GCHQ to circumvent the formal legal process required to 
seek personal material such as emails, photos and videos from an Internet company 
based outside the UK.”382 Google has denied they provided a back door to governments 
for surveillance but suggests it has cooperated with legal requests for consumer data. 
The PowerPoint establishes that the NSA has had access to both stored 
communications and real-time collection of raw data “‘for at least six years, without the 
knowledge of users, who would assume their correspondence was private.”'383 
 In terms of individual disclosure risk, the British Broadcasting Corporation  
warns Internet users that when they visit a website their IP address, type of device, and 
screen size can easily be ascertained.384   In households with more than one device, it is 
the IP address of the router, and not the individual device, that is traceable, although 
law enforcement agents have facilities to trace an individual’s geo-location from his IP 
                                                                                                                                            
later admitted  - that the government is mass collecting phone metadata of all US customers 
under the guise of the Patriot Act. Moreover, the media reports confirm that the government is 
collecting and analyzing the content of communications of foreigners talking to persons inside 
the United States’. 
379 Leo Kelion, Q&A: NSA’s Prism internet surveillance scheme, BBC News (25 June 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-23027764 
380 Id. 
381 Nick Hopkins, UK Gathering secret intelligence via covert NSA operation, GUARDIAN (7 June 
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/07/uk-gathering-secret-intelligence-
nsa-prism. 
382 Id.  
383 Id.  
384 Tom De Castella & Kayte Rath, Prism and privacy: What could they know about me? BBC News 
Magazine (12 June 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22853432. 
 95 
address.385  The website can also see what search term or former website brought users 
to the current website. An individual’s geo-location can be determined by cross-
referencing the IP address with other data and, if access was obtained using a work 
computer, the name of the employer. All those details are automatically identified and 
recorded. Internet service provider British Telecom suggests that, unlike its American 
counterparts, it does not keep a record of customers’ browsing activity.386  
 After such metadata has been obtained by the NSA or other intelligence agency, 
it begins to data mine and analyze it for evidence of activities that threaten national 
security. Data mining involves the search for key words and connections of ideas or 
persons. According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the specific equipment 
installed at telephone facilities includes a machine called the NARUS Semantic Traffic 
Analyzer387, a powerful tool to conduct deep packet inspection (DPI). The latter is a 
method of information extraction that filters packets of data as they reach inspection 
points in their transmission. DPI collapses firewall security programs as it searches for 
breaches of protocol, viruses, spam, or other predetermined criteria and redirects such 
data for closer inspection.388 Good uses include cleaning up spam and viruses and 
helping with traffic disruption. Bad uses include totalitarian-type surveillance by 
governments, including the copying of data. The NARUS machine forwards such 
communications to a central location for storage and analysis. The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation estimates the NSA installs several such storage facilities across America. 
Author James Bamford estimates a $2 billion running cost for the Utah facility back in 
2006 which housed data the NSA has collected for the past decade, including “the 
complete contents of private emails, cell phone calls, and Google searches” and personal 
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data trails composed of parking receipts, travel itineraries, bookstore purchases and 
other “digital pocket litter’’.389 
It is important when discussing Big Data collection practices of state authorities 
to distinguish between those used for statistical and demographic purposes (which are 
helpful to the data subject and research generally) and those employed for citizen 
profiling (generally perceived as exploitative in the hands of state authorities).390 The 
latter function is more worrisome in the breach:  analytics are often misapplied or 
results contain errors that could have grave consequences for the data subject. In the 
following account of a researcher at Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet 
& Society, profile indicators have led to an erroneous ‘personalization’.  
Google thinks I’m interested in parenting, superhero movies, and shooter games. 
The data broker Acxiom thinks I like driving trucks. My data doppelgänger is 
made up of my browsing history, my status updates, my GPS locations, my 
responses to marketing mail, my credit card transactions, and my public records. 
Still, it constantly gets me wrong, often to hilarious effect.391  
 
The researcher suggests we all have a data doppelganger somewhere in the digital 
universe, due to the sheer amount of processing of Big Data that is being conducted day 
to day. The menacing aspect of that possibility is the data disclosure we undergo 
continuously at the hands of unknown third party agencies. 
 
d  Distinguishing a Processor, Controller & Publisher  
 Identifying the role of the Internet company becomes crucial when attempting to 
allocate liability for the placement or carriage of libelous or other damaging 
reputational content. This area of law is in flux in both the US392 and EU,393 generating 
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a large body of litigation for the courts and government watchdogs such as the FCC in 
America and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in Europe. US 
industry leaders maintain either that their role is confined to acting as intermediary 
between those who post the content (publisher) and the subject of the content 
(individual user), or that they are data processors under an agency arrangement with 
the publisher. The EUDR defines a processor as a  “separate legal entity with respect to 
the controller who process [sic] personal data on his behalf”;394 a controller is any body 
that “determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”395 Those 
definitions suggest that processors act as agents for controllers who decide what 
information is processed and how. For example, SNS providers offer online 
communication platforms that enable individuals to publish and exchange information 
with other users. In this respect, under the EUDR, it could be argued that they are data 
controllers because they determine both the purposes and the means of the processing 
of such information.396  In a more complex example, a public health authority might 
work jointly with several hundred agencies to transmit personal health data; in that 
situation, both agency and authority could be considered joint controllers.397  The 
decision-making by controllers would seem to involve more autonomy and hence attract 
more legal liability. For their part, ISPs and the public health authority could argue 
they are merely processing information or data that is conveyed to them by data 
controllers; they do not have an active role in determining the ‘purpose and means’ of 
what is published online.  
 The concept of ‘publisher’ within the online context is more complex. With 
Google, for example, the role of an active publisher of online content focuses primarily 
on active editorial decision-making. In a 2012 White Paper on the issue commissioned 
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by Google Inc., legal practitioners Volukh and Falk advise that liability can be 
sidestepped by focusing on the ‘mere communicator’ role:   
To be protected by Safe Harbor laws, and free from copyright and libel suits, it 
often works best for Google to be a mere communicator of information, and not 
responsible for the information people put online.398 
 
That characterization might involve disproving that Google’s activities involve editorial 
judgment. We know, however, that Google determines the content and order of search 
results based on which items most accurately respond to the nature of the search 
query.399  Volukh and Falk conclude that Google’s exercise of editorial judgment in such 
cases is analogous to, and could attract liability for, the activities of traditional book and 
other media publishers.400  
The CJEU judgment in the 2014 Google Spain case indeed identified Google Inc. 
and its national divisions as controllers under most conditions, subject to liabilities for 
constructive knowledge of content.401 That judgment is persuasive, not binding, on the 
final form that the EUDR will take; it is also not binding on US jurisdictions. It remains 
to be seen how legal and market pressures around such liability issues raised by Google 
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e The Speed and Ambit of Dissemination 
The speed and reach of online transmissions provides another unique feature of 
web-based content, improving on such attributes of telecommunication cables and 
telephony transmission to an exponential degree. 402  
Internet speed can be measured by megabits per second,403 information that can 
be seen in the downloading activities of users. Figure 1 illustrates, under ‘speed’ in the 
right hand column, the minimum megabits per second (Mbps) at which emails are 
downloaded (0.5), content is downloaded from a browser (less than 0.5 to 1), a video is 
streamed (0.7), a high definition movie is streamed (4), videoconferencing occurs (1), and 
tele-learning materials can be downloaded (4). Those figures indicate a transmission 
speed often faster than the time it takes us as humans to find the ‘send’ key on a 
particular page. The figures also indicate that the downloading speed for email and 
government information sites were relatively the same in 2013 and can be accessed in 
half a second, the fastest access of any shown, except for streaming radio content. The 
latter function requires uploading time, however, which routinely slows down the 
transmission. Although those results are contingent on the bandwidth, time within the 
24 hour clock, and type of device used, they indicate that gossip, lies, doctored content, 
and other reputational damage can be disseminated with menacing speed.   
Translating those figures into meaningful descriptors of speed can be achieved in 
a relational sense if we consider the example of the use of Twitter to warn others about 
impending natural dangers. For example, when examining the transmission of tweets 
during an Earthquake in Virginia in August of 2011, one author suggested that their 
speed (200,000 kilometers per second) actually overtook the seismic event and arrived in 
neighbouring states before the earthquake (traveling at 3 to 5 kilometers per second).404   
                                                
402 Anita Bernstein, Real Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N. C. L. REV. 3 (2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2024661 
403 A bit is a single numeric value, either 1 or 0, that encodes a single unit of digital information. 
A byte is a sequence of bits; usually eight bits equal one byte. An Internet Protocol (IP) 
address contains 32 bits or 4 bytes. The bits encode the network address so that it can be 
shared on the network. The bytes divide the bits into groups. A megabit, then, equals over one 
million (1,048,576) bits. See further Bradley Mitchell, What is the difference between bits and bites, 
About.Com, http://compnetworking.about.com/cs/basicnetworking/f/bitsandbytes.htm. 








  Table 1:  2013 Broadband Speed Guide (excerpt)405 
 
In addition to the speed at which a defamatory posting can cause injury is the 
ambit of its reach. At the close of the first quarter of 2014, for example, Facebook was 
reported to have 1.28 billion monthly active users. 406  Unlike in Brandeis’ day,  
                                                
405 Source: US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
http://www.fcc.gov/guides/broadband-speed-guide.  (Report offer results of rigorous 
broadband performance testing for 13 of the largest wire line broadband providers that serve 
well over 80 percent of the U.S. residential market. Tests conducted used automated, direct 
measurements of service delivered to the homes of thousands of volunteers across the United 
States.) 
406 6 New Facts About Facebook, Pew Research (3 Feb 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/02/03/6-new-facts-about-facebook/ (advising Pew Data indicates Facebook is used 
by 57% of all American adults and 73% of youth ages 12-17, and that adult Facebook use is 
intensifying. See also Facebook claims to become ‘biggest stadium in the world’ for World Cup, RT (9 
June 2014) http://www.facebook.com/fifaworldcup(reporting that although Facebook usage 
amongst European youth reached 57% penetration of the 17-25 year old market, it is not the 
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embarrassing or degrading material is not just disseminated to a limited circle of friends 
or newspaper subscribers: viewers of the Star Wars Kid YouTube video, for example, 
posted in 2002 by rancorous classmates of a 15 year-old awkward teenager, reached 
over 29 million viewers as of June, 2014.407  
 One of the more prominent examples of the instant interoperability of media in 
today’s event coverage occurred on March 2, 2014 with the Oscar Awards ceremony in 
Hollywood. A media conversation occurred as 43 million viewers watched the event in 
person or on television and transmitted and re-transmitted SNS commentary with other 
viewers using social media accessible on their tablets and smartphones. The discursive 
level was record-breaking for the secondary transmissions of a public media event: 
Twitter claimed that 14.7 million tweets mentioned the Oscars during the telecast and 
Facebook reported 25.4 million interactions overall that mentioned the show. That 
simultaneous conversation resulted in the highest television ratings for the Oscar event 
since 2004. In addition, the ‘selfie’ photograph tweeted by Oscars host Ellen DeGeneres 
was retweeted within the subsequent twenty-four hour period 2.8 million times.408 That 
messaging traffic caused an overload disruption of Twitter service for about 20 minutes, 
generating even more publicity for the event.409 The Oscar moment illustrates the high 
value in the news and entertainment business of interconnected participatory media that 
can orchestrate simultaneous real time grassroots and networked conversations that are 
regenerated by journalists and anonymous tweeters within a few hours, with live 
commentary about the secondary traffic during the event. The speed and ambit of 
transmissions detailing the event comprise the story as much as what unfolded within 
the Dolby Theatre in Los Angeles. The event created a “landmark social media 
moment”410 with real time observation, by television and SNS users, of a digitally 
transmitted event going ‘viral’ through the secondary interactivity of social media 
                                                                                                                                            
most popular SNS for youth overall, eclipsed by Hyves in the Netherlands and SchulerVZ in 
Germany).   
407 The figure on 9 June 2014 was 29,192,626 as recorded on Star Wars Kid, YouTube, 
www.YouTube.com/watch?v=HPPj6viIBmU. 
408 A reported 254,644 tweets per minute. The previous record was the 810,000 tweets of 
President Obama kissing his wife upon learning of his election win in 2013. 
409 David Bauder, Ellen DeGeneres’ selfie a landmark social media moment, ASSOCIATED PRESS & 




transmission. While no quantum of viewers is used to define when a video reaches viral 
status, the term in general use conveys the idea that an event has been viewed by more 
than a million people in less than a week.411   
          The widespread and immediate implications for personal reputation of viral 
transmissions are illustrated by a split-second comment: Oscar host DeGeneres made a 
derogatory quip to guest Liza Minnelli suggesting she looked like a drag queen as a 
result of recent plastic surgery.412 That comment was streamed live and subsequently 
carried on social media, print stories, and video and audio clips, provoking the largest 
Twitter traffic to date of any public figure.413 A Google search of ‘Liza Minnelli at 
Oscars’ the same evening delivered hundreds of search results of the remark within 
seconds.414 Many of those stories characterized DeGeneres’ comment as ‘transphobic’, a 
pointed reference to the self-identified gay entertainer; other commentators label the 
remark ‘transmisogynist’,415 ‘disrespectful’,416 and ‘mean-spirited’.417   The comment, 
defended by DeGeneres as humourous, illustrates the fragility of reputation, those of 
both DeGeneres and Minnelli, and the unimaginable breadth of potential stigma caused 
by the out-of-control social media frenzy that reaches millions of viewers in the blink of 
an eye.    
In gauging the ambit of harm, one should also consider the dissemination of 
insulting or defamatory content accessed through the serendipity of the search function. 
Search results can offer a wealth of information we did not even know existed and were 
not looking for, and can provide new insights simply through their random 
combination.418  
                                                
411 ‘Viral’, Techterms.Com, http://techterms.com/definition/viral. 
412 Caitlin Dewey, Internet consensus: DeGeneres’ Lisa Minnelli joke ‘mean’, ‘transphobic’, WASH. 
POST (3 Mar. 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/style-blog/wp/2014/03/02/. 
413 George Stark, Ellen DeGeneres 102uquesn ‘transphobic’ after Oscars joke that suggested Liza 
Minnelli looked like a drag performer falls flat. DAILY MAIL (4 Mar. 2014), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-2573116/.  
414 Results can be viewed at 
https://www.google.ca/?gfe_rd=ctrl&ei=H7vvUrXrJKuC8QfQkYCIBg&gws_rd=cr - 
q=liza+minelli+at+oscars 
415 Dewey, supra fn 412. 
416 Id. 
417 Jason St. Amand, Was Ellen’s Liza Minnelli Joke Transphobic? EDGE SAN FRANCISCO  (3 
Mar. 2014), http://www.edgesanfrancisco.com/entertainment/celebrities/news//156105/. 
418 Korenhoff, supra fn 368 at 2. See also B. Sparrow, et al., Google Effects on Memory:  Cognitive 
Consequences of Having information at our finger tips, 333 SCIENCE, 776-778. 
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f     Memory and Durability: the Half Life Debate 
The question of how long online content endures is of critical importance to 
sufferers of a derogatory remark or untrue accusation within new media.  Much 
literature addressing new media communications has us believing that reputation-
damaging postings are permanent or at least highly persistent. Hence there is potential 
for deeper and more enduring harm than offline defamatory statements because of the 
expanded audience and its protracted access to our data.  Internet users, particularly 
young ones, receive ample warnings of the permanence of online memory from industry, 
educators, and family. In contrast, among those who study the Internet is a group of 
digital communications-savvy scholars who maintain that online content is short-lived. 
Texting and SNS communications as well seem to remain on our smart phones or other 
devices despite promotion of their perishability.419 We speak of their evanescence, a 
feature that “eases the force of the blow” of defamation.420 It has become, in some circles, 
the ‘half-life’ debate of digital communications. 
Among proponents of content evanescence is Harvard history scholar Jill Lepore 
who assesses the Web as ethereal, uns, and unreliable. She cites two studies that 
empirically establish the transience of online sources. In the first, a 2013 survey of legal 
policy-related journals identified a near-fifty percent loss in workable URLs over six 
years. 421  The second study, at Harvard Law School, found over 70% loss of URLs cited 
in Harvard Law Review and other journal articles, as well as a 50% attrition of URLs 
within US Supreme court opinions. Lepore notes the frequency with which the error 
message (Page not Found) is the result of our online search efforts and concludes, 
“[s]ocial media, public records, junk: in the end everything goes.”422 Both of those 
studies relate half-life to the amount of time that content remains accessible and 
functionally useful while online. The term does not describe the value of the underlying 
knowledge conveyed.  
Within the contingent of social network scholars who argue that the durability 
of information via Internet does evaporate over time are Daniel Gomes and Maroi 
                                                
419 For a comprehensive review of social networking sites see dana boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, 
Social network sites: Definition, history, and scholarship, 13 J. COMP.-MED. COMM. (2007). 
420 Bernstein, supra fn 402 at 2.  
421 Jill Lepore, The Cobweb: Can the Internet be Archived? NEW YORKER (26 Jan. 2015) 34. 
422 Id. 
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Silvia. Their studies suggest that, in 2006, just over half (55%) of content remained 
online after one day, 41% after a week, 23% after 100 days, and 15% after a year.423 Meg 
Ambrose of Georgetown University in turn suggests that “information is not 
permanent, no matter the medium” and calls for principled information storage 
practices.424 She attributes disappearing content more to technological malfunctions 
such as media and hardware errors, software failures, network service failures, 
component obsolescence, operator errors, natural disasters, internal and external 
attacks, and organizational failures.425 Interestingly, a search of one of Ambrose’s 
articles posted on her Georgetown University website brings up an error message 
suggesting its evaporation, or at least disappearance, from a reader’s view.426 
Those observations of disappearing articles, eroding links, and faulty URL  
address the technical decay of online access. Another view of the half-life debate is the 
diminishing value or usefulness of knowledge or content over time. The half-life of 
knowledge can be defined as the time span between its attainment and its 
obsolescence.427 Software trainer Cathy Gonzales of the University of Northern Texas 
pointed out over a decade ago that half of what was known in the world had not been 
known ten years prior. In other words, the amount of online-accessible knowledge in 
the world had doubled over those ten years.428  
Marketing professionals assign another meaning to the half-life of digital 
communications: the waning of public interest over time in particular technologies or 
platforms. It is appropriate, in marketing terms, to speak of emails reaching a half-life as 
a social networking preference as a large percentage of users have migrated to Facebook 
and other SNSs. Similarly the usefulness of data sets might be described as reaching 
their half life with time, as possessing only half their scientific usefulness compared to 
when they were first compiled. As much of learning is now online as a shared activity 
                                                
423 Daniel Gomes & Mario J. Silvia, Modeling Information Persistence on the Web, Proceedings of 
the 6th International Conference on Web Engineering, 1 (2006). 
424 Angelo, Google, supra fn 79 at 23.   
425 Id. 
426 Meg Leta Ambrose, A Digital Dark Age and the Right to be Forgotten, 17 J. INTERNET L. (2013) 
1. 
427 See, for example, Cathy Gonzalez, The role of blended learning in the world of technology (2004), 
http://www.unt.edu/benchmarks/archives/2004/september04/eis.htm.  




rather than an internal, individualistic experience in a library stall, the study of the 
persistent value of knowledge is an important pursuit; knowledge acquisition is altered 
to some extent every time new tools are utilized and skills developed.  
 
g Is Digital Speech Different? 
Who among us has not been alarmed at the bluntness of expression used in the 
texting or YouTube commentary authored by digital natives? If the compression of 
words and fragmentation of meaning has you scratching your head, consider this 
fictional text authored by an adult to suggest how a casualty of the massacre at Bull 
Run might have communicated to his wife on the evening before his death if texting had 
been available 60 years ago:  
 
 “rly scrd. mite not mk it. luv u. C u on otr side.”429 
 
As every prosecutor and defence counsel is aware, trial outcomes can turn on the 
indecipherability of one term or line in a social media message (SMS)430 that frustrates 
attempts to successfully link cause and effect. When SMS users suggest that they 
employ two languages to communicate with their close communities, the truncated, 
rebus-like form used for social texting and a more grammatically correct form for more 
professional or academic communications, a recent study supports their claim.431 Study 
participants spoke of their ability to speak two languages, to effortlessly move from one 
to the other depending on the medium. As the study reported,  
students are generally aware of the context in which they are writing and they 
can switch to the appropriate register or style when writing formally for 
                                                
429 Peggy Drexler, The Importance of being Fluent in the Language of texting, FORBES (23 June 
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peggydrexler/2014/06/23/the-importance-of-being-fluent-
in-the-language-of-texting/. 
430 A texting acronym for ‘short message service’ or the text message itself. 
431 Shazia Aziz et al., The Impact of Texting/SMS Language on Academic Writing of Students – What 
do we need to panic about? 55 ELIXIR LING. & TRANS. J. 12884 (2013), (reporting on 50 
undergraduates (42 males and 8 females) in Bachelor of Computer Engineering and Bachelor 
of Telecommunication Engineering classes in Lahore India. Participants between the ages of 
19 and 25 years were asked to write an essay which was analyzed for texting features.) 
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academic purposes despite the fact that texting is their common way of 
communication.432  
Those results pose the question: might digital language comprise its own form of 
communication?  
In canvassing the harm that we need to prove for legal actions in reputational 
damage, it is relevant to consider whether new norms should be adopted for 
characterizing speech on the Internet. Given the democratization of online speech (free, 
spontaneous, and open cultural expression) it has been suggested we allocate less 
probative weight and meaning to such utterances. 433  The human sources of 
communications, so critical to acceptance of traditional media accounts, are often 
suppressed online. Cues about authority and status can be hidden, as one psychological 
study of Internet behavior points out,  
Although one’s identity in the outside world ultimately may shape power in 
cyberspace, what mostly determines the influence on others is one’s skill in 
communicating (including writing skills), persistence, the quality of one’s ideas, 
and technical know-how.434  
 
With the lack of editorial second thought for bloggers, tweeters, and other participants 
in virtual reportage and other new media uses, it becomes practically infeasible to read 
the tone of derisive material. The normative debate usually goes like this: the Internet is 
a communicative tool with a wireless method of transmission but otherwise of similar 
purpose and method as offline communications, and so the customary societal norms 
should apply; on the other hand, Internet content is “located in another time and zone” 
and therefore not subject to the norms of traditional journalism.435  Yuval Karniel of 
IDC Herziliya in Israel takes the position that “an anonymous, instant, unfiltered and 
unmediated statement” for which there is no source and “which does not make grounded 
factual claims” should not constitute a cause of action for defamation.436  He views the 
role of blogs and other informal journalism as the preliminary flagging of issues that the 
mainstream offline press later might assess as worthy of more formal investigation, as 
                                                
432 Id at 12889. 
433  Yuval Karniel, Defamation on the Internet: A New Approach to Libel in Cyberspace, 2 J. INTL 
MED. & ENT. 215, 216 -219 (2008). 
434 John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCH. & BEH. 324 (2004). 
435 Id. at 218. 
436 Id. at 234. 
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was the case with the Clinton-Lewinski allegations.437 Such investigations could lead to 
publication in traditional media, argues Karniel, but are not to be valued as authentic 
information source in themselves.438  
A counter position has been taken by Meg Ambrose who suggests that the 
purpose of self-publishing online is to express opinions and convey news in the 
language of traditional media but using electronic platforms. That opinion holds that, 
for the digital author, all online speech maintains a fluidity due to its ad hoc, unstudied, 
and unedited nature and is itself a contributor to our moral autonomy, to our self-
presentation. Our expression via online blogs, chats, commentary, and emails affirms 
our own moral career, and that justifies constraining others ‘in their attempts to 
engineer and directly, or indirectly shape’ our identities.439 Texting, therefore, is its own 
means of expression, its own language.  
Ethan Zuckerman, founder of Facebook, points out that the difference with 
online comments (within the context of the hate or ‘dangerous’ speech incited by trolls) 
can be characterized as one of access: the Internet creates an environment where we are 
aware of speech we would not hear otherwise. Most of us in pre-online times, he argues, 
would not have been aware of what speech is shared at a KKK meeting, and many of us 
would not have heard the sexist jokes that were told in male-dominated locker rooms. 
Online speech permits a crossing to formerly closed communities.440 Researcher Susan 
Benesch of the Berkman Center of Internet & Society at Harvard University defines the 
online-offline speech discrepancy involved in hate or dangerous speech as one perceived 
in the effect such speech has on people. With online speech environments we can 
examine the effect of speech on people through tracking both responses and effects. In 
offline environments, however, ‘it’s very hard to measure what reactions dangerous 
speech leads to’.441   Zuckerman and Benesch’s comments introduce the constitutional 
                                                
437 Id. 
438 Id., p. 237. 
439 Angelo, Google, supra fn 79 at  22. 
440 Ethan Zuckerman, Susan Benesch on dangerous speech and counterspeech, Blog (2 Mar. 2014) 
http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2014/03/25/susan-benesch-on-dangerous-speech-and-
counterspeech/. 
441 Susan Benesch, Troll Wrastling for Beginners: Data-Driven Methods to Decrease Hatred Online, 
Video, Berkman Center for Internet & Society (25 Mar. 2014) 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2014/03/benesch. 
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parameters of freedom of expression in more ad hoc forms of online expression, a 
discussion we shall take up more vigorously in Chapter IV.  
 
3.2 How Harm is Done 
a          Exposure Harms: the Technology and Case Examples  
In terms of how reputational injury can be practically achieved using the Web, I 
examine three sources that, either through attributed or anonymous postings, inflict 
shame or ridicule than can be easily ascertained by other members of a virtual 
community. Those sources include: exposure by other users; exposure by ourselves; and 
exposure by journalists.442 My focus continues to be the individual Internet user: 
reference to corporate, government, or other institutional activity is used to survey the 
extent of the threat to that user’s reputation. 
 
i Exposure by Other Users  
The most common, and probatively useful, online activity by other users that 
damages reputation involves ‘flaming’, ‘outing’, tagging, and creation of false ‘mirror’ 
social networking sites. 443  Flaming can be defined as the hostile and insulting 
interaction between Internet users, often expressed through profanity. Flamers 
subscribe to forums, chatrooms, email, Xbox or PlayStation interactive games and 
video-sharing sites with the intent of embarrassing other players by revealing their 
identities and personal information to pierce the anonymity of their chosen pseudonyms 
or avatars. Flaming is routinely generated by political, religious, or philosophical topics 
and the objective is to impose emotional and reputational injury for all participants to 
see.  
Some websites create an interactive environment that attracts the participation 
of flamers or ‘trolls’,444 sowers of discord through their deliberate, inflammatory 
messaging. Such online provocateurs are increasingly the subject of social science 
                                                
442 Exposure by journalism is a method that is covered more generally throughout this 
dissertation. 
443 Cyberbullying and cyberstalking are online predatory behaviors that are traditionally 
addressed by the criminal law and are beyond the scope of this paper.  
444 The Chambers Dictionary (12 ed) (2011): to ‘flame’ is to produce ‘an insulting, rude or 
controversial email message’ and to ‘troll’ is to ‘make a conscious attempt to provoke 
controversy or disagreement on the Internet’ more generally.)  
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research, and developing theories to explain flaming or trolling include deindividuation 
(a psychological state where inner restraints are lost when individuals are not seen or 
acknowledged as individuals), 445  and the disinhibition effect (the de-inhibiting of 
behavior prompted by anonymity resulting in more aggressive or punitive activity).446 
Such behaviors can attack the emotional integrity of others either through individual 
action or group behaviors. With the latter, individual identity is absorbed by the group, 
and individual responsibility for actions is diffuse due to the number of actors. One way 
to reduce deindividuation is to make group members more self-aware by addressing 
them by name, pointing out the harm they are doing.447 Another is to report (or self-
report) such anonymous attacks online, as this former troll reports:  
After processing what I did, I was disgusted by how I acted and I sent [the 
victims] a message and talked to them in private. I did apologize … You are 
proving nothing when you use someone's personal information for your own 
vandetta.[sic].448 
 
Outing originally involved “an act of telling the public that a person is 
homosexual when that person does not want the public to know”449 For example, in a 
survey of studies exploring the low reportage levels in same sex domestic assault cases, 
the authors determined that threats of ‘outing’ the victim’s sexual orientation is used by 
the abuser to isolate the victim even further.450 The threat to go online with such 
personal information compounds the shame. It could also bring fear of loss of family 
emotional support or the ability to sustain oneself financially.451  
                                                
445 Christina Demetriou & Andrew Silke, A Criminological Internet ‘Sting’: Experimental Evidence of 
Illegal and Deviant Visits to a Website Trap, 43 BRIT. J. CRIM., 213, 214.  
446 Suler, supra fn 434 at 322; see more generally P. Ellison et al. Anonymity and Aggressive Driving 
Behavior: A Field Study, 10 J. SOC. BEH. &  PERS., 265 (1995). 
447  See further Mike Perry, Deindividuation, Living in a Social World, 
http://www.units.miamioh.edu/psybersite/fans/deindividuation.shtml .  
448 Gotham City (Gameplay Discussion), Sony Online Entertainment (13 Dec. 2013), see generally 
https://forums.station.sony.com/dcuo/index.php?forums/gotham-city-gameplay-
discussion.2/page-5 . For further exploration see Teo Keipi et al.  Who prefers anonymous self-
expression online? A survey-based study of Finns aged 15–30 years, 18 Inf., Comm. & Soc. (2015) 
(correlating anonymous Finnish Facebook users with both grandiosity, a component of 
narcissism, and low self-esteem; users are younger, highly trusting, with few offline friends. 
449 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/outing. 
450 Hadar Aviram and Annick Persinger, Perceiving and Reporting Domestic Violence Incidents in 
Unconventional Settings: A Vignette Survey Study, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 159 (2012). 
451 Id.  
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The meaning of ‘outing’ has been expanded through popular usage. It now 
conveys the more general idea of exposing undesirable aspects of a person’s self or 
experiences and includes the activities of Anonymous, an international collective of 
activists and hacktivists,452 whose rationale is to cause the public exposure of personal 
secrets or public wrongs. For example, a news article has described as ‘outing’ the 
Anonymous identification of the man who taunted Canadian teen Amanda Todd into 
performing sexually explicit acts on her webcam, ultimately resulting in her suicide.453 
In a show of similar journalistic altruism, the media blog Gawker claimed to be the first 
to ‘out’ Toronto mayor Rob Ford’s use of crack cocaine by blogging about its viewing of 
a video showing Ford’s indiscretion.454 The Gawker founder claimed his ‘outing’ 
contributed to Ford’s confession of illicit drug use.455   Those examples suggest outers 
might be motivated by a sense of noble cause, of exposing evil and righting an injustice. 
Gamer ‘outers’ give no such impression, however, although their incentives remain 
relatively unexplored by research.  
There appears to be an unwritten social code amongst bloggers that anonymous 
contributors will not be exposed. The reaction of a science writer to the outing of a 
fellow writer explains the preference for anonymity:  
 
There's still a lot of fudging around, figuring out the boundaries of our online 
interactions. When people play games like outing someone who's using a 
pseudonym, they're … declaring to the community that "I believe that our 
community standards should say that this is an appropriate way to deal with 
conflict".456  
 
                                                
452 Hacktivism indicates anonymous group action to convey a political message through 
manipulation of a website. 
453 Sady Doyle, Outing online sexual predators is a sensationalist stopgap, GUARDIAN (17 Oct. 
2012), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/17/outing-online-sexual-
predators-gawker-anonymous. 
454 Gawker is a blog founded by Nick Denton and Elizabeth Spiers and based in New York 
City that bills itself as ‘the source for daily Manhattan media news and gossip’. Founded in 
2003, it focuses on celebrities and the media industry. See Documents: Rob Ford did ‘Hezza’, Tries to 
Buy Crack Video with a Car, Gawker.com (12 Apr. 2013), http://gawker.com/documents-rob-
ford-did-hezza-tried-to-buy-crack-vid-1476729771.  
455  Gawker Ends Hunt for Purported Crack Video, CBC Radio podcast (18 July 2013), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/gawker-ends-hunt-for-purported-rob-ford-crack-
video-1.1370154. 
456  CC Mark, On outing in the sciblogging community, Scientopia (21 Jan. 2014) 
http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/2014/01/21/on-outing-in-the-sciblogging-community/. 
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In some instances, anonymity is a safety precaution: 
 
Some people [choose anonymity] to avoid professional retaliation…there are 
tenure committees at many universities that would hold blogging against a 
junior faculty; there are companies that don't allow employees to blog under 
their real names; there are people who blog under a pseudonym in order to 
protect themselves from physical danger and violence!457  
 
Within that frame, to expose a fellow participant is to breach an unwritten code of 
mutual trust and support. 
 ‘Tagging’ represents another potentially harmful activity. It serves the same 
function as keyword searches by attaching a word or phrase to a digital object, such as a 
document or photograph, for easy retrieval. Facebook reported in 2011 that “Every day, 
people add more than 100 million tags to photos on Facebook.” 458  The social 
networking server (SNS) promotes tagging as “an easy way to share photos and 
memories” because, unlike photographs that get forgotten in a camera or an unshared 
album, “tagged photos help you and your friends relive everything.”459 Tagging occurs 
in two ways: through the identification of individuals in a photograph by a user that is 
then locked into the memory of networking sites through facial recognition software; 
and the insertion of single words on a site that provides a link to that photograph. Both 
methods instantaneously create a tracking system of images. For example, when you 
post a photograph on your Facebook, MySpace, Instagram or other SNS, and tag 
persons in the photograph, those tags create a link to your SNS account, in Facebook, 
for example, through your Facebook Timeline.  
You can also tag by creating a status update, letting friends know who you are 
with at any given moment. That update is conveyed instantaneously and with your 
implied consent: unless you opt-out of such tagging in your privacy settings, each time 
you enter a message or image on your FaceBook or other social messaging account, that 
SNS autonomously sends an alert or update by email to each of the subscribers within 
your bank of ‘friends’. Anyone who sees that update can click on any of your friends’ 
name and go to their Facebook Timeline without invitation, unless your friends have 
                                                
457 Id. 




indicated in their privacy settings that they do not welcome such access. Facebook does 
warn against that activity: “if you or a friend tags someone in your post, the post could 
be visible to the audience you selected plus friends of the tagged person.”460 The friend 
you have tagged will also receive notice via their Facebook account or email that they 
have been tagged. And so the depth of their exposure grows.461 While Facebook 
architecture provides for reversing tagging of your photographs, it is not at all a 
straightforward or visible process.462 
 The facial recognition involved in Facebook tagging is controversial for its  
automatic default. As well, in order to access privacy settings on the SNS to delete your 
photograph, you must subscribe to that system, a requirement that artificially inflates  
the subscribership figures of that SNS and that assumes a certain technical facility on 
your part. Another concern is that the facial recognition technology resides in 
Facebook’s servers and not on the user’s laptop, giving de facto control of the content to 
the server, not to you.  
EU policymakers in the area of online privacy are more proactive in their efforts 
to warn subscribers about such privacy hazards as tagging,463 while Americans prefer 
the “notice and choice” system in keeping with the US entrepreneurial perspective. One 
commentator notes that such facial recognition technologies create “the biggest creep 
factor” if it were to fall into the hands of governments.”464 That fear might already have 
been realized as government databases already include sufficient facial data of our every 
mundane function from renewing our driver’s license to updating travel documentation.  
                                                
460What is tagging and how does it work? Facebook, 
http://www.facebook.com/help/124970597582337. Similar facial recognition technology is 
offered by Google’s Picasa and Apple’s iPhoto.  
461 What is Timeline review? How do I turn Timeline review on? Facebook, 
http://www.facebook.com/help/168229546579373(advising that Facebook warns a photograph 
taken by you or a third party might show up in Timeline Review, a function that requires an 
active opt-out, or News Feed.) 
462 Smith, Facebook Photos: Opt-Out or Tag You’re It, Networkworld (7 Jan. 2011) 
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2228269/microsoft-subnet/facebook-photos–opt-out-or-
tag-you-re-it.html. 
463  Online Privacy, Europa.eu, http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/online-privacy. Click on 
‘Radio Frequency Identification Devices’ for an itemization of tagging activities. The principal 
concern in Europe is that, “[u]nlike ubiquitous UPC bar-code technology, RFID technology 
does not require contact or line of sight for communication.” 
464  Ian Paul, Facebook Photo Tagging: A Privacy Guide, PCWorld (9 June 2011) 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/229870/Facebook_Photo_Tagging_A_Privacy_Guide.html. 
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 Tagging presents exposure risks in job searches, university admissions, 465 and 
other opportunities.466 A 2013 commercial study of personal postings incurred as much 
damage as those describing illegal drug use, sexual behavior, gun use, and alcohol 
consumption.467  Tagging is also an enabling tool for cyberstalkers and identity theft 
perpetrators. As Pew Internet’s Lee Rainie summarized the exposure of tags: “It’s hard 
to have privacy and be social at the same time. It’s the classic human 
struggle/tension.”468 The future of tagging might be secure, however, if only because 
there is no community norm discouraging it.469  
Revenge porn and the creation of false social media accounts comprise another 
category of online vindication that risks reputational harm in several ways: through 
defamatory content, the intentional infliction of emotional harm or the enabling of 
identity theft.470 In both activities, an anonymous user posts nude or compromising 
images of others for their embarrassment potential or creates a false account using 
profile and other personal information that mirrors a valid account. In the latter case 
the perpetrator uses the bogus site to duplicate the target’s contact list in order to send 
false and damaging content. Offending posts might even involve false information about 
the recipient, damaging her reputation at the same time. False trust is built by engaging 
the target’s list of ‘friends’ in order to announce the new account and attract input by 
well-intended personal and professional contacts. That information can further expose 
the target. This ruse is notoriously employed by ex-spouses or former friends aiming to 
diminish the professional or social credibility of the target.   
                                                
465 Natasha Singer, They Loved Your G.P.A. Then They Saw Your Tweets, NYTIMES (9 Nov. 2013) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/business/they-loved-your-gpa-then-they-saw-your-
tweets.html (reporting a commercial telephone survey of 381 college admissions officers who 
admitted to visiting applicants’ Facebook or other social media page to learn more about 
them). 
466  Peter Harris, The three things that employers look for the most in your social media profiles, 
Workpolis (22 Feb. 2014), http://www.workopolis.com/content/advice/article/the-three-things-
that-employers-want-to-find-out-about-you-online/. 
467 Id.  
468 Mark Glaser, Top 10 Media Stories of 2010: WikiLeaks, Facebook, iPad Mania, PBS (30 Dec. 
2010) http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2010/12/top-10-media-stories-of-2010-wikileaks-
facebook-ipad-mania364. 
469  Lillian Edwards, Privacy, Law, Code and Social Networking Sites, in IAN BROWN, ED., 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET, University of Oxford UK, 
19, (2013),  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2200163.  
470 In most common law jurisdictions infliction of emotional harm is addressed through civil 
torts while identity theft attracts criminal sanctions.  
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The practice is sufficiently widespread that social networking innovators are 
publicizing the extent of the problem.471 While laws dealing with mirror sites vary from 
one jurisdiction to another, search companies are taking some responsibility for the easy 
access of personal information by employing facial recognition technologies or other 
authenticating precautions.472 Social media sites are also instilling policies about the 
acceptable parameters of posts, with Twitter, Reddit, and Blogger announcing privacy 
changes.473 Empirical evidence is starting to emerge assessing the extent of the damage: 
a 2012 study of discrepancies in authentic and fake Facebook accounts determined that 
1) almost 60 percent of fake Facebook creators claim to be bisexual, 10 times more than 
real users; 2) fake accounts indicate having six times more friends than real users; 3) 
fake accounts use photo tags over 100 times more than real users; and 4) fake accounts 
claim to be female in 97 percent of the cases, as opposed to 40 percent for real users.474  
The ultimate aim of such fake ‘friending’ is to create the widest possible networked 
audience to damage the target’s reputation.475 
Anonymity for social or professional reasons provides legitimate reasons for 
maintaining fake accounts. For example, a performance artist creates a work that delves 
into issues about being black and queer within an Islamic environment, a pursuit she 
                                                
471 See, for example E. Protalinski, Facebook: 5-6% of accounts are fake, ZDNet (8 Mar. 2012), 
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-5-6-of-accounts-are-fake/10167(wherein the 
author relates the concern of Facebook authorities that, in 2012, somewhere between 42.25 
million and 50.70 million Facebook accounts were fake, according to measurements of monthly 
and daily active users as per the company’s own estimates.) 
472  See, for example,  ‘How to Reveal a Fake Facebook Account’, Wikihow,  
http://www.wikihow.com/Reveal-a-Fake-Facebook-Account (explaining that “Google uses 
facial recognition and other algorithms to match a picture, and will either return an exact 
match (with information like names), or pictures similar to the original.”) 
473 Brian Barrett, Twitter Finally Banned Revenge Porn. Now How to Enforce it? WIRED (12 Mar. 
2015)  http://www.wired.com/2015/03/twitter-bans-revenge-porn/. 
474 Study by private security firm Barracuda Networks as reported by E. Protalinski, How to 
spot a fake Facebook profile (infographic)’, ZDNet (4 Feb. 2012), 
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/how-to-spot-a-fake-facebook-profile-infographic/8580.  
475 Id. The discovery of fake Twitter accounts following the campaign of presidential hopeful 
Mitt Romney, and the selling of tweets to give the impression of a significantly more engaged 
public in his campaign than was true, is a similar activity but intended to enhance, rather than 
damage, individual reputation and hence not within the framework of this dissertation. See 




does not wish known to friends and family;476 or police create false accounts to 
investigate political subversives or online child stalkers. 477  Discrediting a Facebook 
user to family and former friends through malicious fake social networking accounts is 
criminalized in some jurisdictions under laws of personation and identity theft. The 
arrest of a New Jersey resident was an event highlighted by Facebook authorities as an 
opportunity for users to comment on the issue. The tactic garnered 150 responses, most 
opposed.478 The story was similarly posted on the American Bar Association website to 
alert practitioners in criminal law to the difficulty of prosecuting out-of-state offenders 
as only the states of California and New York have laws specifically banning online 
identity theft.479 Such public education aims at deterring fakeries through an emphasis 
on shaming and the reputational repercussions of crime itself.  
 
ii Exposure by Self 
The term “user-generated content” (UGC) describes self-created and self-
published online content.480 It can be distinguished from engineered content from an 
established authority with a high level of oversight that created credibility with public 
readers.481 UGC is the primary source of self-exposure. The myriad forms in which that 
can occur include photographs, videos, podcasts, articles, and blogs.  Social networking 
is completely user-generated and regenerative, in that they provide hyperlinks to other 
social network accounts and UGC.   
                                                
476 Alicia Eler, Why People Have Fake Facebook Profiles’, Readwrite (23 Jan. 2012) 
http://readwrite.com/2012/01/23/why_people_have_fake_facebook_profiles – 
awesm=~oGOrS2OC. 
477  Belleville Woman Charged over Facebook Identity Theft, Facecrooks (27 Oct. 2011) 
http://facecrooks.com/Internet-Safety-Privacy/Belleville-Woman-Charged-over-Facebook-
Identity-Theft.html/ (describing that the woman’s fake Facebook profile was alleged to have 
depicted her ex-boyfriend, a narcotics detective, as a sexual deviant and a drug addict.)  
478 As accessed on Facebook 10 June 2014 at 
<https://www.facebook.com/Facecrooks/posts/280129868676470. 
479 Mark Hansen, NJ Woman Can Be Prosecuted Over Fake Facebook Profile, Judge Rules, ABA 
JOURNAL  (4 Nov. 2011), 
http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/woman_can_be_prosecuted_over_fake_facebook_p
rofile_judge_rules/ 
480 Unless the content is dealt with anonymously, in which case attribution becomes a matter of 
forensic skill.  
481 John Krumm et al., User Generated Content, PERVASIVE COMPUTING (Oct. – Dec. 2008), 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=4653465 
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UGC is technologically possible due to the Web 2.0 second generation of 
services that enables user collaboration and sharing.482 With Web 2.0 our computers 
and mobile devices become platforms for producing, consuming, exchanging, and 
remixing data from innumerable sources. Those functions expand our role from content 
consumer to producer, publisher, critic, journalist, public performer, confidant, 
commentator, broadcaster and, when our activities cross the boundaries set by law, 
perpetrator. The cultural ethos behind Web 2.0 is collaboration, cooperation, 
interactivity, and social networking.483 
UGC also includes the concept of sourcing from a crowd, or the harnessing of 
the power of users. For example, with peer-to-peer (P2P) technology every participant 
becomes a server; the BitTorrent website, for example, promotes itself as offering a 
protocol484 that enables users to download files quickly and to upload or distribute parts 
of them at the same time.  BitTorrent is often used for sharing very large and popular 
files as it is a lot cheaper, faster and more efficient than a commercial download.485  
The resultant surge in Web 2.0 distribution and sharing of content has both 
positive effects, such as the empowering of ordinary citizens on a previously unimagined 
scale, and negative repercussions, including the creation of content that harms the 
creator’s reputation and potentially breaks the law. On the face of it, such self-exposure 
would seem to have two principal causes: user ignorance of the background mechanics 
of ‘free’ online services, or an impetuous response to socializing cues that we later regret 
or outgrow.  Regarding the former, ignorance could be related to unfamiliarity with 
privacy settings offered by site administrators. For example, when creating a Facebook 
account, the subscriber is prompted to answer a number of questions regarding 
intended recipients, specific conditions for sharing, and duration. If those questions are 
not addressed, the default action is full exposure to anyone who searches the homepage. 
                                                
482 First used by Media Inc., publisher of computer texts and technology-related conferences, 
under the ownership of Tim O’Reilly in 2004. See further Oreillynet.Com, 
http://www.oreilly.com/pub/au/27 - Biography . 
483 Carlisle George & Jackie Scerri, Web 2.0 and User-Generated Content: legal challenges in the new 
frontier, J.  INF., L. & TECH. (JILT) (2007), reporting that one of the most common legal 
issues regarding UGC is the number of defamatory entries on Wikipedia. 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2007_2/george_scerri/ 
484 A set of guiding rules and procedures.  
485 A Beginner’s Guide to BitTorrent, http://netforbeginners.about.com/od/peersharing/tp/Torrent-
Download-Guide.htm  
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Adjusting those settings takes thought: studies exist that suggest younger subscribers 
are more adept at orchestrating such privacy settings, but also increasingly more prone 
to over-sharing with their circle of ‘friends’.486 In Figure 2 below, the comparative 




 Table 2:   Social Media Profiles: what teens post – 2006 vs. 2012 
 
As indicated, teenagers from 12 to 17 are sharing more personal information in 
all categories than those surveyed six years ago. That change indicates a major shift in 
                                                
486 Mary Madden et al., Teens, Social Media, and Privacy, Pew Research (21 May 2013), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/05/21/teens-social-media-and-privacy/. N=802 in 2012; 
N=485 in 2006. 
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attitudes about privacy, particularly regarding photo-sharing which have become the 
preferred currency of social exchange. The significant surge in sharing email addresses 
and mobile phone numbers suggests a general relaxation in personal standards of 
privacy amongst friends. Results were also analyzed along gender and racial lines, with 
boys showing a higher tendency to share their mobile phone numbers than girls and a 
less likelihood of African-Americans disclosing their real names on their social media 
profile than white teens.487 
Opportunities for exposure are significant: in 2011, for example, 85% of US 
college students spent an average of 6.2 hours per week on Facebook488 and 77% of 
college students in another study used Snapchat on a daily basis during the first few 
months of 2014.489 Despite the requirement that all new subscribers to social media sites 
read and agree to Terms of Use to reduce privacy risks, the attraction of socialization 
through such platforms and devices seems to cloud the prospect of subsequent regret, 
embarrassment, or loss of opportunity. 
Socio-psychologists question why social media users display a propensity to 
over-share personal details. A self-reporting study suggests motivations include vanity 
that exceeds caution, and extroverted needs to maintain social ties.490 Rather than 
escaping from or compensating for their offline personality, social networking service 
(SNS) users appear to extend their offline personalities into the online domain. So 
extroverts seek out virtual social engagements that “leave behind a behavioral residue in 
                                                
487 The Pew study sample size for African-American teens was relatively small (n=95), but 
judged to be statistically significant. 
488 Jamison Barr & Emmy Lugus, Digital Threats on Campus: Examining the Duty of Colleges to 
Protect Their Social Networking Students, 33 W. NEW ENGLAND L. REV., 757, 761 (2011).   
489 Similarly, 77% of US college students use Snapchat on a daily basis, according to a study by 
New York-based marketing company Sumpto, as reported by Kurt Wagner, Study finds 77% of 
College Students use Snapchat Daily, Mashable.Com (24 Feb. 2014), 
http://mashable.com/2014/02/24/snapchat-study-college-students/. Study Breaks College 
Media reported that, of 260 college students polled in the Fall of 2013, 95% used Facebook, 
80% tweeted, 73% posted images on Instagram, 48% posted photos on Pinterest, and 40% 
used Google+. See further S. Viner, Social Media Statistics: How College Students are Using Social 
Networking, Study Breaks College Media (7 Feb. 2014), 
http://studybreakscollegemedia.com/2014/social-media-statistics-how-college-students-are-
using-social-networking. 
490 Samuel A. Gosling et al., Manifestations of Personality in Online Social Networks: Self-Reported 
Facebook-Related Behaviors and Observable Profile Information, 14 CYBERPSYCH. BEH. SOC. NETW. 
483 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3180765/ . 
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the form of friends lists and picture postings.”491 The study concludes that, rather than 
characterizing over-sharing behavior as an escape from reality, SNSs exist as a 
microcosm of people's larger social worlds.  
Such behavior can have therapeutic value as well, especially for emotionally uns 
or apprehensive individuals.492 Online interactions offer a non-threatening experience, 
social bonding, and a buffer for negative feelings in the short.493 On the other hand, 
psychological theories of disinhibition and disindividuation, as discussed above, also 
throw light on the propensity of some SNS users to post selfies in socially questionable 
situations.494  Social psychologist John Suler speaks of “toxic disinhibition”, the elevated 
tone or uncharacteristic behaviors exhibited online. In his words, 
We witness rude language, harsh criticisms, anger, hatred, even threats. Or 
people visit the dark underworld of the Internet—places of pornography, crime, 
and violence—territory they would never explore in the real world.495  
 
And yet to choose not to be on SNSs has its social costs as well.496 Postings that are too 
antithetical to the social expectations of our peer communities create exclusion, as was 
apparently experienced by Canadian teenager Raeteah Parsons when photographs of 
her alleged gang rape were posted online.497 Oxford University’s Lillian Edwards is 
more circumspect about the causes of such anguish: she suggests SNSs have become the 
whipping boy for “almost every possible social blight imaginable by the mass media”, 
                                                
491 Id. at 485. 
492 Jonah Berger & Eva Buechel, Facebook Therapy? Why Do People Share Self-Relevant Content 
Online?,  SSRN, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2013148.  
493 Id. at 3. Berger and Buechel tested 81 participants and found those who were emotionally 
unstable were more likely to post self-relevant information online. 
494 See, for example, Ian Sparks, Schoolboy French journalists annoy White House staff by taking selfies 
while covering Francois Hollande’s U.S. visit, DAILY MAIL (13 Feb. 2014), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2558620/French-journalists-annoy-White-House-
staff-taking-selfies-covering-Francois-Hollandes-U-S-visit.html; Duquesne cancels Rivera over 
‘selfie’, DUQUESNE STUDENT MEDIA (15 Sept. 2013)detailing the cancellation of Geraldo 
Rivera of Fox News as a participant in a Duquesne University symposium due to a shirtless 
posted ‘selfie’ on Twitter; Judith Soal, Barack Obama and David Cameron pose for selfie with Danish 
PM, GUARDIAN (11 Dec. 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/10/nelson-
mandela-world-leaders-selfie(suggesting ‘selfie’ of Obama and other heads of state at Nelson 
Mandela’s funeral created diplomatic embarrassment at high levels).  
495 Suler, supra fn 434 at 321. 
496 Edwards, Privacy, supra fn 469.  
497 Kevin Dolak, Rehtaeh Parsons Suicide: Justice Minister Revisiting Alleged Rape Case, ABC NEWS 
(11 Apr. 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/International/rehtaeh-parsons-suicide-justice-minister-
revisiting-alleged-rape/story?id=18924592.  
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especially in relation to young people, from encouraging social predators and sexual 
grooming to inciting and enabling fraud, deception, stalking, harassment, bullying, 
abuse and victimization. SNSs are also blamed for “encouraging young people to inflict 
antisocial behavior on each other.”498  
The trade-off for social media companies offering convenient technologies is the 
use of our content for marketing purposes. For example, Facebook Terms of Use claim 
that subscribers own all personal information they post on their profile page, including 
photographs. That statement contradicts another Facebook provision that, upon 
subscribing, users “grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, 
worldwide license to use any intellectual property (IP) content that you post on or in 
connection with Facebook’.499 That IP License should end when you delete your 
content, except for third party access that is not retrievable and probably has been 
retransmitted to unknown recipients.  
SNSs also freely use the email addresses of subscribers and their ‘friends’ to 
inform them about new content postings, endorsements, and changes in location. 
Facebook and LinkedIn subscribers receive an average of two emails per day notifying 
them of new endorsements or postings by friends. That routine has been challenged in a 
San Jose, California district court regarding the practice of professional networking site 
LinkedIn to send several sequential emails to friends of its subscribers, inviting them to 
endorse those subscribers.500 The judgment determined that, while the initial email is on 
consent from the account holder as per the terms of the user agreement, subsequent 
requests are not. Those emails could injure users’ reputations by giving the impression 
they are harassing their contacts or that they are the type of people who spam their 
contacts.501  
In contrast, the same San Jose judge denied certification for a class action 
against Google Inc. that would have marked the largest class action case in US 
litigation history. The complainants were disgruntled email users who accused Google 
                                                
498 Edwards, supra fn 469 at 7. 
499 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms.  
500 Jonathan Stempel, LinkedIn must face customer lawsuit over e-mail addresses, GLOBE AND MAIL 
(13 June 2014) http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/13/linkedin-lawsuit-
idUSL2N0OU0LB20140613 . 
501 Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., Case No. 13-cv-04303, U.S. District Court, Northern District of 
California (San Jose). 
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of intercepting, reading, and mining the content of their email messages.502  The Court 
denied certification on the basis that consent is an individually determined matter and 
cannot be pleaded on a class action basis. Similar cases accusing Yahoo!, Facebook, and 
Hulu of monetizing personal content for an online advertising market are pending.503  
  
iii         Exposure by Journalists  
The speed of news coverage is also accelerating to meet viewer demand for 
social media as a source of up-to-the-minute journalism. Mainstream news services, 
such as major television networks, have responded by using software to incorporate 
social media reports, via Twitter and Facebook, into their real time news broadcasts.504  
Such media integration allows more accurate and timely coverage from the field, as seen 
in the 2011 Tsunami in Japan, and the 2013 US presidential elections. A ‘social media 
newsroom’ is evolving where journalists develop stories by engaging with communities 
on Twitter, YouTube, Google+ and anyone with an Internet connection. Those sources 
then feed into live onscreen television coverage, along with items from news services 
like Reuters and newspapers such as the New York Times, Le Monde or The Guardian. 
505 That integrated approach maintains the impression that major networks remain the 
official information source.  
Digital news media has expanded from a corporate-controlled entity to 
unmediated citizen journalism. That shift raises the risk of hyperbole, inflammatory 
speech, and libelous commentary. In addition, a declining readership and failing 
economic model of traditional newsrooms puts into question the ongoing viability of a 
mass media based on advertising and circulation. In response, many journalists have 
created non-profit news sites seeking support from foundations and viewer donations. 
                                                
502 Re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation, Case No. 13-md-02430, U.S. District Court, Northern 
District of California (San Jose). 
503 Joel Rosenblatt, Google Won’t Face Group E-Mail Privacy Lawsuit: Judge, BLOOMBERG (19 
Mar. 2014) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-19/google-won-t-face-group-e-mail-
privacy-lawsuit-judge-rules.html. 
504 Grant Buckler, Breaking a story with the speed of social media, GLOBE AND MAIL (1 Dec. 2011), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/small-business/sb-digital/biz-categories-
technology/breaking-a-story-with-the-speed-of-social-media/article4179877/ . 




Such entrepreneurial journalism challenges journalistic standards of impartial coverage. 
Equally at risk in this new arrangement are journalistic reputations. 
 
b Disclosure Harms and Case Studies 
This section will detail the three most prevalent opportunities for disclosure of 
personal information generated online: the mishandling of Big Data; activities of data 
brokers; and the refusal of take-down orders. Reports of studies and cases will be used 
throughout to illustrate key principles and to personalize the harm to reputation 
suffered as a result.  
 
i         Mishandling of Big Data 
Big Data can be defined as data sets with sizes beyond the ability of commonly 
used software tools to capture, curate, manage, and process within a tolerably elapsed 
time.506 Descriptions of Big Data capabilities and collections are replete with awe-
inspiring quantifiers, as seen in this excerpt from Science Magazine in 2011: 
 
Data sets grow in size in part because they are increasingly being gathered by 
ubiquitous information-sensing mobile devices, aerial sensory technologies 
(remote sensing), software logs, cameras, microphones, radio-frequency 
identification (RFID) readers, and wireless sensor networks. The world's 
technological per-capita capacity to store information has roughly doubled every 
40 months since the 1980s; as of 2012, every day 2.5 exabytes (2.5×1018) of data 
were created.507 
 
The terms ‘exponential’ and ‘ubiquitous’, so favoured by researchers of Big Data, are 
inadequate to describe the size of the data collection activities that infuse our daily lives. 
Authors Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier suggest that, with the onslaught of such 
‘datafication’ of our every move and preference, the entire gestalt of information 
collection and analysis has altered:  
In the spirit of Google or Facebook, the new thinking is that people are the sum 
of their social relationships, online interactions and connections with content. In 
order to fully investigate an individual, analysts need to look at the widest 
                                                
506  Chris Snijders et al., Big Data’: Big gaps of knowledge in the field of Internet, 7 INT’L J. INT. SCI., 
1, http://www.ijis.net/ijis7_1/ijis7_1_editorial.html.  
507 Martin Hilbert Priscila Lopez, The World’s Technological Capacity to Store, Communicate, and 
Compute Information, 332 SCIENCE, 60 (2011).  
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possible penumbra of data that surrounds the person — not just whom they 
know, but whom those people know too, and so on.508 
 
The authors speak of entrepreneurs of Big Data having a big data mindset’, devoted to 
the belief that certain data can be mined to reveal valuable secrets.509 From that 
vantage, data gains in optional value as it is put to new purposes. The authors examine 
the three components of the Big Data enterprise within such industries as 
pharmaceuticals, financial services, and manufacturing: the collector of the information; 
those skilled with data; and the innovators who can foresee the novel ways that data can 
lead us to new information. The latter professionals are in most demand as they have 
the ability to extract wisdom from banks of raw data. 510  Their innovations are 
anticipated by political and financial leaders who have watched the bulk of 
manufacturing migrate to developing parts of the world. The good news that Mayer-
Schönberger and Cukier can offer about Big Data is that, for the present, firms will gain 
by tapping data in clever ways.511  Benign examples they offer include Google search 
algorithm’s use of subscriber data for behavioral advertising, and Germany’s use of car 
parts data to improve automobile components.512 Market research as well is greatly 
advanced by Big Data analysis: the authors speak of the discovery by Walmart stores, 
through data analysis of their sales patterns, that customers purchase Pop-Tarts in 
greatly increased numbers just before a hurricane. That information was used to 
position Pop-Tarts beside flashlights and other emergency products in hurricane-prone 
locations with favourable sales results.513 
The risks associated with the autonomous compilation of Big Data are many. 
For instance, state espionage agencies are no longer our major intruders: that 
distinction goes to our neighbours, service providers, and retailers. A second shift is 
that privacy has become a dominant social good that counters values of free speech, 
                                                
508 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER AND KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION 
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013). 
509 Id. at 124. 
510 Id. at 125. 
511 Id. at 149.  
512 Id. The authors observe that Big Data collection exaggerates a firm’s strengths and 
weaknesses.  




including commercial free speech or enterprise. As well, big data analytics means we are 
judged more by propensities, and by indicated preferences, than by completed acts.514 
Amazon and Netflix think they know more about our next consumer selections than we 
do from data that is autonomously collected each time we browse a book or movie 
online. Prediction and pre-supposition have supplanted analysis of done deeds.  
Big Data use is encouraged by free storage costs and unlimited space, surgically 
adept technologies, and all the idiosyncrasies of the Internet we have listed above 
(section 3.1).  While not all collected data is personal, such as algorithms that deliver 
better-refined oil or more precise predictions about airport weather, the triangulation of 
seemingly disparate bits of data can produce conclusions about individuals that could be 
personally devastating. A simple example is the autonomous correlation of three bits of 
information that could lead a potential employer to conclude (erroneously) that a job 
applicant has a fatal illness: 1) she has contributed to a Run for the Cure in the past; 2) 
she visited Princess Margaret Cancer Care Hospital twice over the past two years; and 
3) she has conducted online search queries on vitamin therapy in the past year. Under 
such informational scrutiny, former US President Woodrow Wilson would never have 
been permitted to complete his last term due to a stroke he suffered, known at the time 
only to his personal physician and his wife.515  
As an indication of public awareness of reputational risks associated with Big 
Data collection, three in five British citizens believe the general public has lost control 
of the way its personal information is collected and processed by others.516 Those results 
are included in a 2013 study reported to the United Kingdom’s Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) that also found 88% of respondents listed the protection of 
people’s personal information as the most urgent issue affecting the public at the hands 
of government.517 As if to substantiate those fears, two incidents of inadvertent 
                                                
514 Id. 
515 Michael Alison Chandler, A President’s Illness Kept Under Wraps, WASH. POST (3 Feb. 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/02/AR2007020201698.html. 
516   Annual tracking of the ICO has measured public awareness of the Data Protection Act 
(DPA) since 1997 and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) since 2003. The study cited the 
United Kingdom’s state-run National Health Service as the repository of personal information 
most at risk (p. 5).  
517 N=2,500. 
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disclosure of sensitive personal data involving EU citizens were reported within months 
of the ICO study.  
In the first, German language news service Neue Zurcher Zeitung reported the 
anonymous delivery to its editorial staff of data tapes belonging to Swisscom, a 
Switzerland-based telecommunications provider. The tapes contained private employee 
data from 2008 to 2010, including 14,500 emails from Swisscom employees, 600,000 
phone numbers, and other private and business contract details.518 Specifically, the NZZ 
claimed its editorial office was in possession of four data tapes originating from 
Swisscom data centres. Swisscom immediately filed a criminal complaint against 
persons unknown for data theft. The NZZ went on to analyze the data further and 
revealed the names of a number of customers in a subsequent article in 2013. Swisscom 
sought an injunction against further publication, arguing the ongoing release of such 
personally identifying customer data served no public interest. Not all data sets were 
checked, however. Swisscom took the view that a comprehensive and time-consuming 
check of all data sets, which in total contain more than a terabyte of data, was “not 
expedient”, even though it could have allayed fears of its customers.519 That decision left 
much personally identifying data open to data theft or other exposure, so Swisscom 
eventually demanded that the NZZ release and destroy the data still in its possession.520  
The second incident involved the Bank of Scotland’s erroneous misdirection of 
faxes to an unsuspecting third party several times over a four-year period that contained 
sensitive customer data.  Home addresses and telephone numbers were disclosed, along 
with pay-slips, bank statements, account details, and mortgage applications.521 The 
documents’ misdirection was caused by staff error in using a fax number one digit 
                                                
518  Adam Greenberg, Telecommunications provider Swisscom investigations stolen data, SC 
MAGAZINE FOR IT SECURITY PROFESSIONALS (18 Sept. 2013),  
519 Judge Rules on Temporary Injunction, Swisscom (14 Feb. 2014), 
http://www.swisscom.ch/en/about/medien/press-releases/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/02/AR2007020201698.html/. 
520 Id.  
521 B. Davidson, Bank of Scotland Receives 75K GBP Penalty Notice for Misdirected Faxes, PRIVACY 
ADVISOR (IAPP) (27 Aug. 2013) https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/uk-bank-of-scotland-
receives-75k-gbp-penalty-notice-for-misdirected-faxes ; Bank of Scotland Fax Blunder leads to 
Fine, BBC NEWS (5 Aug. 2013) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-23572574. Although the 
Berne Commercial Court has now overturned the injunction, it clearly states in its reasons for 
judgment that any further piecemeal publication of information gained from these data tapes 
may constitute a breach of the Swiss Unfair Competition Act. 
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different than the one intended. The receiving organization first alerted the bank to its 
error in February of 2009, but the bank continued to send out the private information 
over three more years. When reported, the lack of response by the Bank of Scotland 
prompted a report to the ICO; the subsequent investigation revealed that a further 10 
documents went to a member of the public due to another faxing error. The ICO official 
commented that sending a person’s private financial records to the wrong fax number 
once was careless but ‘to do so continually over a three year period, despite being aware 
of the problem, is unforgiveable’ and in clear breach of data protection legislation.522 No 
further action was taken against the bank.  
 
ii Studies of Big Data Vulnerability 
Both incidents highlight the growing vulnerability of Internet users to careless 
disclosure of their sensitive information to third parties despite legislative efforts to 
curb such activity. Similar disclosure dangers related to the use of mobile devices is 
reflected in opinions expressed in a 2010 Eurobarometer study. 523  Nine of ten 
Europeans reported their concern about mobile applications collecting their data 
without their consent, and seven Europeans of ten expressed concern about the 
potential use that companies might make of the information disclosed.524 
Our vulnerability at the hands of institutional and corporate data collection 
practices and analysis is also alarming. Through use of de-anonymizing technology and 
the combination of seemingly discrete bits of information,525 data analysts can unearth 
very private information. For example, we have been told that our gender and sexual 
preferences can now be ascertained from a mere examination of our use of the ‘like’ 
function on Facebook.526 Similarly we have been alerted that we are only four mobile 
phone conversations away from government identification.527  
                                                
522 Christopher Williams, Bank of Scotland fined for ‘unforgivable’ fax blunder, TELEGRAPH (5 Aug. 
2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/10223435/Bank-of-
Scotland-fined-for-unforgivable-fax-blunder.html. The Bank was ultimately fined 75,000 
pounds by ICO authorities. 
523 Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the European Union, Flash Eurobarometer 
359 (June 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_359_en.pdf     
524 Id. 
525 Daniel J. Solove, Scalia, supra fn 365.   
526 Rebecca Rosen, Armed with Facebook ‘Likes” Alone, Researchers Can tell Your Race Gender and 
Sexual Orientation, ATLANTIC (12 Mar. 2013) 
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 The degree of apprehension on the part of citizens appears to differ from one 
side of the Atlantic to the other. A survey of Internet users in the US found a much 
lower level of alarm than in the EU: despite revelations in 2013 that the NSA has been 
monitoring Americans' activities online and increasing backdoor access to Internet and 
telephone records, US Internet users appeared not as concerned as British citizens about 
the government having access to their home computers or email accounts, nor as 
concerned as other Americans had been in 2000. Only 35% of Americans expressed 
concern in 2013, compared with 47% in 2000.528 Concerns were higher for software that 
enabled governments to tap into all Internet email searching for incriminating 
information of any type (51% in 2013 compared to 63% in 2000). Study analysts suggest 
that US Internet users might be more resigned to the idea that, in an advanced 
technological age, monitoring is inevitable whereas in 2000, the relatively new medium 
of the Internet “might have caused more concern about privacy than today when 87% of 
Americans use the Web.”529 The study report also suggested that Americans might be 
less concerned because they support the government's pursuit of foreign or domestic 
targets suspected of terrorism. The discrepancy might also be explained by the fact that 
America was the site of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, although England has suffered a 
chronicle of discrete national security incidents as well. Further study into this 
discrepancy holds promise for understanding public awareness of disclosure risks. 
When it comes to users’ knowledge of remedies for the harms of data disclosure, 
a 2013 study by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (the FRA Study) determined that 
only a third of EU citizens were even aware of their right to data protection530 or of the 
existence of Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) within their country to assist them in 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/03/armed-with-facebook-likes-alone-
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527 Matt Warman, Online anonymity: impossible after four phone calls, TELEGRAPH (25 Mar. 2013) 
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528 U.S. Internet Users Less Concerned About Gov't Snooping, Gallup Report 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/165569/internet-users-less-concerned-gov-
snooping.aspx(telephone interviews from 3-6 Oct. 2013, n= 887 Internet users, aged 18 and 
older, living in all 50 US states.  
529 Id. 
530 Access to data protection remedies in EU Member States, 2013 Report of the European Union 
Agency For Fundamental Rights, Publications Office of the European Union: Luxembourg 
(14 Mar. 2014), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-access-data-protection-
remedies_en.pdf (FRA Study).   
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accessing those protections.531 The FRA study also found a significant lack of legal 
expertise in the privacy and data protection fields.532  The policy context for the study 
was built around two fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (The Charter): the right to the protection of personal 
data (Article 8)533 and the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal (Article 47).534 
Most data protection violations in EU Member States were found to arise from Internet 
based activities, direct marketing and video surveillance with closed circuit television 
cameras.  
FRA study participants in Europe stated they were aware of the following 
sources of Internet violations: social media, leakage of personal data from e-shopping 
sites, hacking of email accounts and databases, identity theft, security breaches and 
misuse of personal data by global Internet companies. Of particular concern were 
unauthorized data transfers of personally identifiable information from data controllers 
(employers, public authorities, Internet service companies, mobile operators, credit 
companies) to unauthorized third parties (such as online commercial enterprises and 
debt collection companies); nonconsensual data retention by police, other government 
agencies, and supermarkets; and unauthorized disclosure by the justice system of 
confidential personal data from criminal and divorce proceedings to the media and 
Internet sites.535 Victims stated they became aware of the disclosure violations by 
receiving marketing emails and other spam, experiencing difficulty when accessing their 
                                                
531 Id. Methodology included a comparative analysis of the national legal frameworks in the 
area of data protection remedies and qualitative research in the following 16 EU Member 
States: Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
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N=700, including alleged victims of data protection violations, judges, staff of DPAs, 
intermediaries, and lawyers.   
532 The FRA study confirmed findings of a 2011 Eurobarometer survey conducted by the 
European Commission on Attitudes on data protection and electronic identity in the European Union, 
that most of the Europeans (74 %) surveyed saw disclosing personal information as an 
increasing part of modern life. In addition, 70% expressed concern that their personal data 
held by companies might be used for a purpose other than that for which it was collected.  
533 As distinguished from the Charter’s right to private life (Article 7). 
534 Charter Of Fundamental Rights Of The European Union, 2010/C 83/02, EC 2012/C 326/02 
(final 26 October 2012) (the Charter) codifies all rights found in 1) the case law of the CJEU; 
2) the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and 3) other rights resulting from 
the common constitutional traditions of EU countries and other international instruments.  
535 Id. at  26. 
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online banking accounts or government websites, and discovering that personal data 
had been conveyed to third parties that were outdated, inaccurate, or false.536 
A study of Americans reveals more public acceptance of Big Data practices. A 
2012 Pew Internet/Elon University survey of American Internet experts, observers and 
stakeholders537 measured opinions about the potential impact of human and machine 
analysis of newly emerging large data sets in the years ahead. The study revealed that 
US users are less pessimistic or suspicious about Internet data collection at the hands of 
authorities. Some 53% of those surveyed predicted that the rise of Big Data is likely to 
be “a huge positive for society in nearly all respects” by the year 2020. Respondents 
predicted that the continuing development of real-time data analysis and enhanced 
pattern recognition could bring “revolutionary change to personal life, to the business 
world and to government.”538 For the 39% of participants who stated they saw Big Data 
as more menacing in the hands of unauthorized authorities, concerns included the fact 
that governments and businesses had their own agenda for the use of Big Data, worries 
about the shortage of human analysts qualified to sort data, and the possibility that data 
could be manipulated or misread.539 
In summary, all studies indicate a much more acute awareness by individuals of 
the misuse of personal information by authorities in the UK, and a lower level of 
concern, declining considerably over 15 years, by US participants. EU data protection 
laws are more harmonized and offer more direct supervision; for example, Internet 
Protocol addresses in the EU are considered personally identifiable information (PII) 
and hence merit privacy protection. In contrast, PII protection is localized in the US, 
depending for protection on the laws within each jurisdiction. Citizens in both 
jurisdictions reveal ignorance about available laws or remedies dealing with 
informational disclosure. Once victimized, however, the FRA study participants 
articulate a variety of psychological and social repercussions.  
They described various personal harms from data disclosure, including 
emotional distress, feeling offended, experiencing insecurity or damage to reputation, as 
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well as the impact on their relations with other people.540 The overwhelming majority of 
interviewees mentioned disturbance of daily life, the pressure of defamation suits, 
disappointment due to misplaced confidence, shock, fear, feelings of injustice, 
humiliation, and a sense of dispossession or lack of control over their own data. 
Financial damages were also mentioned but less frequently. Most interviewees sought 
remedies, such as lodging complaints with the national Data Protection Authorities 
(DPAs). Very few went through judicial procedures because of the lengthy and time 
consuming process, the complexity of procedures, and the high costs involved. Judges 
and practising lawyers involved in the study shared that view. Reasons for preferring to 
lodge complaints with national DPAs rather than seeking court remedies were again 
cost related: the complaint procedure was shorter and less complex, and the procedure 
did not demand legal representation. Hopes for outcomes included fixing an unjust 
situation, correcting damage to identity or image, clarifying wrong records, rectification 
or deletion of personal data, achieving rehabilitation, imposing sanctions against 
violators and stopping the abuse of power and excessive unlawful control by employers. 
An even greater share of respondents wanted to minimize a possible risk of other 
individuals becoming a victim of data protection violations. They most commonly 
mentioned prevention of future violations of rights, awareness raising, standing up for 
fundamental rights, teaching a lesson to concerned authorities, obtaining an 
acknowledgement of the violation from a competent authority, or imposing a sanction 
on the perpetrator.541  
         
 iii  Data Brokers 
Another source of data leakage or non-consensual retention is the activity of 
data brokers. Data brokers either collect or buy Big Data containing personal data and 
exchange it or sell it to others for purposes of identity verification, marketing of 
products, and fraud detection. In a 2014 report of a study into the activities of nine 
representative data brokers, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that, while 
there are consumer benefits from data broker practices, there are exposure issues as 
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well.542 Data brokers conduct consumer profiling to such an extent that they often know 
as much, or more, about us than our family and friends, including our online and in-
store purchases, our political and religious affiliations, our income, and our socio-
economic status. 
The primary risk to consumers is that the information held by data brokers is 
often outdated, inaccurate, or collected or retained without the consent of the data 
subject. The example the study gives deals with ‘Biker Enthusiasts.’543 If the profile 
crafted from your PII places you in that category, you can expect to be targeted for road 
gear, bike discounts and helmet advertisements.  However, insurance companies might 
use your interest in motorcycles to make a calculation about your inclination to engage 
in ‘risky behavior’ and your premiums would be higher than those of your non-biking 
enthusiast neighbour. Data brokers often store the data ‘indefinitely’ and use it for 
numerous unidentified purposes, practices that concern the FTC.544  
The non-consensual retransmission of personal data still occurs. For example, 
within the health care system, doctors working under government funded health 
systems make PII details of our visits available, through our health plan numbers, to 
third parties or to governments for billing purposes. Within government-funded 
healthcare systems, our health information is tied to our health plan number. Those 
data might be retained far beyond the limits of our consent, perhaps because, as 
Lawrence Lessig has suggested, it is cheaper and administratively simpler to “push the 
save, rather than the delete button”.545  Such data might also be shared with other 
departments of government or with third parties without our knowledge or consent. 
For those privately insured, the network of data receivers might extend to third parties 
within and outside the hospital. For example, the hospitals we attend for procedures at 
the advice of our family doctor are likely to have provided our contact data to 
fundraising personnel within their organization or to business enterprises to whom that 
                                                
542 Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, Federal Trade Commission study 
(May 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-
transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-
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function is outsourced.546 The pharmacy that fills our doctor’s prescription might pass 
along our prescription information to pharmaceutical manufacturers, and their 
researcher staff, whose products they sell.547 Those data reveal which drugs doctors are 
prescribing and from which manufacturers, information of significant marketing value 
to competitors. Pharmacies claim no harm is done because the data is anonymous as to 
patients’ names. As we know, current data forensic capabilities include de-anonymizing 
practices.548 The pharmacy might, in turn, sell our information to data brokers that, in 
turn, sell it to a widening network of pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, 
consulting firms, advertising agencies, government bodies, and financial firms.549  
 One author relates the dilemma over PII control to four idiosyncrasies of the 
Internet: its convergence capabilities, scale, volume, and individual empowerment.550 
Convergence refers to the process by which media content is increasingly being 
unbundled from its traditional distribution platforms so it can find many paths to the 
consumers. As a result, it is now possible to disseminate, find, or consume the same 
content using many devices or distribution networks, a capability that complicates 
efforts to control information flow. The scale of that activity has burgeoned due to the 
elimination of geographic, technological, and cultural-language barriers. As discussed, 
                                                
546 Patients at Toronto’s largest cancer care facility, Princess Margaret Hospital routinely 
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the lack of a central Internet regulatory agency in the US reduces the effective 
monitoring of online data sharing. Regulators would be faced with a monumental task 
because, as Internet scholar Adam Thierer observes, “there is just too much stuff for 
regulators to police today relative to the past.”551  
 
iv    Cookies 
  Cookies are used to track web site activity.552 When you visit some sites, the 
server leaves a cookie onto your site that acts as your identification card. Upon each 
return visit to that site, your browser passes the cookie back to the server. This allows a 
web server to gather information about which web pages are used the most, and which 
pages are gathering the most repeat traffic. Cookies are also used for online shopping. 
Online stores often use cookies that record any personal information you enter, as well 
as any items in your electronic shopping cart, so that you don't need to re-enter this 
information each time you visit the site. 
Webmasters can track access to their sites, but cookies facilitate that function. In 
some cases, cookies come from advertising companies that manage the banner or 
sidebar ads for a set of sites. That access allows advertising companies to develop 
detailed profiles of the people who select ads across their customers' sites. Such access 
carries privacy issues. They also have more benign uses, however, such as providing 
research data for determining how search queries can be interpreted by a search 
company to best respond to your queries. Ron Dolin provides the example of a search 
site trying to decipher the best results to return for a ‘GM’ search which, depending on 
the language of the person conducting the query, could mean a brand of automobile, 
“genetically modified” food, “guerre mondial” or world war in French, and so on.553 
Internet companies justify the use of cookies in such functions as ultimately improving 
customer service. The autonomously generated notices on some sites that cookies are 
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being employed is an indication that authorities are responding to user concerns about 
their invasive potential. 
 
v Lingering Data, Autocorrection & the Power of Internet Companies  
There is a divergence in opinion concerning the permanence of collected data 
within archival spaces on the Internet. That discrepancy creates uncertainty around the 
continuing accessibility of harmful content to third parties, even once a claim in 
defamation is successful.554 Within the EU, there is a tradition in many Member States 
of expunging court records as of right once the sentence has been completely served. In 
most American jurisdictions, however, records are treated as part of the historical court 
record and data subjects can apply for a pardon, but criminal records do not 
autonomously expire when sentences are completed. That practice runs counter to the 
rhetoric in America of second chances and new beginnings. In many jurisdictions, while 
records might be removed from immediate public view, they still reside in archival 
spaces for future reference.  
 The US National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) produced 
a 2014 report on the erosion of rights and status of convicted persons due to the 
persistence in online spaces of their criminal records. The report cites incidents where a 
total of 65 million Americans by 2008, or one in four, had lingering criminal records on 
file within the states people in America.555 Those “collateral consequences” can create 
such significant reputational stigma as voting bans, immigration status issues, parental 
rights limitations, unfavourable credit ratings, problems in obtaining or using 
passports, as well as diminishment of employment opportunities and benefit 
eligibility.556 Interestingly, the NACDL report refers to the ‘stigmatization’ and ‘second 
class legal citizenship’ of those with persistent criminal records,557 but does not identify 
                                                
554 As was noted in the Mosley case where the plaintiff’s vigilance led to the launching of over 
20 lawsuits after his success with the British system. 
555 65 Million Need Not Apply: The Case for Reforming Criminal Background Checks For Employment, 
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legal penalties, debarments, and disabilities” more lasting than the original penal sanctions, at 
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them as harms to reputation. Among the report’s recommendations is the retention of 
criminal records only if criminal conduct is recent and directly related to a particular 
benefit or opportunity.  
Unless educated in the subject, the individual user is unaware of the nature and 
extent of stored data and of how Internet companies can misrepresent the workings of 
security features that they promote as privacy features. Several FTC cases involving 
Internet companies that have been sanctioned illustrate the myriad ways Internet 
companies can mislead individual users. I set out three below. 
 
FTC v. Google Buzz 
In the first case, Google created a new social networking service called Google 
Buzz in 2010 by linking its Gmail subscribers with each other without their 
knowledge. 558  The link was promoted as enabling subscribers to share updates, 
comments, photos, videos, and other information through posts or ‘buzzes’. Google 
populated the Google Buzz network by gleaning personal data from profiles and other 
required information when users first subscribed to Gmail. 559 Without prior notice or 
the opportunity to consent, Gmail users were automatically linked with unknown 
‘followers’ who had access to personal details of their account. When a user logged on, 
she could either choose to check out those users or go straight to her inbox. If she chose 
the latter, she could still be followed by all other users of Gmail who had been enrolled 
in Buzz, and without her knowledge; as well, a Buzz link would appear in the list of 
links on the margins of her Gmail page. If she clicked on that link, she would be taken 
to the Buzz welcome screen and automatically enrolled in Buzz, without any disclosure 
of that fact and without any further action on her part. In 2012, Google was discovered 
to be actively releasing cookies or other architecturally-altering programs into users’ 
devices in order to extract more user information.  
 
FTC v. Snapchat 
The second group of cases involved the nonconsensual transfer and sale of 
subscribers’ personal information. Snapchat is an application enabling users to share 
                                                
558United States v. Google Buzz (FTC File 102 3136) https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/102-3136/google-inc-matter. 
559 First and last names, photos, friends and their and email contacts, for example.  
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photos, record videos, text and drawings. It was found in 2014 to be misrepresenting to 
users the extent to which those features compiled their personal data and that of their 
recipients.560 Similarly, in 2012 Myspace was found to be passing along users’ personally 
identifiable to advertisers with whom they had information exchange contracts.561 
Those recipients, in turn, could sell such information to other advertisers unknown to 
Myspace or the users. Facebook and Google were prosecuted for similar invasive 
practices. 
Snapchat was also found to have misrepresented the expiry feature of their 
photographs. In United States v. Snapchat562, the defendant company used as a main 
marketing feature the ‘ephemeral’ nature of ‘snaps’.563  Snapchat claimed the user could 
pre-set the duration of each post, after which content would ‘disappear forever’ from 
both the sender’s and recipient’s device. Despite Snapchat’s claims, the FTC complained 
of several ways that recipients could archive the content and continue to transmit it to 
third parties. Consumers could, for example, use third-party applications to log into the 
Snapchat service.  Because the service’s deletion feature only functions in the official 
Snapchat application, recipients could use these widely available applications to view 
and save snaps indefinitely. Indicative of the popularity of such applications is the report 
that they have been downloaded millions of times.564  Despite a security researcher 
warning the company about this possibility, the complaint alleges, Snapchat continued 
to misrepresent expiry times.  
In addition, the complaint alleged that any recipient could preserve content 
indefinitely by taking a screenshot, and that the company transmitted the user’s 
geolocation if an Android system were used, despite its denial of the same in its privacy 
policy. The FTC complaint also alleges that Snapchat collected iOS users’ contacts 
information from their address books without notice or consent.  
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FTC v. Google 
The third type of case565 involved Google bypassing Apple users’ privacy 
settings by placing cookies on their computers.566 Specifically, Google used computer 
code to gain access, through Apple's Safari Web browser, to user data that it then 
monitored via cookies.567 Safari, the most widely used browser on mobile devices, is 
designed to block such tracking by default. The technique reaches far beyond those 
websites, however, because once the coding is activated, it can enable Google tracking 
across the vast majority of websites. The findings appear to contradict some of Google's 
own instructions to Safari users on how to avoid tracking as contained in their online 
privacy policies. Until recently, one Google site told Safari users they could rely on 
Safari's privacy settings to prevent tracking by Google. Google defended its actions by 
stating that the cookies were only passively collecting personal information. Google 
continued to implant cookies even where users explicitly requested that no cookies be 
used. The FTC fine for that activity was 22.5 million, the highest monetary penalty 
ordered by the regulator against an Internet company.568  
 
Autocorrection   
One final feature within the control of the Internet company and its designers, 
that of autocorrection (and its correlate autosuggestion) has been introduced to facilitate 
browsing and search activities. Some of the search terms it autonomously prompts are 
specific to geolocation and its cultural sensitivities that can, in some contexts, provide 
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data-protection-a-849372.html. 
567  Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Google Tracked iPhones, Bypassing Apple Browser 
Privacy Settings, WSJ (17 Feb. 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204880404577225380456599176. 
568 At the time, Google reported that the penalty comprised only 0.81% of company profits for 
2012’s second quarter and that could reputedly be recouped in 5 hours of retail sales. 
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socially inappropriate content and embarrassing innuendo. 569   Under such 
circumstances it might suggest racial, sexual, or other discriminatory messages or 
search terms. Technically, the autocorrection feature depends on a relatively simple 
algorithm. The system can be similar to a word processor's spell checker: as you type, 
the software checks each word against a built-in dictionary and suggests alternatives 
when it does not find a match.570 Many systems try to predict your intentions and 
suggest a word before you have finished typing it. When sent, the lingering damage can 
be considerable. Misunderstandings arise when words contained in the built-in 
dictionary do not reflect the cultural or legal climate of the user.   
Some insults to reputation cross all cultural lines. For example, a Japanese 
plaintiff in a defamation suit suffered work loss due to Google algorithms linking his 
name to criminal acts he had not committed.571 European courts seem similarly 
intolerant of autocorrection references to illegal activity.572 An Italian court found 
liability, for example, in Google Inc.’s autosuggestions that linked a citizen’s name with 
truffa (fraud) and truffatore (con man).573 In France, Google faced a similar suit over 
search suggestions linking several persons’ names to "Jewish", in violation of a French 
law prohibiting the recording of a person’s ethnicity.574 Google argued in its defence 
that autocorrection technology is based on most frequently searched terms, but has 
more recently modified its practice to exclude references to constitutionally protected 
groups. Other lawsuits for defamation involving autocorrection include claimants in 
Germany who requested that Google delete the autocomplete results “fraud” or 
                                                
569 Danny Sullivan, How Google Instant’s Autocomplete Suggestions Work, Searchenglineland (6 
Apr. 2011), http://searchengineland.com/how-google-instant-autocomplete-suggestions-work-
62592. 
570 Farhad Manjoo, Yes, I’ll Matty You, SLATE (July 2010), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2010/07/yes_ill_matty_you.2.html. 
571  Google ordered to change autocomplete function in Japan, BBC News (26 Mar. 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-17510651. 
572 David Meyer, Google loses autocomplete defamation case in Italy, ZDNet (Apr. 5, 2011), 
http://www.zdnet.com/google-loses-autocomplete-defamation-case-in-italy-3040092392/. 
573 Padova Maria Luisa v Google Inc. (10847/2011) TRIBUNALE ORDINARIO DE MILAno 
(Mar. 31, 2011). 




“Scientology” associated with their name search;575 and an action by the wife of a former 
president of Germany whose name prompted search terms “escort” and ” red light”.576 
In that case, Internet companies were not ordered to preemptively vet auto suggestions; 
their liability is only triggered if and when they become aware of a violation of third 
party rights.577 In practice, Google claims to routinely investigate the defamatory 
nature of suggested search terms when faced with a cease and desist request.   
Those actions are arising in places other than the US due to the latter’s failure, to 
date, to squarely address such potential liability. The major hurdle in enjoining an 
American Internet company as defendant in autocorrect or autosuggestion cases is the 
near carte-blanche they receive under the Communications Decency Act, s. 230, as pointed 
out above. In defence of their invasive practices, Internet companies claim they are 
personalizing online services, bringing information and social connections to an extent 
the subscriber would never enjoy without such services. As observed in one German 
publication, American companies are the great offenders as they dominate the market 
and have considerable influence in the effectiveness of FTC regulation: 
Internet companies benefit from America's lax privacy and data protection laws, 
which are unlikely to change any time soon. It's a stark contrast to Europe, 
where the EU wants to toughen its laws -- and apply them to American 
companies.578 
 
One disincentive to compliance with privacy rules is that punitive fines, relatively low in 
relation to profits, can be rationalized as an everyday cost of doing business. All of the 
above examples illustrate the technological and economic power that Internet 
                                                
575 Federal Supreme Court: Google Liable for Defamatory Autocomplete Search Terms, Dispute 
Resolution In Germany Blog (14 May 2013), 
http://www.disputeresolutiongermany.com/2013/05/federal-supreme-court-google-liable-for-
defamatory-autocomplete-search-results/(where the court found a violation of personality 
rights). 
576 Michael L. Smith, Search Engine Liability for Autocomplete Defamation: Combating the Power of 
Suggestion, 2013 J. L. TECH. & POLICY, 314, 314-315. 
577 See further Seema Ghatnekar, Injury By Algorithm: A Look Into Google's Liability For Defamatory 
Autocompleted Search Suggestions, 33 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 171 (2013), 
http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol33/iss2/3 (abstract). 
578 Stocker, supra fn 566. 
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companies have always exercised over our ‘interests, needs, desires, fears, pleasures, and 
intentions.’579 
 
3.3 Case Studies 
 In examining the Mosley and Martin cases, my purpose is to illustrate that the 
damage imposed on personal, familial, and societal relationships by persistent Internet 
content is profound and not particularly aided by practical legal responses. While each 
plaintiff turned for vindication to the traditional adversarial systems in Europe or 
America, neither one had their search for justice completely met. Much of that 
discontent was due to their awakening to the shortcomings of the litigation process. In 
both cases, the privacy invasion they felt at the hands of Internet companies was 
compounded by the inability of their respective legal systems to ease the sting of a 
damaged reputation.  
 
a Exposure: The EU Mosley Case       
The decision of the British High Court in the Max Mosley exposure case was 
favourable in its initial findings but has brought little reputational reprieve in the end. It  
illustrates the deep reputational damage incurred by public figures,580 the extent to 
which they will go to restore their good name, and the shortcomings of the civil court 
process to bring satisfaction after the fact. Mosley is a world figure in auto-racing. On 
March 30th 2008, the UK Sunday tabloid News of the World (NoW) published an article 
about Mosley under the heading “F1 boss has sick Nazi orgy with five hookers”.  The 
NoW published photographs and a link to its website that displayed video footage of the 
applicant that was secretly recorded by a paid participant to the sexual activities. Public 
response was viral: the original publication enjoyed a circulation in excess of 3 million, 
the online video received 1.4 million views the first day, and the online article attracted 
400,000 views on each of the first two days.  
                                                
579 Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 UTAH L. REV., 1433, 
1435 (2008). 
580 Mosley served as the President of that non-profit federation of motoring organizations 
dedicated to world motor sport. 
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Mosley sued the NoW and its owners, News Group Newspapers Ltd, for breach 
of confidence “by way of conduct inconsistent with a pre-existing relationship”.581 The 
nature of that pre-existing relationship was never made clear.582  He also sought, 
unsuccessfully, an interim injunction to prevent the NoW showing footage of the 
covertly recorded video on their website.  In his defence, Mosley admitted to having a 
party but denied the Nazi theme and found fault with the press characterization of his 
private conduct. 583 Mosley was awarded £60,000 in actual damages. 
When Mosley applied to the ECtHR for a reference on the matter of injunctive 
relief, the Court cited the ECHR,584 the UK Human Rights Act of 1998,585 and the 
successful defamation case of Canadian singer Loreena McKennitt that expanded 
confidence actions to circumstances involving public figures where no prior relationship 
existed. Mosley petitioned the ECtHR for support of his claim that Article 8 of the 
ECHR imposed a positive obligation on the State to require prior notification of 
newspaper publications interfering with privacy rights. Only by advanced notice and a 
corresponding injunction, Mosley proposed, could he meaningfully preempt publication 
of such highly personal material.  He argued that the available remedies in English 
domestic law inadequately protected his right to respect for private life, as guaranteed 
by Article 8 of the ECHR. The ECtHR agreed that privacy breaches were irreversible 
                                                
581 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 687 (QB)(Mosley 1). Although there was 
no action for defamation and therefore no ruling on damage to reputation, Justice Eady 
pointed out the judicial obligation to apply such legislation as the UK Human Rights Act 1998, c. 
42: “[T]he law is concerned to prevent the violation of a citizen’s autonomy, dignity and self-
esteem. It is not simply a matter of “unaccountable” judges running amok. Parliament enacted 
the 1998 statute which requires these values to be acknowledged and enforced by the courts”. 
582 Breach of confidentiality had been successfully argued in the UK case of Canadian singer 
Loreena McKennitt in McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73 at [8], per Buxton LJ, a significant 
precedent for privacy rights of public figures. 
583 The press use of the word ‘nazi’ was intended, according to Mosley, to generate public 
discussion of Mosley’s father, Sir Oswald Mosley, well known during the interbellum years as 
the founder of the British Union of Fascists. Mosley had previously denounced his father’s 
past associations, so saw the press reference as an implication of his duplicity in secretly played 
Nazi sex games.  
584 ECHR, supra fn 534 at art 8 and 10.  Article 8 provides for the right of respect for private 
and family life, one’s home and correspondence, with no public interference in that right 
except in accordance with law and in the interests of national security, public safety, the 
country’s economic wellbeing, the prevention of crime, protection of health or morals, or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Article 10 addresses the countervailing right of 
free speech.  
585 UK Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42: Article 8, s. 12(3) serves to buttress the protection afforded 
to freedom of speech at the interlocutory stage. 
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under any circumstances, but pointed out that news of defamation awards could serve to 
restore some of the plaintiff’s reputation. Citing with approval the distinction made by 
Justice Eady in the court of first instance, the court commented:   
[L]ibel damages can achieve one objective that is impossible in privacy cases. 
Whereas reputation can be vindicated by an award of damages, in the sense that 
the claimant can be restored to the esteem in which he was previously held, that 
is not possible where embarrassing personal information has been released for 
general publication. As the media are well aware, once privacy has been 
infringed, the damage is done and the embarrassment is only augmented by 
pursuing a court action.586 
  
Mosley’s case does not illustrate that distinction: he is a wealthy587 former 
lawyer with worldwide influence in motor sports. While the monetary award assisted in 
bringing his case against Internet companies in other European jurisdictions for 
retransmitting the offending images, it was of little consequence in removing the stain 
to his reputation: he was forced to resign as President of the auto sport governing body 
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile. Further, the Queen’s Bench Justice Eady 
denied his request to stem further dissemination of the harmful content by granting an 
injunction to any further re-publication of the video on the Internet, citing the practical 
futility of trying to suppress the highly generative medium once the dams had burst.   
Greatly affected by news of his son’s drug-induced death, exacerbated in 
Mosley’s view by the devastating effect of the NoW story, he then sued Google Inc. for 
its continued listing of his Nazi-themed orgy amongst its search results and Nazi-
themed photographs in Google Image.588 He pursued takedown orders in the courts of 
twenty-two countries and ordered the removal of material from 193 websites in order to 
vindicate the false accusations of the NoW press.589 In 2013, Mosley won injunctive and 
financial relief from courts in France590 and in Germany. Mosley commented on the 
                                                
586 Mosley v United Kingdom, Reference Application no. 48009/08; [2012] EMLR 1; Mosley v 
United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 30. 
587 Gossip sites estimate Mosley’s net worth at $US16 million: Max Mosley Net Worth,  
http://www.celebritynetworth.com/richest-businessmen/max-mosley-net-worth/. 
588  Leveson Inquiry: Max Mosley describes outrage at story, BBC News (24 Nov. 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-15874015. 
589 Josh Halliday, Max Mosley sues Google in France and Germany over ‘orgy’ search results’, 
GUARDIAN (25 Nov. 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/nov/25/max-mosley-
google-france-germany. 
590 Max Mosley v Google Inc. and Google France, TGI Paris, Court of First Instance, RG# 11/07970 
(6 Nov. 2013) (Mosley II). 
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harm that the exposure of private actions caused him (“enormous and continuous 
damage”),591 caused his wife of 48 years (“totally devastating”) and his sons (he could 
think of “nothing more undignified or humiliating” for his two sons to experience).592  
The Mosley case has been ongoing since 2008 and has exacted a personal toll for 
the plaintiff in the lowering of his esteem and that of his family in the public eye, the 
embarrassment and humiliation that have resulted, and the formidable cost of pursuing 
retribution.593 For the average income earner, litigation on the Mosley scale would be 
completely inaccessible. 
  
b Disclosure: the US Martin Case 
The David-and-Goliath case of Lorraine Martin is about a Connecticut nurse 
and single mother who sued the Hearst Corporation media giant for persistent online 
media accounts of a criminal charge for which she was never convicted. The ongoing 
case for erasure that was denied in the US District Court of Connecticut and is now 
before the state’s appellate court, and is noteworthy for the additional layer of 
complexity added to claims for reputational redress when the Internet is involved.594 
Martin’s persistent efforts to assert erasure rights have brought her no remedial relief 
to date. 
Martin was arrested in 2010 on a warrant, along with her two adult sons, for 
possession of a narcotic (traces of cocaine) and drug paraphernalia (scales) and 
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), evidence police needed to substantiate 
an informant’s contention that the Martin sons had been selling drugs in the 
neighbourhood. Ms. Martin was arrested and released on bail. Her charges were 
                                                
591  Tim Lowles, Max Mosley wins his case against Google in France, Collyerbristow.Com, Press 
Release (6 Nov. 2013), 
http://www.collyerbristow.com/Default.aspx?sID=90&cID=1214&ctID=43&lID=0. 
592 Mosley wins court case over orgy, BBC News (24 July 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7523034.stm. 
593 Mosley reported to the Leveson Inquiry that he had spent, to that point in 2011, 500,000 
BPS on defending his name. See further Leveson Inquiry Into The Culture Practices And 
Ethics Of The Press (5 Apr. 2014), 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http:/www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/  
594 Lorraine Martin v. Hearst Corp. et al., District Court of Connecticut case number 3:12-cv-
01023 (Martin I). 
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withdrawn a year later for lack of evidence.595 Martin argues her case has been 
expunged from court records and should similarly be removed from online websites.596 
Its persistence in Internet searches serves as a virtual scarlet letter in terms of Martin’s 
future chances at employment in the medical field.597 
Martin’s arrest was covered by three Hearst publications, both in print and 
online.598 Upon the withdrawal of her charges, Martin invoked a clause in a Connecticut 
erasure law arguing that while the original accounts of her arrest were true, from the 
point of their dismissal they should be considered never to have happened and so should 
be removed from both online and offline news archives as a conviction had never been 
registered. Most American states have some version of such erasure laws.599 Martin 
maintained that any sustained media account of her arrest was therefore defamatory 
because it was untrue, brought untold damage to her reputation, robbed her of 
opportunities for employment and social acceptability, and did not allow her to move 
forward without the stigma of the arrest. She sought expungement of the accounts of 
her arrest from all online sources and archives, claiming four tortious causes of action: 
libel, publicity placing her in a false light, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 
invasion of privacy.  
The District Court of Connecticut applied strict statutory interpretation to deny 
all four claims and dismissed the case. The court acknowledged that the law mandates 
the erasure of the arrest records by law enforcement and court officials but states:  
 
                                                
595 Lorraine Martin v. Hearst Corporation, Main Street Connect, and News 12 Interactive Inc., File §3:12-
cv-01023-MPS, DOC 58, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, (2013) at 3 
(Martin II). 
596 Tim Powers, Expungement: what does it mean for your record? Denton County Criminal Defense 
Lawyer Blog (9 Oct. 2012), 
http://www.timpowers.com/dentonCriminalDefense/2012/expungement-what-does-it-mean-
for-your-record.html. 
597 Bill Keller, Erasing History, NYTIMES (28 Apr. 2013). 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/opinion/keller-erasing-history.html?_r=0. 
598 Anna Helhoski, Crack Cocaine Raid Nets Two, GREENWICH DAILY VOICE, (25 Aug. 2010), 
http://greenwich.dailyvoice.com/news/crack-cocaine-raid-nets-two.  
599 Connecticut General Statute §54-142a, provision e(3) “Any person who shall have been the 
subject of such an erasure  shall be deemed to have never been arrested under the meaning of 
the general statutes with respect to the proceedings so erased and may so swear under oath.” 
The criminal laws of several EU Member States carry similar provisions. 
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[T]he expungement statute does not transmute a once-true fact into a 
falsehood. It does not require the excision of records from the historical archives 
of newspapers or bound volumes of reported decisions or a personal diary. It 
cannot banish memories.600 
 
The dismissal is considered a win for the First Amendment, both freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press.601 The judge’s decision shields the factual reporting of news 
organizations from being erased from the Internet just because its archived version 
might seem detrimental to someone’s reputation years later. The case, however, does 
not resolve the stickier ethical questions surrounding news organizations’ 
responsibilities in the digital age, where news stories linger online and can be dredged 
up indiscriminately long after most paper copies would have been buried and forgotten. 
Martin subsequently brought a class action pleading similar grounds to the state’s 
Court of Appeal. An amicus brief filed by the Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of 
Expression argues in support of the defendant publishers that parties who use erasure 
laws to ‘remove factually accurate newspaper stories’ threaten the First Amendment 
rights of freedom of expression.602 It stresses that, while erasure is required of court 
staff, police, and prosecutors, the Connecticut law would violate individual 
constitutional rights if it required journalists who report the truth to rescind it 
retroactively once the facts were no longer true.603  
 
c Significance of Mosley and Martin Cases 
The significance of the Martin case lies in the extra layer of complexity brought 
to the law of journalism by the Internet. In the class action, Martin could argue that the 
ethics around the censorship question are skewed when considering the extent of harm 
to her reputation with a medium with permanently cached information, instantaneous 
access, and global redistribution capabilities to third parties. The defendant news 
publishers rely on standard ethical and constitutional principles espoused by journalists 
                                                
600 Martin I supra fn 594 at 8. 
601 Marie K. Shanahan, Archived Arrest Stories are like Zombies Arising from the Grave, Blog (1 Sept. 
2013), http://www.mariekshanahan.com/hearst-news-12-and-main-street-connect-defeat-
lawsuit-over-archived-arrest-stories/. 
602 Martin v. Hearst Publications, Case 13-3315, filed 17 March 2014 in the US Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, http://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/2014-03-17-martin v hearst.pdf 
(Martin III). 
603 Id. at 9. 
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regarding the inviolable truth of their news at the time it is reported, and the practical 
difficulties inherent in ‘unpublishing’ and foreshortening the ‘long tail of the news’.604   
The legal issue of who controls news online has been broadened with Google’s 
claim that news organizations can block Google from indexing specific content. It is 
webmasters who control web content, Google maintains, not Internet companies, and 
news publishers control webmaster decisions about what stories have public access, 
when, and at what price.605  
Meanwhile Mosley continues to sue Google in one country after another, as 
domestic laws are the current route to relief in the absence of any pan-European or 
international judicial authority over transborder transmission of reputation-destroying 
information. Journalist Bill Keller describes the ongoing stigma experiences by Martin: 
 
[She] found that when she applied for jobs that should have been well within 
her reach, she got the cold shoulder. She Googled herself and discovered what 
any vigilant employer would have seen: stories still sitting in online news 
archives with headlines like “Mother and sons charged with drug offenses.”606  
 
While the EUDR might help in bringing some clarity and consensus to an 
effective legal response to such damage, for now litigants like Mosley and Martin must 
endure the legal uncertainty and the sensational or titillating accounts that publicize 
individual efforts at stemming reputational damage.607 
 In terms of existing legal remedies to protect reputation, the Mosley case 
illustrates there are few tools and most are financial. As Mosley’s comments about his 
family show, injuries to reputation are not borne exclusively, or even primarily, by the 
affected individual. Defamation scholar Ardia explains that, in many ways, reputation is 
a quintessential public good in that it is a product of cooperation with others and 
                                                
604 Kathy English, The longtail of news: To unpublish or not to unpublish, TORONTO STAR, 
Journalism Credibility Project (October 2009), http://www.apme.com/?Unpublishing 
(reporting that publishers are increasingly inundated with ‘unpublish’ requests and aware they 
must come to a practical resolution of the issue.) 
605 Working with News Publishers, Google Public Policy Blog, https://groups.google.com/forum/ - 
!forum/public-policy-blog/join.  
606 Keller, supra fn 597. 
607 Kelly Fiveash, Mosley thrash’n’tickle vid case against Google opens in Hamburg: Ex F1 chief’s clip 
campaign flogging a -erm-dead horse?  REGISTER (28 Sept. 2012), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/09/28/. 
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relative to our relationships with them.608 Ardia urges understanding of reputation’s 
“important signaling function” in communicating complex information about an 
individual and about the individual’s place within society. To malign that reputation, in 
his view, is to degrade the value and reliability of that information and of the 
community identity as a whole.609  
 The factor of online permanence is highlighted by the Martin decision. In 
Europe, where journalists and citizens do not have the First Amendment protections, a 
right to be forgotten allows for those with cleared records to demand every trace of the 
record be completely erased.610 That demand extends to print and electronic media 
accounts (including European bureaus of US-based media) and includes a demand that 
all records of a case be completely erased, not just updated. Toronto Star editor Karen 
English reports that misdemeanors and other criminal charges are an increasing source 
of requests to “unpublish” news accounts for North American publishers.611 She cites 
with approval a ‘sunset’ provision instituted at one news corporation whereby certain 
news items autonomously ‘drop off’ the news organization’s website six months after 
initial publication.612 
Both Mosley and Martin have become victims to what, in the world of US 
defamation law, is a commonplace occurrence of time-lapse or “incremental” thinking: 
jurists within many legal systems struggle in their own ways with legal culture and 
laws that are remnants of simpler times.  Another unfortunate and unhelpful influence 
on both plaintiffs is what is known as the ‘Streisand Effect’.613 The phenomenon, named 
after American entertainer Barbra Streisand, reflects the unsatisfactory results obtained 
in an invasion of privacy action she filed in 2003 against a photographer for capturing 
images of her Malibu oceanfront home to promote a government coastal erosion project. 
Streisand maintained that inclusion of those images in the proposal implied she was 
                                                
608Ardia, supra fn 10, 262.  
609 Id. 
610 Genevieve Balmaker, Erasing the Record, One Story at a Time, QUILL (July/August 2013), 
http://digitaleditions.walsworthprintgroup.com/display_article.php?id=1475867&_width=. 
611 English, supra fn 604 at 7. 
612 Id. 
613 The Streisand effect is a phenomenon whereby an attempt to censor or gag a report has led 
to greater interest in the story than would have been garnered had they not attempted to ban 
or censor it in the first place. Some people have proposed that it be called Streisand’s law given 
the inevitability of the effect (Streisand Effect, Rationalwiki, 
http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Streisand_effect.) 
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insensitive to coastal erosion, a false impression she judged would cause her great 
reputational damage, both personally and as an entertainer. Upon the filing of 
Streisand’s legal action for invasion of privacy, public interest in the images on 
YouTube soared from six to more than 420,000 downloads within one month.614 The 
continued access to the story on YouTube substantiates the fear of every potential 
litigant that, far from ameliorating personal suffering, court actions can perpetuate 
anyone’s negative reputation. 
 
3.4  Summary 
              Life in the post-analogue world offers a richness of choice in communications. 
The downside is that we become what we behold: we move from being shapers of tools 
to being shaped by them.615  We experience opportunities to express, inform, consume, 
advance professionally, and entertain ourselves in ways only sketchily drawn by science 
fiction authors. With innovation in digital communications comes mobility, plasticity, 
speed, ambit, a-spatiality, and ephemeral storage - all creating enhanced risks of 
personal privacy invasion. Those invasions damage our reputation or personal identity 
within the communities in which we work and interact socially. That result would not 
surprise futurist authors such as George Orwell or Michel Foucault or Marshall 
McLuhan, but it poses important legal questions that need to be tackled to restore the 
balance of key ingredients in post-modern life such as technological convenience, 
information management, privacy, free expression, and attribution.   
 The role of law in remedying damage to reputational privacy within that 
complex environment is explored in the next two chapters. Several crucial questions 
raised in this chapter prompt that inquiry: is anonymity practically possible or even 
desirable in digital transactions; can the power of Internet companies to control our 
online presence be shaped to our protection rather than our vulnerability; is digital 
                                                
614 Mike Masnick, Streisand Suing Over Environmentalist's Aerial Shots Of Her Home, 
TechDirt (1 June 2003), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20030601/1910207.shtml. 
Streisand received no compensation from the court and was ordered to pay her opponent’s 
legal fees.  
615 MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN, xxi 




speech sufficiently different than real-time communications to warrant a new legal 
regime? As set out in Chapter II, the normative and political differences between US 
and EU legislators and jurists regarding those broader questions have produced two 
very different regulatory regimes that could lead to a trans-Atlantic clash of values. But 
first, an examination of the current legal tools available to those who suffer reputational 




























CHAPTER 4  LEGAL RESPONSES TO REPUTATIONAL INJURY  
 
 
4.0 Introduction  
 
Meaning is the essential starting point in any claim for defamation. The same set 
of words can legitimately be given quite varied interpretations by different 
individuals, but the law of defamation applies a "legal fiction" that a publication 
can only be understood to bear one ‘natural and ordinary’ meaning. This is the 
meaning as understood by a hypothetical, reasonable reader.616  
 
The Web has augmented and diversified ways to intrude upon our private lives. 
It is reasonable as individuals that we look to law to either safeguard our needs for 
reputational integrity or to offer a remedy when other mechanisms fail.617 International, 
regional, and domestic laws each provide a particular response, either for state-citizen 
conflicts (primarily in the area of data protection) or for disputes that arise between 
private individuals (such as defamation, privacy, and breach of confidence cases). Since 
the end of World War II, the international community has formulated a handful of 
significant legal conventions that address reputation, primarily by framing those 
concerns broadly within values of privacy, family life, and personal dignity as 
entitlements of membership in the human race. As world wars have shrunk to more 
regional and asymmetric conflicts in the ensuing decades, the ambit of our interpersonal 
communications have expanded – from localized gossip to global, instantaneous 
messaging. We might anticipate, therefore, that the wide selection of international 
treaties would provide some conceptual reference point and inspiration for collaboration 
among jurists. Similarly, with the emergence of the Internet as the dominant 
                                                
616 The Leveson Inquiry Into The Culture Practices And Ethics Of The Press, UK Government National 
Archives, para. 3 (2 Mar. 2012) 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http:/www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Witness-Statement-of-Max-Mosley.pdf. 
617 This dissertation views legal privacy protection as including control over our personal 
information while recognizing that not all breaches of personal data involve injury to 
reputation. Alan F. Westin described such control as, “the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about 
them is communicated to others.” Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 
31 MISS. COLLEGE L. REV., 226 at fn 13, citing Westin’s Historical Perspectives on Privacy: From 
the Hebrews and Greeks to the American Republic”, (unpublished manuscript on file with 
Henderson).  
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interpersonal messaging tool within the past decade, it would be reasonable to expect 
the evolution of Internet-specific laws protecting our virtual selves and that 
accommodate speech idiosyncrasies that were not in existence in the analogue era. In 
this chapter I begin with international instruments and look for their influence on 
regional (EU) and domestic (EU and US) law. Their degree of influence should be 
somewhat predictive of how effective and international law of the Internet might be. I 
then look to more regional and local causes of action (defamation, privacy, and 
confidentiality laws) and case samples to determine how they have incorporated those 
international legal norms. I conclude with a discussion about whether digital speech is 
ontologically different and hence deserving of a discrete legal or extra-legal response for 
our protection. That question is important to an understanding of whether courts are 
approaching Internet cases of reputational and privacy violations in a novel way or are 
merely applying real time solutions to online content. In summarizing the chapter I 
mention alternatives to our traditional legal practices if we are to approach online 
speech as an evolving and discrete form of expression. 
  
4.1        International, Transnational & Domestic Response 
a Conventions & Declarations  
Two earlier international instruments expressly address reputation as a basic 
human right, the first crafted by United Nations members as they emerged from the 
destruction and atrocities of the Second World War and the second, somewhat 
ironically, created in the midst of the Vietnam War of the mid-1960s.618 The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights619 (UNDR) and the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights620 (ICCPR) use almost identical wording to stipulate that “no one shall 
                                                
618 Vietnam Timeline: 1966, http://www.vietnamgear.com/war1966.aspx. 
619  Universal Declaration Of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) 10 Dec. 10 1948, Article 12. International law creates a hierarchy of 
instruments: a convention (used synonymously with treaty and covenant) is binding between 
states. Conventions are therefore stronger than declarations that constitute an agreement of 
standards without legal enforcement. Declarations frequently are products of UN Conferences, 
and can be produced by government representatives or NGOs.  Although the declaration was 
intended to be nonbinding, through time its various provisions have become so respected by 
states that it can now be said to be customary international law.  
620 International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights,  S. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171, 16 Dec. 1966, art. 17 (ICCPR). The Human Rights Glossary appended to the UNCR 
defines ‘civil and political rights’ as “The rights of citizens to liberty and equality; sometimes 
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be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, 
nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation” and that “everyone has the right to 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”621 The ICCPR qualifies 
“interference” and “attacks” with addition of the word “unlawful”.  
The UNDR in article 19 also addresses a human right to free speech “through 
any medium and regardless of frontiers.”622 Reputation is treated as a right devolving 
from social and political life, and so is significantly more open-ended regarding 
interpretation than the protections against violent and arbitrary treatment with which 
the Declaration begins. As one source explains, the UNDR leaves larger scope for 
variation in different social and political contexts, because “ individuals everywhere have 
the right to be free of torture, but different countries may legitimately come to different 
conclusions about the conditions under which private property may be taken for public 
use,”623 Or, we might add, the import of privacy and reputation as elements of family 
and social life. Such differential treatment sets up the conditions for a hierarchy of rights 
in actual state practice.  
The US and EU Member States have all signed both the UNDR and the ICCPR 
and ratified the multilateral UN treaty.624 Both treaties have enforcement bodies: for the 
Universal Declaration several oversight bodies are provided. 625  The ICCPR is 
monitored by the UN Human Rights Committee that reviews regular reports from 
                                                                                                                                            
referred to as first generation rights. Civil rights include freedom to worship, to think and 
express oneself, to vote, to take part in political life, and to have access to information.” 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-5/6_glossary.htm. 
621 Id., Article 17. Those instruments, in combination with the International Covenant On 
Economic Social And Cultural Rights, are considered the International Bill of Human Rights. 
622 “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers.” 
623 Mary Ann Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2 NW. J. 
INT'L HUM. RTS. 1 (2004), 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=njihr 
624 The US signed on 5 Oct. 1977. EU Member States signed upon gaining EU membership 
unless they had signed previously.   
625 Including the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Office of the UN 
High Commissioner on Human Rights, the Human Rights Council, and treaty-monitoring 
bodies like the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child.  
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State parties on how the rights are being implemented.626 In practice enforcement for 
both treaties is more nominal than of real weight, with diplomatic pressure and other 
‘soft law’ tools being preferred.   
The UNDR is not legally binding as such; it carries no formal legal obligations 
but might carry moral obligations or attain the force of law as customary international 
law.  Most of its rights had already received a significant degree of recognition by 1948 
in the constitutions of many nations, if not in their practices. Since that time, most of its 
rights have been incorporated into the domestic legal systems of most countries.  
In contrast, neither the ECHR nor the US Constitution contain direct references 
to honour or reputation as a human right, although the ECHR includes a reference to a 
respect for privacy and family life, in the spirit of article 12 of the UNDR and refers to 
reputation as a legitimate aim that might justify interference with the right of free 
speech, not by granting it rights status but by speaking of “protection of the reputation 
or rights of others.”627 The use of “reputation” as a qualification of free speech rights 
seems deliberate, as appears from the preparatory work on Article 8 of the ECHR.628 It 
took the Pfeifer v Austria decision of the ECtHR in 2007 to recognize reputation as a 
right equivalent to free speech at European common law.629 
In the case of the ICCPR, as with other international treaties, the US and all EU 
Member states who are parties to the Convention must comply with and implement the 
provisions of the treaty just as it would any other domestic law, subject to reservations, 
understandings and declarations (RUDs) requested by other signatories. One RUD of 
                                                
626 States must report initially one year after acceding to the Covenant and then every four 
years or upon request of the Committee. 
627 The ECHR refers expressly to “reputation” but only in the context of Article 10. 
628  See further the information document prepared by the Secretariat of the European 
Commission, “European Commission of Human Rights Preparatory Work on Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights”, Council of Europe, Strasbourg (17 Aug. 1956) DH 
(56) 15 Oe.Fr. (noting the following proposals that were made but did not appear in the final 
document: a French proposal (Dec. E/1371, p. 21) that free speech could be limited by the 
protection of “the reputation or rights of other persons”; a UN conference on freedom of 
information suggestion that free speech be restricted by expressions of other persons that 
“defame their reputations or are otherwise injurious to them without benefiting the public.”  
(para. 2(g)); and a similar proposal by the British Government (para 8(3)(2)). Subsequent 
references to a Committee of Experts eliminated references to ‘reputation’.) 




considerable weight in foreign relations, as requested by the US, establishes that the US 
Constitution shall prevail over any contested free speech use involving the terms of the 
ICCPR. Another key RUD attached by the US Senate is a "non self-executing" 
Declaration, intended to limit the ability of litigants to sue in a US court for direct 
enforcement of the ICCPR. That Declaration effectively challenges any external 
enforcement mechanism, although the US continues to file a report every four years 
with an ICCPR Human Rights Committee that oversees compliance.630  
Cases relating to reputation that expressly reference the UNDR and the ICCPR 
are very limited; one reason might be the strength of RUDs requested by the US. 
Another could be the comparatively lower significance of reputational harm and privacy 
invasions on the scale of human rights violations, ranging from violent physical harms 
to intangible ones, that each instrument addresses. Rights to remedies, as discussed in 
the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to Remedies, seem restricted to ‘gross’ 
violations of International Human Rights Law and ‘serious’ violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, a bar the indignities and social exclusion caused by reputational 
injury might not be able to hurdle.631   
In its last report to the ICCPR Human Rights Committee in 2014, the US was 
criticized by a committee of the UN for its surveillance activities on foreign as well as 
US citizens632 that showed non-compliance with the privacy provisions in Article 17 and 
with international law principles of legality, proportionality and necessity.633 Reputation 
rights as included in Article 17 were not specifically addressed. The report noted, 
however, but cannot enforce, recommendations that any interference with the right to 
privacy, family, home or correspondence be authorized by laws that: 1) are publicly 
                                                
630 States must report initially one year after acceding to the Covenant and then whenever the 
Committee requests (usually every four years).  
631 Basic Principles And Guidelines On The Right To A Remedy And Reparation For Victims 
Of Gross Violations Of International Human Rights Law And Serious Violations Of 
International Humanitarian Law, GA 60/147 (16 Dec. 2005).  
632 Specifically highlighted were NSA’s bulk phone metadata surveillance programme (Section 
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act); surveillance under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendment Act, conducted through PRISM (collection of 
communications content from United States-based Internet companies) and UPSTREAM 
(collection of communications metadata and content by tapping fiber-optic cables carrying 
Internet traffic).  
633 Human Rights Committee (ICCPR) Concluding Observations On The Fourth Periodic 
Report Of The United States Of America, CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, para 20ff. (23 Apr. 2014), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5374afcd4.html . 
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accessible; 2) are tailored to specific legitimate aims; 3) detail the precise circumstances 
of data collection and obtaining consent, and 4) provide for effective safeguards against 
abuse.634 Also mentioned as excessive invasions of personal privacy are practices that 
mandate that third parties (such as ISPs and other Internet companies) retain personal 
data for state use; and that the judiciary be involved in “authorizing or monitoring” 
surveillance activities.635 
 With respect to the ICCPR, its Human Rights Committee has assessed its 
provisions relating to free speech as describing a much narrower right than that 
articulated in US constitutional laws. Article 20(2) of the ICCPR requires prohibition of 
any negative statements towards national groups, races or religions that “constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”. The US Supreme Court has determined 
the First Amendment addresses free speech in three fora: public speech, used in public 
spaces such as parks, where all speech is protected unless leading to violence; designated 
forum speech, such as meetings held in universities, where speech enjoys the same 
protection as public speech but for a designated time; and limited forums where only 
certain classes of speech are protected, such as a meeting on a religious subject.636 In 
any conflict between a US citizen’s free speech rights and those of a non-US citizen 
subject to a non-US free speech law, the US position is likely to prevail due to its wider 
ambit. That is particularly the case with hate speech. The US subscribes to an even 
wider tolerance: only incitement that is intended to cause imminent violence justifies 
restricting fundamental speech right.637 Some EU states, however, such as Finland, 
Belgium, Iceland, and Denmark, oppose the term ‘hate speech’ as potentially restricting 
democratic debate on religion and minorities. Those protections are broader still than 
those in American law. 
The International Bill of Human Rights, then, has been extensively elaborated 
through numerous conventions and declarations, both at the universal level and at the 
regional level.  Altogether they comprise a wide range of human rights and that form an 
interrelated normative system. More recent additions include the International 
                                                
634 Id. at para. 20(b). 
635 Id. at para. 20(c) and (d). 
636 See further, Forums, WEX Legal Dictionary, Legal Information Institute, Cornell University 
Law School, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forums. 
637 See further Hate Speech, ARTICLE 19, http://www.article19.org/pages/en/hate-speech-
more.html.  
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Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families that mentions reputation as a qualification in the balance to be struck between 
privacy and free speech.638 So even temporary citizens are afforded a basic right to a 
good reputation, although its wording suggests it might be subordinate to free speech 
rights. Other international instruments and initiatives that are relevant to online 
reputation are: the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child;639 (prohibiting arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with a child’s privacy, family, or correspondence, and unlawful 
attacks on his or her honour and reputation); the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities640(with similar provisions for the disabled, including protection from 
unlawful attacks on reputation and privacy rights for correspondence “and other types 
of communications”); and the UN Resolution on a Global Agenda for Dialogue among 
Civilizations641 (urging full utilization of communication technologies including the 
Internet to further global dialogue and understanding).  
With respect to regional initiatives, the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) expressly addresses reputation as one limitation on 
the right to free expression. It also suggests reputational protection obliquely through 
the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence.642 It qualifies 
that right for national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the state, the 
                                                
638 International Convention On The Protection Of The Rights Of All Migrant Workers And 
Members Of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45-158, U.N.P.M. 69, Dec. 18, 1990, Article 14. 
639 Convention On The Rights Of The Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, Article 16: “1. 
No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, 
family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.” 
[emphasis added] 
640 Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3, 
Article 22: 1) No person with disabilities, regardless of place of residence or living 
arrangements, shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, 
family, or correspondence or other types of communication or to unlawful attacks on his or her 
honour and reputation. Persons with disabilities have the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks; 2) States Parties shall protect the privacy of personal, 
health and rehabilitation information of persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others. 
[emphasis added] 
641 Global Agenda For Dialogue Among Civilizations, G.A. Res. 56-6, U.N.Doc. A/56/L.3 and 
Add/ 1, Nov. 21, 2001, Article 9: “Utilization of communication technologies, including audio, 
video, printed press, multimedia and the Internet, to disseminate the message of dialogue and 
understanding throughout the globe and depict and publicize historical instances of 
constructive interaction among different civilizations”. [emphasis added] 
642 Art. 10. The ECHR does refer to reputation as one of the legitimate aims that might justify 
interference with freedom of expression. However, it does not do so by granting rights status 
to reputation, but instead speaking of “protection of the reputation or rights of others”. 
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prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health and morals, and the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.” 643  
The recognition of reputation as a distinct right was slow coming in EU case 
law. In the first defamation case brought under article 10 of the ECHR, Lingens v. 
Austria644 in 1986, the ECtHR denied the Government’s argument that the case 
concerned a conflict between two equal Convention rights; the court held that a right to 
reputation only acted as a qualifier of the right to free expression. With the article 10 
case of Chauvy and others v. France645 in 2004 and the article 8 case of Pfeifer v. Austria646 
in 2007, however, the right to protection of reputation was established as a full 
Convention right under article 8 of the ECHR. The Pfeifer case decided “a person’s right 
to protection of his or her reputation is encompassed by Article 8 as being part of the 
right to respect for private life”.647 EU law had finally incorporated international legal 
norms expressed by the UNDR and ICCPR. That development has its critics: Stijn 
Smet of the University of Ghent criticizes the ECtHR for elevating reputation to 
convention right status as it will naturally conflict with another, stronger right, that of 
freedom of expression which comprises its “strongest enemy”.648  He cites the ECtHR 
case of Polanco-Torres (where a judge’s wife fought defamatory claims that she and her 
husband engaged in unlawful business transactions) as a judicial attempt to balance the 
                                                
643 ECHR, Article 8 provides for the right of respect for private and family life, one’s home and 
correspondence, with no public interference in that right except in accordance with law and in 
the interests of national security, public safety, the country’s economic wellbeing, the 
prevention of crime, protection of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. Article 10 addresses the countervailing right of free speech.   
644 Lingens v. Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407.  
645 Chauvy and others v. France (2005) 41 EHRR 29, regarding a book that suggested by 
innuendo that Jean Moulin, Resistance Leader in WW2 was betrayed and killed because of 
the actions of Raymond Aubrac who escaped. (“the book is little more than pure conjecture 
and constitutes a direct assault on the integrity and identity of Mr and Mrs Aubrac that robs 
them of their dignity. It is necessary to reaffirm respect for human dignity as one of the most 
important Convention values and one which historical works must also foster.”) 
646  Pfeifer v. Austria (2007) 48 EHRR 175 regarding an article alleging the Jews attacked 
Germany in 1933 and trivializing the actions of the Nazi regime. (stating “A person’s 
reputation, even if that person is criticised in the context of a public debate, forms part of his 
or her personal identity and psychological integrity and therefore also falls within the scope of 
his or her private life under Article 8.”). 
647 For further analysis see Stijn Smet, The Right to Reputation under the European Convention on 





human rights pendulum that had swung too far on the side of reputation. In Smet’s 
opinion the court wrongly set a high standard for proof of harm as one that 
“compromises personal integrity”.649 Smet is persuasive in arguing that, by creating the 
integrity standard, the ECtHR has created a situational right, not balanced an existing 
right with a competing right of free speech using the traditional proportionality test. In 
the Polanco case “in some situations one enjoys a right to reputation and in others 
not.”650  
In the Western Hemisphere, the American Convention on Human Rights, promoted 
by the Organization of American States (OAS) with state members in North, Central, 
and South America, sets out the right to privacy, honour and dignity.651 It prohibits 
arbitrary interference with the right to privacy or one’s reputation and stipulates that 
everyone has the right to protection of the law against attacks or interferences with that 
right.652 It further subjects the right of expression to a “respect for the rights or 
reputations of others”.653 The American Convention also provides for a right of reply to 
individual complaints of reputational violations through the designation by every 
publisher (including online publishers) of a person without immunity to respond to such 
complaints.  
The American Convention was inspired by the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man (the Declaration of the Americas) that marked the world’s first 
general international human rights instrument, predating the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 1947 by one year.654 The US and Cuba are the only parties to have 
signed but not ratified the American Convention, although a few states have actually 
                                                
649 Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, ECHR 34147/06, [21 Sep 2010] 1341.  
650 Smet, Strasbourg, supra fn 648.  
651 Article 11: “1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity 
recognized;  
2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his 
family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation; 3. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 
[emphasis added] 
652  American Convention On Human Rights, Organization of American States [OAS], 
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
123 (American Convention).  
653 Id., Article 13, para 2a.  
654 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), American Declaration Of The 
Rights And Duties Of Man, (2 May 1948) http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3710.html. 
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attempted to rescinded their ratification.655 In practice, the OAS and the American 
Convention are seen as “more Latin American than Inter-American” and there is strong 
pressure for the US to become a State Party to the alternative OAS Inter-American 
treaties.656  
Although not well known outside of the legislative histories of the parties,  the 
Declaration of the Americas has been referenced in the jurisprudence of both the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) and the work of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (the Commission) that acts as a court of first instance for 
the OAS and that works at enforcement of the Declaration in all OAS Member States. 
In contrast to the EU system of human rights litigation, individual citizens of the OAS 
Member States are not authorized to take cases directly to the IACHR.657  
Akin to its position regarding the ICCPR, the US holds that its own laws 
provide the same or stronger human rights protections than those of the Declaration of 
the Americas and the latter was not referenced in my search of US jurisprudence 
dealing with inter-American human rights cases. In fact, there were no cases of US 
origin coming before the IACHR. Key objections in the US to OAS rights protections 
relate to issues of federalism, sovereignty, and incompatibility with US domestic laws, 
most prominently the US Constitution.658 In political terms, US exceptionalism659 
regarding OAS activities within the Inter-American System is heavily criticized by 
                                                
655 Trinidad and Tobago has rescinded; Peru tried, but used the wrong procedure. 
656 Monica Pinto, The Role of the Inter-American Commission and the Court of Human Rights in the 
Protection of Human Rights: Achievements and Contemporary Challenges, Human Rights Brief,  
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1840&context=hrbrief 
657 Cases must be referred by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights or a member 
state. 
658 Id., at 21 (advising the US to ratify the American Convention to show international 
leadership regarding human rights). The federalist question asks whether ratification by 
federal authorities could legally encroach on exclusively state matters; sovereignty concerns 
question the interrelation of international and domestic legal regimes; and the third objection 
deals specifically with the incompatibility of the Convention’s provisions with US legal 
positions on abortion and the death penalty. 
659 The term “U.S. exceptionalism” is used here to indicate the belief that, unlike other states, 
the United States does not need to ratify international human rights treaties because its 
domestic legal system provides the same or better protections. See further Stephen M. Walt, The 
Myth of American Exceptionalism, Foreign Pol. (Oct. 11, 2011), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/the-myth-of-american-exceptionalism/ 
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other members who have contemplated the creation of alternatives to the American 
Convention and exclusion of  US participation.660  
With respect to data protection in Europe,661 two international instruments are 
crucial to ongoing oversight of transborder data flow: the Council of Europe's 1981 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data (Convention 108),662 and the 1980 Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data, drafted by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).663 Those rules were devised to deal 
specifically with personal information that crosses international borders, targeting the 
adequacy of protection afforded in the exporting country. The former, Convention 108, 
was devised in 1981 and has been described by the European Data Protection 
Supervisor as “the only legally binding international treaty dealing with privacy and 
data protection.664 Privacy advocates recognized in the Convention 108 an opportunity 
to close a gap in data protections: the ECHR was a ‘closed’ instrument, that is, one not 
                                                
660 Francisco J. Rivera Juaristi, U.S. Exceptionalism and the Strengthening Process of the Inter-
American Human Rights System, Human Rights Brief (2012), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/20/2juaristi.pdf (noting that US exceptionalism has left 
the Inter-American Human Rights System vulnerable to attacks aimed at undermining its 
legitimacy and credibility.) 
661 Data disclosure affects reputation in that its revelation can affect social, financial or 
professional tasks, status, or opportunities. 
662 Council Of Europe Convention For The Protection Of Individuals With Regard To 
Automatic Processing Of Personal Data (ETS No. 108), (Jan. 28, 1981) (108 Convention).  
See further Graham Greenleaf “Modernising” Data Protection Convention 108: A Safe Basis for a Global 
Privacy Treaty? 29 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2262296 
(documenting efforts to globalize Convention 108 to protect the transborder flow of data 
related to EU citizens and to enjoin non-European states in protection of their citizens within a 
globalized information flow and communications environment). 
663 OECD Privacy Guidelines (2013) http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-
guidelines.pdf. For OECD Commentary on secondary use of data and enforcement of privacy guidelines 
see ICT Regulation Toolkit, CH 1.7 New Technologies and their Impact on Regulation, 
http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/1.7 - note1, and OECD Cross Border Privacy Law 
Enforcement, (2007), 
http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,2340,en_2649_37441_37571993_1_1_1_37441,00.html 
(highlighting data leakage and privacy law enforcement across geopolitical borders). For a 
historical overview see also Jennifer Stoddard, Thirty Years After The OECD Guidelines, (2011). 
664 European Data Protection Supervisor, Data protection legislation Q&A, 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS/.../QA/QA2; See also Sylvia 
Kierkegaard, et al., The review of the Council of Europe Data Protection Convention 108, 23 COMP. L. 
& SEC. REV. 223, 223-4 (2011) (Kierkegaard).  
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open to participation by non-European or non-member states.665 It applies to both 
private and public authorities, such as police organizations, but has been heavily 
criticized for lack of enforcement mechanisms and for its Euro-centered membership.666  
It provided the framework for the 95 Directive in the mid-1990s when data 
privacy regulation was viewed as “a niche activity”.667 Today, Internet use is no longer 
an exclusive activity: even the purchase of a morning coffee routinely involves 
computer-based caching or storage of personally identifying information such as name, 
banking data, geo-location, and consumer preferences.  
The OEDC guidelines, the 95 Directive, and Convention 108 are crafted using 
“technologically neutral” language to avoid the dating of legal instruments by too 
specific a reference to the technologies intended. They provide broad principles that 
serve as a template for the more specific and practical details that will become law as the 
EU Data Regulation.668 The Convention 108 places more emphasis on protection of 
human dignity and human rights through individual control of our data but does not 
expressly mention “reputation” or the personal cost of data leakage.669  
Similarly, the OEDC Guidelines, the first internationally agreed-upon set of 
privacy principles, addresses the importance of consumer information to the global 
economy and foresees the vulnerability of individuals to automated processing of their 
personal information.  While the original guidelines do not express concerns over 
                                                
665 Convention 108 drafting involved representatives from Australia, Canada, Japan and the 
United States, which was carried out in close collaboration with the OECD. See further, Jorg 
Polakiewicz, Convention 108 as a global privacy standard?  International Data Protection 
Conference, Budapest (17 June 2011), 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/DataProtection/TPD_documents/Convention_108/. 
666 Polakiewicz, id. 
667 Directive 95/46/EC Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Of 24 October 1995 
On The Protection Of Individuals With Regard To The Processing Of Personal Data And On 
The Free Movement Of Such Data (95 Directive).   
668 Technologically neutral language has been defined by the EC Opinion of the Economic and 
Social Committee on the Proposal For A Council Recommendation Concerning The 
Protection Of Minors And Human Dignity In Audiovisual And Information Services, OJ C 
214 (10 July 1998) at 25 para. 3.2.5: “Regulation should be ‘technology-neutral’: as few as 
possible new regulations, policies and procedures should be specific to the new services”.   
669 Propositions of Modernization, The Consultative Committee Of The Convention For The 
Protection Of Individuals With Regard To Automatic Processing Of Personal Data, ETS 108 
Preamble (“that it is necessary, given the diversification, intensification and globalisation of 
data processing and exchanges of personal data, to guarantee human dignity and the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of every person, in particular through 
the right to control one’s personal data and the processing of such data”.) 
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individual reputation, revisions in 2013 mention reputation for the first time within the 
context of the “reputational impact” and “loss of trust or confidence” caused to 
individuals in organizations that experience a data breach, whether by inadvertence, 
negligence, or victimization at the hands of data thieves.670 Reputation as an individual 
right, within the context of data protection, is a legal principle that has developed more 
in the breach – driven more by punitive than precautionary intentions. 
Both the 108 Convention and OEDC Guidelines are under continuous review 
and part of a push for global consensus on universal regulation of personal data 
collection. Despite those efforts, they have been criticized as ineffectual, as  “burdensome 
to those whose motives are benign and ineffective towards those more malignly 
inclined.” 671  
On a more regional basis, the 95 Directive was created to regulate the misuse of 
personal data before the popularization of the personal computer. The Directive is the 
predecessor to the proposed omnibus EUDR that would update and expand the EU data 
collection regime to accommodate the emergence of the Internet, other digital 
communications, and data collection technologies that were not in existence when the 
95 Directive was implemented. The EUDR’s more novel provisions will grant the right 
of access to data by the data subject672 and the right to an effective remedy for leakage 
before a complex system of administrative tribunals.673 It will also regulate, on a 
mandatory basis, any Internet postings that are no longer true, are outdated, have been 
collected or retained without the data subject’s consent, or are embarrassing to the 
reputation of the data subject who can request their deletion.674 The proposed EUDR 
                                                
670 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum To The Revised OECD Privacy Guidelines, 26 
(2013), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf  
671 Kierkegaard, supra note 664 at 231. 
672 Article 8 states (in part):  
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.  
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or 
her, and the right to have it rectified.  
673 Article 47 states (in part): 
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the 
right to an effective or before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this 
Article.”  
674 Under Article 17, data subjects are granted the right to “obtain from the controller the 
erasure of personal data relating to them […] and from third parties the erasure of any links 
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makes specific mention of the protection of “reputation” eleven times in the draft 
document.675 
With the accelerated saturation of the communications market with digital 
media, transfers across geopolitical borders have become a major concern. The 95 
Directive generally restricts the transfer of personal information about identifiable 
individuals from the EU to the United States, unless there is "adequate protection" for 
such information when it is received in the United States or third party countries. The 
resultant Safe Harbor regime has come under review with the EUDR preparations 
because its level of protection for data of EU citizens is less rigorous than that 
demanded of exporters of such data from one EU country to another.676  
Two additional directives relate expressly to online information and aim at 
protecting personal reputation. The Electronic Commerce Directive, (e-Commerce 
Directive)677 effective since 2000, provides legal certainty for EU businesses and 
consumers alike on issues such as information requirements for online service 
providers, 678  the execution of electronic contracts, and limitations of liability of 
intermediary service providers (ISPs).679 Under the e-Commerce Directive, ISPs are 
subject to the law of the Member State in which the service provider is established. In 
turn, the Member State whose residents receive the service cannot arbitrarily restrict 
incoming services. In addition, the e-Commerce Directive encourages administrative 
cooperation between the Member States and the individual user through a balancing of 
self-regulatory actions. Examples of services covered by the e-Commerce Directive 
include e-newspapers, the online sale of books and videos and services (financial 
advising and travel services) as well as online advertising, professional services from 
                                                                                                                                            
to, or copy or replication of that data”, where the data are no longer necessary in relation to the 
purposes for which they were collected, for which that individual withdraws consent or objects 
to the processing of his/her personal data, or where the processing of such data contravenes 
other parts of the Regulation.   
675 In recital 67, for example, it states: “A breach should be considered as adversely affecting 
the personal data or privacy of a data subject where it could result in, for example, identity 
theft or fraud, physical harm, significant humiliation or damage to reputation.” [emphasis added]. 
676 See, for example, Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel H. Solove. Reconciling Personal Information in the 
United States and European Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. (2014) (Reconciling). 
677 2000/31/EC. 
678 For example, agents who receive tax information filed online. 
679 This paragraph is informed by The EU Single Market: E-Commerce Directive, European 
Commission (Mar. 20, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-
commerce/directive/index_en.htm. 
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lawyers, doctors, and estate agents, and entertainment services including basic access to 
the Internet.  
The second directive influencing online personal data is the Directive on the 
Retention of Data (e-Privacy Directive)680 that relates to publicly available electronic 
communications or public networks, such as mobile phone and texting data plan 
companies. The Directive advises those companies that they have to store citizens’ 
telecommunications data for a minimum of 6 months and a maximum of 24 months, to 
allow for official scrutiny by government agents if authorized by law, but is intended to 
curb data retention beyond an individual’s original consent. The directive enables the 
police and security agencies to request access to details such as the IP address and time 
of use of every email, phone call and text message sent or received. A 2014 decision of 
the CJEU, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v Ireland & Karntner Landesregierng & others, ruled 
certain provisions of the e-Privacy Directive are unconstitutional in that they are so 
broad as to permit mass surveillance by state authorities that challenge individual and 
fundamental human rights.681 
Across the pond, there appears no pan-American legal regime for privacy or 
reputational protections. The federal Privacy Act of 1974 arose out of concern in the 
1960s and 1970s for protecting individuals from the increasing capabilities of computer 
systems to compile and store personal data.682 Its aim is to protect records that are 
retrievable by the use of personal identifiers such as a name, social security number, or 
other identifying data. A data subject can prohibit disclosure of her data: her written 
consent is needed before records are disclosed and she can request correction of any 
                                                
680 Directive On The Retention Of Data Generated Or Processed In Connection With The 
Provision Of Publicly Available Electronic Communications Services Or Of Public 
Communications Networks 
2006/24/EC (15 March 2006), amending Directive 2002/58/EC [ePrivacy Directive]. 
681 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v Ireland & Karntner Landesregierng & others (Joined Cases C-293/12 
and C-594/12) CJEU (April 8, 2014) seeking preliminary ruling on ePrivacy Directive (OJ 
2006 L 105, p. 54) in the light of Articles 7, 9 and 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (Digital Rights Ireland). 
682 Privacy Act Of 1974, (Publ. L. No. 93-579), 88 Stat. 1896 (December 31, 1974), as amended 5 
U.S.C. §552a. The federal law introduces a Code of Fair Information Practice that governs the 
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally identifiable information about 
individuals as maintained by federal agencies.  
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information she finds is incorrect.683 The Privacy Act addresses only data collection by 
federal agencies; states each have their own privacy law regime. It is not referenced 
often in the US jurisprudence selected for examination in this chapter. The US system is 
developing in a more ad hoc and sectoral fashion than the harmonized and uniformly 
applicable system within the EU region. For example, each of the following federal US 
laws addresses discrete sectors of online privacy: the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act 684 ; the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 685 , and the Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984.686  
Privacy principles underscoring US legislation reinforce the concept of a “right 
to be left alone” and a somewhat more amorphous concept of the “right of personality” 
than that recognized by French and German legal traditions, as first articulated in 
America by Warren and Brandeis in the 1890s.687 As suggested above, the US system 
incorporates legal principles contained in the US Bill of Rights688 as enshrined in the 
amendments to the US Constitution. Although neither the US constitution nor its 
amendments expressly refer to “privacy” or “reputation”, the US Supreme Court in its 
federal jurisdiction has given definition to rights to personal privacy as against the state 
through such decisions as the 1973 Roe v Wade689 case (invoking the right to privacy to 
protect a woman's choice to have an abortion), Griswold v Connecticut690 (a 1975 decision 
protecting the rights of married couples to contraception use), and Lawrence v Texas691 
(recognizing in 2003 the right to privacy regarding the sexual practices of same sex 
                                                
683  The Privacy Act, US Department of Health and Human Services, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a . 
684 (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (Pub.L. 105-277), 112 Stat. 2681-728 (October 21, 
1998).    
685 42 U.S.C. §§300 & 29 U.S.C. §§1181 et seq (Pub. L. No. 104-191), 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) 
686 66 U.S.C. (Pub.L. No. 98-549), 98 Stat. 1984 (26 January 1983). 
687 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 112 at 205 (citing continental European reliance on the 
concept in their privacy laws).  
688 As incorporated in the Amendments to the US Constitution; notably the right to free speech 
is articulated (1st Amendment), as well as due process (14th Amendment) and freedom from 
unlawful search (4th Amendment: “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”). 
689 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
690 381 U.S. 479 (1975). 
691 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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couples). 692  Constitutional protection usually excludes private activities between 
citizens, who must pursue actions in private law, and is less stringent for celebrities, 
public officials, or participants in newsworthy events. Individual states also recognize 
privacy as a defensible right, as seen in the constitutions of the states of California693 
and Montana694.  
Data protection in the US has also been uniquely shaped by laissez-faire 
economic policies that privilege private industry in the digital age and so present more 
complex challenges to individual privacy rights.695 As a result, there is no single data 
protection regime comparable to the EU's 95 Directive or EUDR, although 
policymakers and academics now urge a move in that direction.696 Regulation has 
proceeded on an industry-specific basis, relying more on commercial and individual self-
regulation, as can be seen in such federal legislation as the Cable Television Protection and 
Competition Act (1992)697 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act.698 The latter, designed more 
as a credit history protection tool than a privacy law, meets growing concerns over 
automated collection and storage of personal data. It allows individuals to check and 
correct their credit information and restricts credit reporting to authorized 
organizations.  
                                                
692 See contra Paul v Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, (1976) (wherein the 
US Supreme Court determined that “[the Plaintiff’s] interest in reputation is simply one of a 
number which the State may protect against injury...[a]nd any harm or injury to that interest, 
even where as here inflicted by an officer of the State, does not result in a deprivation of any 
"liberty" or "property" recognized by state or federal law, nor has it worked any change of 
respondent's status as theretofore recognized under the State's laws.)  
693 CA Const. Art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable 
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and 
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”) 
694 Mont. Const. art. 2 § 10 (“The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a 
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest"). 
695 See further Framework For Global Electronic Commerce, United States Government 
Report, Washington DC, (1 July 1997) promoted by former US President Bill Clinton and 
former US Vice-President Al Gore, http://Clinton4.Nara.Gov/WH/New/Commerce/. 
696 Schwartz & Solove, Reconciling supra fn 676 at 1816, (at note 2 citing recent initiatives such 
as the Department of Commerce Report Internet Policy Task Force, Commercial Data 
Privacy And Innovation In The Internet Economy: A Dynamic Policy Framework (2010) And 
The Federal Trade Commission’s Protecting Consumer Privacy In An Era Of Rapid Change.) 
697 Public Law §102-385, 102 Stat.  
698 Fair Credit Reporting Act 1970, (Pub. L. No. 91-508), §601, 84 Stat. 1128, codified as amended, 15 
U.S.C. §1681-1681x (Oct. 26, 1970) 15 USC §1681 et seq. (Pub.L. 113-142).  
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Another outcome of US concern over data collection was the drafting in 1973 of 
the Code of Fair Information Practices. That code of principles had significant input from 
the US Department of Health and Human Services that was concerned about individual 
privacy amidst the burgeoning collections of personal information within their agencies. 
That input also led to the federal Privacy Act of 1974 mentioned above. The Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), an independent agent of the US government devoted to 
consumer protection and fair competition practices since 1914, oversees enforcement of 
Fair Information Practices, emphasizing principles of Notice, Choice, Access, and 
Security. The FTC has powers of sanction over companies that breach those principles, 
primarily through hefty fines.699 
In conclusion, the European model presents a more comprehensive, uniformly 
developed, and administratively centralized legal regime with a more accessible internal 
organization than the US system. With data information authorities in place once the 
EU Data Regulation is enacted, EU citizens should have a ‘one-stop’,700 streamlined, 
and affordable resource to meet their need of protection or redress for both online 
exposure of personal reputation and excesses of online data retention. The US sectoral 
system, in contrast, relies on self-regulation, in deference to commercial and individual 
free speech rights and freedom of information, with the FTC as the oversight 
mechanism for any commercial practices that threaten consumer protection. The OAS 
forum does not appear to figure prominently in the US regarding human rights issues 
around misuses of personal information. A search of cases decided by the OAS 
Committee in recent years does not identify any US-related parties. The US has not 
made frequent use of its provisions, preferring instead the international OEDC 
principles and the domestic Fair Information Practices. 
The borderless flow of personal information enabled by the Internet and Big 
Data collection, and the different laws it inspires on either side of the Atlantic, results in 
two significant legal issues that challenge any individual trying to protect or recover 
her reputation from online attack or sabotage: jurisdiction and choice of law. Once a 
                                                
699 See further Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov. 
700 Vivian Reding, Data Protection Day 2014: Full Speed on EU Data Protection Reform, Press Release 
(7 Jan. 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-60_en.htm (explaining the 
Regulation’s ‘one-stop’ policy and proposing that every company operating in the single 
market should have a single regulatory interlocutor in the EU). 
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victim decides to entrust her reputational recovery to a lawyer and decides on a cause of 
action, they must reach consensus on the most favourable forum in which to file suit. 
That decision determines the choice of applicable law. In the next section, I examine 
how the Brussels I mechanism, in tandem with the Rome II statute, was intended in 
principle to provide certainty and flexibility for such procedural decisions facing EU 
plaintiffs. We also see how a decision of the CJEU has given such a wide interpretation 
to those principles, and others listed above, with the resultant clouding of the very  legal 
certainty that they had intended.    
 
b EU/US Jurisdiction & Choice of Law in Internet Decisions   
 
Personality rights have been described as one of the most contentious areas of 
private international law. 701  When tortious conduct involving personal data or 
defamatory content crosses national borders the issue of a multistate conflict of laws 
arises.702 On the personal level, such conduct can create devastating exposure for the 
private citizen who needs to know where to bring a lawsuit. It should also be reasonably 
foreseeable to the defendant in which court she will be sued. That prospect has been of 
concern to Europeans since the initial formation of the EEC in 1958 and throughout its 
subsequent formulations to harmonize the laws across Europe.703  
Given the unique architecture of Internet communications, such reputational 
harm now crosses borders widely and instantaneously and far more frequently. For 
example, as we saw in Chapter III, it is increasingly common for the operators of 
websites to use cookies in the browser programs of those visiting their sites to 
automatically collect their personal data. That activity brings the website operator 
based in a non-European country within the four corners of two EU legal instruments: 
                                                
701 Csongor Istvan Nagy, Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Personality Rights in EU Law – Missed and 
New Opportunities, 8 J. Priv. Int’l. L., 251, 253 (2012). Also cited as Nagy, Csongor Istvan, The 
Word is a Dangerous Weapon: Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Personality Rights in EU Law – Missed 
and New Opportunities, 8 J. PRIV. INT. L. 251 (2012). (Nagy). 
702 For a US-EU comparison of contractual conflict of laws, a relatively new focus of private 
international law, see Tamas Dezlo Czigler, Choice of Law in the Internet Age: US and European 
Rules, 53 ACTA JUR. HUNG. 193 (2012). 
703 Adrian Briggs, The Conflict Of Laws, 1-5 (2013) (describing the “hybrid corpus” of private 
international law in jurisdiction and choice of law for non-contractual matters). 
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the Brussels I Regulation704 (governing the jurisdiction or the location of courts for 
hearing transborder civil matters, including torts involving media) and the Rome II 
regulation 705   (addressing the choice of laws that will apply to non-contractual 
obligations). The third instrument, the E-Commerce Directive is also involved as it 
addresses publication of information on the Internet, particularly the issue of “mere 
conduit” or the determination of whether an Internet service is involved in content 
decisions (as a controller) or is a mere conduit (or transmitter) of such information.706  
What becomes important under Brussels I is not the location or domicile of the plaintiff 
but that of the defendant and, due to the variety of recognized exemptions, the geo-
location where harm is experienced.707  
With respect to reputational disputes, the Rome II Regulation has been a most 
anticipated mechanism for clarifying “all matters relating to privacy and personality 
rights, including defamation”.708 It marks an effort by the EU to coordinate judicial 
cooperation regarding civil matters with cross-border impact, such as the import and 
export of online information. Such harmonization is intended to reduce or eliminate 
forum shopping for plaintiffs not satisfied with the legal parameters within their home 
jurisdiction regarding personality or privacy rights. Information flow over the Internet 
has been a particular impetus for solidifying such rules709 and there have been decades of 
preparation for its introduction.   
The 1969 Benelux Uniform law on private international law marked the first 
attempt to codify choice of law for torts at a multinational level.710  Although never 
                                                
704  Jurisdiction And The Recognition And Enforcement Of Judgments In Civil And 
Commercial Matters, 2001/44/EC, (22 December 2000) [Brussels I], 
705 Regulation On The Law Applicable To Non-Contractual Obligations, 2007/864/EC (11 
July 2007) Article 1(2)(g) [Rome II]. 
706 2000/31/2000 [e-Commerce Directive]. 
707  For a more detailed analysis of Brussels I, see The Brussels I Regulation, Ch 1, 
http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/content/brusselsone011.htm. 
708 On 11 July 2007 the European Parliament and the Council adopted the ‘Rome II’ 
Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, p. 40). 
Under Article 1(2)(g), ‘non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and 
rights relating to personality, including defamation’ are excluded from the Regulation’s scope.  
709 Rome II, final sentence. Unlike directives, any regulation of the EU is “binding…and 
directly applicable” in each member state without the need for implementation into domestic 
legislation. 
710 Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Benelux Uniform Law on Private International Law, 18 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 406 (1970)(containing the draft law in English), 420. 
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passed into law, its basic principle was to choose the place of tortious conduct as the 
venue for a private action, subject to a very broad escape clause. If the consequences of 
the conduct were experienced in another jurisdiction with a different system of law, that 
system would determine any obligations flowing from the tortious conduct.711  In 1972, 
the EEC drafted a Convention on Contractual and Non-Contractual Obligations that 
also adopted the place of conduct rule (lex loci damni) with an even broader escape 
clause.712 With the development of Rome II, those efforts were to be realized.  
Rome II has universal application in that it applies to conflicts of torts 
committed outside of the EU involving an EU citizen’s reputation or privacy and so will 
have effect the very nanosecond that information regarding EU citizens crosses into a 
non-EU state. Rome II takes a major step towards the harmonization of EU private law 
regarding non-contractual disputes. Unfortunately for legal clarity and predictability, 
defamation law is not included in the provisions of Rome II at present, withdrawn at the 
eleventh hour due to a flood of protest from the publishing industry as well as a lack of 
consensus between the European Commission and the Council of Europe. 713  To 
illustrate the diversity of opinions that led to that decision, a meeting of the Council’s 
Rome II committee in January 2006 debated thirteen different options for choice of law 
applicable to violations of privacy and personality rights.714  
In the void left by Rome II’s inapplicability to media issues, a study 
commissioned by the EC determined that domestic laws on the right to privacy and to 
freedom of expression varied widely between the Member States.715 The jurisprudence 
of the Member States’ High Courts showed a “difficult and imprecise balance” between 
                                                
711 Benelux Uniform Law, Article 14. 
712 EEC Draft Convention On Contractual And Non-Contractual Obligations, Article 10(2) 
(providing that, if the place of the tortious conduct and that of the resulting event were not 
connected, but another state had a predominant connection to the situation the law of that 
state could apply). 
713 Symeon C. Symeonides, Rome II and Tort Conflicts: Missed Opportunities, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 
(2008).  
714 Jan-Jaap Kuipers, Towards a European approach in the Cross-Border Infringement of Personality 
Rights, 12 GERM. L. J. 1681, 1697 (2011), (where the author attributes the comment about the 
13 options to Andrew Dickenson, Privacy and Personality Rights in the Rome II Regime – Not Again? 
Conflict Of Laws.Net (July 19, 2010), an article no longer available on the website cited.) 
715 Comparative Study On The Situation In The 27 Member States As Regards The Law 
Applicable To Non-Contractual Obligations Arising Out Of Violations Of Privacy And Rights 
Relating To Personality. JLS/2007/C4/028. Final Report, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/study_privacy_annexe_3_en.pdf(EC Privacy Study) 
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the two values,716 and that some Member States already had mature rules of law in this 
respect, while others did not. The study consulted professionals within the legal, 
judiciary, and other professional sectors717 and concluded that the common principles 
enunciated in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECHR) that codified the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (an unwritten set of principles 
on which the ECHR was based), developed within the Council of Europe, were insufficient 
to overcome the problems arising from divergences in national law, particularly 
involving issues of digital technology.718 In fact, most countries were found to have 
made no special provision for conflict rules at all.  Regarding the choice of law question, 
the vast majority of respondents were in favour of allowing the offended party to 
choose, based on the criterion of lex locus damni or the law in the jurisdiction where the 
damage occurred. With the borderless and amorphous nature of Internet transmissions, 
however, and the re-distribution options available to third parties, such a criterion has 
little practical meaning. For example, where does Internet harm occur, where read by 
the data subject, where accessed by the majority of public readers, or where the ISP is 
headquartered? Nevertheless, press and media associations preferred the law of the 
country in which the publisher is established, 719 a position clearly in their favour. The 
study recommends some combination of the three.720 
The Brussels I Regulation, which provisions include non-contractual conflicts 
involving torts and including the media, provides a greater measure of clarity regarding 
jurisdiction. It holds that jurisdiction is to be exercised by the EU country in which the 
defendant is domiciled, regardless of his/her nationality.721 In the case of legal persons 
or firms, domicile is the country where they have their central administration or 
principal place of business. For Google Inc., for example, domicile could be Mountain 
View, California but if the suit involves an individual plaintiff domiciled in France, the 
matter could involve Google France and hence a French court. Brussels I also provides 
                                                
716 Id.  
717 A total of 10,000 professionals were sent a survey questionnaire that yielded 371 valid 
responses. 
718 EC Privacy Study supra fn 715 at 6.  
719 Id. at 7. 
720 Id. at 9. 
721 Brussels 1, Article 2. 
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that jurisdiction can be determined by the “place where the harmful event occurred”.722 
That provision is problematic in that it creates a number of possibilities along the chain 
of causation. In the Bier Bv case, the CJEU interpreted that clause to mean either the 
place where the harmful conduct occurred (the domicile of the defendant who posted the 
defamatory content, for example) or where the harm was experienced (the domicile of 
the plaintiff who suffered the resulting publicity, for example).723 That interpretation 
was made in pre-Internet days, however, when points along the causal chain were more 
easily identified.  
The Bier issues were revisited in 1996 CJEU case of Shevill that decided harm 
occurs where the defamatory material is accessed or read (offline newspapers in this 
case), not where the publisher is headquartered or where the plaintiff is located when 
discovering the offending content.724 In that case, a French newspaper published an 
article accusing an English student of money laundering while on a three-month job in 
France. The newspaper was primarily marketed in France with some circulation in 
other countries. The CJEU ruling, therefore, made all locations where the newspaper 
was read an acceptable forum for bringing suit. Thus Miss Shevill was able to sue a 
French publisher in England in respect of the damage to her reputation caused by the 
250 copies of France-Soir distributed throughout the UK.725 Both the Bier BV case and 
the Shevill judgment of the CJEU, therefore, have done little to narrow the issue of 
jurisdiction, and continue to be applied to Internet cases by European courts despite the 
fact that Shevill dealt with newsprint, not new media.   
Choice of jurisdiction is also a principal challenge for US cases, often involving 
EU litigants as well. One of the first major high profile decisions to highlight US-EU 
personal jurisdiction and choice of law issues involving worldwide Internet 
transmission was that of LICRA & EUJF v. Yahoo! handed down by the Tribunal de 
Grande Instance726 in Paris in 2000.727 The Internet company Yahoo! transmitted its 
                                                
722 Id., Article 5(3) for all torts (non-contractual matters). 
723 Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace [1976] ECR 1735 (Case 21/76) [BIER]. See generally 
Csongor Istvan Nagy, supra fn 701.  
724 Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint International Ltd v Presse 
Alliance SA [1995] ECR I-415 (Case 68/93 [SHEVILL]. 
725 See further Mark Vinall, EDate Advertising and Martinez, Informm’s Blog (3 November 2011), 
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2011/11/03/case-law-edate-advertising-and-olivier-martinez-–-
mark-vinall/. 
726 Court of General Jurisdiction with three judges sitting en banc. 
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auction website throughout many countries of the world advertising Nazi paraphernalia 
and providing links to Nazi doctrine sites. Both activities violated criminal laws in 
France.728 The relevant issues involved jurisdiction, sovereignty, and enforceability of 
court decisions involving the worldwide web. The arguments of the parties, as well as 
the interim and appellate judgments, address aspects of Internet and web functioning 
that set them apart from traditional communications media cases. 
For the Paris suit, Yahoo! argued that the French court lacked jurisdiction 
because the goods were offered for sale within the US on the Yahoo site targeted for US 
users. In the alternative they invoked US constitutional protections of free (commercial) 
speech. The bases on which the Paris court found it had jurisdiction reveal the layer of 
complexity added to conflict of laws cases by the Internet context: it found 1) that the 
Nazi memorabilia auction was open to bidders from any jurisdiction, including France; 
2) the display of such objects on the French website caused a public nuisance in France; 
and 3) Yahoo! Inc. was aware that French residents were accessing its site because it 
displayed advertisements of the paraphernalia in the French language on the pages 
accessed by those users. The Paris court then used an “effects” test to find liability on 
the part of Yahoo! Inc. The test is typically used in torts cases and, the Paris court 
maintained, was sui to the Internet context. 729 The test measures the effects within the 
jurisdiction of the transmission of the impugned website. The court held that citizens of 
France who accessed the Yahoo! site suffered the effects of being exposed to “an affront 
to the collective memory of a country profoundly traumatised by the[Nazi] 
atrocities”.730 It convicted Yahoo! Inc. and, in light of the company’s insistence that 
filtering content out of France was technologically beyond its capabilities, ordered a 
                                                                                                                                            
727 L'Union Des Etudiants Juifs De France (UEJF) & La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et 
L'Antisemitisme [LICRA I] Inc. & Yahoo! France, T.G.I. Paris, May 22, 2000, 
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/yauctions20000522.htm (condemning Yahoo! for its 
violation of French Penal Code R. 645-1). See further Elissa A. Okoniewski, Yahoo!, Inc. v. 
LICRA: The French Challenge to Free Expression on the Internet, 18 AM. U. Int’l L. Rev. (2002): 
295-339 (distinguishing the hands-off role of government in limiting free speech rights 
expressed in the US First Amendment from the more active role for government in la liberté in 
France through the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen).  
728  Code Penal de France, Art. R.645-1, http://www.lex2k.org/yahoo/art645.pdf for English 
translation.  
729 Id., 1173-74 (as originally devised for the pre-Internet case of Calder v. Jones 465 U.S. 783 
(1984). 
730 Id, Plaintiff’s Application at 4. 
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consultancy with Internet experts who advised on the installation of geo-location 
filtering technology in Yahoo! servers in California.  
Yahoo! Inc. appealed the French decision to the US District Court for the 
Northern District of California in San Jose seeking a declaration that the French 
decision was neither recognizable nor enforceable in the US. Yahoo! Inc. had to argue in 
that case that the California court did exercise jurisdiction over the French defendants. 
731 The gamut of arguments used by Yahoo! illustrates the lack of clarity within conflict 
of laws matters created by online cross-border transmissions, and the resultant 
expenditure of financial resources for the two human rights organizations and time to 
pursue or defend such actions. The defendants in the California action732 argued lack of 
jurisdiction as they did not maintain offices, assets or agents in the United States. 
Yahoo! replied that jurisdiction could be established using the "targeting" approach that 
emphasized the defendants were 1) sending a cease and desist letter to Yahoo in Santa 
Clara demanding removal from the U.S. auction site of items constitutionally protected 
in the United States; 2) repeatedly using the U.S. Marshal's Office to serve complaints 
and orders on Yahoo! in Santa Clara; and 3) establishing an e-mail account with the US 
site and thereby agreeing to Yahoo's Terms of Service that dictated that users would 
submit to the personal and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of California. 172   
The principal conflict of laws issue in the California action was whether another 
nation could regulate speech within the United States without violating its 
Constitution, on the basis that the speech could be accessed through the Internet in that 
nation.733 In addressing that question the California Court distinguished between the 
less regulated speech freedoms under US law and those dictated by the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. In the end, the Court found 
that the French order called on Yahoo! to make actions that would chill or sensor 
protected speech, thereby causing “irreparable injury”, all in the name of comity 
between nations as required by international law.734 Yahoo! was issued its declaration 
                                                
731 Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisdmitisme, Plaintiff’s Application for 
Declaratory Relief, 169 F. Supp. 2d. 1181(N.D. Cal. 2001) (No. 00-21275); Yahoo!, Inc. v. La 
Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2001) 
[LICRA II]  http://www.cdt.org/speech/intemational/001221yahoocomplaint.pdf. 
732 LICRA and Union des étudiants juifs de France. 
733 Okoniewski, supra fn 727 at 317. 
734 LICRA I, supra fn 727 at 1189. 
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that the First Amendment precludes enforcement within the geopolitical borders of the 
US  of a French order that in effect regulates speech via Internet of an American 
corporate citizen. 
 
A second noteworthy case addressing conflict of laws (between US states) 
involving the Internet was decided on a sliding scale of website activity from passive to 
active. A district court judge in Zippo Manufacturing case found jurisdiction, and 
liability, in a trademark infringement involving Zippo lighters. 735  Within US 
jurisprudence, a combination of the Zippo sliding scale and the Calder test (discussed 
infra) has been most instrumental in determining jurisdiction and choice of law for 
interstate Internet disputes.  
On a broader philosophical scale, the Yahoo! France case raised the flag 
regarding Internet disputes that have created “endless litigation in disjunctive legal 
systems [resulting in] stalemates and unenforceable judgments”.736 Mark Greenberg 
points out that France and the US share a long history of support for a free press and 
democratic principles in governance and, within the Internet age, the free flow of 
information and opinions limited only by a need to preserve domestic and international 
peace and to respect cultural values in each country.737 The wider practice question in 
cases of personal jurisdiction is whether litigation in multiple fora is the best way to 
resolve the international disputes that are arising with increasing frequency over the 
clash between web content and local laws. Greenberg argues that the litigation route is 
fruitless and endlessly draining of valuable resources, and proposes that the 
international community restructure certain principles governing international 
jurisdiction in Internet cases and adopt shared guidelines on online content available to 
the world market.738 This proposal and others will be considered further in Chapter V.  
More recently, the CJEU took the opportunity to address the “Gordian knot”739 
that the jurisdiction and choice of law issues have become in defamation and invasion of 
privacy cases. In the jointly heard Internet cases eDate Advertising and Oliver 
                                                
735 Zippo Manufacturing Co. v.  Zippo Dot Com Inc. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
736 Marc H. Greenberg, A Return to Lilliput: The LICRA v. Yahoo - Case and the Regulation of Online 
Content in the World Market, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1191 (2003), 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/btlj/vol18/iss4/6. 
737 Id., 1198.  
738 Id., 1192. 
739 Nagy, supra note 701 at 251. 
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Martinez,740 the claimants alleged that their personality rights had been infringed as a 
result of online publications on websites that were based in different EU Member States 
to those in which they lived. In eDate Advertising, the plaintiff was a German national 
and resident that had been convicted of murdering a well-known actor in 1993 and 
released on parole in 2008.741 He complained that an Austrian website publication, eDate 
Advertising, infringed his personality rights by reporting his full name, conviction for 
murder, and the fact that he was appealing his conviction.742 The Bundesgerichtshof or 
Federal Court of Justice for Germany asked for a preliminary ruling on Brussels I 
regarding jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters743 as well as the e-Commerce Directive relating to matters of tort, delict, or 
quasi-delict published on the Internet and the place of jurisdiction.744   
In the enjoined case of Martinez, the French actor Olivier Martinez, while living 
in France, complained of an infringement of his privacy and of the right to his image by 
the UK-based Sunday Mirror website in an article entitled “Kylie Minogue back with 
Olivier Martinez”. The online coverage used a dated photograph to erroneously suggest 
Martinez had reunited with a former girlfriend.745 In both the eDate Advertising and 
Martinez actions, domestic courts faced arguments from the commercial defendants that 
the court did not possess authority to make orders restricting publication outside their 
jurisdictions. 
In the eDate Advertising/Martinez decision, the CJEU determined that (1) with 
an alleged infringement of personality rights by Internet, the person offended has the 
option of bringing an action either in the Member State where the publisher is   
established or before the courts of the Member State in which the “centre of his 
                                                
740 Joined cases eDate Advertising v X and Olivier Martinez & Robert Martinez v MGN Limited, 
[2011] EUCJEU C-509/09 & C-161/10, [2012] QB 654, Grand Chamber,  
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=111742&doclang=EN 
(Edate/Martinez) 
741 EDate Advertising GmbH v X (25 October 2011) Bundesgerichtshof, Germany. 
742 Nagy, supra fn 701 at 252-253, acknowledges that “personality rights” and privacy are much 
broader concepts than libel and defamation and might cover, for example, the right to human 
dignity, bodily integrity, and private communications.  
743 Id., at note 43. 
744 Id., at note 28. 
745 Oliver Martinez & Robert Martinez v MGN Limited (25 October 2011) Tribunal de grande 
instance de Paris, France (Martinez). 
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interests” is based.746 In the alternative, he may bring his action before the courts of 
each Member State in the territory in which content placed online is accessible; (2) the 
e-Commerce directive must be interpreted as not requiring specific conflict-of-laws 
rules for Internet torts that are stricter on Internet service providers than those 
applicable in their own Member State.747   
The first issue, then, involved the interpretation of Article 5(3) of Brussels I 
when dealing with transborder jurisdiction and recognition/enforcement of foreign civil 
judgments.748 As suggested above, that provision had been interpreted in pre-Internet 
days (the Shevill case) to mean that the plaintiff could sue for harm to her reputation 
either in the place where the newspaper publisher was established or in every Member 
State where the newspaper was distributed.   
The second issue in eDate Advertising/Martinez dealt with whether the context of 
Internet media justified a discrete rule of jurisdiction and choice of law. The judgment 
offered such comments as “the Internet reduces the usefulness of the criterion related to 
distribution in so far as the scope…is universal”;749 and “…the placing online of 
content…is to be distinguished from printed matter in that it is intended…to ensure the 
ubiquity of that content;”750 and further reference to  “the impact which material placed 
online is liable to have on an individual’s personality rights”.  The matter of jurisdiction 
for Internet harms to personality are best determined by the courts located where the 
plaintiff has his “centre of interests”.751 That place will usually be the location of his 
habitual residence; that presumption can be defeated by other indications such as the 
pursuit of a professional activity in a specific jurisdiction. According to the CJEU, the 
publisher of the harmful content is usually the best source to determine the plaintiff’s 
centres of interest, but the whole “centre of interests” concept calls for further judicial 
clarification. 
                                                
746 EDate/Martinez supra 740, para 48. 
747 Id. at para 46.  
748 Article 5(3) “A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be 
sued:  in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the 
harmful event occurred or may occur.” 
749 EDate/Martinez supra fn 740 at para 45. 
750 Id.  
751 id. at para 48. 
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The CJEU decision is not clear regarding the establishment of a discrete law of 
Internet defamation or privacy breach. EDate Advertising/Martinez has also been 
criticized for exposing online publishers to the jurisdiction of extra-territorial EU 
courts outside their core markets and for holding them liable for the totality of damage 
suffered across the Internet.752 The opinion of the Advocate General preceding the 
CJEU judgment characterizes the digital era as putting an end to the “markedly 
national context” of more traditional media and perpetuating the “territorial 
fragmentation of the media”. 753  In the end, however, Villalón recommends a 
technologically neutral solution, or one that deems irrelevant, for purposes of 
establishing jurisdiction, whether the defamatory statement was published online or in 
the print media.754 That conclusion is neither helpful nor practical, given the dramatic 
changes evinced by the idiosyncrasies of the Internet.  
The message for present purposes is that efforts to conduct a mutatis mutandis  
application of pre-Internet laws to online tortious conduct, particularly as it moves 
across political borders, have not brought the clarity and flexibility that European 
practitioners, academics, and policymakers have been seeking since the early Benelux 
days. The CJEU in eDate Advertising/Martinez did not opt for revising or replacing the 
Shevill standard to accommodate the Internet, but merely tacked on the “centre of 
interest” criterion if the offending content were transmitted by digital means.755  The 
Court has also been accused of turning a blind eye to the new vulnerability of the 
publisher,756 a group whose numbers and professional characteristics have transformed 
with online authorship but whose pockets regarding damage awards remain quite 
shallow. In addition, the eDate Advertising/Martinez decision does not leave us much 
more certain of the particularities of the e-Commerce Directive that could address 
specific harms perpetrated online but not addressed by criminal law. On a broader scale, 
the CJEU decision appears to favour individual rights to private life over freedom of 
                                                
752 EDate Advertising GmbH v X and Olivier Martinez and Robert Martinez v MGN Limited, 5RB 
MEDIA & ENT. L., http://www.5rb.com/case/edate-advertising-gmbh-v-x-and-olivier-martinez-
and-robert-martinez-v-mgn-limited/. 
753 Advocate General Cruz Villalón. 
754 Jan-Jaap Kuipers, Joined Cases C-509/09 & 161/10, 49 COMMON MARKET L. REV., 1211 
(2012).  
755 Id. at 1230. 
756 Id. 
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expression, a not-surprising conclusion in light of the EU continental history of 
commitment to fundamental rights principles.    
 
c Domestic Responses 
The US has long been considered defendant-friendly terrain for defamation and 
privacy suits, in view of the strong constitutional support for free speech and the 
entrepreneurial spirit that has fostered ICT and, more recently, digital technologies.757 
Although Brandeis and Warren envisioned a privacy regime shaped much like that in 
fin de siècle Europe, US commercial interests and the fastidious taxonomy of William 
Prosser regarding defamation and privacy took the laws of tort into a very different 
direction than for plaintiffs in Europe. The impact of the Sullivan case on US domestic 
law related to reputation should not be understated .758 It has put strict limitations on 
libel suits and kept the burden of proof with the plaintiff to establish intent and actual 
malice in the case of a public figure or celebrity. 759 The US Supreme Court also 
eliminated the common law presumption of falsity in defamation cases: henceforth a 
plaintiff was required to prove fault in addition to falsity, even if it involved a private 
figure.760  
Conflict-of-laws principles are relevant to privacy and defamation harms when 
content crosses geographical borders that are the rule in the world of the borderless 
Internet, transient populations, and off-shore servers. A resultant patchwork of differing 
domestic laws from one state to another can be seen in both the EU and the US. Within 
the EU, for example, English defamation law has historically held that a reverse onus, 
or proof of truth by the defendant, was required, while French law recognizes a broader 
                                                
757 Laura E. Little, Internet Defamation, Freedom of Expression, and the Lessons of Private International 
Law in the United States, 14 EUR. YEARBOOK PRIV. INT’L.  L. (2012) 2.   
758 Sullivan, supra fn 143 for facts of the case. The Alabama lower court ruled in favor of 
Sullivan, finding that the newspaper ad falsely represented the police department and Sullivan. 
Upon appeal, the New York Times invoked the First Amendment. The US Supreme Court 
held for the newspaper, requiring actual malice for libelous claims of public figures, meaning 
with knowledge that they are false or with reckless disregard for the truth. 
759 Christopher J. Kunke, Rome II and Defamation: Will the Tail Wag the Dog? 19 EMORY INT’L. 
L. REV. 1733 (2005) (suggesting that, in America, the legal requirement of intent traditionally 
does not mean moral fault, but the intent to publish) 1762.  
760 Not so in the UK or Australia. See further Fredrick Oduol Oduor, The Evolution of Internet 
Defamation Law: Will Dow Jones v. Gutnick Survive the International Legal Schisms and Legislative 
Onslaught? (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646168. 
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privacy right for which neither good faith nor truth is a defence.761  As well, French 
judiciaries over the years have taken a defendant-friendly approach to libel laws, 
primarily through very tight procedural requirements.762For example, any suit for 
defamation against press or online statements must be filed within three months of the 
statement’s first availability to the public, a requirement that necessitates tracking the 
first third party access date.763 Meanwhile in the Netherlands and Germany, truth is not 
a complete defence to defamation. Regarding procedural rules, in Germany and Italy, 
the plaintiff may choose the most favourable law whereas the French and Austrians 
prefer the law of the location where the defendant’s conduct occurred.764 The Swiss, 
Portuguese, and Polish may apply either rule, as dictated by the facts of a particular 
case.765   
Those substantive and procedural discrepancies can create considerable expense 
and doctrinal confusion for plaintiffs whose efforts to salvage their reputations involve 
bringing suit in several foreign jurisdictions. The Mosley case illustrates the legal 
complexity, as well as financial and personal burdens, created by those differences in 
domestic defamation laws.766 Similarly, the Yahoo! France judgment ordering a blocking 
of Nazi paraphernalia commercial websites from France was determined to be 
inapplicable in California, the corporate headquarters of Yahoo! due to the refusal of  a 
California court to recognize the jurisdiction of French courts over California 
corporations.   
Similarly, defamation cases within the US are governed by myriad sectoral laws 
at the federal level and at the state level as well.  Courts at both federal and state levels 
                                                
761 Alan Reed, The Anglo-American Revolution in Tort Choice of Law Principles: Paradigm Shift or 
Pandora’s Box? 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 867, 878 (2001). The requisite mental element is 
one aspect of defamation law that is much changed in the Defamation Act 2013. 
762 Taylor Wessing, Defamation and Privacy, (2013). 
http://www.taylorwessing.com/uploads/tx_siruplawyermanagement/IP_Defamation_and_priv
acy.en.pdf .  Over 70% of defamation cases are brought under the civil law, according to this 
source. 
763 Niri Shan, & Timothy Pinto (eds), Defamation and privacy law and procedure in England, 
Germany & France, Taylor Wessing (Spring 2006) 
http://www.taylorwessing.com/uploads/tx_siruplawyermanagement/. 
764 Mathias Reimann, Codifying Torts Conflicts: the 1999 German Legislation in Comparative 
Perspective, 60 LA. L. REV. 1297, 1307 (2000). 
765 Kunke, Will the Tale Wag the Dog, supra note 759 at 1738, notes 22-26. 
766 In his UK civil actions, Mosley chose breach of confidentiality law that avoided some of the 
doctrinal and procedural complexity of English defamation law. 
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has assigned priority to rights of belief and free expression (as inspired by the US First 
Amendment), rights against unreasonable search and seizure (Fourth Amendment), the 
right against self-incrimination (Fifth Amendment regarding personal information), and 
the provision that enumerated rights do not abrogate those not expressed in the Bill of 
Rights (Ninth Amendment).767   
Substantive law issues vary from one US state to another, such as separating 
public figures in Texas law into all-purpose and limited-purpose agents of 
government. 768  Virginia defamation law recognizes as a per se cause of action 
implications that the plaintiff is unfit to perform the duties of an office or employment of 
profit, or lack of integrity in the discharge of such duties.769 Pennsylvania maintains a 
wire service defence on its books for the republishing of a news item from a “repu news 
service”.770 As indicated below, several states maintain criminal defamation laws despite 
renewed appeals within state legislatures and in Congress to abolish them.  
Reliance in some US states on the jury system for private actions in defamation 
and privacy intrusions has resulted in monetary awards of a size unheard of within most 
common law countries in Europe.  For example, a Florida jury in 2006 awarded $11.3 
million in damages to Susan Scheff for Internet defamation. The Broward County, 
Florida resident was inundated with caustic messages posted by a Louisiana resident 
charging that Scheff was a “con artist” and a “fraud”, allegations that turned out to be 
completely false.771 Plaintiff Scheff was aware the defendant would be unable to satisfy 
judgment, but even offered to meet her own costs to achieve vindication against the 




                                                
767 Amendments to the US Constitution comprise the US Bill of Rights. 
768 Texas Defamation Law, Digital Media Rights Project, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/texas-
defamation-law. 
769  Virginia Defamation Law, Digital Media Law Project, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-
guide/virginia-defamation-law. 
770 Wire Service Defence, Digital Media Law Project, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/wire-
service-defense. 
771  Scheff v. Bock, Broward County Circuit Court, FLA, Digital Media Law Project, 
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/wire-service-defense. 
772 Laura Parker, Jury awards $11.3M over defamatory Internet posts, USA TODAY (Oct. 11, 2006), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-10-10-internet-defamation-case_x.htm. 
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4.2       Private Law Responses 
 
a What Plaintiffs Seek: Types of Remedy  
  
The law addressing reputational injury is principally framed in Western 
democracies as private law claims in defamation, breach of privacy, or breach of 
confidentiality.773 In addition, perpetuating rumour and gossip focusing on public 
figures is punishable in some EU Member States and some US states through criminal 
defamation laws. Plaintiffs who employ the private law to seek redress from online 
reputational injury, whether from posted content or leaking of personal data, are usually 
granted remedies that fall short of the scope of personal damage the Internet can incur. 
The most sought-after remedy is pecuniary,774 with the implication that lost status does 
have financial worth. One US study has found that plaintiffs prefer financial settlements 
despite their reported lack of effectiveness in meeting their expectations.775 Other 
remedial options include vindication through retractions (conveying the idea that the 
impugned trait or activity was wrongly reported), containment through injunctions (to 
stem the damage at source), and restitution through erasure mechanisms (self-censoring 
of stories, images, and data that are no longer true or that cause irretrievable damage to 
professional, social, and financial opportunities).776   
The advent of new communication technologies has increased the availability of 
discursive remedies as well, thereby expanding immeasurably the audience for 
apologies, corrections, and rights of reply. With the resurrection of the French notion of 
le droit a l’oublie, or the right to be forgotten or right of oblivion, as contained in the 
proposed EUDR, another remedial variant is introduced: the deletion from the Internet 
or other digital sources of personal information or data that was once true within 
                                                
773 At public law, individual reputation is addressed through crimes of cyber-bullying, identity 
theft, extortion, or harassment. 
774 Damage awards are customarily allocated in two categories, compensatory (or actual) 
damages and punitive damages (known as exemplary damages in Cyprus, England and Wales 
where they are extremely rare). There are other modifying terms placed in front of the word 
damages like "liquidated damages," (contractually established damages) and "nominal 
damages" (where the court sets a figure to reprimand the defendant, such as awards of one 
dollar).  
775 Randall Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 71 IOWA 
L. REV., 226, 227 (1985). See contra Ardia, supra note 10 (reporting results of a study in Iowa 
that plaintiffs prefer retraction to pecuniary settlements.) 
776 Id. at 703. Criminal remedies include penal consequences such as incarceration, fines, 
probation, community service, or other methods of public shaming. 
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certain defined contexts but that is no longer accurate or whose collection or 
publication will bring embarrassment and hence is no longer desirable.777Critics of such 
mechanisms are uncomfortable with the self-censorship, revisionism, or filtering 
functions they enable. 
The right of reply, or le droit de réponse in France, is of particular interest because 
it is available in most EU jurisdictions to varying degrees, except in the UK, but is not 
recognized as a right of remedy in the US.778 The principle holds that the correction of 
the offending statement is offered through a counter declaration prepared by the 
plaintiff and published by the disseminator of the original statement.779 The right is 
available in some jurisdictions even in non-tortious circumstances if the statement is 
incomplete or the result of “non-culpable ignorance” of the falsity.780 In some EU 
Member States, the right extends to family members if the subject of the press account 
is deceased.781The droit de réponse extends farthest in France, where press reports of 
every kind, whether false or mere expressions of opinion, even artistic or scientific 
critiques, hold a right of reply.782 The right even applies if the plaintiff is only indirectly 
named (designé) or referred to in the statement.783 The droit de réponse is not a 
promising remedy for online defamation or privacy incursions because, at the time of 
publication of the reply, a large portion of the reputational damage has been incurred 
through retransmissions, retweets, and other methods of third-party dissemination that 
forms a convoluted network not reproducible for response. 
David Ardia suggests a more conceptually based taxonomy of remedies that 
measures the societal harm experienced by the plaintiff: pecuniary loss to the plaintiff;784 
                                                
777 That concept is examined in more detail in Ch. 5 infra. 
778 William Bennett, Rome II and Defamation, British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law (BIICL), http://www.biicl.org/files/5177_bennett_27-09-10_biicl.pdf  (2010). 
779 Right of reply as a private law entity, René David (ed.) International Encyclopedia Of 
Comparative Law, 163, 164 (1986). 
780 Id. In those cases, the aggrieved party must pay costs of the reply, if determined by the 
judge to be just. 
781 Characteristically by the children, spouse, parents, and siblings in that order.  
782 Other related systems of law, in Italy and Greece for example, carry similar provisions. 
783 Id. at 164. 
784 Ardia, supra note 10 at 292 (characterizing pecuniary loss in proprietary terms. His 
categorization gives the nod to Robert C. Post’s three conceptual elements: reputation as 
dignity, honour, and property).  
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non-pecuniary loss to the plaintiff; 785  non-pecuniary loss to society of its social 
connections; the loss to society of its normative standards; and loss of meaningful 
discourse within the plaintiff’s society. Ardia does not provide practical application as 
the law of remedies currently stands.786  
 
b Causes of Action 
 
i Defamation  
  
        “There is a great deal of the law of defamation that makes no sense.”787  
Defamation law is aimed at protecting reputation against harmful statements, 
whether framing the action as libel (written or permanent form),788 calumny, slander 
(spoken or ephemeral form), insult, desacato,789 or lèse majesté.790 Defamation has been 
defined in American law as an oral or written statement which tends to “injure 
reputation in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence 
in which the plaintiff is held,” 791 and in English common law as words about a person 
that “excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him.”792 
English common law has further developed three definitions that focus on the social 
harm caused. Defamation is made out 1) if the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the 
                                                
785 For Ardia those losses can be measured in emotional and physical distress. 
786 Id. at 293 (and as discussed in Chapter 2 supra). 
787 Prosser, supra n 156 at 737. 
788 Generally considered to include video and other permanent digital forms of speech. 
789 “Disrespect” laws in many South American jurisdictions make it a criminal offence with 
penal consequences to criticize or show disrespect for the head of state or public officials. In its  
Report On The Compatibility Of "Desacato" Laws With The American Convention On 
Human Rights, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88, doc. 9 rev. (17 February 1995), 197-212, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights found such laws “lend themselves to abuse, as a 
means to silence unpopular ideas and opinions, thereby repressing the debate that is critical to 
the effective functioning of democratic institutions” (212).   
790 The term lèse majesté addresses the insult of a monarch. In Thailand, anyone who “defames, 
insults or threatens” the king or his family will be punished with up to 15 years in prison. 
Thailand’s lese majeste laws explained, BBC NEWS (1 Dec. 2014),  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29628191.   
791 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, §111 at 773 
(5th ed. 1984).  
792 Case de Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (1606) as cited by James R. Bayer, Defamation : 
Extension of the ‘Actual Malice’ Standard to Private Litigants, - Colson v. Stieg, 59 CHI-KENT L. REV. 
115 (1983). Famosus libellus, or written defamation laws, can be traced back to the Roman 
Empire, when the offense was often punishable by death. Insult laws or iniuria also existed in 
Roman times and evolved from bodily assault and other harms to the person. 
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estimation of right-thinking members of society generally”;793 if a publication “is 
calculated to injure the reputation of another by exposing him to hatred, contempt, or 
ridicule;794 or if “it tends to make the plaintiff be shunned and avoided”.795 
Defamation has undergone a very uneven history in terms of its conceptual 
development, its location in public or private law, and the requisite elements for a claim 
in either civil or criminal law. As William Prosser summed up, the law of defamation is 
full of “absurdities for which no legal writer ever has had a kind word”.796 
 In this section, I survey the general principles of defamation in both the EU and 
US jurisdictions, with case examples, and suggest in the footnotes further reading on 
more tangential points.  An additional layer of complexity has been added with the 
emergence of the Internet and social media: primarily the challenge of anonymity, 
limitless dissemination, permanence of storage, and difficulties in defining and proving 
the requisite mental element. I will discuss each of those challenges in turn. 
 
                    a        Conceptual Differences 
        As the above definitions suggest, defamation in the US is conceptually more 
aligned with traditional English common law and tends to focus on case law regarding 
the loss of social esteem and goodwill, or a loss of social capital in economic terms. By 
contrast and as discussed in Chapter II supra, legal principles of continental Europe, 
primarily reflected in the ECHR and other statutes, tend to link reputation to one’s 
dignity or honour among peers. To defame that dignity is to challenge the positive 
public appraisal of the person, and to defame his honour is to mar the self-appraisal of 
the person for his own public significance.797 In the Germanic tradition, reputation is 
also linked to the concept of personality, a right of autonomy over one’s name that 
German courts have determined survives death.798 In contrast, most US law at federal 
                                                
793 Slim v. Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, HL. 
794 Parmiter v Coupland [1840] 6 M&W 105;  
795 Youssoupoff v Metro Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Limited  [1934] 50 TLR 581, CA. 
796 WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 737(4ed. 1971). 
797 Council of Europe, Defamation And Freedom Of Expression. See also the French Press Act of 
1881 that remained faithful to the spirit of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens 
that proclaimed the freedom of the press "save to respond to the abuse of this liberty, in the 
cases determined by the law”, ie to defamatory statements (art. 11). 
798 Hannes Rosler, Dignitarian Posthumous Personality Rights - An Analysis of U.S. and German 
Constitutional and Tort Law, 26 BERKELEY. J. INT'L L. 153 (2008) (illustrating that in the 
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and state levels does not tend to recognize the posthumous right to a good reputation or 
of third parties to sue for defamation to protect it.799 The key rationale offered is that 
posthumous defamation actions would have a chilling effect on both historical 
recordkeeping and on journalism. That is a serious consideration given the public 
interest in maintaining historical debate and exercising “reasonable speculation” where 
records have gone amiss.800 For those states that recognize posthumous reputational 
rights, it represents an important social value to have a person’s dignity reinstated by 
survivors if its status is questionable his death. 
Within the rights discourse, free speech has been viewed as the vehicle for the 
advancement of knowledge and the truth, as espoused in England by such theorists as 
John Milton and John Stuart Mill. European laws that define free speech rights 
traditionally balance those principles with a right to reputational privacy centered 
around home and family life. As discussed elsewhere, the right to reputation was first 
interpreted by the ECtHR to be subordinate to free speech; in 2004 it gained rights 
status of equal value.801 The ECHR as an international convention within the EU has 
been particularly influential in gaining that status.802 Any EU legal action involving 
defamatory content, then, would trigger a balancing of those two rights. In the US, the 
elements of the rights debate are similar, but debates over the relative merits of 
reputation and privacy have been dominated by the admonition to Congress contained 
in the First Amendment that it must make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
                                                                                                                                            
Mephisto decision, the German Federal Constitutional Court [BVerfG] established a right to 
posthumous personality protections). 
799 Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763 (2009) (pointing out 
that the executor of an estate in the US cannot sue for the libel or slander of a deceased 
person, and proposing an ‘Interest Theory’ approach that would extent protections to the 
dead, similar to those of the mentally ill and infants, that would permit judges to make 
decisions affecting the decedent’s dignity and honour based on cultural and social norms 
within his community.)  
800 Al McConnell, Speaking Ill: an analysis of posthumous defamation, 
https://alistairmcconnell.wordpress.com/essays/speaking-ill-an-analysis-of-posthumous-
defamation/ 
801 Lingens, supra fn 644. For a conceptual background of reputation see Ch 2, s. 2.1 supra. Lingens 
states: “With the article 10 case of Chauvy and others v. France in 2004 and the article 8 case of 
Pfeifer v. Austria801 in 2007, the right to protection of reputation was established as a full 
Convention right under article 8 of the ECHR.” See further Hugh Tomlinson, Privacy and 
Defamation, Strasbourg blurs the Boundaries, Inforrm’s Blog (23 Jan. 2014), 
https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/23/privacy-and-defamation-strasbourg-blurs-the-
boundaries-hugh-tomlinson-qc/. 
802 For wording of articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR, see fn 643ff.  
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the press.803 Such an eminent role for free speech is justified for the free flow of 
democratic discourse and the development of rational human capacities. Anathema to 
such necessary opinion that keeps public officials trustworthy is any paternalistic 
interference of the state. Such signature concepts perpetuated the American Horatio 
Alger Jr. dream that participation and prosperity were determined by personal 
attributes, not social order. 
 
b  Public or Private Law? 
We generally think of defamation as a matter for private law. In many 
jurisdictions, however, including some states within the US and some member states 
within the EU, defamation can involve the criminal law either as an alternative or an 
adjunct to private law. This topic is addressed more comprehensively in section 4.3(a) 
infra and the EU countries still practising criminal defamation are set out in Appendix 
B, Map 2 with penalties listed in Chart 4.  I will provide an overview of defamation law 
elements and point out regional differences that add complexity to its application. I 
focus on US private law and its comparison to that of the UK, and provide a general 
overview of criminal defamation laws in the US and EU member states. 
The involvement of the criminal law in individual reputation suggests a matter 
in which the state holds an important interest. Criminal defamation is much criticized as 
a heavy-handed response by the state to affairs of a more personal nature and as 
endowing autocratic regimes with physical enforcement mechanisms out of proportion 
to the offence. The hybrid nature of legislative response to defamation, addressing it 
variously as a tort or contract matter in private law, or as criminal libel, brings further 
conceptual confusion to an area of law that has come under historical criticism as replete 
with “meaningless and grotesque anomalies”804 and doctrinal inconsistencies.805 The 
result for both plaintiff and accused is uncertainty regarding jurisdictional and choice of 
law decisions in private law, differing standards of proof, and lack of clarity regarding 
remedies meted out by the courts. Discrepancies in criminal defamation laws among EU 
                                                
803 That provision is part of the original twelve constitutional amendments that comprise the 
US Bill of Rights. 
804 Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of Defamation Law, 3 COL. L. REV. 546 (1903). 
805 Ardia, supra, fn 10.  
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member states is set out in chart form in Appendix B;806 US states holding various 
forms of criminal defamation laws are similarly numerous and set out below.807  
 
c         The Requisite Elements 
A case for defamation should exhibit the following elements: the publication to 
third parties of a harmful statement808 which concerns the plaintiff and causes him 
public embarrassment and/or professional and financial suffering, and made without 
adequate research into the truthfulness of the statement.809 When those elements are 
present, and the plaintiff is reduced in the social estimation of his community as a result, 
a private case in defamation is usually made out.  
Regarding the form of the complaint, an action can be framed as defamation per 
se (a statement is so obviously defamatory according to prevalent social or moral 
standards that no proof is required) or as a per quod action (not so obvious, so the mental 
element becomes important). Per se actions have historically been made out in the 
following circumstances: where false statements relate to charges that a person has 
contracted a contagious or venereal disease; charges that a woman is of unchaste 
character; other untrue statements that tend to injure a person in his profession, trade, 
or business; or accusations of the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude. Of 
late, per se actions are becoming more restrictive as certain insults to reputation, such as 
calling a person a homosexual, are gaining social acceptance and hence no longer 
deemed to offend community standards or reduce one’s esteem in society.  
The role of truth in identifying a defamatory statement varies with the laws of 
particular jurisdictions. This variation can be seen in EU member states: for example in 
Sweden truth is an absolute defence; in Latvia, by contrast, truth is not a defence in law, 
but defamation can only be committed by the distribution of “fictions”. In Croatia, truth 
                                                
806 Mike Harris, The EU’s commitments to free expression: Libel and privacy, Index On Censorship, 
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/01/eus-commitments-free-expression-libel-
privacy/#footnote  (2 January 2014). 
807 David Pritchard, Rethinking Criminal Defamation, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 303 (2009), (listing 
the following US states as having criminal defamation laws:  Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin, as well as Puerto Rico 
and the US Virgin Islands). Colorado repealed its criminal defamation laws in 2012 further to 
the Colorado Senate Bill 102 (Sen. Greg Brophy).   
808 Some states further require that the statement be defamatory; others require it be false. 
809 Sullivan, supra fn 143.  
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is not a defence if the defendant acted with actual intent to harm the offended party’s 
reputation. In Poland, defendants must prove, apart from truth, that they were acting in 
the public interest.810 Within the UK, the onus of proving truth rested with the 
defendant prior to the 2013 UK Defamation Act that shifted that onus to the claimant.811 
Again, further comparisons among EU member states are contained in Appendix B, 
particularly through the link provided. 
In the US, truth is accepted as an absolute defence in some state jurisdictions, 
but not in others.812 A plaintiff who is a public official or celebrity must prove both 
falsity and malice on the part of the defendant.813 A statement does not need to be 
literally true in order for this defense to be effective, just substantially true in the legal 
sense. This means that even if the defendant states some facts that are false, if the "gist" 
or "sting" of the communication is substantially true, then the defendant can rely on the 
defense. 
It can be argued that untruthful statements create social harm because they 
upset the “relational interest” that an individual has in maintaining personal esteem in 
the eyes of others.814 Another social harm would be to put at risk of exposure a 
journalist’s sources.815 In a 2015 study of civil defamation laws within the EU for how 
helpful they are to journalists, it was concluded that most were unclear and confusing 
                                                
810 Scott Griffen, Key Findings: Defences in Defamation Cases, in Barbara Trionfi, et al. eds, Out Of 
Balance: Defamation Law In The EU, Report For The International Press Institute (10 Mar. 
2015), http://www.freemedia.at/ecpm/defamation-law-report.html (providing a relatively 
complete comparison of defamation laws in EU states). 
811 UK Defamation Act of 2013, c 26. For an analysis of the truth defence debate, see Elizabeth 
Samson, The Burden to Prove Libel: A Comparative Analysis of Traditional English and U.S. Defamation 
Laws and the Dawn of England's Modern Day, 20 CARDOZO J. INT. & COMP. L. (JICL) (2012), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170040. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170040. 
812 Cf a claim for invasion of privacy in the US where truth provides no defence.  
813 Sullivan, supra fn 143 at 279-283. Sullivan did not prevail, as he could not establish that the 
statements were made with actual malice or that they related to him, at 285-292. 
814 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH. L. REV. 
1, 37 (1996); and Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of 
Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1983).  
815 The issue of legal protection of the journalist/source confidential relationship is not settled at 
common law and affords different protections at the state and federal levels within the US, as 
set out in Rodney A. Smolla, The First Amendment, Journalists, and Sources: A Curious Study in 
Reverse Federalism’, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1423 (2008), 
http://cardozolawreview.com/Joomla1.5/content/29-4/29.4_smolla.pdf.  
 190 
and that, currently, “vagueness is the name of the game”.816 Only Ireland, Macedonia 
and the UK were named as having passed legislation specific to defamation that 
reasonably conforms to international standards and that would assist journalists.817 
A consideration of the requisite mental element in civil cases of defamation also 
points up complex differences from one jurisdiction to the next. In the US, for example, 
prior to the 1964 case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan a plaintiff had to prove the 
defendant’s general intention to publish a false statement, or his negligence as to the 
truth of the statement.818 With Sullivan, the US Supreme Court refined that mental 
element as one of more specific intent with respect to public officials; henceforth the 
plaintiff had to prove some malice on the part of the defendant.819 The malice standard 
appears, when examining the Sullivan decision, to be less about finding ill will feelings 
toward the plaintiff and more about establishing a wider protection for press free speech. 
That higher standard has been rationalized as appropriate for public figures because 
they voluntarily expose their views to greater public criticism.820  
A decade after Sullivan, the US Supreme Court clarified in Gertz v. Robert Welch 
Inc. that, unlike public officials or public figures, private individuals could secure a 
remedy in defamation simply by proving negligence, as opposed to a higher standard of 
intent, on the part of a media defendant.821 So, current US laws have set negligence as 
an acceptable level of mental liability when a plaintiff is bringing an action against a 
publisher, including digital publishers such as Google, Yahoo! and Tumblr as well as 
individual publishers of online blogs and social media content.  
                                                
816  Griffen, supra fn 810 at Key Findings: Civil Defamation, FREE MEDIA 
http://www.freemedia.at/ecpm/key-findings/civil-defamation-laws.html. 
817 The study also notes that Austria, Croatia and Luxembourg have passed general media 
legislation that specifically addresses defamation and provides most relevant defences.  
818 Sullivan, supra fn 143 at 256. 
819 See Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (describing how the “New York Times 
standard” requires “clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with 
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth” for suits involving public 
officials). 
820 Ellyn M. Angelotti, Twibel Law: What Defamation and its Remedies Look Like in the Age of Twitter, 
13 J. HIGH. TECH. L. 430 (2013), 
https://www.suffolk.edu/documents/jhtl_publications/ANGELOTTI-
MACROFINALFINAL.pdf; see also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n Inc., 443 U.S. 157 
(1979)(viewing the primary achievement of Sullivan as establishing the American approach to 
libel as basically governed by the First Amendment). 
821 Gertz supra fn 819.  
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In UK law, the mental element has long been a more onerous standard. In other 
words, by shifting the onus of proof onto the defendant, who cannot always raise proof 
that the impugned statement is true, the plaintiff under UK law was generally successful 
in her claim for damages. As a result of such rigid evidentiary rules, the UK had come to 
be described as the most ‘claimant friendly’ jurisdiction in the world822 while America 
continues to be known as the most protective of free speech, even to the extent of 
protecting some falsehoods in the arena of public discourse.    
The UK Defamation Act 2013 (2013 UK Act) set out to rebalance, rather than 
rewrite, the common law of defamation. It sets the requisite standard of harm at serious 
damage, thereby weeding out more trivial cases, but also doing away with the 
presumption in law that defamation causes reputational harm.823 The defendant retains 
the defence of truth, but s/he must prove a statement is substantially true.  New defences 
of honest opinion and publication on a matter of public interest are also introduced. 
British defamation suits with journalist/publisher defendants have long called on the 
qualified privilege defence, as developed in the Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. 
decision.824 A journalist could claim privilege if reporting in good faith, on a subject of 
interest to her, and made without malice. The defence has been eliminated in the 2013 
UK Act, along with the defence of fair comment. The former has been replaced with a 
public interest defence 825  and the latter with honest opinion. More precisely, 
‘justification’ becomes ‘truth’, and ‘fair comment’ becomes ‘honest opinion’. Malice 
remains a requisite element to prove within the journalism context.826 In terms of 
procedural changes, the presumption of right to trial by jury is abolished.  
In light of the growing use of the Internet, several provisions of the 2013 UK 
Act address online defamation. The Act creates a new defence for operators of websites: 
                                                
822 Trevor C. Hartley, 'Libel Tourism' and the Conflict of Laws, 59 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 25, 26 
(2010). 
823 In line with the decisions in Thornton v Telegraph Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 
(QB)and Dell’olio v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 3272 (QB). 
824 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (HL). 
825 That is, that the impugned statement was on a matter of public interest and the defendant 
reasonably believed its publication was also in the public interest. The publisher need not 
prove that it has met a standard of responsible journalism but can argue reasonable belief. 
826 This paragraph is informed by George Tamunokuro, Limitations on the Freedom of Speech by 




they will not be held liable for defamatory comments made on their website if they can 
prove that the statement was not posted by them and, upon receipt of a defamation 
complaint, they followed a procedure outlined in the Defamation (Operators of 
Websites) Regulation accompanying the Act. The defence will fail, however, if the 
claimant can prove that it was not possible for her to find the individual responsible for 
making the post, she issued a notice of complaint regarding the offending statement to 
the defendant and the defendant failed to act according to the regulations. The question 
of whether unmediated user generated content will place its author under the Act as a 
publisher remains to be developed with future case law. 
Finally, the 2013 UK Act creates a limitation period for filing a claim involving 
online conduct, and assigning liability for the regeneration of posted content. Known as 
the single publication rule, it sets a one-year limit from first publication for making a 
claim; that provision should prevent indefinite liability for online publications, including 
Internet archives.827 The provision does not apply to third party re-publication. It does 
apply, however whenever a publisher provides a new link to a news article or publishes 
a new edition of a book or refreshes links to an older obscure article that later becomes 
newsworthy. It is also applicable for an article that gets tweeted around the world.828 
The legal test is whether the new link, edition, or broadcast is materially different from 
the original. The 2013 UK Act came into force January 1, 2014 and so old libel law will 
therefore still apply in many 2014–2015 defamation cases where the events complained 
of took place before commencement. 
In the EU more broadly, there is a broad discrepancy in the application of civil 
defamation laws from one Member State to the next, as there is with available defences, 
costs to litigants, and damage awards.829 Regarding costs, for example, a 2008 study of 
defamation actions for EU Members, conducted by the University of Oxford, 
determined that total costs to plaintiffs ranged from approximately 600 euros in Cyprus 
and Bulgaria to over 1 million euros in Ireland and England.830 That vast range speaks 
to the various perceptions from one jurisdiction to another regarding the relative 
                                                
827 Id. at 9. 
828 Id. at 7. 
829 Harris, supra fn 806.  
830 A Comparative Study of Costs in Defamation Proceedings Across Europe, Centre For Socio-Legal 
Studies, University Of Oxford, 173 (2008). 
http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/sites/pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/files/defamationreport.pdf (2008). 
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importance of reputation to other civil claims. 
Acceptable remedies include monetary damages, retraction, declaratory relief 
that the statement is untrue, and injunctive relief against further publication of a 
defamatory statement. In America, a defendant who disparages a plaintiff’s professional 
reputation is additionally punished upon losing the action by being assessed special 
damages without need for the plaintiff’s prove of specific harm.  
I have examined the 2013 Act of the UK in some detail above to exemplify the 
breadth and complexity of issues at play in instituting a defamation claim. While 
discrepancies in laws from one jurisdiction to the next raise the ever-present risk of libel 
tourism, major revisions such as the 2013 UK Act are aimed at eliminating that practice, 
as well as incorporating references to digital publishing that raises its own roster of 
legal challenges.831  
 
d     Internet Defamation  
As discussed throughout this dissertation, digital technology has introduced a 
breadth of additional challenges to the legal response to reputational harm. Most 
problematic in terms of preparing a civil suit involving new media are 1) defining a 
victim’s community; 2) identifying and establishing the liability of the content publisher; 
3) identifying anonymous defendants; and 4) assessing the probative value of digital 
speech. Each of those challenges is discussed elsewhere in this dissertation,832 but those 
legal questions ask legislators and judiciaries to think in digital terms rather than in 
geospatial, chronological, sequential, and hierarchical ones. Of interest here is how the 
jurisprudence of our highest courts can provide guidance for such new media legal 
issues. I will make general observations about both the US Supreme Court and the 
ECtHR in their roles as high-level adjudicators of cases involving new media. Not all 
the cases below use defamation as a cause of action; the need for judicial clarity 
regarding new media infuses many areas of law. I then contextualize those observations 
                                                
831 Re libel tourism in US and UK laws see Michael McFall, American and English Libel Law - 
Which Approach is Best? EUR. J. L. & TECH. (2012), http://ejlt.org/article/view/173/261 - 
_ednref29. 
832 Community is dealt with in sections 4.3(c) and 5.4(a); ISP liability is addressed in section 
4.2(c); anonymity is addressed in section 3.2(a)(i); and digital speech is discussed in section 
4.4 and 5.4(a).    
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with two recent cases: the ongoing American case before the US Supreme Court of 
Anthony Elonis and the 2013 case of Delfi AS v. Estonia before the ECtHR.  
The US Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider the legal implications of 
the Internet’s borderless ambit with three cases involving student online postings of a 
defamatory nature. The Court declined to hear three student social media cases in 2012 
that would have assisted school authorities in determining whether they held authority 
to  discipline students for online speech while off-campus.833 The cases focused on the 
necessary balance between school authority to provide a harassment-free educational 
environment, the reputation of school personnel, and the online free speech rights of 
students when not involved in school activities.  
In the first of the three cases, from the US Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, the court found no violation of a student’s First Amendment rights when 
educational authorities disciplined her for criticizing faculty in vulgar terms, using off-
campus web postings.834 A second case, from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, found 
there was indeed a violation of free speech rights in 2007 regarding the disciplining of a 
student who created a MySpace parody of his principal from his home.835  In a third 
case, from West Virginia, a high school student used her home computer to create 
S.A.S.H. (Students Against Sluts Herpes) and invited approximately 100 individuals to 
join, including students from her high school. Her discipline by school authorities was 
upheld as not in violation of First Amendment rights.836 Those conflicting results could 
be attributed to the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled on 
whether a school official may punish student speech that occurs outside the supervisory 
authority of the school. If they had, such discussions could have made valuable 
contributions to how to reconcile the limitless reach of online content with the concern 
for geographical borders in local administrative laws.  
                                                
833 David Kravets, Supreme Court Rejects Student Social Media Case, WIRED (1 Jan. 2012), 
http://www.wired.com/2012/01/scotus-student-social-media/. 
834 Doninger v. Niehoff (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2011). 
835 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., No. 07-4465 (3d Cir. Jun. 13, 2011). A case with similar 
facts, J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. No. 3:07-cv-585, 2007 WL 954245 (M.D. Pa. 
Mar. 29, 2007) was enjoined with Layshock for consideration by the 3rd Circuit Court of 
Appeals.   
836 Kowalski v. Berkeley County Sch., No. 1098 (4th Cir. Jul. 27, 2011).   
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 In none of those recorded appellate decisions was there much helpful 
deliberation on the new legal terrain in which we find ourselves when it comes to online 
communications. Paul Easton of Boston College Law School, in comparing several 
similar decisions, has determined there is a clear need for direction from the Supreme 
Court to prevent such results as a conflict between results of the Second Circuit 
Appellate Court and the Third Circuit Appellate Court due to use of a different 
constitutional standard for student online off-campus speech.837   
Court watchers have commented critically that the most up-to-date Supreme 
Court precedent available to those appellate courts was a 1969 pre-Internet case 
involving the right of students to wear black armbands in class to protest the Vietnam 
War.838 So, what the Supreme Court could have provided by hearing the three 2012 
cases was much needed clarity on the legal boundaries between private online 
communications and school-related online speech that considers new media’s borderless 
reach, persistent memory, architectural autonomy, and indeterminate audience. The 
Court’s thinking in digital terms, rather than geospatial ones, is much needed. 
The silence of the US Supreme Court regarding social messaging has been 
assessed by Professor Little of Temple University as attributable to the more general 
chill to digital speech created by the Communications Decency Act’s blanket protection of 
ISPs from publisher liability.839 I would include in that chilling effect the continuing 
influence of the Speech Act of 2010 that sets a very high bar for enforcement of foreign 
judgments against US journalists. Without such public discussion by the Supreme 
Court, the nature of intermittent questions posed by individual justices that reveal a 
lack of technological acumen is troubling, as will be discussed infra regarding the Aereo 
case.840 
The situation in Europe is much more encouraging. The CJEU and ECtHR have 
been relatively active over recent months in their observations regarding the liability of 
                                                
837 Paul Easton, Splitting the Difference: Layshock and J.S. Chart a Separate Path on Student Speech 
Rights, 53 B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. 17 (2012), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol53/iss6/3.  
838 Edmund H. Mahony, U.S. Supreme court Declines review of off-campus, online student speech case, 
Hartford Courant, (Oct. 31 2011) (stating the last relevant Supreme Court decision was Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) where the US Supreme 
Court found a school board regulation banning the wearing of armbands by students was 
protected speech under the First Amendment.)  
839 Little, supra fn 757 at 2. 
840  S. 4.5 infra. 
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Internet companies and web content hosts for allegedly defamatory content they 
transmit but do not read or edit. The CJEU decision in Google Spain, for instance, was 
landmark in its characterization of ISPs and Internet companies as ‘controllers’ of such 
content with attendant liability for third-party retransmissions and hyperlinks. The 
court also ventured into novel legal terrain in its consideration of the appellant’s right 
to be forgotten and its allocation of responsibility for takedown decisions to Internet 
companies.   
A 2014 preliminary ruling in a case before the District Court of Amsterdam put 
those Google Spain rulings to the practical test in a case involving deletion requests of 
an escort agency owner.841 The appellant had been convicted and sentenced to six years’ 
imprisonment in 2012 for attempted incitement of contract killing. That conviction is 
still under appeal. The man wanted to have links removed to online publications that 
defamed him by continuing to connect him to the crime. Although Google was willing 
to remove part of the search results he complained about, the search engine refused to 
comply fully with his request. The Amsterdam decision clarified the Google Spain 
position on permissible erasure:  
 
The [Google Spain] judgment does not intend to protect individuals against all 
negative communications on the Internet, but only against ‘being pursued’ for a 
long time by ‘irrelevant’, ‘excessive’ or ‘unnecessarily defamatory’ expressions.842 
The Dutch judge pronounced as relevant the reporting of the conviction and negative 
media coverage, but found excessive the online repetition of those factors, not for factual 
background but to launch into a “slanging match’ against the plaintiff. The decision also 
deals with search company liability for autocomplete suggestions and anonymization of 
certain content. 
 Two cases in courts of final jurisdiction address those issues, one before the US 
Supreme Court and the other at the ECtHR.  In the first, a pending appeal of a criminal 
conviction for US citizen Anthony Elonis will challenge the US Supreme Court to 
determine the free speech rights of an ex-husband who used his Facebook page to post 
                                                
841 Arthur van M., C/13/569654 / KG ZA 14-960 (19 Sept. 2014). 
842 Joran Spauwen and Jens van den Brink, Dutch Google Spain ruling: More Freedom of Speech, 
Less Right To Be Forgotten For Criminals, Inforrm’s Blog (27 Sept 2014), 
https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/09/27/dutch-google-spain-ruling-more-freedom-of-speech-
less-right-to-be-forgotten-for-criminals-joran-spauwen-and-jens-van-den-brink/.   
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hostile messages about his community and his estranged wife.843 Anthony Elonis 
claimed his posted content dealt with rap lyrics and was not intended to threaten or 
endanger the objects of his posts: he offered the defence that he was, in fact, just 
kidding. 844 One such posting stated about his wife:  
There’s one way to love you but a thousand ways to kill you. I’m not going to 
rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little 
cuts.845 
  
Elonis’ lawyer suggests it is difficult with decontextualized online speech to distinguish 
humour or high drama from the intent to defame, demean, or frighten:  
Increasingly people who speak on the Internet…could be held subject to felony 
liability not because they intended to…threaten anybody but because somebody 
misinterpreted their comments as a threat…That is a risk on the Internet, where 
you're frequently speaking to people…without the context of tone of voice, body 
gestures, and frequently talking to people who you don't even know in the 
physical world.846 
The Supreme Court has been clear that intended threats do not garner free speech 
protection if they engender imminent violence.  
The court is invited to distinguish threats from protected speech such as 
hyperbole or “unpleasantly sharp attacks”, a reference to Justice Brennan’s comment in 
the Sullivan case about the outer limits of tolerated speech that attacks government and 
public officials.847 Elonis is arguing in his appeal that the requisite intent for online 
threats must be specific intent given the looser speech used in the medium. That 
determination of intent in the absence of offline corroborating evidence is difficult when 
the mode of communication is Facebook postings that can employ two-dimensional, 
                                                
843 United States v. Anthony Douglas Elonis, Case No. 12-3798 (14 June 2013), US App. Ct. 3rd 
Cir. 
844 No clear cut outcome for Supreme Court’s Internet free speech case, CBS NEWS (1 DEC. 2014), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/no-clear-cut-outcome-for-supreme-courts-internet-free-speech-
case/. 
845 Sam Hananel, Supreme Court considers extent of free speech over Internet, PBS (30 NOV. 2014), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/supreme-court-case-considers-extent-free-speech-
internet/. 
846 No clear cut outcome, supra fn 844. 
847 Sullivan, supra fn 143, where Justice Brennan speaks of a US constitutional history 
exhibiting "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that [such debate] may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials." (376 U.S. at  376 U.S. 270). 
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hasty, and impulsive venting and more spontaneous and emotionally charged rants that 
can be easily misinterpreted by readers. Also problematic is the determination of the 
intended community or audience given Elonis’ claim the contents are rap lyrics.848 The 
case is urging the Supreme Court to weigh in on the novel challenge of special intent 
involved in threatening social messaging.   
 The ECtHR has been recently active in providing precedent in the EU for some 
of those issues. In the 2013 case of Delfi AS v. Estonia the Court upheld an Estonian 
court ruling that an online news service was liable for defamatory comments, including 
anonymous postings, submitted by its users regarding news stories.849 Delfi is an 
Internet news portal that publishes up to 330 news articles a day, operating out of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The articles received about 10,000 readers’ comments 
daily, the majority posted under pseudonyms. The comments in question were online 
responses to one article suggesting a majority shareholder in a local ferry company was 
endangering public safety. The contents were profane and explicit in their threats of 
physical harm and other criminal acts.  
Delfi had taken wide precautionary measures regarding offending content. There 
was a system of notice-and-take-down in place: any reader could mark a comment as 
leim (an Estonian word for an insulting or mocking message or a message inciting 
hatred on the Internet) and the comment would be removed “expeditiously”. 
Furthermore, there was a system of automatic deletion of comments that fielded certain 
stems of obscene words. In addition, a victim of a defamatory comment could directly 
notify the applicant company, in which case the comment was removed immediately, as 
was done in the instant case, with removal accomplished the same day. Delphi also 
published conditions of postings on it site, advising users that the comments were not 
its opinion and that the authors of comments were responsible for their own content.  
 In finding Delphi liable as publisher and controller of content, the ECtHR relied 
on a proportioned balancing of free speech and privacy protections under the ECHR.  
The minimal fine, 5000 kroons or approximately $427 US, provided little deterrent 
effect, however. The Court reasoned that Delfi benefited financially from comments 
posted on its server by individual users, and assigned Delfi a positive duty to monitor 
                                                
848 Hananel, supra fn 845. 
849 Delfi AS v. Estonia, no. 64569/09, §§ 7, 94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (October 10, 2013). 
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comments on predictably controversial articles it transmits. Long ranging implications 
of the decision could be that anonymous commentary might be vetoed by Internet 
portals and servers850 and that industry reliance on automatic word filtering capabilities 
or posted notice-and-take-down notifications would be insufficient to avoid liability.851 
It has also been suggested, more controversially, that the decision affords more 
protection to the right to reputation, as contained in the ECHR article 8 right to 
privacy, than in previous ECtHR cases.852 
Meanwhile across the Atlantic, until the US Supreme Court provides more 
jurisprudential direction for the above issues, uncertainty regarding the law of 
defamation’s “shifting sands of assumptions and policymaking”853 will persist in that 
country.  
Other uncertainties remain: with regard to the particular society in whose hands 
our reputation resides, whom do jurists include in our online communities when they 
attempt to measure the extent of our shame and embarrassment? Where do we measure 
losses to social, financial and professional chances, within that online community or 
within the broader community? Are we, as social media users and victims, a composite 
of our communities both online and off? Current jurisprudence has not delivered clear 
legal thinking on those puzzling issues.   
Another uncertainty is the question of how a monetary award, besides conveying 
exoneration, works to retrieve our good name or future opportunities. As has been seen 
in the Mosley case in Chapter III, the distributive capabilities of the Internet and offline 
texting perpetuate defamatory content and necessitate a serial protocol of court 
challenges in various jurisdictions. To date, Mosley has initiated actions in 22 countries 
within the EU based on Google links to News of the World publications. That iterative 
process is expensive in both real costs and emotional wear. The UK 2013 Act limits 
                                                




852 Neville Cox, Delfi AS v Estonia: The Liability of Secondary Internet Publishers for Violation of 
Reputational Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, 77 MOD. L. REV. 619-629 
(July 2014) (suggesting such stronger berth given reputational rights in the ECHR would 
conflict with the UK Defamation Act 2013, s. 5(2): “It is a defence for the operator to show 
that it was not the operator who posted the statement on the website.”) 
853 Ardia, Defamation, supra note 10 at 292. 
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actions against such retransmission as well with its single publication rule. As well, the 
lack of deep pockets with online publishers means that, unlike institutional media that 
maintains a keen interest in safeguarding professional standards in reportage, freelance 
authors of blogs, tweets, and e-magazines comprise a new crop of defendant with little 
ability to pay and hence a reduced fear of large damage awards.854   
There is also a noticeable surge of injunctive relief awarded in Internet 
defamation cases, notwithstanding the timeworn equitable principle that “equity will 
not enjoin a libel”.855 That remedial development goes against years of judicial concern 
over prior restraint to free speech rights.856 In a review by David Ardia of fifty-six 
decisions involving injunctive relief in US defamation cases, well over half were found to 
have been delivered since 2000 and over half by separate calculation, involved Internet 
speech. 857  As well, the nature of injunctive relief awarded has been either 
disproportionate to the harm threatened or technologically unfeasible. For example, 
judges have ordered defendants to cease mentioning a plaintiff’s name online858 or to 
take down a complete website for a single defamatory remark,859 both remedies that 
ignore the Internet’s capability for third party regeneration of the offending message 
and the resilient memory of Internet archiving. In addition, injunctions afford scant 
procedural protection for the defendant who is compelled to obey under threat of severe 
punitive sanctions, usually a hefty fine or period of incarceration. Interestingly, plaintiffs 
have confirmed in hindsight that apologies, corrections, or a retraction from the 
defendant would have sufficed. 
                                                
854 See, e.g., David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 WILLIAM & MARY 
L. REV. 4 (2013) (Ardia Injunctions). 
855 See further Stephen A. Siegel, Injunctions for Defamation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 
56 BUFF. L. REV. 655 (2008). 
856 Id., at 5 (as opposed to post facto solutions that allow offensive speech and then sanction it for 
first amendment violation); for a more historical perspective, see also William O. Bertlesman, 
Injunctions Against Speech and Writing: A Re-Evaluation, 59 KY L.J. 319, 323 (1971); Estella Gold, 
Does Equity Still Lack Jurisdiction to Enjoin a Libel or Slander? 48 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 262 
(1982). 
857 Ardia, Injunctions, supra note 853 at 189. 
858 Apex Tech. Grp. Inc. v Doe, No. MID-L-7878-09 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 23, 2009) 
(order granting preliminary injunction); Cochran v. Tory, (No. BC239405, 2002 WL 33966354 
(Cal. Sup. Ct. Apr. 24, 2002) (granting permanent injunction) but vacated 544 U.S. 734 
(2005). 
859 See e.g. Ardia Injunctions, supra note 853 at notes 8, 9. 
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The differing views on whether new media journalism merits legal protection 
equal to that of traditional media can be seen in two final cases I discuss at this juncture: 
the California Courtney Love case and the Oregon Obsidian Finance decision.  In the first, 
the plaintiff was arguing that her tweets were not bona fide journalistic statements 
while in the second the defendant maintained her blogs were journalism to the Sullivan 
standard and hence deserving of constitutional protection.  
Celebrity Courtney Love was turned down when she asked her former lawyer 
Rhonda Holmes to administer the estate of her deceased husband, singer Kurt 
Cobain.860 Love subsequently published tweets suggesting Holmes had “been bought 
off” and therefore had acted against her client’s best interests.861 Holmes sued in 2013 in 
the California Supreme Court for defamation on the grounds that Love’s tweets implied 
Holmes had an association with organized crime, accusations that impugned her good 
name and professional reputation. In an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment, 
Love’s lawyers proposed in oral argument that it is the nature of tweets to use 
“hyperbole and sensational language” characteristic of communications by social media 
that are not to be scrutinized too carefully or taken as carrying deeper meaning.  They 
asked that claims made via Twitter not be held to the same legal standards as speech 
used by offline (or online) news organizations.862  Love’s counsel were asking that the 
law of defamation shift to create a lesser category of speech that not be held to 
professional publishing standards, particularly given its unmediated status.863  
The judgment on preliminary motion determined that, when both the language 
and context of the offending tweets were considered, they were sufficiently akin to real 
time communications to proceed to trial.864 In the context of defamation law, the rights 
                                                
860 Nancy Dillon, Courtney Love claims ignorance of Twitter in libel suit, NY DAILY NEWS (Jan. 23, 
2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/courtney-love-claims-reckless-oath-
article-1.1588397. 
861 Gordon & Holmes et al. v. Love, Motion for Summary Judgment BC462438, Sup. Ct Cal. 
(Dec. 29, 2013), (addressing Love’s tweeted comments that her lawyer had stopped taking her 
calls because ‘they got to her…she’s disappeared’.)  
862 Id. See also Courtney libel suit shows landmark 1964 case relevant in digital age, CBC NEWS 
(Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/courtney-love-libel-suit-shows-landmark-
1964-case-relevant-in-digital-age-1.2565330.  
863 Id. at 600. Hunt points out that Twitter is a revolutionary communications platform in that it 
enables, for the first time in modern communication, the participation of the average citizen 
with celebrities, major news networks, and politicians.  
864 Gordon & Holmes et al. v. Love, 24 Cal. 3d at 260-61 (2014).   
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of social media publishers were held to no greater or lesser standard than those enjoyed 
by institutional counterparts.  
There was, in other words, an opportunity missed to address the potential for 
discrete treatment in law for digital messaging. A jury returned a verdict favouring 
Love on other grounds, due to the inability of the plaintiff to prove Love’s knowledge 
that her statements were false. That is not surprising, given the cryptic messaging 
within the 140-character limitation that lacks any cues often available in more 
traditional media as to how Love received her information or her level of credulity when 
tweeting. The case does recognize, on a more basic level, that First Amendment 
protections for defendants can extend to tweets.865  
In the 2011 case of Obsidian Finance Group v Cox, 866 the District Court of 
Oregon required Crystal Cox to prove that her blogging met the standard of a bona fide 
publisher in order to merit the Sullivan malice standard of speech protection. 867 The 
plaintiff Obsidian was a bankruptcy consultant business engaged in the reorganization 
of Summit, a company that had misappropriated client funds in the past. The defendant 
Cox was a blogger with a history of making allegations and seeking payoffs in exchange 
for retractions. 868  She considered herself an investigative journalist and posted 
accusations that the plaintiff company was involved in fraud, corruption, money 
laundering, and other illegal activities in connection with the Summit bankruptcy. She 
claimed that Oregon’s shield law protected her from revealing her sources. The Court 
found the hyperbolic and figurative language of the postings to be personal opinion, not 
editorial opinion or journalism. It found the statement that Obsidian had failed to pay 
$174,000 in taxes sufficiently specific, however, to create a cause of action for 
defamation.  
                                                
865 For a detailed analysis of ‘twibel’ cases and constitutional protections see, Patricia Hunt, 
Tortious Tweets: A Practical Guide to Applying Traditional Defamation Law to Twibel Claims, 73 L.A. 
L. REV., 578, http://twitter.com/about. 
866 Obsidian Financial Group., LLC v. Cox, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1232–34 (D. Or. 2011) 
(Obsidian 1). 
867 Sullivan, supra fn 143 at 280. 
868 David Carr, When Truth Survives Free Speech, NYTIMES, B1 (Dec. 11, 2011) (arguing that 
the fact Cox had offered to take down the offending posts for $2,500 per month was a 
persuasive factor in denying her claim for shield protection.) 
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Cox argued for the higher malice standard of intent as a journalist but the Court 
disagreed. 869 Cox was held not to be a media defendant for the purposes of shield law or 
libel protection. That decision, based largely on Cox’s use of the Internet as a medium 
and her lack of professional credentials, has potential to threaten legal protections of 
online citizen reporting and publishing. It also underscores the narrow construction of 
US state legislation related to journalism shield laws, a major block to wider legal 
protections for online citizen journalism in what we can agree is a formative time in its 
development.870 
  Cox appealed her loss, claiming that Obsidian and its partners were public 
figures, an assertion the Ninth Circuit rejected, holding that her posts involved private 
figures even while covering a topic of public concern.871 It found that, “in the context of 
defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than 
those enjoyed by other individuals engaged in the same activities.”872 In light of the 
Internet-induced decline of the unique hold on information by traditional media, the 
court found “the line between the media and others who wish to comment on political 
and social issues becomes far more blurred.”873  
The Obsidian appellate decision advances the law of intent by meshing the 1964 
Sullivan decision (that public figures can only seek claims for defamation if false 
information is published with actual malice,874) and the 1974 Gertz decision of the same 
court (holding that the First Amendment required only a negligence standard for false 
information about private individuals to constitute defamation).875 The import of the 
two decisions is, as one analysis states, that  
                                                
869 Obsidian I, supra fn 865 at 1238.  
870 John J. Dougherty, Obsidian financial Group, LLC v. Cox and Reformulating Shield Laws to 
Protect Digital Journalism in an Evolving Media World, 13 N.C.J.L.& TECH. ON. 287, 290, 
http://www.ncjolt.org/sites/default/files/6RD_Dougherty_287_322.pdf (proposing a medium 
neutral model of journalists’ shield laws.) 
871 Obsidian Finance Group v Cox, Case §12-35238, Court of Appeal, 9th Circuit, from District Ct. 
of Oregon (Nov. 6, 2013) (Obsidian Ii). 
872 Id. at 9, citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985). 
873 Citing Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010). 
874 That is, at the time of publication certain information must either be known to be false or 
published with blatant disregard for the truth. There are currently no federal US shield laws 
for reporters. 
875 Sullivan, supra note 143; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. decision [418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)]. 
 204 
[t]aken together, the two cases establish a meshing precedent: To count as 
defamation, false information about public figures must be published. False 
information about private figures, meanwhile, must merely be published 
negligently.876  
A weighing in on these issues by the US Supreme Court is much needed for clarifying 
the requisite elements of Internet defamation. 
 ii Privacy Torts 
European discussions on privacy enjoy a long history of framing it within family 
life and, in some countries, around the concept of individual personality rights.877  The 
European statutory model has historically incorporated fundamental rights of privacy, 
personhood, and personality.878 Across the Atlantic, any comprehensive consideration of 
privacy law in America begins with the seminal suggestions of Warren and Brandeis 
that privacy laws keep pace with "numerous mechanical devices [that] threaten to make 
good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the 
house-tops’.”879 The technological framework of Brandeis and Warren was yellow 
journalism and the Kodak camera. As judge in the Olmstead wiretapping case, Brandeis 
later makes mention of not only “what has but what may be,” anticipating a future 
technology whereby Government, “without removing papers from secret drawers, can 
reproduce them in court,” to reveal some of the most intimate occurrences of the 
home.880 The advice of Warren and Brandeis regarding crafting a federal US privacy 
law was not followed immediately and, according to research by Neil Richards and 
Daniel Solove, the law of privacy in America veered away from the European model, 
including the law of confidentiality in the UK, to create a new conception of privacy 
                                                
876  Robinson Meyer, U.S. Court: Bloggers Are Journalists, Atlantic (21 Jan. 2014), 
http://www.theAtlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/01/us-court-bloggers-are-
journalists/283225/. 
877 Notably in Germany. 
878 Warren & Brandeis, supra fn 112 at 195. See further Bratman, supra fn 240 at 624 (observing 
the Warren & Brandeis article was a “seminal force in the development of a ‘right to privacy’ in 
American law.”) 
879 Id., citing THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS 
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT, 9 (1879). 
880 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1927). Brandeis’ reference to future surveillance 
technologies is noted by Jeffrey Rosen, Introduction, in Jeffrey Rosen and Benjamin Wittes 
(eds) Constitution 3.0: Freedom and Technological Change, 3 (2011). 
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based on the individual’s ‘inviolate personality’.881 The principles promoted in that 
article of 1890, however, have shaped the development of statutory, constitutional, and 
other privacy protections from that point on.882  
Privacy common law in America has developed in a particular direction due to 
the considerable efforts of William Prosser. His extensive taxonomy of privacy torts 
was meticulously catalogued. Prosser reviewed hundreds of US cases in the 1960s and 
relegated them to one of four torts: intrusion upon seclusion (invading a plaintiffs’ 
physical solitude or seclusion), appropriation (commercial exploitation of the property 
value of one’s name), public disclosure of private facts, and false light in the public 
eye.883  His texts still form the backbone of US law school torts courses. 
While Prosser’s organization has been instrumental in producing a uniform 
reference for the tort law of privacy in the absence of a robust federal privacy law, his 
work has been criticized as too regimental in its categorization of tort law: it contains 
such arbitrary inclusions as the ‘right of publicity’ (that protects a celebrity’s intellectual 
property from misappropriation and hence financial deprivation) within the 
‘appropriation’ category (that protects the private person from the emotional harm of 
unwanted publicity). To some, such results produce contrivances that do not work well 
in practice.884  
Most controversial are the uneven results played out in court. For example, false 
light claims are recognized in only about two-thirds of US states due to their doctrinal 
overlap with defamation actions. There are differences, however, that justify Prosser’s 
inclusion of both torts. For example, false light actions avoid hurdles set by limitation 
and retraction statutes to which defamation actions are subject. In terms of substantive 
differences, false light claims have no access to defences available to the press in 
defamation actions.885 Truth is a complete defence to defamation, while true statements 
                                                
881 Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Cal. L. R. 
1887, passim (2010) (Legacy). 
882 Bratman generally, supra fn 240 at 624. 
883 Prosser, Restatement supra note 156;. Prosser, Privacy, supra fn 242.  
884   Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L. J., 123, 125 (2007) (arguing that Warren and Brandeis did not 
invent the law of privacy from meager precedents of the common law but took it in a new 
direction) (Privacy’s Other Path). 
885 Patricia Avidan, Protecting the Media’s First Amendment Rights in Florida: Making False Light 
Plaintiffs Play by Defamation Rules, 35 STET. L. REV. 227 (2005). 
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are actionable under false light law. Journalists must therefore be particularly wary of 
attracting false light claims because defendants can be successful even if the story is 
truthful in its entirety.886 As well, false light requires the dissemination of offending 
content to a wide audience, whereas defamation claims can rest on the perceptions of a 
smaller number of recipients. The principal doctrinal difference rests in the interest the 
law seeks to protect: defamation protects the objective interest of reputation while false 
light protects the subjective interest of emotional injury causing personal 
embarrassment, helplessness or mere hurt feelings.887 The conceptual vagueness of 
those terms, as well as of the reasonable person standard of proof, has prompted 
journalists to complain of the tort’s chilling effect on their First Amendment 
protection.888  
Daniel Solove’s work builds on Prosser’s taxonomy, emphasizing the variety of 
possible legal protection models beyond tort law that need addressing. 889  He observes 
that many jurists too readily rely on Prosser and avoid tackling the conceptual “muddle” 
that the law of privacy has become more recently.890 Beyond Prosser’s tort law, 
American privacy law extends to the jurisprudential right to privacy,” Fourth 
Amendment law, evidentiary privileges, dozens of federal privacy statutes, and 
hundreds of state privacy statutes.891 With the “panoply of different privacy problems” 
arising with new technologies that do not fit readily into Prosser’s categories, Solove 
calls for a new legal framework that more accurately recognizes potential risks of privacy 
harm: information collection, information processing, information dissemination, and 
                                                
886 For e.g. the case of Anderson Columbia Co., Inc. v. Gannett Co., Inc., No. 2001 CA 001728, Fla. 
Cir. Ct. 1st Dist. (filed Aug. 28, 2001) (where the owner of a road-paving company was 
awarded $18.28 million for a true report that he had shot his wife but that failed to state that 
the authorities ruled the shooting accidental until two sentences after the original mention of 
the shooting, thereby putting his name in a false light. The decision was overturned on appeal 
(Florida Supreme Court No.sc06-2174 (October 23, 2008)).  
887 Getting it right, but in a “false light”, Reporters Comm. Fr. Press, http://www.rcfp.org/browse-
media-law-resources/digital-journalists-legal-guide/getting-it-right-false-light-0 (pointing out 
that some states hold that false light claims can concern untrue implications, not directly false 
statements.) 
888  Thereby offending the constitutional standard that “Congress shall make no law… 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” [emphasis added]. 
889 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 605 (2006) (Taxomony).   
890 Daniel J. Solove, ‘I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 S. DIEGO 
L. REV., 745, 754 (2007). 
891 Solove, Taxonomy supra fn 888 at 483. 
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invasion. 892  That organizational framework accommodates nicely the concept of 
reputational privacy (with its inclusion of data privacy) addressed throughout this 
paper. 
Solove notes particular conceptual problems posed for personal privacy by the 
Internet, primarily consent893 and increased accessibility.894 Recognizing that there is 
no pan-American law of information privacy, unlike the uniformity achieved by the pan-
European 95 Directive,895 Solove argues for more nuanced categorization of harm, from 
methods of intrusion from gazes (surveillance) to official questioning (interrogation) to 
the imposition of one’s presence into another’s physical space as revealed in celebrity 
cases.  
Regarding the latter, some US celebrities have taken the prying of the yellow 
press into their own hands: they have joined forces to argue for laws that prohibit 
paparazzi from photographing their children.896 For celebrity targets of unwanted 
publicity, virtual intrusions magnify the ambit, speed, and constancy of exposure. 
YouTube videos and mobile phone photo capabilities provide a particular kind of 
                                                
892 Id. at 488ff. 
893 Id., at fn 28 citing Julia Cohen (people are bad at predicting “the risk of future harms that 
might flow from piecemeal, otherwise consensual collection of their private data”) and Paul 
Schwartz (who calls consent a legal fiction in the context of the Internet). 
894 Id. at 536. 
895 In the EU, two main legal instruments regulate the data protection in the information 
society. These legal instruments include the 95 Directive, supra fn 667, and the e-Privacy 
Directive 2002/58/EC supra fn 680. 
896 Laura Olson, Paparazzi who harass stars’ kids face tougher penalties, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (25 
Sept. 2013), http://www.suntimes.com/news/nation/22779614-418/paparazzi-who-harass-stars-
kids-face-tougher-penalties.html; Susan Rohwer, Kristin Bell and Dax Shepard’s scheme to sideline 
aggressive paparazzi, L.A.TIMES (5 Mar. 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-
ol-kristen-bell-dax-shepard-aggressive-paparazzi-20140305-story.html - page=1; Anthony 
York, Halle Berry, Jennifer Garner to urge crackdown on paparazzi, L.A.TIMES (13 Aug. 2013), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-halle-berry-jennifer-garner-paparazzi-
crackdown-20130813,0,3748682.story - ax/ (commenting on NoKids Policy campaign created 
by celebrities to stop publication of images of their children); California lawmakers pass bill to 
protect kids from paparazzi, ABC NEWS (7 Sept. 2013), 
http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?id=9240150 (describing the ‘de Leon’ bill on privacy that 
would expand the definition of harassment to include photographing a child without the 
permission of a legal guardian,   increase fines to $10,000, introduce incarceration as a sentence 
option, and allow civil lawsuits in cases where children are harassed because of their parents' 
occupation).  
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intrusive dissemination that tort and privacy laws fail to address.897 By undertaking 
their own anti-paparazzi campaign, American celebrities are exhibiting the 
independence and autonomy of the self-regulatory model that US privacy policymakers 
prefer.  
For EU Member States, two main legal instruments direct privacy legislation in 
the digital information society: the 95 Directive regarding data privacy of individuals898 
and the e-Privacy Directive regarding privacy rights of individuals and other legal 
persons for electronic communications, including oversight of the free movement of 
data, communications equipment, and services.899 Both directives are persuasive, not 
mandatory, but portions of the 95 Directive will instantly become domestic law upon 
passage of the EUDR. Domestic criminal laws and the EU Convention on Cybercrime 
continue to address such violations as identity theft, the transmission of pornography, 
and cyberbullying.  
The unsolicited commercial use of email addresses for marketing purposes is 
prohibited by the e-Privacy Directive900 within the EU, unless consenting individuals 
choose to opt-in to such activities. That model contrasts with the traditional tenet of US 
Internet company terms of service where participation of consumers is accompanied 
with provisions for opt out choices. Those differences reflect US political support for the 
behavioral advertising regime that, as a consequence, makes the sale and transfer of 
personal data a flourishing industry in America. The emergence of post facto data breach 
notification laws in several US states marks a slight shift from the older US policy 
mindset of placing all data protection in the hands of the consumer.901 The fact that 
breach notification was contained as early as 2002 in its e-Privacy Directive within the 
                                                
897 See, for e.g. Jaqueline Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital 
Video”, 96 IOWA L. REV. 919 (2010).  
898 95 Directive supra note 667, section 2.1. 
899 E-Privacy Directive, supra fn 680. pp. 37-47, section 2.2. 
900 Article 13. A natural or legal person who initially collects address data in connection with 
the sale of a product or service has the right to use it for commercial purposes provided the 
customers have a prior opportunity to reject such communication. Member States have the 
obligation to ensure that unsolicited communication will be prohibited, except in 
circumstances given in Article 13. 





EU indicates there is some cross-Atlantic influence of Europe’s more paternalistic 
approach.902 
A significant conceptual challenge posed by our participation in new media is 
whether we can claim any expectation of privacy when the very appeal of digital 
communications resides in the features that reduce our privacy. For example, we know 
that the personal cost of free entry and the convenience of the Web is the privacy 
invasion involved in commercial tracking of our online activities and consumer 
preferences.903 While socialization has taken on a whole new visual appeal through the 
portability and immediate distribution of selfies and group photos, we have come to 
expect that our party antics are frequently tagged, posted, and widely disseminated 
through Facebook or Instagram, often without our knowledge. Potential employers, 
clients, and business prospects have access to legal, and illegal, spyware to learn more 
about such indiscretions.904 On a broader scale, with each web search auto-correction 
suggestions are algorithmically determined from the most frequently entered search 
terms, a compendium to which we contribute with each entry online. We are coming to 
know, click by click, the privacy costs of our engagement. 
 
iii Breach of Confidentiality 
 
 This subcategory of tort law has historical roots in Anglo-America to protect 
information conveyed within a confidential relationship. 905  It has maintained its 
usefulness within the UK to recognize expectations of trust within certain transactions, 
but has less currency in US legal practices due, primarily, to the other path taken by 
legislators responding to Warren and Brandeis, that of individual rights to privacy.906 
                                                
902 See further, European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), 
Recommendations for the Technical Implementation of the Art of the E-Privacy Directive 
(2011), https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-trust/risks-and-data-breaches/dbn.  
903 For further discussion of this legal dilemma, see Adam J. Tutaj, Intrusion upon Seclusion: 
Bringing an “Otherwise” Valid Cause of action into the 21st Century, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 655 (1999).  
904 Daniel Dimov, Mobile Phone Spying Software: Legality, Symptoms, and Removal, Infosec Inst. (8 
Mar. 2013), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/mobile-phone-spying-software-legality-
symptoms-and-removal/. (giving examples such as SpyBubble, Mobile-Spy, and Stealthgenie 
whereby the owner can keep track of information exchanged over the tracked phone, 
including text messages and phone calls.)  
905 Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. REV. 
1061, 1078 (1978). 
906 Richards & Solove, Privacy’s Other Path, supra fn 883 at 123ff. 
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Communications within the confidential relationship are protected in a court of law 
through evidentiary privilege.907 At earlier periods of history, communications through 
letters and literary expression were also respected as confidential, as were post office or 
telegraph office services.  
 Having existed in the shadow of tort law, the US breach of confidentiality action 
remains obscure and rarely invoked. In England, however, actions have been expanded 
to include cases where no prior relationship of confidence or trust existed but where an 
equivalent breach of privacy would be found in America.908 An example is provided by 
the UK case of Loreena McKennitt v. Ash.909 Canadian singer McKennitt sued in a breach 
of confidentiality action for a handful of references in a book by Ash, her former friend 
and confidante with whom no prior, legally-recognizable relationship of confidence 
existed.910 Justice Buxton of the UK Court of Appeal found McKennitt’s personal trust 
had been breached with the revelation of personal details. The cause of action has been 
similarly expanded over the past decade to include disclosure of personal information in 
such fields of practice as insurance, accountancy, social work, and education.911   
Doctrinally the two causes of action are quite distinct. First, breach of 
confidentiality deals more with the context within which information is revealed, that of 
a relationship of trust and an understanding that certain information is of such a private 
nature as to be kept between those who originally shared it. With breach of privacy, the 
content is more the focus: the information must be sufficiently personal that its revelation 
causes humiliation and shame to the subject of the information. As one judgment 
                                                
907 For greater clarity, confidentiality is a broader ethical concept while privilege is an 
evidentiary matter. Examples include lawyer-client, priest-penitent, and doctor-patient 
relationships; they vary in . 
908 See section 4.2(b)(i) supra for a separate analysis of changes to the UK Defamation Act in 
2013. See also Elizabeth Samson, The Burden to Prove Libel: A Comparative Analysis of Traditional 
English and U.S. Defamation Laws and the Dawn of England's Modern Day, 20 CARDOZO J. INT. & 
COMP. L. (JICL) (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170040.  
909 McKennitt v Ash, [2006] EWCA Civ. 1714.  In Mosley v United Kingdom infra, Justice Eady 
extended the concept to find a confidential relationship between Mosley and the press despite 
the absence of any significant prior interrelation. 
910 The decision was one of the first libel cases that invoked the new Human Rights Act (1998) in 
the UK. Richards & Solove, Legacy, supra fn 880, suggest breach of confidence actions enable 
the UK to meet its obligations regarding privacy under that UK legislation and under the 
ECHR as a member state of the EU. 
911 Id. at 174. 
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determined, breach of confidence in the UK is more about the source of leaked 
information while the US privacy torts address the nature of the information itself.912 
US and UK doctrine differ as well regarding the impact of the offending or 
leaked information. It is sufficient to make out a case of breach of confidentiality with 
few recipients of the news. With privacy invasion, however, an element of publicity 
must cause the plaintiff embarrassment and humiliation. The impact on reputation is 
much more profound. In addition, the information itself must be “highly offensive to a 
reasonable person”913 whereas the confidence that is shared in a UK action need only be 
one that is preferred to be kept between the speaker and the confidante.  
 
iv Data Disclosure 
 
The genesis of modern legislation in this area can be traced to the first data 
protection law in the western world, enacted in the area of Hesse, Germany in 1970.914 
Such legislative development was reportedly prompted by an increased interest in 
rights to privacy with the advent of information technology in the 1960s and 1970s.915 
Similar data protection provisions followed in Sweden (1973),916 the United States 
(1974)917, Germany (1977)918 and France (1978).919 The Hesse data privacy legislation 
                                                
912 McCormick v England, 494 S.E. 2nd 431. (S. Ct. App. 1997) (which states “[A]n invasion of 
privacy claim narrowly proscribes the conduct to that which is ‘highly offensive’ and ‘likely to 
cause serious mental injury.’”  
913 McCormick id.  
914 Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz (The Hesse Data Protection Act), Gesetz und 
Verordungsblatt I (1970), 625.  
915 Data Protection and Privacy Laws, Privacy International, 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/data-protection-and-privacy-laws. 
916 The Swedish 1973 Data Act. See Soren Oman, Implementing Data Protection in Law, 
Stockholm Institute For Scandinavian Law, http://www.scandinavianlaw.se/pdf/47-18.pdf 
(advising that the Act only covered processing of personal data in traditional, computerized 
registers. The Act did not contain many material provisions on when and how the data should 
be processed, or general data protection principles.) According to David Wright, et al., Are the 
OECD guidelines at 30 showing their age? 54 Comm. Acm, 119 (February 2011), Sweden's Data Act 
of 1973 was the first comprehensive national act on privacy in the world. 
917 Privacy Act of 1974, supra fn 682. 
918 German Federal Data Protection Act of 1977 (BDSG), Gesetz zum Schutz vor MiBbrauch 
personenbezogener Daten bei der Datenverarbeitung (Bun- desdatenschutzgesetz - BDSG) of 
27 January 1977, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBI] 1 201 (W. Ger.) [Law on Protection 
Against the Misuse of Personal Data in Data Processing (Federal Data Protection Act - 
BDSG)].  
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was prompted by the power struggle that was developing between legislative and 
executive authorities.920 The legislature sought to monitor the control the executive 
branches of local government would have over knowledge collection and retention.921 
As well, citizens began to worry about what would happen to their data and, more 
broadly, to their jobs as data collection became more widespread.922  
The Hesse prototype contained basic themes that would influence most privacy 
and data protection legislation in Europe up to the present day: 1) the negative default 
rule (viewing the processing of personal data as interference per se that needed 
legitimization); 2) the idea that data subjects had a right of access to information 
relating to them without the need to show cause; 3) the omnibus approach (the Hesse Act 
could not cover the private sector and so it set out to regulate all of the state public 
sector within its competence); and  4) the establishing of a privacy protection institution 
(with the primarily European idea that you cannot regulate behavior through litigation 
but through highly structured organizations).923Today within the EU, the e-Privacy 
directive has been instrumental in introducing breach notification measures that can be 
taken within EU Member States once the damage of disclosure has occurred.924 
                                                                                                                                            
919 Loi Informatique Et Libertes Act N°78-17 (6 January 1978) On Information Technology, Data 
Files And Civil Liberties, as amended. 
920 Herbert Burkert, Privacy – Data Protection: A German/European Perspective, Max Planck 
Institute For Research, (nd), 
https://www.coll.mpg.de/sites/www.coll.mpg.de/files/text/burkert.pdf. 
921 Id., at notes 4 & 5, p 45, (advising that “In the constitutional system of Germany after the 
war a new emphasis had been put on the executive and rule-making power of the local 
communities which carried the main burden of executing state and federal laws, as well as 
their local bye-laws. This role became expressly recognized in the German Basic Law 
[constitution].” The federal government had “only a relatively small administrative 
infrastructure of its own”. The Grundgesetz or Basic Law functioned as a constitution for West 
Germany until the entire German people approved a constitution (i.e., after reunification). It 
guaranteed the "dignity of the individual," and the right to the "free development" of one's 
personality.  
922 Id.  
923 Id., at 46 (pointing out that the Hesse Act and many, but not all, subsequent laws in Germany 
tried to avoid "state association" by making the agency or commission directly responsible to 
Parliament).  
924 For practical ramifications and advice see further, Data Breach Notifications In The Eu, Full 
Report, European Network And Information Security Agency  (ENISA) (2013), 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/it/library/deliverables/dbn/at.../. 
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Such principles differed widely from those that led to a much less centralized  
data protection regime in the US where the right to be left alone involved a freedom 
from state intrusion into one’s private spaces. One German principle has influenced 
privacy policymaking in both Europe and US, however: the right to free development of 
the personality as the "highest constitutional value," existing within the "untouchable 
sphere of private life withdrawn from the influence of state power."925 That goes back to 
that expressed by Justice Brandeis: the right to be let alone as against the 
government."926  
Both EU and US jurisdictions have enacted legislation for the protection of 
personal data,927 the central doctrinal concept that defines the scope and boundaries of 
many privacy statutes and regulations around the world.928 As indicated above, in the 
1990s the Clinton administration determined that the private sector should take the 
lead in global electronic development through self-regulation. As a result no single data 
protection law emerged in the US.929   Consequently, electronic and digital innovation 
has produced such various pieces of federal legislation as the Credit Reporting Act of 
1970, the Privacy Act of 1974, the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, and the Cable 
Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992. 930  In addition, individual states 
frequently pass their own versions of such legislation when local jurisprudence 
determines that portions of the federal acts are unconstitutional. An example can be 
found in the creation of the federal Children’s Internet Protection Act of 2000 upon the 
                                                
925 Article 2(1) of the Grundgesetz provides: "Every person has the right to free development of 
his own personality, in so far as he does no damage to the rights of others, to the constitutional 
order, or the moral law." [d. The right to free development of the personality means, in the 
broadest sense, the right to act freely. (Judgment of 16 Jan. 1957 6 Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfG] 32, 36).  
926 Olmstead v. United States, supra fn 879, (dealing with the constitutional challenges to the US 
Fourth Amendment posed by wiretaps).  This opinion is expressed in J. Lee Ricardi, The 
German Federal Data Protection Act of 1977: Protecting the Right to Privacy? 6 Boston Col. Intl. & 
Comp. L. Rev., 243, 245. 
927 ‘Personal data’ is often referred to as ‘personally identifiable information’ and so are used 
interchangeably in this dissertation. 
928 Schwartz & Solove, Reconciling supra fn 676.  
929 William J. Clinton  & Al Gore, A Framework For Global Electronic Commerce, (1 July 
1997) http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/framwrk.htm.   
930 For a comprehensive list of federal and state data privacy legislation see United States Privacy 
Laws, Information Shield, http://www.informationshield.com/usprivacylaws.html. 
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striking down by the US Supreme Court of certain provisions of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1995 dealing with Internet pornography.931  
Cases of inadvertent data leakage by a public repository (such as a bank) or more 
deliberate or negligent disclosures at the hands of commercial entities (such as Internet 
companies and retail outlets) are an increasingly familiar occurrence worldwide. (click 
on Pictogram 2 in Appendix B). The case of Google’s Street View mapping service 
demonstrates the litigious response such privacy invasions can ignite in concerned 
citizens on both sides of the Atlantic. From 2006 to 2010, Google Street View camera 
cars navigated city streets in more than thirty countries collecting over 600 gigabytes 
of personal data from citizens using unencrypted or public Wi-Fi services.  No 
notifications went out to those residents or to the Wi-Fi stations involved.932 The 
collection of video, audio, and other information bits only came to the attention of 
Google executives through queries by German regulators. The equipment used to 
photograph neighbourhoods around the world also picked up personal details of the Wi-
Fi networks and coding from Wi-Fi routers, including usernames and passwords.933  
Google claimed its camera cars only picked up fragments of data due to their rapid 
movement through city streets. Several lawsuits ensued, including a class action heard 
in San Francisco that was decided for the plaintiffs and affirmed on appeal.934The case 
established that Wi-Fi operations do not come within the definition of “radio 
communication” under the federal Wiretap Act, an interpretation argued by Google Inc. 
to render all Wi-Fi data publicly accessible and hence to relieve them of charges of illicit 
interception of private data or communications.935   
The 2013 Google Spain decision of the CJEU marked an expansion of individual 
rights over personal data collected by Internet companies for the retention and 
dissemination of inaccurate or irrelevant personal data. The decision’s findings, while 
                                                
931 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) USSC.   




934 Google Inc v. Joffe et al, 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 11-17483 (10 Sept. 2013), on 
appeal from Re Google Inc. Street View Electronic Communication Litigation, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. 
Dist. CA, Case No. 5:10-MD-2184-JW 794 F.Supp.2d 1067, June 29, 2011.  
935 Statement of Defense, Google Inc. See also Jonathan Stempel, Google loses appeal in privacy 
case, Reuters (10 Sept. 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/10/us-google-view-
lawsuit-idUSBRE98913D20130910. 
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focused on the 95 Directive, set the stage for acceptance of the provisions of its 
successor, the EUDR. The facts of the case are straightforward: A newspaper published 
a notice of auction in respect of the property of Mario Costeja González for unpaid debts 
in Spain. He subsequently paid the debts and the property was not auctioned. Ten years 
later Google searches on his name still brought up the newspaper advertisement. The 
Spanish courts did not agree that the newspaper archive should be amended and so 
González brought an action to require Google to suppress those results. Google 
appealed the lower court finding for the plaintiff to the National High Court that, in 
turn, sought a preliminary ruling from the CJEU on ISP liability (among other issues) 
as set out in the 95 Directive. 
Google’s principal argument was that search engines do not distinguish between 
data it carries that are protected by the 95 Directive (personal data) and other data, and 
that it has no control over the data or the selection of the data. It therefore argued that 
its role was not to “determine […] the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data” as required by the terms of the 95 Directive, and hence it was not a 
controller for purposes of the Directive. The CJEU rejected those arguments. Firstly it 
was not contested that the data included personal data that was processed: the fact that 
there was non-personal data in the search engine operations was deemed irrelevant. It 
was decided that:  
a search engine ‘collects’ such data which it subsequently ‘retrieves’, ‘records’ 
and ‘organises’ within the framework of its indexing programmes, ‘stores’ on its 
servers and, as the case may be, ‘discloses’ and ‘makes available’ to its users in 
the form of lists of search results’.936  
 
The CJEU emphasized that a broad definition must be given to ‘controller’ to 
ensure complete protection for data subjects. In assessing this, the CJEU looked not 
only to what Google does in terms of the organization of the search engine but also its 
role in linking individuals to results.937 
The decision establishes a system for data processing in the EU that gives the 
data subject certain rights to correct data and to object to its ongoing retention. The 
                                                
936 Google Spain, supra fn 401 at paras. 28-29. 
937 See further, Lorna Woods, Google v Spain, landmark CJEU decision in relation to freedom of 




data subject thereby moves a step closer to garnering control over its online data 
presence. The case also raises important questions about the scope of the 95 Directive in 
its impact on non-EU resident processors who might be a ‘controller’. It has 
repercussions for non-EU-based companies using data of EU citizens and exporting 
them across national borders. It also has implications beyond a first publisher of 
material to search engines and other entities that republish personal content and that 
might have more audience than first publishers of a webpage. Under all those scenarios, 
a search engine operator might be required to remove information at the request of the 
data subject.  
With respect to the particular data rights of M. Gonzales that concern the right 
to be forgotten,938 the CJEU held that: 
having regard to the sensitivity for the data subject’s private life of the 
information … and to the fact that its initial publication had taken place 16 years 
earlier, the data subject establishes a right that that information should no longer 
be linked to his name by means of such a list. 939 [emphasis added] 
It is critical to remember in the ensuing discussions on the right to be forgotten 
that follow in Chapter IV that the Google Spain decision recognizes a right to request 
erasure of architecturally embedded links to one’s non-consensual information, not a 
right to have the original information itself removed. Such a finding is always subject to 
the public interest in having access to the information. 
 
c ISP Liability 
There appears to be different judicial treatment emerging on each side of the 
Atlantic regarding the activities for which ISPs should be held legally accountable. US 
judges are less likely than their European counterparts to find Internet companies or 
Internet service providers (ISPs) liable for the hosting and distribution of defamatory 
content due to First Amendment protections and the sweeping immunity afforded by 
the Communications Decency Act.940 Section 230 of that law states:  
                                                
938 As set out in Articles 12(b) and 14(a) of the Directive. 
939 Google Spain, supra fn 401 at para. 98.  
940 The Communications Decency Act of 1996, (47 U.S.C.) is a common name for Title V of the 
Telecommunications Act of the same year. 
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No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as a 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”941  
 
Such wording suggests liability is restricted to active publishers or intermediaries, as 
the Matthew Drudge case illustrates.  
The Internet gossip columnist Drudge,942 most noted for breaking the President 
Clinton-Monica Lewinski story, was contracted to America On-Line (AOL) for a series 
of columns he posted on an AOL enabled website that were distributed by email to 
subscribers. The Drudge Report promoted itself as a particular species of new media: a 
US-based “news aggregator”.943 The AOL, as ISP for those columns, had the right to 
remove content under its standard terms of service, and arguably could be considered 
an editor or controller of content for its active involvement in the selection of posted 
material.   Drudge physically posted the gossipy content, which provided links to other 
articles and sources of news. In one such column Drudge reported domestic abuse by 
Sidney Blumenthal, a prominent member of President Clinton’s administration.944 
Blumenthal sued both Drudge and AOL for defamation. By invoking section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act and disavowing any activities as publisher, AOL was 
successfully removed as a defendant, despite its input to content and the editorial 
oversight it provided.  
In its deliberations over whether it held the judicial authority to impose a 
judgment in Blumenthal’s suit for $30 million, however, the District Court of Columbia 
questioned the carte blanche extended to ISPs under the Communications Decency Act. It 
specifically addressed ISPs’ freedom to “flaunt a rumormonger’s ability to make rumors 
instantly accessible to its subscribers and then claim immunity” for any defamation 
claims that follow. The court upheld ISP immunity all the same,945 and revealed in its 
judgment a misunderstanding of the technology of the Internet. The court suggested 
                                                
941 Section 230(c)(1). 
942 The Drudge Report provided links to upcoming political and entertainment stories and 
“predicted” the Monica Lewinsky scandal in 1996. 
943 Kaley Leetaru, New media vs. Old media: A portrait of the Drudge Report 2002-2008, 14 FIRST 
MONDAY (6 July 2009), http://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2500/2235 
(arguing that the Drudge Report relied heavily on wire services and obscure news outlets to find 
small stories that would break large in future days, making it highly dependent on mainstream 
“old media” sites.)  
944 Blumenthal v Drudge and America On-Line Inc., 992 F. Supp. 44 (1998) (D.D.C.). 
945 Id., at 51. 
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Drudge maintained a mailing list of email subscribers. Online authors like Drudge do 
not maintain email subscription lists that they service; they have no idea where, or from 
whom, their postings are transmitted from day to day. That service is provided 
autonomously in response to anonymous prompts from subscribers.  
The ISP immunity provisions of the Communications Decency Act have been 
applied consistently by US jurists to defeat defamation or privacy claims provided three 
criteria are present: 1) the defendant must be an “interactive computer service”;946 2) the 
plaintiff must allege the defendant I s a publisher or author of the material; and 3) the 
communication must have been provided by a third party “information content 
provider”.947 There has been a certain judicial willingness in recent decisions to use a 
more nuanced interpretation of the section 230 provisions.     
EU case law has generally taken a stricter view of liability for ISPs than that of 
the US. Under EU law, a “service provider" is any person or entity providing an 
"information society service” which means any services provided for remuneration at a 
distance by electronic means.948 The eCommerce Directive949 affords an ISP immunity from 
liability only when it serves as a "mere conduit"950 or provides "temporary caching"951 
for the sole purpose of making the transmission of content more efficient. The Directive 
is used in cases of copyright infringement, defamation, and invasion of privacy. 
Immunity is also provided if the ISP service is of a mere technical, automatic and 
                                                
946 In § 230(c)(1) the Act states: “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.” In § 230(f)(2) “interactive computer service” is defined as “any information 
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server. . . .” 
947 In ” § 230(f)(3) “information content provider” is defined as “any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided 
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”  
948 Article 1.2 of EU Directive 98/34/EC. 
949 Directive 2000/31/EC (8 June 2000) On Certain Legal Aspects Of Information Society 
Services, In Particular Electronic Commerce, In The Internal Market (eCommerce Directive). 
That approach is termed "horizontal" because it addresses liability regardless of the grounds of 
claim by a rights holder or injured party.  
950 Article 12. 
951 Article 13. 
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passive nature, and where the ISP has neither knowledge nor control over the content 
being transmitted or stored.952  
Personal data retained by telecom service providers are regulated under a 
separate Telecom Directive.953 Such laws requiring the retention for government 
purposes of location and traffic data of individual users were found to violate the ECHR 
according to the CJEU Digital Rights Ireland case in 2014.954 Such service providers are 
thereby granted valid grounds to refuse to comply with national data retention 
obligations, although the decision is unclear as to which remedies are available to 
individual users whose personal data is disclosed. It is difficult to imagine such 
restriction on government surveillance practices in America. 
Takedown requests by ISPs are of particular interest to courts in Europe. An 
oft-cited example involves the conviction for invasion of privacy and defamation of three 
Google executives at the hands of Italian courts in 2010. Residents of a small Italian 
town complained that a video of schoolmates taunting an autistic student lingered 
online for a couple of weeks before Google administration removed it.955 The Milan 
court found that period of time sufficient for extensive access by countless online 
viewers. Google argued a guilty verdict might require it to filter content on YouTube 
before it was posted, which it claimed would be incompatible with the open spirit of the 
Internet, as well as the tenor of several European directives and guidelines. The 
executives were given a suspended sentence and fine.956  The case is currently making 
its way through appellate levels of court, with the Google executives arguing the “mere 
conduit” defence.  
The cases against Google’s Street View mapping services in Europe, as 
                                                
952 Article 42. As affirmed in the CJEU decision of Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM (Societe belge 
des auteurs, compositeurs et editeurs,  C-70/10 (24 Nov. 2011). 
953 EU Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC (eTelecom Directive). The Directive covers fixed 
telephony, mobile telephony, Internet access, Internet email and Internet telephony. All EU 
Member States have incorporated the Directive’s provisions into their domestic laws except 
Belgium and Germany.  
954 Digital Rights Ireland, supra fn 681 . 
955 Loek Essers, Google Video trial to continue to Italian supreme court, PCWORLD (17 Apr. 2013), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2035387/google-video-trial-to-continue-to-italian-supreme-
court.html. Three Google executives were handed 6-month suspended sentences in Milan in 
2010, a decision that was reversed on appeal. The prosecutor has appealed that reversal in the 
highest Italian court, the Court of Cassation, arguing the executives deserve criminal sanctions 
for having knowledge of the continued posting. 
956 Privacy actions are addressed through the criminal law in Italy. 
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mentioned above, show how far some courts are willing to go to find ISP liability. 
Several EU countries have taken exception to the privacy invasion of Google’s Street 
View cars and several German towns and cities have moved to block Google from 
taking pictures of storefronts and homes. In Switzerland, data protection authorities 
sued Google to press it to increase privacy protections.957 The Swiss Data Protection 
laws extend privacy rights to images of a person’s home and street view without 
express permission of the owner.958 This is also the case for vehicle number plates and 
pictures of residences, gardens and other private spaces, all considered personal data 
because in such cases a personal connection can be established without difficulty. Public 
institutions housing individuals in need of privacy protection, such as hospitals and 
schools, are also protected. The rationale is that it takes little effort to identify specific 
persons and it must be assumed that third parties will take an interest in the data.959  
The German decisions further rejected the claim of Google that the fact vehicles 
are clearly equipped with a rooftop camera meets its duty to provide information on 
what it is doing. People are simply not aware that the object of the exercise is to travel 
the roads, systematically photographing them to publish the images on the Internet 
without their consent. In Switzerland, advance notice in both the local and regional 
media and in particular in the print media must be given of Google Street View 
recording trips and of the activation of new images on the Internet. Clear notice must 
also be given of the right to object.960  
There is increasing concern in the US over the lack of precision in defining the 
functions of ISPs for the purpose of determining legal liability. Such intermediaries as 
AOL, Prodigy, and Yahoo! have reportedly struggled with the issue of how much 
                                                
957 FDPIC v. Google Inc., BGE 138 II 346 (31 May 2012). Note: Switzerland is not an EU 
member state so its relations with the EU Union membership is regulated through a series of 
bilateral agreements. Although it does not have a concrete legal framework dealing with rights 
and obligations of ISPs, legal doctrine and practice apply similar principles to those stated in 
the eCommerce Directive and the provisions of the 95 Directive concerning data protection 
more generally. See further Rolph H. Weber Internet Service Provider Liability: The Swiss Perspective 
(2010), https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-1-3-2010/2793/Weber_ISP_Ch.pdf. 
958 Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (FADP; SR 235.1). 
959 Google Inc. und Google Switzerland, BGE 138 II 346 E. 6. The only exception is when data is 
processed exclusively for personal use by a private individual who does not disclose the data to 
third parties. 
960 See further Judgment of the Federal Supreme Court on Google Street View: Decisions on the processing 
of personal data, Confederation Suisse, 
http://www.edoeb.admin.ch/datenschutz/00683/00690/00694/01109/index.html?lang=en. 
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control to exercise over their members and subscribers.
 
By gearing its content to 
particular sectors, such as the family, Prodigy became known as a content-rich or 
content-specific site, thereby attracting liability for damages in the case of Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.961 Post-Stratton, ISPs have attempted to rely on safe 
harbour protections to avoid liability for content.962 They argue they are passive 
intermediaries, although their provision of services and their insistence on subscriber 
compliance with terms of service indicates some de facto control over content. The 
posting of warnings by ISPs about compliance with certain laws, on auction sites for 
example, provide further indicia of control.  
The more clear-cut intercontinental differences between European and American 
legal treatment of ISPs are beginning to shift as we experience the democratizing effects 
of online speech, become more aware of the existence of cached data, and ponder the 
implications of the Google Spain decision.963 The issue of takedown requests is becoming 
the battleground for those shifting issues. Under the Google Spain ruling, individual 
users’ takedown requests must be considered by Internet companies using a set list of 
criteria and, if denied, brought as of right before a “competent authority” for a decision. 
Within the EU that authority would be a Data Protection Authority once the EUDR is 
in effect. Within the US, that authority would be a court of competent jurisdiction.964  
In a comment from France regarding take down requests discussed in the Mosley 
decision by the Court of First Instance in Paris (detailed below), we can see resistance 
based on privacy rights that involve cached or linked content that get transmitted to 
third parties and hence is claimed to be outside of Google’s control.965  The author 
                                                
961 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
May 24, 1995). 
962 For an extended discussion of various methods of ISP control, see further Greenberg, supra 
fn 736 at 1195ff.  
963 Google Spain, supra fn 401. 
964 As stated in the Google Spain decision: ‘…if, following a search made on the basis of a 
person’s name, the list of results displays a link to a web page which contains information on 
the person in question, that data subject may approach the operator directly and, where the 
operator does not grant his request, bring the matter before the competent authorities in order 
to obtain, under certain conditions, the removal of that link from the list of results.”   
965 Mosley v. Google France, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris file # 11/07970 (Nov. 2011) 
http://inforrm.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/mosley-v-google-france.pdf; Florain Martin-
Bariteau, The Mosley/Google Case: Why Privacy Can Not be Argued, Droitdu.Net (17 Nov. 2013) 
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comments that Google has responded to each of Mosley’s takedown requests, but the 
offending images are still accessible via video using a different search URL: 
 
Mosley asked Google to figure a way to automatically and permanently take 
them down. Google refused, arguing the company wasn’t the Internet Police, 
and has no duty to watch the web content. 966  
 
Google’s resistance to taking down any links to lingering images from Mosley’s 
private party, particularly YouTube video footage that continues to be available 
through Google searches, has the Hamburg District Court characterizing the Internet 
company an “accomplice” to the News of the World whose story provoked Mosley’s initial 
claim filed in the UK. As one commentator notes,  
 
The case strikes another blow at Google’s continued resistance to the idea that it 
should play its part in preventing unlawful images from being published by way 
of image search results.967 
 The fact that Internet companies, as corporations, are not restrained by First or 
Fourth Amendment provisions, has resulted in executives for companies like Google 
wielding considerable autonomy regarding what content is posted, retained, or removed 
from their sites.   
Facebook executives wield similar power: although its policy statements 
promote the democratic concept of its subscribers having a duty to invigilate offensive 
content, it is the upper management tier that makes final decisions.968 Its current 
protocol is to ask its one billion subscribers to flag content that they believe violates 
Facebook’s community standards as posted on its site. Such factors as “nudity, hate 
                                                                                                                                            
http://droitdu.net/2013/11/the-mosley-case-paris-why-privacy-can-not-be-argued-for-notice-
and-stay-down/. 
966  Mosley v Google France, Inforrm’s Blog (Nov. 2013) 
http://inforrm.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/mosley-v-google-france.pdf  (reporting that ‘The 
publication of the images was held to be unlawful by Mr Justice Eady [2008] EWHC 1777 
(QB) but video footage continues to be accessible via Google searches’.)  
967 Dominic Crossley, Case Law: Hamburg District Court: Max Mosley v Google Inc., Google go down 
(again, this time) in Hamburg Inforrm’s Blog (5 Feb. 2014), 
https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/02/05/case-law-hamburg-district-court-max-mosley-v-
google-inc-google-go-down-again-this-time-in-hamburg-dominic-crossley/. 
968  Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Facebook, (15 Nov. 2013) 
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms. 
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speech, bullying and pornography” are particularly targeted.969 Facebook algorithms 
then sort the offending content into digital piles and Facebook employees around the 
world do a more detailed sorting and decide which content stays and which is deleted. 
Their word is the final arbiter.970 There is an exception to such standards if content is 
group-posted on community pages, or involves humour.  
Law professor Jeffrey Rosen objects to such “delete squads” or “deciders” 
wielding the power to determine community norms and to weed out comments that 
might be controversial and offensive, but still within legal limits.971  Delete squads will 
be explored in section 5.3c(1) infra. 
 
4.3 Outliers: Criminal Defamation, Insult Laws, Opinion, & Creepiness 
 
a Criminal Defamation 
 
While the focus of this paper is primarily on private law, defamation as a crime is 
still invoked in many countries in Europe and in some states of America. It is designed 
as either an alternative to, or in addition to, private law actions in defamation. More 
specifically still, the penal laws of several civil and common law states makes defamation 
of public officials, the nation, or government a discrete offense from laws addressing 
defamation of a private person. In the civil law jurisdiction of France, for example, the 
choice of law is left to the discretion of the prosecutor who bases such decisions on the 
degree of public interest that the facts attract.972 Although framed as an offence related 
to the selling of prohibited goods rather than as defamation, the LICRA v Yahoo! 
decision of the Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance is an example of a high profile case 
where the court applied the French penal code to the streaming into France of Yahoo! 
                                                
969 Id. 
970 Stephen Henn, Facebook’s Online Speech Rules Keep Users on a Tight Leash, NPR (3 Apr. 2013) 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/04/03/176147408/facebooks-online-speech-
rules-keep-users-on-a-tight-leash. 
971 Jeffrey Rosen, The Delete Squad: Google, Twitter, and Facebook and the new global battle over the 
future of free speech NEW REPUBLIC (29 Apr. 2013), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113045/free-speech-internet-silicon-valley-making-rules 
(Delete Squad). See also Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: Facebook, Google, and the Future of 
Privacy and Free Speech, in JEFFREY ROSEN & BENJAMIN WITTE, EDS, CONSTITUTION 
3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, 69-82 (2011). 
972See further Gerlind Berger-Walliser & Franck Valencia, The Yahoo Case: How to Reconsider State 
Sovereignty in the Internet Age, (1 Dec. 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1927461. 
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auction websites advertising Nazi paraphernalia and links to holocaust denial 
literature.973 The case was deemed of considerable public interest in that over 70% of 
French citizens were identified as Internet users that accessed the unlawful content, as 
determined by their digital tracks. The court had several criminal sanctions from which 
to choose: stiff fines, confiscation of offending materials, and the court appointment of 
technological experts to advise on the permanent removal of offending advertising from 
such websites.974 The court chose the first and third options and issued an injunction to 
facilitate such removal within three months, failing which the defendant Yahoo! 
Corporation would be subject to a fine of 100,000 francs per day (about 16,500US).  
In general, criminal defamation laws differ from those of civil defamation in their 
higher probative standards, penal sanctions, and more pervasive social stigma.  Their 
chilling effect on dissidents, journalists, and political activists at the hands of state 
authorities and monarchs has led to repeated calls for repeal of such laws.975 The power 
of criminal sanction has proven irresistible to leaders across time, even within 
democratic states, as an instrument to quell public criticism.  
The first citizen to be convicted under the 1881 French Press Law had called the 
French President a ‘voyou profanateur’ or profane thug and a ‘goujat iconoclaste’ or 
iconoclastic boor.976 The last to be convicted was fined thirty euros977 for holding up a 
cardboard sign at a 2008 rally telling then-President Nicolas Sarkozy to “Casse-toi 
pov’con,” or get lost.978 Critics of French Presidents, if convicted under insult laws, have 
                                                
973 Contrary to Article R645-1 of the French Criminal Code that prohibits the wearing or 
exhibiting of public uniforms, insignias and emblems which recall those used by any 
organization declared illegal by the Nuremberg Charter or by a person convicted of crimes 
against humanity under French law № 64-1326 of 1964-12-26. 
974 LICRA I supra fn 727. 
975  United States Helsinki Commission On Security And Cooperation In Europe, 
Memorandum On Defamation And Insult Laws, http://www.csce.gov (14 Dec. 2001). 
976 Max Fisher, Yes, it really was a crime in France to insult the president until this week. Here’s why, 
WASH POST (26 July 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/07/26/yes-it-really-was-a-crime-
in-france-to-insult-the-president-until-this-week-heres-why/. 
977 A typical fine for criminal defamation is $18,000 (US) or about 13,500 Euros. 
978 Fisher advises that “the expression literally translates to “break yourself off, poor jerk,” but 
has a more colloquial meaning that is a profane (and unprintable) way of telling someone to go 
away.” See further European Court backs man against France over anti-Sarkozy insult, BBC 
EUROPE (14 Mar. 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21783922. (offering the 
translation “Get lost, you sad prick”, as reportedly used by Sarkozy himself to a rally member 
a few months earlier).  
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been sentenced to a year in jail; between 1881 and 1958, the law against presidential 
insults was used only nine times, but employed thereafter by President De Gaulle to 
convict 350 critics of his tactics in the war in Algeria. 
It is a legal curiosity that such laws remain in force. A 2014 study of extant 
criminal defamation laws in Member States of the EU determined that only five of the 
28 states have repealed general criminal defamation and insult laws, despite broad 
international consensus among legal experts and press freedom advocates that criminal 
punishments for defamation represent a disproportionate restriction on free 
expression.979 The study has further determined that the laws of 20 EU Member States 
suggest imprisonment as a punishment for either defamation or insult, in contradiction 
of ECtHR rulings that imprisonment is, as a general rule, never an appropriate 
punishment for defamation. Fifteen states set maximum incarceration at two years, with 
eight years in one state. 980 Although international standards recommend against 
providing public officials with any special protection under defamation law, the laws of 
six EU states elevate criminal punishments for defamation when the offended party is a 
public official or public figure. In Appendix B, Chart 1, the distribution of criminal 
defamation laws within the EU is shown, indicating the ample provisions within EU 
states that have resisted pressure for repeal. 
While the basic elements of defamation include a false statement about the 
person made to a third party that results in the lowering of his reputation in the esteem 
of his community, criminal defamation law additionally requires proof of intent to cause 
harm at a much higher probative standard than for civil actions. 981 In more autocratic 
regimes, the criminal law of defamation has become a weapon to rout out public 
discourse on controversial policies of the state.982 Journalists and writers are specific 
                                                
979 Scott Griffin et al., Out Of Balance: Defamation Law In The European Union And Its Effect On Press 
Freedom, Report for International Press Institute, (July 2014) 
http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/uploads/pics/Out_of_Balance_OnDefamation_IPIJuly201
4.pdf  
980 Slovakia sets a maximum of eight years’ incarceration upon conviction for criminal 
defamation. 
981 Private law defamation traditionally only requires malice for the defamation of public 
figures and celebrities. Criminal defamation requires proof of intent to defame according to the 
penal standard of the particular state.   
982  The United Nations Commission on Human Rights determined in 2012 that the 
criminalization of libel violates freedom of expression and, in particular, Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
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targets of such laws and press councils and associations tirelessly promote the repeal of 
such laws.983 
At times defamation laws, often in the form of “insult” provisions, are invoked 
simply to compensate for hurt feelings or indignation, without appreciation for the fact 
that in an open society, a person’s sensibilities must be weighed against the right of 
others to freely express themselves.  
In America, penal consequences can be quite harsh: in Colorado, for example, 
criminal libel was a felony carrying up to 18 months in prison and a $100,00 fine for a 
first offence. The libel law was quite broad: it was a crime to “knowingly publish or 
disseminate, either by written instrument, sign, pictures, or the like, any statement or 
object tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, 
integrity, virtue, or reputation or expose the natural defects of one who is alive, and 
thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule”. 984 
Nearly all EU Member States retain criminal sanctions for defamation – with 
only Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the UK having repealed such laws.985 The 
European Commission continues to call for a harmonization of libel laws across the 
EU,986 and the Council of Europe called on states to repeal criminal sanctions for libel in 
2007, as did both the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)987 
                                                
983 Examples include the International Press Institute, ARTICLE 19 within the EU, and the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation in the US.  
984 Criminal libel laws were repealed in Colorado in September of 2012.  
985 Council Of Europe, Defamation And Freedom Of Expression: Selected Documents, Directorate 
General of Human Rights (March 2003) (detailing the status of criminal defamation and insult 
laws in most EU Member States). See also Mike Harris, The EU’s commitment to free expression: 
libel and privacy, X-Index (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/01/eus-
commitments-free-expression-libel-privacy/ (suggesting a major variance in civil and criminal 
defamation laws and practices across the EU and referencing a 2008 Oxford University study 
that found costs of actions ranged from approximately 600 euros (claimant and defendant 
costs) in Cyprus and Bulgaria to over 1 million euros in Ireland and the UK. Defences varied 
widely as well: truth was commonplace, but a stand-along public interest defence was in more 
limited use).  
986 European Commission, Comparative Study Of Different Approaches To New Privacy Challenges, In 
Particular In The Light Of Technological Developments, Final Report JLS/2008/C4/011 – 30-CE-
0219363/00-28  (Jan. 20, 2010), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_e
n.pdf 
987 Ending the Chilling Effect: Working to Repeal Criminal Libel and Insult Laws, OSCE (Nov. 25, 
2004), http://www.osce.org/fom/13573 (detailing the censorship experienced by journalists for 
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and UN special rapporteurs on freedom of expression. 988  Non-governmental 
organizations that oppose their use include Amnesty International, Article 19, the 
Committee to Protect Journalists, the Helsinki Committees of Bulgaria, Croatian, 
Greece, Romania, and Slovakia, the International Helsinki Federation, the World Press 
Freedom Committee, the Norwegian Forum for Freedom of Expression; national 
chapters of PEN; and Reporters Sans Frontières. For many EU Member States, politicians 
and journalists receive tougher sanctions for criminal libel than ordinary citizens, even 
though the ECtHR ruled in 2006 that the limits of acceptable criticism (of the state and 
other citizens) are wider for a politician than a private citizen.”989  
In the US, criminal defamation remains on the books in seventeen states despite 
repeated calls for its repeal for the restrictions it places on First Amendment rights.990 
Journalism professor David Pritchard suggests that criminal libel can be a legitimate 
and hefty legal tool in the hands of state agents for ‘expressive deviance’ causing harm 
to private citizens, particularly victims with few resources for private lawyers, lengthy 
delays, and the unpredictability of private law outcomes.991  
The reformation of criminal defamation (desacato) laws of OAS Member States 
has been a focus of the IACHR and, despite reports in 1998 and 2000 of its Special 
Rapporteur for Free Speech recommending their abolition across the OAS 
membership,992 there is still wide usage of desacato laws to silence opinions against state 
authorities.993 The basic constitutional argument of the IACHR is that desacato laws 
                                                                                                                                            
criticisms of a ruling regime, but dealing very little with the experiences of non-journalistic  
critics of the state). 
988 International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression, Joint Declaration By The UN 
Special Rapporteur On Freedom Of Opinion And Expression, The OSCE Representative 
On Freedom Of The Media And The OAS Special Rapporteur On Freedom Of Expression’ 
(2002), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=87&lID=1(stating in 
its preamble that the authors are “Mindful of the ongoing abuse of criminal defamation laws, 
including by politicians and other public figures”.  
989 Lingens supra fn 644. 
990 Pritchard, supra fn 807, listing the following states: Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin, along with Puerto Rico 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 
991 Based on 61 trial-level prosecutions in Wisconsin from 1999 to 2007. 
992 Annual Report Of The IACHR, 1998 Volume III, Chapter IV A. –OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102 Doc.6 
(rev. 16 April 1999); and Annual Report Of The IACHR, 2000 Volume III, Chapter III A.2. –
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111 Doc.20 (rev. 16 April 2001). 
993 IACHR, Report On The Compatibility Of "Desacato" Laws With The American Convention On 
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afford a higher level of protection to public officials than to private citizens. This is in 
direct contravention of the “fundamental principle in a democratic system that holds the 
government subject to controls in order to preclude abuse of its coercive powers.”994 It 
also offends the principle of US constitutional law that the state serves with the consent 
of the governed. 
 
b Insult Laws 
 
Insult laws differ from criminal defamation in that insults might be true but 
undesirable to public figures and heads of state; criminal defamation, in contrast, relates 
to false allegations involving either public or private citizens. Particularly disconcerting 
is the fact that insult laws remain in place in twelve EU Member States even though 
convictions have been consistently overturned by the ECtHR.995 Even insult to national 
symbols, such as the flag, is criminalized in Austria, Germany and Poland. 
Most European countries have domestic laws that accommodate actions in 
insult, a term so broad that it frequently covers expression that would be considered an 
opinion or value judgment.996 Even countries regarded as having relatively strong 
media freedoms have statutes outlawing the insult of elected officials. For instance, the 
ECtHR has described Belgium’s insult law as covering “gratuitously offensive terms or 
exaggerated expressions.”997  
Insult laws can cast a wide net and punishments can range from token to severe. 
For instance, until its repeal in 2013, France's 1881 Press Law prescribed punishments 
for insult to the president, public officials and foreign dignitaries. At one time 
punishment included prison terms, but more recently “an insult to the president of 
France could see you smacked with a €45 000 fine.”998 Insult laws are frequently 
confused with criminal defamation laws, possibly because the procedural result is the 
same: hefty fines or incarceration, and the chill of expressive freedoms. For example, 
                                                                                                                                            
Human Rights, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88, doc. 9 rev., 17 February 1995, 197-212. 
994 Id.  
995 Swiss Data Protection and Privacy laws include a subcategory of “pillory” laws.  
996 Marlene Arnold Nicholson, McLibel: A Case Study in English Defamation Law, 18 WIS. INT. L. 
J., 1 at note 21 (2000). 
997 De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 25 EUR. H.R. REP. 1, para 26 (1997). 




ARTICLE 19 as an organization of free speech activists complains that a number of 
countries across the world use defamation laws for the “ill-defined and stifling 
protection of ‘feelings’”999 where the plaintiffs’ requisite standard of proof appears to be 
“that they feel offended.”1000 In some countries the term ‘honour’ is used instead of, or in 
addition to, reputation and humour and satire come within its prohibited actions.  
 
c Opinion 
Finally, much online invective that offends individuals has been determined by 
jurists in defamation cases to be opinion, not fact, and hence not actionable. Such speech 
can be “uninhibited, casual and ill thought-out” and it is often apparent to casual readers 
“that people are just saying the first thing that comes into their heads and reacting in 
the heat of the moment."1001 
Internet scholar Yochai Benkler has emphasized that new methods of knowledge 
production on the Internet fundamentally alter the capacity of individuals to be active 
participants in the public sphere, from disparate corners of the world.1002 Within that 
indeterminate community, the Internet confers  
entitlement to opinions and attitudes about me on persons who have never met 
me, likely do not speak my language, and who have the potential to do 
incalculable reputational damage through their online commentary.1003  
 
While such opinions can cause loss of esteem and financial disaster, they escape legal 
remedy due to their unverifiable nature. Prosser took care to distinguish the defamatory 
facts that prompted legal defamation actions from the provocation of harmful opinions in 
a community of third parties.1004  
                                                
999  See further Civil Defamation: Undermining Free Expression, ARTICLE 19, 
http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/civil-defamation.pdf . The organization 
takes its name from article 19 of the ICCPR protecting freedom of expression. 
1000 Id. 
1001 Smith v. Advfn Plc, All E.R. 335 at paras 14-17 (Q.B.D.). 
1002  YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFERS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 212 (2006). 
1003 Id. See further Rodney W. Ott, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative Power of 
Context, 58 FORD. L. REV. (1990) 761 (setting out the fact/opinion debate from the vantage 
of the First Amendment protections invoked by mass media journalists prior to Internet cases).   
1004 Prosser, supra fn 156 (noting “Defamation…tends to injure ‘reputation’ in the popular 
sense, to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or 
to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him.”) 
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Online commentary, even if expressed in biting and devastatingly wounding 
terms, is not often legally actionable because it is not probative - it cannot be proven to 
be true or false. Courts have allowed that deciphering opinion is not always a clear-cut 
exercise, although a few have pronounced that statements posted on an Internet bulletin 
board or chat room are highly likely to be opinions or hyperbolic speech. Each remark 
must be examined in context. To criticize the Toronto Blue Jays as a defensively weak 
baseball team is more clearly a personal opinion than to couch that opinion in an 
assertion of fact, such as alleging that the Blue Jays’ management is using deceptive 
trade practices in their recruitment from the minor leagues. The latter is still arguably 
an opinion, albeit dressed as fact that is unverifiable by the average individual.1005  
US Courts’ interpretation of what comprises opinion has not always been 
predictable; much is based on cultural context. For example, the following comments 
have been judged to constitute opinion: statements on a radio talk show that the 
plaintiff was a “chicken butt,” “local loser” and “big skank”, because they were too vague 
to be capable of being proven true or false and had “no generally accepted meaning”;1006 
and email comments by a newspaper employee that a former publisher had displayed 
“abusive behavior” and “bizarre management style” and had damaged the paper’s 
finances.1007 Other examples of opinion include calling a political foe a "thief" and "liar”; 
calling someone a "bitch" or a "son of a bitch"; and changing a product code name from 
“Carl Sagan” to "Butt Head Astronomer".1008 Examples found to be defamatory are: 
charging someone with being a communist in America in 1959; calling a lawyer a 
"crook"; accusing a minister of unethical conduct; or accusing a father of violating the 
confidence of his son.1009 In Ireland, a former garda commissioner was awarded £30,000 
in damages for the use of a graphic representation of his ears in a television program on 
corruption, and a senior barrister settled a High Court action against Irish television for 
an undisclosed amount for using an image of her car in a story about drunk drivers.1010  
                                                
1005  See further, Online Defamation Law, Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/bloggers/legal/liability/defamation (EEF Defamation). 
1006 Seelig v Infinity Broadcasting, 97 Cal. App. 4th 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
1007 Rose V. Hollinger International, Inc., 882 N.E.2d 596 (Ill. 2008). 
1008 EEF Defamation, supra fn 1005.  
1009 Id.  
1010 Defamation Law in Ireland Lawyer.IE, http://www.lawyer.ie/defamation . 
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Online comments found to be defamatory, even though not verifiable as fact, 
include those referring to a chief executive officer as “insane” with conduct similar “to 
that of Hitler, Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden.”1011 Linking a person’s name to 
the website www.Satan.com however, was determined by a California court not to 
constitute defamation because "merely linking a plaintiff's name to the word "satan" 
conveys nothing more than the author's opinion that there is something devilish or evil 
about the plaintiff."1012 Such examples illustrate courts are not always consistent and in 
many cases arbitrary. 
More formalized opinions, such as those contained on professional performance 
rating sites like ratemyprof.com have become the target of teachers’ unions due to their 
cyber-bullying potential. In 2007, delegates at a UK annual convention of the 
Professional Association of Teachers cited as defamatory such online activities as 
posting a doctored photograph of a headless teacher with the caption “You are dead”. 
The organization approached the Internet company with a take-down request.1013 In 
France matters have gone even further. When French entrepreneurs created the 
Note2be.com site, they encouraged students to grade teachers and discuss their teaching 
abilities. The SNES, a secondary school teachers' union backed by the Ministry of 
Education, immediately took the website to court, claiming the personal comments 
represented a breach of privacy and an incitement to public disorder. The judges agreed, 
ruling the website could no longer identify any teachers by name or risk a 1,000 euro 
fine for every infraction.1014 
                                                
1011 Vaquero Energy Ltd. v. Weir, 2004 ABQB 68, 352 A.R. 191. 
1012 EEF Defamation, supra fn 1004. 
1013 Teachers in websites closure call, BBC, (1 Aug. 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/6925444.stm.  
1014 Don’t complain about your teachers in France, ARS TECH. (6 Mar. 2008), 
http://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php?f=23&t=137941. See also French website Note2Be.com 
closed by court order, 6 EDRI-GRAM  (March 12, 2008), 
http://history.edri.org/book/export/html/1431, (reporting that the Commission nationale de 
l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL) also gave its verdict backing up the court ruling and 
considering the site as "illegitimate in relation to the personal data protection". CNIL 
considered that, on the basis of article 7 of the Information and Freedoms Law, the teachers 
should be given the option of giving their consent for the publication of information about 
them).  
 232 
 Such responses to individual commentary exist in a grey area between 
defamation, cyber-bullying, and opinion that, for the moment, look to the courts for a 




 Certain objectionable online behavior straddles the line between unethical or 
menacing behavior and overtly illegal acts. It might inflict alarm, discomfort, dread, or 
even apprehension of harm, but such creepiness lacks the proof of reasonableness that 
meets the legal test for reputational injury.1015 It does, however, push the public-private 
boundaries of social interaction. Imagine, for example, standing at the bar for a 
professional social event and using your smart phone to access the name, musical tastes, 
and political convictions of an attractive individual you see standing across the room. 
You can equip yourself with immensely helpful background information before 
undergoing the risk of rejection involved in the more direct approach. That kind of 
social snooping does not incur legal liability; specific applications are even available to 
encourage the behavior. One such application, Girls Around Me, provided a profile of 
women within the user’s geographic vicinity whenever they checked into their social 
networks on their mobile devices. While a definite social advantage at a nightclub, the 
passive collection of another’s private actions is creepy and clandestine. 1016 
Unsurprisingly, the application was withdrawn from the public market within hours of 
its launch in response to online critical reference to the “stalker app”.1017 A less sinister 
example, in that consent of subscribers is required, is the application Highlight that 
produces a profile (photos, name, likes and dislikes) on your mobile phone of someone 
standing near you whose phone also contains the application.1018 This digital version of 
                                                
1015 Karniel, supra note 433 at 222 (noting that “frivolous” speech is non-actionable due to its 
spontaneous, general or unemotional nature).  
1016 Mark Sullivan, SXSW Preview: The Year of ‘Ambient Social’ Apps? PCWORLD (7 Mar. 2012), 
http://www.techhive.com/article/251455/sxsw_preview_the_year_of_ambient_social_apps_.ht
ml . 
1017 Damon Poeter, Creepy ‘Girls Around Me’ App Delivers a Wake-Up Call, PCWORLD (30 Mar. 
2012), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2402457,00.asp. 
1018 Highlight – Meet New People, Find and Connect with Friends Nearby, ITunes Preview (9 July 
2014), https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/highlight/id441534409?ls=1&mt=8. 
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speed dating is permissible under rules of privacy, but disturbing for the harassment 
potential it makes technologically possible. 
 Those devices illustrate that innovative technology does not guarantee ethical 
correctness.1019 With social messaging comes ambiguity about the bounds of permissible 
online behavior. For example, is it acceptable to befriend your children, and their 
friends, on Facebook and to tag their photographs? What are the social rules for 
posting, or tagging, a friend’s image on Instagram? How about a photograph of her 
infant children? As dana boyd warns, privacy in an age of social media is complicated. It 
is about “managing visibility, negotiating networks, and facing an ever-increasing flow 
of information.”1020  
 
4.4 Reputation Online: is digital speech different?   
  
Given the democratization of online communications (free, spontaneous, and 
culturally open) there is some argument for allocating less weight and meaning to 
digital speech.1021 Karniel maintains that a rumour does not have elevated status just 
because it is online: its reliability is still “restrained and incomplete”.1022 The credibility 
of sources, so critical to acceptance of traditional media accounts, is part of that status 
but often suppressed or absent in online accounts. Cues about authority and status of 
either the writer or sources can be hidden and footnotes and direct quotations 
suppressed. In online speech they seem to take second place to know-how and good 
ideas, as one psychological study of Internet behavior points out:  
Although one’s identity in the outside world ultimately may shape power in 
cyberspace, what mostly determines the influence on others is one’s skill in 
communicating (including writing skills), persistence, the quality of one’s ideas, 
and technical know-how.1023  
 
Commentary on the Internet is perceived as different than in more scrutinized 
traditional media in that “[h]yperbole and exaggeration are common and ‘venting’ is at 
                                                
1019 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting Social 
Norms, 11 YALE J. L. & TECH. 351 (Fall 2013). 
1020 Dana boyd The Future of Privacy: Privacy Norms can Inform Regulation, 32nd International 
Conference on Data Privacy & Privacy Commissioner. (29 Oct. 2010).  
1021 Karniel, supra fn 433 at 216, 219. 
1022 Id. at 231. 
1023 Suler, supra fn 434.  
 234 
least as common as careful and considered argumentation.”1024 It is the side-by-side 
combination of both styles of speech, unmediated by editorial oversight, that creates 
discomfort about the verifiability of much online ‘reporting’. 
Online statements can be gossipy, grammatically creative, expletive, insulting, 
racist, politically incorrect, and contain only loosely connected thoughts. In the absence 
of editorial second thought for bloggers and tweeters, it becomes practically 
burdensome to authenticate and hence legally prove the reputational harm caused by 
such communications. It is because Internet content is “located in another time and 
zone”, more anecdotal and immediate, that it is not subjected to the investigative 
rigours of traditional journalism.1025  In the Obsidian decision, discussed above,1026 the 
lower court found the language of blog posts contained “somewhat run-on” and “stream 
of consciousness-like sentences”, reading more like a journal entry than assertions of 
fact.1027 For example, Cox used such hyperbolic terms as “immoral,” “thugs,” and “evil 
doers.”1028 On the matter of proof of the truth of blog posts, Cox’s assertions that 
“Padrick hired a ‘hit man’ to kill her” or “that the entire bankruptcy court system is 
corrupt” were found “not sufficiently factual to be proved true or false.”1029  The US 
appellate court of the 9th Circuit found that the very tenor of language used by the 
defendant Cox in her blog posts “negates the impression that she was asserting 
objective facts.”1030 The statements were posted on obsidianfinancesucks.com, a URL 
indicating that any reader would be   
predisposed to view them with a certain amount of scepticism and with an 
understanding that they will likely present one-sided viewpoints rather than 
assertions of provable facts.1031  
 
Karniel takes the position that most digital speech cannot constitute a cause of 
action for defamation.1032 He views the role of blogs, tweets, and other informal 
journalism as the preliminary flagging of issues that the mainstream offline press can 
                                                
1024 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace 49 DUKE 
L.J. 855, 862-63 (2000). 
1025 Id. at 218.  
1026 Obsidian I, supra fn 865. 
1027 Obsidian II, supra note 870 at 17. 
1028 Id. at 17. 
1029 Id.   
1030 Id. at 19. 
1031 Id. at 17. 
1032 Id. at 234. 
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then decide is worthy of further investigation, sober thought, and possible publication. 
Regarding the role of law to address defamatory remarks online, Karniel makes two 
proposals: either create a sub-category of law for virtual speech, with more lenient levels 
of proof, or remove online speech altogether from judicial scrutiny.1033 We shall explore 
those options in Chapter V. 
Yale University constitutional scholar Jack Balkin agrees that, while digital 
technologies have altered the social conditions of speech, the key transformation has 
been around the question of control.1034 Online participation both widens our access to 
speech and diminishes our control over it. When we speak of freedom of speech, 
therefore, we must identify whose speech we are contemplating, the commercial speech 
of industry, the regulatory speech of government, individual speech, and so on. Balkin 
accepts that social networking speech is collaborative, interactive, and involves 
gossiping and shaming as much as supporting and praising. 1035  Internet speech 
intensifies all of those dynamics due to its unique architecture.  
Law has a changed role in all of this, as Balkin promotes. Rather than the 
traditional US model, that is, the “judicial creation and protection of individual rights of 
free expression enforceable against state actors”, he suggests we support individual 
privacy rights with various government programs and entitlements including, perhaps, 
requirements for technological design.1036 The digital age makes the court model as 
important as ever, but aligned with technological and regulatory infrastructure.  
                                                                                                                    
 4.5 Is the Bench Ready for Digital Speech? 
 
A recent indication from the bench that jurists do not always understand digital 
science was provided by the Aereo case before the US Supreme Court. Technological 
confusion was indicated when Justice Sonia Sotomayor asked a lawyer to compare the 
services of his corporate client to "iDrop in the cloud”, a non-existent data storage 
                                                
1033 Karniel supra fn 433 at 213 (rationalizing that most of us do not believe what we read online 
in any event). 
1034 Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the 
Information Society, 79 NYU L. REV. 1 (2004).  
1035 Id., (emphasizing that, “[a]lthough freedom of speech is deeply individual, it is at the same 
time deeply collective because it is deeply cultural”) 5. 
1036 Id., 47ff. 
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system.1037 She also asked a question about the video streaming service “Netflick”.1038 
Another example of technological confusion on the bench is provided by a class action 
against Google, brought in 2011, regarding its Street View geo-location service. 
Plaintiffs claimed privacy invasion under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. The 
information collected, however, was from open Wi-Fi networks, requiring no special 
equipment. It was unencrypted information people were transmitting in the open, that 
is, data that was being broadcast. As one technology writer suggested,  
If you understand basic technology, you can understand what they were doing, 
and how it was almost certainly not to capture data from the network, but just to 
determine location info…This was data that was being broadcast.1039  
 
Although not luddites, some judges ask questions in oral argument to more 
accurately understanding communications technology. In the 2010 case City of Ontario v. 
Quon, involving the issue of constitutional protection of California police 
communications sent by a paging system, US Supreme Court Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts asked “What’s the difference between email and a pager?”1040 Justice Anthony 
Kennedy asked how a text message could be sent to an officer at the same time he was 
sending one, showing a lack of knowledge of the existing technology. Justice Scalia 
asked, “Could Quon print these spicy little conversations and send them to his 
buddies?” 1041  In one court observer’s assessment, "The implications are 
profound…[s]peech, expression, and living have become intertwined in technology. If 
we're ever to have a case involving Snapchat selfies and eDiscovery, we could be in 
                                                
1037 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. [ABC] et al., Petitioners v. Aereo, Incl, f.k.a. Bamboom Labs, 
Inc., 712 F. 3d 676 (25 June 2014). See further Timothy B. Lee, The Supreme Court’s technical 
cluelessness makes them better justices, VOX (15 Oct. 2014), 
http://www.vox.com/2014/4/23/5644154/the-supreme-courts-technical-cluelessness-makes-
them-better-justices (suggesting that US Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor confused 
the technologies of iCloud and Dropbox).  
1038 Lawrence Hurley, In U.S., when high-tech meets high court, high jinks ensue, Reuters (9 May 
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/09/us-usa-court-tech-
idUSBREA480N420140509. 
1039 Vicki Van Valin v. Google Inc. Class action complaint 18 U.S.C. §2511 et seq.; see also Mike 
Masnick, Judge Who Doesn’t Understand Technology Says Wi-Fi is Not Radio Communication,” 
Techdirt (1 July 2011), 
https://www.techdirt.com/blog/wireless/articles/20110701/12225114934/judge-who-doesnt-
understand-technology-says-Wi-Fi-is-not-radio-communication.shtml. 
1040 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).  
1041 Kimberly Atkins, Technical difficulties at the Supreme Court, DC Dicta (19 Apr. 2010), 
http://lawyersusaonline.com/dcdicta/2010/04/19/technical-difficulties-at-the-supreme-court-2/.  
 237 
trouble."1042 US Justice Scalia has publicly admitted to being “Mr. Clueless” when it 
comes to technology.1043  
Similar concerns are expressed within the EU. As one Council of Europe report 
notes, “Experience suggests that in most cases, judges and prosecutors encounter 
difficulties in coping with the new realities of the cyber world.”1044 One country, Japan, 
took the initiative of creating an Intellectual Property High Court in 2005 to hear cases 
of technological complexity. Justice Richard Posner doubts such a move would be well 
received in the US: “[T]he Supreme Court justices are unlikely to agree to any system 
which puts a focus on the technology, and likely will seek the safe harbor of focusing 
their decisions based on prior legal rulings and principles.”1045 
Part of that apprehension might be related to the fishbowl in which judges 
function today. Many judges display an acute awareness of “negative, even noxious 
gossip” that can erode their reputations and those of other officers of the court as 
proceedings are increasingly transcribed for online media.1046 For example, judicial 
competence in online research that informs a judge’s ruling can now be tracked, and 
results might in future be argued by counsel as leading to the judge’s faulty decision 
making.1047 The more technologically intrepid among judges are free to use the Internet 
and social media to monitor the past and current behavior of lawyers and defendants 
                                                
1042 See further, Mark Grabowski, Are Technical Difficulties At The Supreme Court Causing A 
‘Disregard Of Duty?’ 3 J. L. TECH. & INTERNET, 1 (2011). 
1043 Jordan Fabian, Chairman to Justices: “Have Either of Y’all Ever Considered Tweeting or Twitting?” 
Hillicon Valley: The Hill’s Tech. Blog (May 21, 2010), 
http://itk.thehill.com/policy/technology/99209-chairman-to-justices-have-either-of-yall-ever-
considering-tweeting-or-twitting (quoting Justice Scalia’s testimony at a House judiciary 
subcommittee hearing).  
1044 Cybercrime training for judges and prosecutor: a concept, Council Of Europe Project On 
Cybercrime And The Lisbon Network, (8 Oct. 2009), 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Training/2079_t
rain_concept_4_provisional_8oct09.pdf 
1045 Keith Kirkpatrick, Technology Confounds the Judges, 57 Communications Of The ACM, 27 
(May 2014), http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2014/5/174343-technology-confounds-the-
courts/fulltext. 
1046 See further James G. Carr, A Judge's Guide to Protecting Your Reputation, 36, Truth Or 
Consequences, 26-30 (2014) American Bar Association, 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/29760783?uid=3739448&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid
=3737720&uid=4&sid=21104468347941 (recommending that “vigilant and constant probity 
and competence remain the best – and perhaps the only- defenses against the corrosive 
consequences of innuendo”, 26. 
1047 See further Karen Eltis, Does Avoiding Judicial Isolation Outweigh the Risks Related to ‘Professional 
Death by Facebook?, 3 LAWS (2014) 636, 639, www.mdpi.com/journal/laws/. 
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who appear before them, as well as judicial colleagues.1048 As well, American judges use 
the Internet to promote and manage their election campaigns, an activity that has 
ethical implications for the appearance of impartiality.1049 Both American and European 
judicial oversight bodies have expressed a need for judges to stay socially connected 
with their communities in order to gauge community standards, but within limits.1050 
For example, an ethics opinion from South Carolina found that judges could befriend on 
Facebook court employees and law enforcement personnel, so long as they avoided 
making reference to court matters.1051 In a project on media relations for judges, the 
European Network of Councils for the Judiciary crafted guidelines in 2011 for use of 
social media and smart phones by the judiciary that would not compromise the 
appearance of judicial distance from the press.1052 
The National Academy of Science as early as 2004 noted a lack of technological 
literacy amongst the general population in both America and European states.1053 As 
juries for defamation and privacy litigation, as well as prosecutors and candidates for the 
bench, are selected from those populations, those findings are important indicators of 
how well (or poorly) scientific evidence is understood.1054 More broadly, jurists offer 
                                                
1048 Kathleen Elliott Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal Field: Just 
“Face” it, 41 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 355, 399ff (2010).  
1049 Gena Slaughter and John G. Browning, Social Networking Dos and Don’ts for Lawyers and 
Judges, 73 TEX. B.J., 192 (2010) (reporting that the use of social networks by adults 
quadrupled between 2005-2008). 
1050 That policy has been supported in America by Bland v. Roberts, 57 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. 
Va. 2012), rev’d in part, 730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2013) (extending First Amendment protection 
to Facebook “liking”).  
1051 Supreme Court Judicial Department Advisory Committee on Standards of Judicial 
Conduct, Op. 17-2009 (2009) as cited in John G. Browning, Why Can’t We Be Friends? Judges’ 
Use of Social Media, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 447 (2014). 
1052  The Judiciary And The Media, European Networks of Councils for the Judiciary 
http://www.encj.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=21&Ite
mid=241&lang=en. 
1053 Public Knowledge About S&T, Ch. 7, Science And Technology:  Public Attitudes And 
Understanding, NSF (2004), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind04/c7/c7s2.htm - note29 
(highlighting research that challenges, in light of digital technologies, the gatekeeper role of 
judges in admitting scientific evidence using the criteria of falsifiability, error rate, peer review, 
and general acceptance as set by the US Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). A study of 400 state trial court judges in 50 US states 
found that a majority clearly understood peer review but only a fraction clearly understood 
falsifiability and error rate. 
1054 A 2001 study concluded that  "many judges may not be fully prepared to deal with the 
amount, diversity and complexity of the science presented in their courtrooms" and that "many 
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candid admissions that those who shape the law cannot always grasp its immediate or 
future applications. As cyberlaw scholar Michael Geist commented when Internet cases 
were beginning to appear on court dockets: 
 
[T]he technology involved in Internet publication is not a matter of judicial 
notice of knowledge. Many of the words used to describe what appears to be 
happening on the screen . . . are quite obviously metaphors and the Court cannot 
assume that they accurately describe what is actually taking place. 1055 
 
Hence they struggle to use technologically neutral language to avoid dating or 
over-particularizing their conclusions.1056 
Judges are often tasked with using their imaginations to fashion new legal 
answers to problems arising from the functioning of new technology, all without 
overstepping their constitutionally designated functions. The judiciary must rework the 
materials of the common law to meet changed circumstances. Legal and institutional 
legitimacy in the face of such renewal depends, in large measure, on judges expanding 
the contours of law while “proclaiming fidelity to the past”. 1057 Unlike Internet 
technology itself, developments in the law must be seen as continuous, not 
disruptive.1058 Judges are also cautious when speaking of technology in order to prevent 
the need to revisit their prior decisions and preexisting doctrinal framework and often 
                                                                                                                                            
judges did not recognize their [own] lack of understanding" (S.I. Gatowski, et al., Asking The 
Gatekeepers: A National Survey Of Judges On Judging Expert Evidence In A Post-Daubert World, 25 J. 
L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 433–58 (2001). 
1055  Michael Geist, Cyberlaw shows its true colours, Blog (6 Sept. 2001),  
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/resc/html_bkup/sept62001.html (citing the judge in the Federal 
Court of Canada case of Guillot v Istek Corp. [2001] F.C.J. No. 1165. 
1056 Rajab Ali, Technological Neutrality, 14 LEX ELECT. (Rev. du Centre de recherché en droid 
public) (Fall 2009) (citing the United National Convention On The Use Of Electronic 
Communications In International Contracts, para 5 of the Preamble, for the principle of 
technological neutrality as providing for the coverage of all factual situations where 
information  is generated, stored or transmitted in electronic form, irrespective of the 
technology of the medium used) 2. 
1057  AUSTIN SARAT, LAWRENCE DOUGLAS & MARTHA MERRILL UMPHREY EDS, 
IMAGINING NEW LEGALITIES: PRIVACY AND ITS POSSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 
Introduction, 2 (2012), (suggesting law be an instrument of both continuity and change, all the 
while appearing unsettled, not reassured, by such change). 
1058 Id. 
 240 
choose to issue more narrow decisions to avoid the difficult jurisprudential questions 
new technology can present."1059  
  
4.6 Summary  
 
As citizens of mature western democracies, we entrust our governments through 
our laws to balance our needs for liberty and security. However, false ideas or false facts 
by themselves are not illegal, and the dominant principle of the First Amendment is to 
treat falsehoods with “benign neglect”.1060 The US constitution does not offer a defence 
to defamation and American courts vary in opinion as to whether factual falsity is 
protected speech.1061 For the most part the First Amendment shields people who make 
false statements, even intentionally, in the public sphere.1062 Corporations like Google 
and Facebook take the position that, whether designated as carriers, controllers, 
accomplices or publishers in court decisions, they are engaged as innovators in the free 
market. Therefore, any government constraints on those activities must be authorized 
through the consent of the governed.1063   
The constitutional framework of the EU, as embodied in the ECHR, similarly 
offers protection for freedom of speech but does not pronounce as illegal statements that 
are false or harmful per se.1064  
The wider question addressed by this dissertation is whether the First 
Amendment or EU law can protect false statements in a public forum such as a new 
media site. One writer observes there exists very little public space online:  
                                                
1059 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Moving Beyond Cameras in the Courtroom: Technology, the Media, and the 
Supreme Court, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1901 (2012). 
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2012/iss6/7 
1060  Alissa Ardito, Social Media, Administrative Agencies, And The First Amendment, 65 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 301, 378 (2013). 
1061 Id. Ardito suggests Sullivan implied it is; Gertz held it is not. 
1062 As seen in jurisprudence dealing with holocaust denial. 
1063 Id. at 379, (making the point that relying on government to distinguish truth from falsehood 
is at odds with the principles of popular government and robust deliberation at the heart of the 
First Amendment tradition).  
1064 Article 10 ECHR and various provisions of the TFEU (articles 49, 54, and 114) and as 
repeated in constitutions of individual Member States. A limited exception to harmful speech 
is child pornography, as addressed by the Child Pornography Directive, OJ L 335, 
17.12.2011. 
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Because the vast majority of websites and social media sites are in private hands, 
public space online, the equivalent of sidewalks and parks, which receive the 
highest level of First Amendment protection, is next to nonexistent.1065  
We shall address that question in Chapter V. With respect to ISP liability 
discussed herein, those committed to reputational privacy are calling for a  
reconceptualising of free speech values to remedy the fact that “unregulated ISPs, free 
to engage in content discrimination or to steer user attention toward consumption, 
oversee nearly all online expression.”1066  
In summary, this chapter has shown that all levels of law are infused with 
challenges as raised by the presence of the Internet. The following broader conclusions 
relate those challenges to individual reputation: 1) the context of any impugned 
publication is critical to outcome; 2) the importance in pre-Internet law of the 
written/spoken distinction has become nuanced into a durability/ evanescence 
distinction; 3) at the heart of EU and US differences over rights to reputational privacy 
is the perception of individuals as either rights holders or as consumers; 4) increasingly, 
the binary discrepancies between offline/online and public/private activities are losing 
relevance when contemplating free speech or individual privacy;1067 5) Internet users 
have little control over third party damage to their reputations, but they have 
considerable power en masse when discrediting the reputation of others;1068 6) the legal 
infrastructure varies from one jurisdiction to the next, creating a legal balkanization of 
the Internet and frustrating attempts to formulate an international law of the Internet 
                                                
1065 Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1115, 
1116 (2005).  
1066 Ardito, supra fn 1060 at 307. Savin, supra fn 32 notes that the EU, through such initiatives 
as its Digital Agenda 2010-2020, COM(2010) 245, 19.5.2010, is focused on opening up access 
beyond national borders although, again, it does not constitutionally protect it. 
1067 Professor Laura Little of Temple University Beasley School of Law makes a similar 
observation: “To resolve personal jurisdiction and choice of law issues in internet defamation 
cases, U.S. courts have adapted rules from the non-internet context with relative ease. 
Reported cases tend to concern domestic internet disputes between U.S. entities, with few 
plaintiffs attracted to U.S. courts for the purpose of litigating cross-border defamation claims.” 
Supra fn 757 at 2.  
1068 As Jon Ronson asks: Do Twitter users have the right to ruin someone’s life? GUARDIAN (3 Mar. 
2015) (regarding the length of alienation we judge appropriate for one reckless tweet, “It is up 
to us to decide: how merciless do we want to be?”) 
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or even to enforce foreign judgments;1069 7) those discrepancies create expense, delay, 
uncertainty of outcome, and little vindication when using traditional defamation law; 
and 8) much of digital speech is so different in kind from offline expression that it is 
time to consider either a discrete legal process or extra-legal solutions. 
  Three broader observations relate to the cases chosen for analysis in this 
chapter: 1) private corporate action appears relatively immune from legal sanction as 
Internet companies view monetary sanctions as just another cost of doing business; 2) 
judiciaries on both sides of the Atlantic are struggling with the capabilities of new 
media and how to fashion judgments that do more than shoehorning digital speech into 
the timeworn legal categories created for an age of letters; and 3) despite a handful of 
international conventions that address reputation within the context of privacy and 
family life, those legal norms are not seeping down to regional or domestic judiciaries.  
More specifically, in the sample cases considered, we have seen that 1) judges at 
the trial and first appellate levels tend not to invoke broader legal principles as 
contained in international legal instruments; 2) many older causes of action persist (such 
as criminal defamation and insult laws) that prevent development of a uniform or 
updated approach to reputational harm; 3) issues of jurisdiction and choice of law 
require up-front resources as well as emotional investment for the plaintiff even before 
the main contested principles can be heard; they also result in an uneven application of 
the law across geopolitical borders; and 4) judges and legislators are often under 
escalating pressure in both US and EU jurisdictions to recognize that digital speech is 
different that offline communications and hence it calls for more innovative or separate 









                                                
1069 The EU legal infrastructure (108 Convention, for example) has many directives that, in 
principle, direct activity involving the Internet. Practical enforcement is not robust, however.   
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CHAPTER 5      “NEW LEGALITIES” AND OTHER SOLUTIONS  
 
5.0 Introduction 
There are calls to reconceptualize free speech values to remedy the fact that 
unregulated Internet service providers (ISPs), free to engage in content 
discrimination or to steer user attention toward consumption, oversee nearly all 
online expression. It may well be time for such sweeping changes.1070  
 
 We have seen that legal responses offered by western democracies like the US 
and EU have limited value in lowering our reputational risk. Like privacy, reputation is 
of profound personal concern but, unlike privacy, law cannot seem to close a door to the 
world and bring it back. Living online only complicates its vulnerability.  While 
reputation forms our social currency without which our future is limited, legal minds 
cannot arrive at a remedy to guarantee its recapture. As Goffman suggests, once 
stigmatized, our social acceptance is permanently tarnished.1071 In light of its complex 
nature (socially constructed but involving the private self, proprietary without 
meaningful control, reliant on trust from the very people who judge) perhaps the best 
law can do is to garner for us as much autonomy over its fate as society will allow, to 
provide a little vindication as we reorder our diminished opportunities.  
We have also seen that, in Europe, the Web 2.0 is viewed as a highly regulable 
space; in America, it presents a mostly self-regulating marketplace for user-generated 
content and consumerism. Due to the spillover of online information from one 
geopolitical state to the next, those viewpoints must come to terms with one another 
and often clash. Efforts to resolve those differences are increasingly pressured by 
relentless technological innovation that keeps content control in the hands of Internet 
companies.  
In this chapter I examine two such efforts, one originating in the US and the 
other within the EU, for the promise they hold for individuals to achieve meaningful 
                                                
1070 Ardito, supra fn 1060 at 307. 
1071 ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY, 87 
(1990) (noting “The stigmatized individual is asked to act so as to imply neither that his 
burden is heavy nor that bearing it has made him different from us…he is advised to 
reciprocate naturally with an acceptance of himself and us, an acceptance of him that we have 
not quite extended to him in the first place.”) 
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participation in that debate.  I then move to other legal and extra legal suggestions for 
addressing reputational stigma and conclude with a consideration of a solution 
introduced in Chapter IV supra: whether digital speech might best be perceived as its 
own language, subject to its own rules.1072 
 
5.1 User-Focused Legal Initiatives   
 
Two new instruments, one remedial and one preventative, mark efforts by 
legislators in the EU and US to address another unique feature of Internet architecture, 
its persistent memory. Both models offer a user-centric tool for individual Internet users 
to control their online reputations. In the EU, the EUDR proposes erasure mechanisms 
whereby data subjects can order the take-down by Internet companies of content the 
data subject finds offensive or embarrassing, or the cessation of data collection and 
retention that no longer has their consent.1073 In America, DNT legislation proposed in 
some US legislatures exhibits the more ad hoc and sectoral approach of US lawmakers 
and offers the Internet user (including children) the opportunity to proactively opt out 
of certain data mining and commercial access to their digital tracks by commercial 
agents. Those mechanisms will be compared for their effectiveness in addressing novel 
retention and tracking issues posed by Internet and web architecture.  
 
a  Erasure Laws: The European Harmonized Approach 
 
i A  Brief  Legislative  History 
   
The most significant precursor to the EUDR is the 95 Directive, so called 
because of its introduction into the European Union in 1995, a time when both the 
political stability of the EU and individual use of the Internet were in much earlier 
states of their development. The total state membership of the EU was 15 that year, 
with Austria, Finland and Sweden having just acceded to the union.1074 In 1995 “the 
Net” was an emerging technology, desktop computers were suitcase-sized and 
Compuserve was used to sign into USENET to get the daily news on the world wide 
                                                
1072 CH 4, section 4.4. 
1073 EC Communication To The European Parliament, The Council, The Economic And Social 
Committee And The Committee Of The Regions”, Com 609, 8 (2010) (EC Communication). 
1074 Norway, after negotiations to accede, lacked the political majority in a national referendum 
to complete the process, as experienced by Switzerland three years earlier. 
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web: that dial-up process took about a minute.1075 The principal social medium was 
email. 
 The 95 Directive was an important component of European privacy law and 
human rights law, but it dealt very little with the Internet. Its objective was to provide 
standardization of rules for all members of the EU regarding data collection by 
governmental, commercial and other interests that could identify individual citizens of 
the EU. That protection became particularly critical in the late 1990s as authorities 
sought to harmonize practices across all Member States in order to protect personal 
data as it was transmitted to any corner of the EU. To do so, the Directive set strict 
limits on the collection and use of personal data and demanded that each Member State 
set up an independent national body responsible for the protection of those data.1076 
The 95 Directive, like all EU directives, was not a compulsory legal tool, but a 
guideline for crafting domestic legislation. Its provisions were sufficiently language-
neutral to accommodate ICT evolution. As membership in the EU grew into the new 
millennium, and as collection and retransmission of personal data became more 
autonomous and more technologically sophisticated, EU authorities looked for a more 
effective regulatory tool that would reflect the two growing concerns of EU politicians: 
a strong digital economy for all commercial interests, and enhanced privacy protection 
for all EU citizens.  
In January 2010, the European Commission proposed a reform of the EU's data 
protection rules to make them “fit for the 21st century” by addressing the vastly 
networked communications enabled by the Web, the Internet, and various applications 
such as social media.1077 The EUDR sets out a general EU framework to meet that 
objective. It aims at data protection for purposes of prevention, detection, investigation 
or prosecution of criminal offences and related judicial activities.  
To become law, the proposed EUDR must meet the approval of four 
institutional authorities: the European Parliament, the European Commission, the 
                                                
1075 This Was the Internet in 1995, BUSINESS INSIDER, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/flashback-this-was-the-internet-in-1995-2013-4?op=1. 
1076 Protection of Personal Data, EUROPA, Legislation Summary, 
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1077 EC Memorandum, Progress On EU Data Protection Reform Now Irreversible Following 
European Parliament Vote, Memo /14/186 (12 March 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-14-186_en.htm (EC Memorandum) 
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European Council, and the Council of the EU.1078 The European Parliament gave the 
regulation first reading on 14 March 2014 with 207 amendments to the original draft. 
Still outstanding at this writing is final ratification by the European Parliament and 
passage by the Council of the EU. The EUDR will crystalize into state law of the 28 
EU Member States once approved, without need for further voting or ratification by 
the domestic parliaments. Although over 3,000 changes to the current Directive are 
under current review, the European Commission anticipates that it will be finalized and 
passed by the end of 2015. It is then expected to take two years from that date for the 
law to come into force.  
In the interim, EU Member States are reviewing their data protection and 
privacy laws to ensure they do not conflict in principle with the proposed EUDR. All 
foreign countries and commercial interests that deal in any way with personal data of 
EU citizens are now challenged to review their data collection laws and policies to aim 
for compliance with the EUDR. The scope of the proposed legislation is very wide: it 
will affect public and private sector businesses, large and small, all of whom must have 
compliant in-house privacy and data protection regimes. Internet services are 
particularly involved, as online collection and storage is the dominant method to deal 
with personally identifying data.  
 
ii Scope and Significance 
 
The EUDR is promoted by the European Commission as the most 
comprehensive data protection tool in the world for meeting both individual and 
corporate needs.1079 It deals with personal data that it defines as  “any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person” or  “data subject “.1080 More 
specifically, an “identifiable person” is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, 
                                                
1078 The regulation requires final approval of the Council of the EU in which national Ministers 
sit as President on rotating basis for six months.  
1079 Data Protection Day 2014: Full Speed on EU Data Protection Reform, European Commission Press 
Release (27 January 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-60_en.htm (EC 
Press Release).  
1080 Proposal For A Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council On The 
Protection Of Individuals With Regard To The Processing Of Personal Data And On The 
Free Movement Of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation) 2012/0011 (COD) (1 
January 2013) Article 2a. (EUDR) 
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by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity” such as a name, a 
photo, an email address, bank details, posts on social networking websites, medical 
information, or a computer’s IP address.” 1081  The regulation applies if the data 
controller or processor or the data subject is resident in the EU. Furthermore, and 
unlike the current 95 Directive, the Regulation applies to organizations based outside 
the EU if they process personal data of EU residents.  
The EUDR states three policy objectives for businesses involved in the digital 
economy: 1) a single pan-European regime for data protection;1082 2) application to all 
foreign companies without preference; 1083  and 3) strong enforcement powers for 
European regulators.1084 Compliance is the responsibility of the “controller” of a 
business, that is, the authority that determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data.1085 Small and medium sized businesses are predicted to 
draw particular benefit from cost savings available when dealing with one law and one 
data authority. Commercial interests will henceforth have a clear regulatory regime that 
should contribute to the health of the online global market.  
Individual users, as data subjects, stand to benefit in significant ways as well. 
They include extended control of their own personal information once it is posted (or 
data collected) online, thereby resolving the issue of who owns content once it appears 
online. As well, in keeping with the principle of transparency, individuals’ data can only 
be processed1086 with their consent, to protect their vital interests as the data subject, 
for tasks carried out in the public interest, or in the exercise of official authority vested 
                                                
1081 EC Press Release supra fn 1078. 
1082 As was the case with the 95 Directive. 
1083 In accordance with the principle of harmonization that eliminates the need of external 
parties to deal with many different domestic laws. That aim necessitates the review of the 
current US Safe Harbor agreements. 
1084 EC Press Release, supra fn 1078. Fines have been projected to be 5% of yearly turnover of a 
data processing firm, up to 100m euros for major firms.  
1085 Draft EUDR, supra fn 1079, Article 2(d). All further references to ‘article’ in this section 
deal with the Draft EUDR. 
1086 Defined under Article 2(b) as “"any operation or set of operations which is performed upon 
personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, 
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, 
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or 
destruction."  
 248 
in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed.1087 A controller is 
defined as the people or body, “which determines the purposes and the means of the 
processing” both in the public and in the private sector. A medical practitioner, for 
example, would routinely be the controller of the data processed on her clients that is 
stored within her own firm’s medical record system; a company would be the controller 
of the data regarding its clients and employees. The Google Spain CJEU decision 
extends that responsibility to the Internet company that provides online access to such 
data or general information. 
Very stringent rules apply to processing sensitive data, that is, data relating to 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs trade union 
membership, data concerning health or sexual preference. In principle, such data cannot 
be processed. Exemptions include historical and scientific research, health and other 
necessary institutional records, and journalistic coverage that serve the public interest. 
Individual users are offered expanded rights of free erasure, 1088  rights of 
notification of when and how their personal data will be used including its transfer to 
third parties,1089 rights to block contested data,1090 restriction of the collection or 
lengthy retention of sensitive data in relation to fundamental rights of privacy,1091 
restriction of profiling,1092 general access to their own data,1093 its easy transfer between 
service providers,1094 its general portability,1095 and the right to be notified of any 
corporate data breaches in time to take appropriate action1096 (ie, to cancel credit cards 
                                                
1087 Article 7. 
1088 Article 54. That right requires a controller to “take all necessary steps to have the data 
erased, including by third parties, without prejudice to the right of the data subject to claim 
compensation.” The latter phrase retains the right of the data subject to commence a private 
action.  
1089 Article 48 (notification includes the existence of the processing operation, its purposes, the 
time the data will be likely stored for each purpose, and whether the data are to be transferred 
to third parties or third countries).  
1090 Article 54(a) (“Data that are contested by the data subject and whose accuracy or 
inaccuracy cannot be determined should be blocked until the issue is cleared.”)  
1091 Article 41. 
1092 Article 58 (“Profiling which leads to measures producing legal effects concerning the data 
subject or does similarly significantly affect the interests, rights or freedoms of the concerned 
data subject should only be allowed when expressly authorized by law”).  
1093 Article 47. 
1094 Article 79. 
1095 Article 59. 
1096 Article 67 (“which should be presumed to be not later than 72 hours” after the breach).   
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or order new government licenses).1097 A breach should be considered as adversely 
affecting a data subject “where it could result in, for example, identity theft or fraud, 
physical harm, significant humiliation or damage to reputation”.1098  
Children merit particular attention when it comes to personal data, because 
“they may be less aware of risks, consequences, safeguards and their rights in relation to 
the processing of personal data.1099 A parent or legal guardian is required to authorize 
such use where the child is under the age of 13. Exceptions are made for matters of 
public interest, such as processing in the context of “preventative or counseling services 
offered directly to the child.”1100  
The enumerated rights of the data subjects are not absolute,1101 but can only be 
suspended for the following purposes: to safeguard public security, including the 
protection of human life including response to natural or man made disasters, the 
prevention, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, for breaches of ethics for 
regulated professions, other specific and well-defined public interests of the EU or of a 
Member State such as its important economic or financial interest, or the protection of 
the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others. The EUDR notes that all such 
rights or restrictions should be in compliance with the ECHR. The EUDR would place 
a reverse onus on the data controller to establish why data cannot be erased.  
Erasure rights extend the most direct control of users over their data and have 
created a great deal of media and academic interest.1102 Known historically (and in 
                                                
1097  EC Memorandum, supra fn 1076.  
1098 Article 67 (“A breach should be considered as adversely affecting the personal data or 
privacy of a data subject where it could result in, for example, identity theft or fraud, physical 
harm, significant humiliation or damage to reputation.”) 
1099 Article 29. 
1100 Id. 
1101 Google Spain, supra fn 401. 
1102 Meg Leta Ambrose, et al., Seeking Digital Redemption: the Future of Forgiveness in the Internet Age, 
24 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L. J, 99 (2010); Steven C. Bennett, The ‘Right to be 
Forgotten’: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L., 161 (2012); Bernal, A 
Right to Delete?’ supra fn 341; Blanchette & Johnson, supra fn 319. Chris Conley, The Right to 
Delete, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, Spring Symposium Series, 8; 
Martin Dodge & Rob Kitchin, Outlines of a World coming into Existence: Pervasive computing and the 
ethics of forgetting’, 34 ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING B: PLANNING AND DESIGN, 431-45; 
William H. Dutton, The EU’s Right to be Forgotten and Why it is Wrong, Oxford Internet Institute 
(2010), http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/?id=1; Karen Eltis, Breaking through the ‘Tower of Babel’: 
A ‘Right to be Forgotten’ and How Trans-Systemic Thinking can help Reconceptualize Privacy Harm in the 
Age of Analytics, 22 FORD. INTEL. PROP. MED. & ENT. L. J., 69; Bert-Jap Koops, Forgetting 
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earlier drafts of the EUDR) as the “right to be forgotten” or, more historically still, le 
droit a l’oubli, they are based on the data minimization principle that data controllers 
must keep compilations of personal data to a minimum and remove any data when it is 
not longer needed for the original purpose of its collection.1103 The Google Spain 
decision particularizes that requirement to data that is inaccurate, inadequate, 
irrelevant, or excessive for the purpose of the data processing.1104The controller must 
respond to requests of the data subject within a reasonable deadline and give reasons if 
the request is denied. 1105 Permissible reasons include for the fulfillment of contract 
terms or other legal obligations.1106 
The EUDR does not expressly define a right of erasure with respect to social 
media, including user generated content, false and anonymous social networking posts, 
or third party re-contextualized postings, that provoke reputational damage.1107 Any 
mention of that aspect of forgetfulness is confined to explanatory notes in the many 
public speeches promoting the EUDR,1108 in online news commentary,1109 and through 
a growing interest on the part of academics.  
  In terms of the practical mechanics of asserting individual rights, erasure or 
rectification requests can be made directly to Internet companies. Those agencies must 
provide transparent and easily accessible and understandable information, including 
procedures for submitting deletion requests and reasons should those requests be 
                                                                                                                                            
Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of the 'Right to Be Forgotten' in Big Data Practice, 8 
SCRIPTed, 229-256 (2011). 
1103 EC Communication supra fn 1072. 
1104 Google Spain, supra n 401, para 93. 
1105 Article 47. 
1106 Article 53. Such legal reasons might include cases of international data transfers between 
competition authorities, tax or customs administrations, financial supervisory authorities, 
between services competent for social security matters, or to competent authorities for the 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. 
1107 Google Spain supra fn 401.  
1108 Reding, supra fn 700. 
1109 Private data, public rules, ECONOMIST (28 Jan. 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21543489; ’The Right to be Forgotten’: US Lobbyists Face Off with 
EU on Data Privacy Proposal, SPIEGEL (17 Oct. 2012), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/us-government-and-internet-giants-battle-eu-
over-data-privacy-proposal-a-861773.html; David Reid, France ponders right-to-forget law, BBC 
(8 Jan. 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/8447742.stm; Is there a right 
to be forgotten on Google? Freedom House (27 February 2013), 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/france - .VRAFZUuGq1A. 
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refused.1110 Data subjects hold a right of rectification of mistaken or otherwise faulty 
personal data or information1111 either when (a) the data are no longer necessary in 
relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; or (b) the 
data subject withdraws consent for its collection or storage or the consent period has 
expired. 1112 Data transfers and processing by law enforcement and judicial authorities 
will have particularly strict guidelines,1113 most notably in view of allegations by 
Edward Snowden in 2013 of spying activities of US intelligence agencies on EU high 
profile figures,1114 and of other NSA activities.1115  
  There is promise of a significant impact on user rights made by the combined 
force of the 95 Directive, the clarification of its current scope in the Google Spain case, 
and the user-directed provisions of the EUDR. Their combination should aid in shaping 
an omnibus EU law with broad scope both inside and outside the EU that defines a 
European model of data protection and Internet company liability. The broad strokes of 
the EUDR are mostly backed up by domestic laws in each of the 28 Member States 
already in place as inspired by the 95 Directive.  
 
iii Responses to EUDR with Respect to Reputation        
  
  Through the EUDR, the European Commission promotes three legal principles 
that underlie the legitimacy and stability of the EU: transparency, proportionality, and 
                                                
1110 Article 11. 
1111 Article 15(e). 
1112 A further elaboration of Article 12(b) of the 95 Directive. 
1113 Fact Sheet: EU-US Negotiations on Data Protection, IP/10/1661, EU-US “Umbrella Agreement” 
for transfers and processing of data in the context of police and judicial cooperation, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/umbrella_factsheet_en.pdf.   
1114 Joint Press Statement following the EU-US-Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial Meeting 
in Washington DC (18 Nov. 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-
1010_de.htm. (“We together recognise that this has led to regrettable tensions in the 
transAtlantic relationship which we seek to lessen. In order to protect all our citizens, it is of 
the utmost importance to address these issues by restoring trust and reinforcing our 
cooperation on justice and home affairs issues.”)  
1115 Kelly D. Dubacki, Renewed Calls for Finalization of EU Data Protection Regulation by 2015, 
FIRST ADVANTAGE (29 Sept. 2014), (noting that the EP Civil Liberties Members inserted 
increased safeguards in the draft EUDR for data transfers outside of the European Economic 
Area, including heftier fines, an explicit consent requirement, and a right to erasure, roughly 
4,000 amendments in total.) 
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legitimate purpose.1116 Within the context of data protection, the European Commission 
explains transparency as the right of every European citizen to know how the European 
institutions are collecting their data, who participates in that collection, and what 
documents are held or produced. The right extends to accessing those documents and 
making one’s views known, either directly, or indirectly, through intermediaries.1117 
Proportionality generally involves regulating the exercise of powers by the EU. It seeks 
to set within specified boundaries the actions taken by the institutions of the EU. Under 
this principle, the involvement of the institutions must be limited to what is necessary 
to achieve the objectives of the Treaty on European Union.1118 In other words, the 
content and form of the action must be in keeping with the aim pursued.1119 Legitimate 
purpose assumes that personal data will only be processed in accord with the provisions 
of Article 7 of the 95 Directive. 
  Within the EU there is, predictably, resistance to the legislation as it is currently 
drafted. Jan Philipp Albrecht, as vice-chairman of the European Parliament’s civil 
liberties committee, has identified Germany’s concern with how the EUDR might erode 
the sovereignty of the country’s powerful regions (Lander) in relation to the federal 
government.1120 He notes both France and Germany are also sensitive to the idea that 
data issues could be decided in the smaller member states with less established data 
                                                
1116 EU Data Protection Policy, (asserting “personal data should not be processed at all, except 
when certain conditions are met. These conditions fall into three categories: transparency, 
legitimate purpose and proportionality.”) 
1117 European Commission, Transparency Portal, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
13-1010_de.htm. 
1118 Treaty On The Functioning Of The European Union (TFEU) C 83/49 1 December 2009, 
renamed, consolidated and amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ C 326, 26 Oct. 2012), 
Article 5. 
1119 Europa: Synthèses de la Législation,  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/proportionality_en.htm. In its decision in the 
case of Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. (C–293/12) v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0293&rid=1, the Grand Chamber of the 
CJEU determined that the EU had exceeded the limits of proportionality in drafting the 95 
Directive. 
1120 Jan Philipp Albrecht, Draft Report On General Data Protection Regulation, COD 2012/0011 (12 
Dec. 2012), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/pr/922/922387/922387en.
pdf. See also Simon J. McMenemy, Further Delay to the EU Data Protection Regulation, Ogletree 
Deakins Blog (4 Mar. 2015), http://blog.ogletreedeakins.com/further-delay-to-the-eu-data-
protection-regulation/ - sthash.u9gs6RSF.dpuf. 
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protection traditions. The United Kingdom is opposed to the entire EUDR document, 
preferring that the EU adopt a new directive with members states who will bring it into 
force in their own way similar to pending directives on nuisance callers and 
spammers.1121 
  For American businesses involved in the use of personal data of EU citizens, 
however, the EUDR provisions provide a considerable barrier to business as usual. 
Provisions that most affect US businesses include 1) specified fines for non-
compliance;1122 2) inclusion of data processing of personal data regardless of whether 
the data belongs to persons EU citizens or residents and regardless of whether the 
controller is resident in the EU;1123 3) the need to report to EU data supervisory 
authorities any mass surveillance activities of the US government (as reported by 
Edward Snowden) to receive supervisory permission in order to transfer such data;1124 
and 4) the requirement that successful erasure requests are forwarded to third parties 
that might control replications of the data.1125 The most controversial provision is (3) 
above regarding government surveillance.  
  US litigants are already engaged in disputes over court orders by US judges 
compelling the transfer of data out of the EU because one side argues that US law 
requires the provision of certain evidence, and the other argues that doing so would 
make its EU subsidiary or parent violate the applicable EU law. Such discrepancies are 
expensive and time consuming for litigants. EUDR provisions will need to be 
scrutinized to assure litigants that such procedural discrepancies are addressed. In this 
                                                
1121 Anti-Spam Activities, European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
(ENISA) http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/networks-and-services-
resilience/anti-spam-measures. 
1122 Article 79. For example, Google announced $50 billion in revenue for 2012, meaning a 
maximum fine under the proposed EU data protection laws could total up to $2.5 billion. 
1123 Article 3. See further, Francois Gilbert, A Legal Analysis of the updated EU General Data 
Protection Regulation, ITLAW.com, http://searchcloudsecurity.techtarget.com/tip/A-legal-
analysis-of-the-updated-EU-General-Data-Protection-Regulation (outlining such new 
provisions as Article 9 that establishes a new category of sensitive data known as "gender 
identity"). 
1124 Article 43(a).  
1125 Article 17. Important limitations of the right to erasure include making it dependent upon 
the data controller's ability to verify that the person requesting the erasure is also the data 
subject; allowing companies to block, rather than erase, data where a particular technology 
does not allow erasure (article 17(4)); and exempting data needed to complete a contract or 
fulfill other legal obligations (article 53).   
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and a variety of other ways, American sources are the most vocal critics of the EUDR; 
then again, the US has the largest stake in the digital economy with respect to its 
Internet companies and collateral industries.  
  Regarding the practical details of individual take-down requests, an Internet 
company’s procedure up to this point is to direct users with deletion requests to site 
operators. For example, educators concerned with the defamatory details of a posting on 
the Rate My Professors site would go to the “help” function on the 
<http://www.ratemyprofessors.com/help.jsp> site and follow the instructions under 
“Can I flag a comment or professor note that I think should be removed from your site?” 
They will be asked to report any postings that contain, 1) profanity, name-calling, 
derogatory remarks about  religion, ethnicity or race, physical appearance, mental 
and/or physical disabilities; 2) references to a professor's sex life, including sexual 
innuendos; 3) claims that a professor shows bias for or against a student or specific 
group of students; 4) claims about a professor's employment status, including previous 
employment; 5) claims that a professor engages or has engaged in illegal activities; and 
6) accusations that the professor is rating him/herself or his/her colleagues; 1126    
  The website creators address liability for defamation to third parties with the 
statement that all postings are opinion, not fact.1127 More recently, as the enactment of 
the EUDR with its right of erasure seems more certain, Google and its video arm 
YouTube are dedicating teams of administrators and paralegals to vet requests. Take 
down requests from government agencies are not processed automatically unless 
accompanied by court order.1128 Google raises in defence of its decision to deny a take-
down request that the applications lack important detail, or that complete erasure of 
content is technologically impossible or infeasible due to costs of tracking third party 
use.1129 In general, Google staff review and categorize requests as defamation, copyright 
                                                
1126 Terms & Conditions, Rate My Professor, 
http://www.ratemyprofessors.com/TermsOfUse_us.jsp. 
1127 Id. 
1128 Google refuses US request to video, Alakhbar (16 Sept 2012. http://english.al-
akhbar.com/node/12230 (Note: cut and paste: link does not respond to hyperlinking 
command). 
1129 See further Access to Information, Google Transparency Report, 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/. See also Don Reisninger, Google: More government 
takedown requests than ever before, CNET (25 Apr. 2013) at http://www.cnet.com/news/google-
more-government-takedown-requests-than-ever-before/  (reporting Google received take 
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infringement, or violence, and appear prepared to reveal the number of successful 
requests but not the reasons.1130 
  As indicated earlier, the major concern over the EUDR provisions for erasure is 
the quasi-judicial role bestowed on the few largest Internet companies.1131 Their staff 
function as the first layer of authority to vet erasure requests from individual users. The 
principle objection is that the key players in the Internet industry thereby become the 
first line arbiters of online content, a distribution of power in opposition to that 
anticipated by the promoters of the EUDR.1132 The only guidance provided by the 
CJEU, through the Google Spain decision, is that the data subject’s rights should 
override the interest of Internet users as a general rule, and that the balance of interests 
should be determined on a case-specific basis. 
  Academic response to the passage of the EUDR has been generally 
favourable, 1133  urging compliance by US Internet companies. 1134  Paul Schwartz 
criticizes the EUDR initiative for, among other things, heightening individual rights of 
privacy beyond those accepted in the US. Schwartz advocates diminishing the role of 
the European Commission as the final arbiter of information privacy disputes under the 
EUDR, primarily because of the US preference for self-regulation regarding 
transborder data transmission.1135  
                                                                                                                                            
down requests for 24,179 pieces of content by government around the world between July and 
December of 2012). 
1130 Rebecca J. Rosen, Google Refuses to Remove Police-Brutality Videos, ATLANTIC (27 Oct. 2011),  
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/10/31/news/nation/google-refuses-to-remove-police-
brutality-videos/ (note: the original link has been removed by content carrier). 
1131 For further discussion of Google take-down requests, see Rosen, Delete Squad, supra fn 
970. 
1132 Most notably EC Commissioner and the EUDR’s most vocal promoter, Vivienne Reding, 
FaceBook posting, (concluding that “Companies can no longer hide behind their servers being 
based in California or anywhere else in the world.”) See contra, Meg Ambrose, EU Right to be 
Forgotten Case: The Honorable Google Handed both Burden and Boon (19 May 2014), 
http://playgiarizing.com (concluding that “the intention of the European Union to redistribute 
power away from companies and toward users backfired [because] Google gets to decide what 
the right to be forgotten means, because its interpretation of the right will be as good as 
anyone else’s guess.”) 
1133 For the European view, see Christopher Kuner, The European Commissions’ Proposed Data 
Protection Regulation: A Copernican Revolution in European Data Protection Law, Bloomberg BNA 
PROV. & SEC. L. REP. (6 Feb. 2012) 1-15.  
1134 Paul Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV 
L. REV. 1966 (2013). 
1135 Id., at 1968.  
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  In preparation for the EUDR, the current US-EU agreements concerning data 
export involving EU residents are under review. The Safe Harbor provisions; Model 
Contractual Clauses; 1136  and Binding Corporate Rules 1137  only require proof of 
‘adequate’ data protection, a standard much lower than for other exporting countries.1138  
For its part, the US has maintained that a combination of policy responses do provide 
adequate data protection by combining to provide a type of collaborative ‘lawmaking’, 
with compliance overseen by the FTC.1139  
 
b Do Not Track Laws: The US Sectoral Approach   
 
The Do Not Track (DNT) policies in the US represent a different approach to 
individual control over one’s online content: injecting FTC oversight into unauthorized 
commercial access to a person’s digital tracks. Interestingly, the original guidelines 
drafted for US government agencies in the 1970s were very similar to the current 
EUDR provisions. 
 
i A Brief Legislative History 
 
DNT policies were created to provide an easy mechanism for consumers to opt 
                                                
1136 The current framework makes each party responsible for any damage it causes to the data 
subject (see Schwartz, supra fn 1133).  
1137 Under current agreements, data export is permitted if exporters can prove the data will 
receive ‘adequate’ privacy protections while in transit. It has been the opinion of the EU that 
US privacy legislation did not meet that standard, although neither side has requested a clear 
definition of ‘adequacy’. The ARTICLE 29 Working Party, a group of European data 
protection officials, was of the opinion in 1999 that the “patchwork of narrowly focused 
sectoral laws and voluntary self regulation [of US data transmissions] cannot…be relied upon 
to provide adequate protection in all cases for personal data transferred from the European 
Union.” Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 
Opinion 1/99 concerning the level of Data Protection in the United States and the Ongoing 
Discussion between the European Commission and the United States Government, at p. 4, 
DG MARKT DOC 5098, WP 15 (26 Jan 1999). 
1138 95 Directive, fn 667, Article 25(1). The EUDR will require a level of data protection 
“equivalent” to that provided for internal data transfers between Member States. 
1139  Schwartz, supra fn 1133 at 1980; See Issuance Of Safe Harbor Principles And 
Transmission To European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (24 July 2000); EU Commission 
Decision 2000/520/EC (26 JULY 2000) Pursuant To Directive 95/46/EC Of The European 
Parliament And Of The Council On The Adequacy Of The Protection Provided By The Safe 
Harbor Privacy Principles And Related Frequently Asked Questions, US Department Of 
Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L215) 7. 
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out of online tracking that led to targeted or behavioral advertising.1140 As indicated in 
Chapter 3, tracking of our online activity involves targeters or advertising companies 
contracting with online publishers to place a piece of tracking code on its site that, when 
you visit the site, will inject cookies into your computer that enables digital tracking of 
all the sites you visit or browse online.1141  
In 2010, the FTC endorsed the concept of a universal browser-based DNT 
signal that could be inserted into online services and programs. Much earlier, in the 
1970s, the DNT concept was raised on a formal governmental basis by the US  
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. At that time a voluntary Code of Fair 
Information Practices was devised to form the backbone of a US privacy law model that 
included data collection and use. The key policy points of the code were openness (no 
secret personal data record keeping systems); disclosure to data subjects; no secondary 
use of data without full disclosure to the data subject; ability of the data subjects to 
correct false or outdated data; and assurance by collectors of the security of the stored 
data against third party unconsented use. Many of those policies reflect provisions of 
the draft EUDR. 
While those principles were influential in formation of some state laws, no 
overarching federal privacy law was ever developed covering public and private sector 
data collection. Neither was there created a federal privacy commission unlike in the EU 
and may commonwealth jurisdictions. The result has been a patchwork of laws with 
many gaps.1142 For example, the federal Do Not Track Me Online Act,1143 introduced into 
Congress in February of 2011 but never passed, was specifically targeting the blocking 
of all collection of personal data for behavioral advertising purposes, with an exception 
for fraud prevention and inventory control. The bill also authorized the FTC to create 
nationwide regulations that required DNT technologies to be implanted into devices, 
and to use random audits of web publishers as an enforcement mechanism. Five 
                                                
1140 Laura Drell, 4 Ways Behavioral Targeting is Changing the Web, Mashable (26 APR. 2011), 
http://mashable.com/2011/04/26/behavioral-targeting/. 
1141 Ch. 3, section 3.3(iv) infra. 
1142 Beth Givens & Sen. Steve Peace, A Review of State and Federal Privacy Laws, Testimony To 
The California Legislature Joint Task Force On Personal Information And Privacy, Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse (1997-2014), https://www.privacyrights.org/ar/jttaskap.htm. 
1143 House of Representatives 654 (112th), introduced into the US Congress by Representative 
Jackie Speier for the 112th session and referred to Committee.  
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additional attempts have been made in the US to introduce similar legislation, most 
invoking the FTC to set an ‘opt out’ regime for online tracking as well as other user-
directed mechanisms to discourage third party tracking.1144  
 
ii Scope and Significance 
   
  Unlike the uniform approach to data protection and user control envisioned by 
the EUDR, American DNT policy and legislative tools regarding information privacy 
have proceeded in a much more ad hoc fashion. For example, there is one set of statutes 
for the public sector and another for the private one. Further, US private sector 
legislation distinguishes between types of data. The variety of US legislation governing 
the regulation of data collection and transfer just at the federal level is wide: it could 
involve the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021145 for the financial sector;1146 the Financial 
Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act)1147 to protect the privacy of 
consumer information held by financial institutions; or the Economic Espionage Act of 
1996.1148 
On the state level, the passage of the California DNT legislation, The California 
Online Privacy Protection Act, marks the first successful codification of DNT policies in 
any US jurisdiction.1149 It requires any operator of a  website, online service, or mobile 
                                                
1144 California Senate Bill 761 (14 March 2011), http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0751, 
(Lowenthal Bill on computer spyware); Consumer Privacy Protection Act Of 2011, (14 March 
2014), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1528ih.pdf (introduced by House 
Representatives Stearns and Matheson); A New Commercial Privacy Bill Of Rights, (14 March 
2014), http://www.kerry.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Commercial (introduced by Senators 
Kerry and McCain); Do Not Track Online Act Of 2011 (14 March 2014), 
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=85b45cce-63b3-4241-99f1-
Obc57c5c1cff (introduced by Senator Rockefeller); Do Not Track Kids Act Of 2011, (14 March 
2014), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/billdreaft050 (introduced by House 
Representative Markey).  
1145 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, PL 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (July 2002) (Devised to regulate 
corporate financial reporting following the Enron and WorldCom scandals). 
1146  What is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Legislative And Governance Fact Sheets (2005), 
http://www.securit.com/legislative/sarbanesOxley.pdf. 
1147 Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 1999). 
1148 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. 1831 (theft for the benefit of a foreign entity) and 
18 U.S.C. 1832 (theft for pecuniary gain). (Oct. 1996). Both encompass electronic storage. 
1149 The California Online Privacy Protection Act, A.B. 370 (CalOPPA as amended); See background, 
Ivan Rothman & Philip Zender, California passes the first “Do-Not-Track” legislation in the US, 
ITCAN LEXOLOGY (24 October 2013) 
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application that collects personally identifiable information about California  residents to 
include DNT disclosures in its privacy policy. That disclosure would reveal any third 
party tracking activities on the operator’s website and explain how the operator 
responds to web browser DNT signals or other mechanisms used by individuals to stop 
such tracking.1150 The Act does not require website operators to incorporate DNT 
technologies into their sites or services nor does it require operators to respond to DNT 
signals used by data subjects in a certain manner. If an operator does not respond to 
such signals, it will suffice merely to indicate this fact in its privacy policy. The 
legislation limits operator responsibility to setting forth its privacy policy in a separate 
online location accessible by hyperlink. Once again, any active opting in or out is left to 
the individual user. Should the operator violate any terms, it has 30 days from the time 
of notice of the violation to comply or be subject to fines of up to $2500 per violation.1151 
That fine is often justified by operators as the cost of doing business, so the California 
Attorney General has clarified that each download of a non-compliant mobile 
application constitutes a single violation.1152 
A similar first step has been taken through the California The Student Online 
Personal Information Protection Act1153 regarding children’s rights of online erasure, 
dubbed by the press as a youth “erasure button”.1154  The draft law stipulates that 
websites and applications directed at children under 18 must allow registered users to 
remove publicly posted content and make certain disclosures to those users. 1155 A 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a51c3fe0-98b8-4c2d-9035-01e32f2576e2. The 
act is in the form of an amendment to the California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 
(CaIOPPA). 
1150 Id, s.1. The legislation amends the Business and Professions Code, s. 22575, and only required 
the operator to ‘describe’,’ identify’, and ‘disclose’ certain third party practices involving PPI of 
users. 
1151 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17206(a). 
1152  AB370: California's "Do Not Track" Law, Cooley LLP, http://www.cooley.com/ab370-
californias-do-not-track-law. 
1153 The Student Online Personal Information Protection Act – Sb 1177 (in force 1 Jan 2016) 
(Student Online Act). The Act amends s. 22581 of the California Business And Professions 
Code and becomes effective 1 January 2015.  US congressman Edward Markey spearheaded 
the initiative, calling for technological adaptation of website access to enable erasure of search 
histories that reveal personal information of child Internet users.    
1154 Mike Reicher, State law allows kids to clean their digital past”, Orange County Register (24 
SEPT 2013), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/online-527862-companies-law.html (arguing 
adults would benefit from a similar law in America). 
1155 Or ask the provider to remove or anonymize. 
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website or application is directed to a minor (under 18) when it is “created for the 
purpose of reaching an audience that is predominately comprised of minors, and is not 
intended for a more general audience comprised of adults.”1156 A complete expunging is 
not required: deleting the requested content from viewer accessible websites will suffice, 
even though it remains on the operator’s servers in some form.1157 
 
iii Responses to DNT with Respect to Reputation 
  
 Internet researcher Adam Thierer characterizes the DNT mechanism as “a 
browser-based tool that tells advertisers and other third parties not to follow us around 
the Internet”.1158 In policy terms, he suggests the anti-tracking device transports the 
EU data minimization principle to the US. Thierer warns, however, that such 
technology proposed for California minors opens a back door for hackers or “others with 
malicious intentions”. The uneven history of data protection in the US might be 
attributed in some regards to the lack of uniform definition of online “tracking” as well 
as government policy concerns about undermining commercial entities that rely on 
behavioral tracking and subsequent advertising for economic survival.1159  
As most online activities are free to the consumer, commercial interests argue 
that behavioral advertising is carrying the weight of the digital economy. That pull 
between individual privacy expectations and the economic wisdom of the market 
overshadows transnational efforts to reach agreement on the legal efficacy of anti-
tracking. A prominent example is the lack of direction in the wake of the 2012 meeting 
in Amsterdam between the European Commission’s top privacy panel, the Article 29 
Working Group, and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) a global standards 
group that promotes good governance of the Internet.1160 The talks foundered on what 
types of user data advertisers should be allowed to collect while respecting the right of 
                                                
1156 Student Online Act, supra fn 1153, s. 22581(a)(1) to (4). 
1157 Id., s. 22581(d).  
1158, Pursuit of Privacy supra fn 160 at 413. 
1159 Id. at 414. 
1160 Kevin O’Brien, Privacy Advocates and Advertisers at Odds Over Web Tracking, NYTIMES (4 Oct. 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/technology/privacy-advocates-and-advertisers-at-
odds-over-web-tracking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. (W3C was founded 20 years ago by Web 
inventor Tim Berners-Lee to garner support for an open Web). 
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consumers to “simply and effectively declare their ‘do not track’ preferences on Web 
sites.”1161  
Advertisers express concern that EU regulation could diminish the amount of 
free information that users access on the Internet and could “create incentives for online 
companies to erect pay walls and lead to more shotgun forms of advertising.”1162 As US 
data collection regulator, the FTC has contributed to the conflict by exempting Internet 
companies, including Google, Facebook, Microsoft and Apple, from tracking oversight 
in 2011, arguing consumers gave implicit consent to data collection by signing up for 
their services. In the EU, regulators perceive that tracking is illicit in any form without 
the data subject’s consent. Such discrepancies could lead to a “two-track do-not-track 
system” which makes cross-Atlantic compliance costly and perpetuates choice of 
jurisdiction issues – none of which helps either side.1163    
A critical impediment to the success of DNT policies is public confusion or 
ignorance regarding tracking policies. Two studies have found that individual users are 
not aware of such data protection measures in the US. The Hoofnagle study found that 
almost 66% of American Internet users have never heard of DNT.1164 The 2012 study 
additionally determined that a significant number believed their activities online were 
protected by strong privacy laws, but could not provide details when asked, a failing 
that raises doubt about the viability of the notice-and-choice process and the ability (or 
willingness) of individual users to make informed opt out choices.  
An earlier US study by McDonald and Peha similarly reported that a wide gap 
existed between the capabilities of DNT technology and the expectations of users.1165 
While users currently have a choice of total blocking of all advertising data collection 
                                                
1161 Advertisers’ interests in the DNT debate are represented internationally by the Digital 
Advertising Alliance, the lead organization representing online advertisers, within the US by 
the Association of National Advertisers, and in the EU by the International Advertising 
Bureau, among others. 
1162 O’Brien, supra fn 1159.   
1163 Id., as per Jeffrey Chester, Center for Digital Democracy.  
1164 Chris Hoofnagle, Jeff Urban & Su Li, Privacy and Modern Advertising: Most US Internet Users 
Want ‘Do Not Track’ to Stop Collection of Data About their Online Activities, Berkeley Consumer 
Privacy Survey & Research Paper, (8 Oct., 2012) http://ssrn.com/abstract=2152135. 
1165 Aleecia McDonald & Jon Peha, Track Gap: Policy Implications of User Expectations for the 'Do 
Not Track' Internet Privacy Feature, Tracking Position Working Group, SSRN, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1993133 (2011) (McDonald Study). Online survey April 22-29, 2011, 
n=293. 
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(opt out) or only those selected by the user (HTTP cookies), most participants of the 
McDonald study were unaware of the difference, and believed if they chose a DNT 
option all of their personally identifying information was deleted all of the time. 
McDonald found participants to be naïve about more aggressive data mining 
technologies as well, such as flash cookies1166 (that evade the opt-out settings) and cache 
cookies (that store webpage history for fast retrieval).1167 As users become more 
knowledgeable about DNT technologies, advertisers become more creative in their 
innovations for data collection, igniting the semblance of a virtual “arms race”.1168   
The key concern for researchers was the users’ imbalance of technological savvy. 
For example, when users delete cookies believing they are erasing data collection 
capabilities of advertisers, the McDonald study determined that they are often deleting 
the opt-out function instead.1169 The study concluded that users do not have a nuanced 
understanding of DNT technology; about 25% expected they would be exempt from all 
commercial tracking by merely clicking a DNT option and a further 50% believed they 
were completely exempt from any tracking (commercial or government or private) 
simply by choosing one of the options available. When informed such expectations were 
not valid, those users displayed a general distrust so eroded in the opinion of the 
researchers that “there may not be many options for engagement left.”1170 
 Public ignorance of DNT capabilities is troubling, particularly to the FTC.  In 
2010 it promoted three priorities its staff determined would move users closer to 
informed choices for protection: greater industry transparency, privacy by design at 
every stage of product development, and implementation of greater consumer choice 
                                                
1166 Tanzina Vega, Code Known as Flash Cookies Raises Privacy Concerns, NY TIMES (20 Sept. 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/21/technology/21cookie.html?_r=3& (noting that at 
issue is “a little-known piece of computer code placed on hard drives by the Flash program 
from Adobe when users watch videos on popular Web sites like YouTube and Hulu.”) 
1167 John Herrman, What are Flash Cookies and How Can You Stop Them? POP. MECH. (23 Sept. 
2010) http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/how-to/computer-security/what-are-
flash-cookies-and-how-can-you-stop-them (advising that “Every time you surf the Internet, 
your browser collects bits and pieces of information from the sites you visit, either in the form 
of cache, which stores photos and site data on your hard drive to help speed up page loading, 
or cookies, which are small files deposited on your computer so Websites can remember 
certain things about you” such as shopping preferences). 
1168 McDonald, supra fn 1164 at 2. 
1169 Id. 
1170 Id. at 30. 
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and hence control through such mechanisms as DNT tools.1171 In a follow-up report in 
2012, the FTC reported have brought enforcement actions against 1) Google and 
Facebook for failing to gain express consent of users before changing their data 
practices;1172 2) online advertising networks that failed to honor opt outs; 3) mobile 
applications that violated the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act; 4) applications that 
set privacy settings in a way to cause consumers to unwittingly share their personal 
data; and 5) companies that sold consumer lists to advertisers in violation of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act.1173 The FTC further announced it would increase vigilance against 
de-anonymizing activities of companies, and against information brokers who buy, 
compile, and sell highly personal information about consumers but never interact with 
them. 1174  The 2012 Report sets the following future goals: intensified DNT 
implementation; increased privacy initiatives by mobile service companies; increased 
access by consumers to information about them held by data brokers; and the creation of 
sector-specific privacy codes of conduct.1175  
Not all major browsers and web servers are on board, however, foretelling a 
possible regulator-industry clash. Yahoo! announced in May 2014 its intention not to 
honour DNT customer requests, and to disable web browser DNT settings, primarily 
due a lack of a single, easy-to-use standard that has been adopted “by the broader tech 
industry.”1176 Google has “opted out” of DNT policies as well.1177 Facebook similarly 
announced its decision to dishonour DNT browser settings in June of 2014, except for 
iOS (Apple) and Android devices, and to employ its ‘like’ function for subscriber 
tracking- all because of a lack of industry consensus.1178 AOL followed in August of 
                                                
1171 Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed 
Framework for Businesses and Policymakers, (December 2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/12/privacyreport/shtm. 
1172 The FTC reported over 1 billion users of both online services. 
1173 FTC 2010 Report, supra fn 1171 at iii. 
1174 Id., at iv. 
1175 Id., at ix.  
1176  Yahoo’s Default = a Personalized Experience, Yahoo Privacy Team, (30 April 2014), 
http://yahoopolicy.tumblr.com/post/84363620568/yahoos-default-a-personalized-experience. 
1177 Zach Minors, How bickering and greed neutered the ‘Do Not Track’ privacy initiative, PC WORLD 
(22 May 2014), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2158220/do-not-track-oh-what-the-heck-go-
ahead.html. 
1178 Cotton Delo, Facebook to Use Web Browsing History for Ad Targetting, Digital Advertising Age 
(12 June 2014), http://adage.com/article/digital/facebook-web-browsing-history-ad-
targeting/293656/. 
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2014.1179 Other industry leaders are more compliant: one source reports that 12 percent 
of Firefox users around the world have opted into Mozilla’s DNT program, that 
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer and Apple’s Safari now block many cookies by default, 
and that most mobile devices, including the iPhone, don’t allow use of cookies in its 
applications.1180 The initiative taken by Microsoft and Apple raises the stakes in the 
debate, accelerating protests from advertising industry associations. Those actions 
nevertheless fall far below the expectations of the FTC for a nationwide program to 
gain some control over behavioral tracking. 
The principal advantage for industry (and challenge for the FTC) is that, in the 
legislative vacuum created by the inability of Congress to agree on a uniform DNT law, 
major Web companies and intrepid start-ups are offering “personalized services” that 
streamline web searches and allow portability between personal devices,1181 generally 
through cookie alternatives that are getting smarter and more difficult to spot or 
disable.1182 Start-up companies add new meaning to the word “interoperability” by 
selling tracking devices that can link smartphones, tablets, personal computers and even 
Internet-connect televisions to an autonomous entity that uses algorithms to sift 
through their programs for IP addresses, browsing patterns, and buying preferences.1183 
The resultant cross-device advertising illustrates the relentless surge of innovation 
when regulation falters or becomes entrenched in only one game plan. 
 
c. Can the EU and US Agree on Data Protection Mechanisms? 
 
Unlike the influence US policies confer in the areas of copyright, net neutrality, 
and cybercrime, information privacy policies are being set by a combination of US and 
EU initiatives. The good news about both the EU and US mechanisms is in its message 
to legal, political, and civic sectors that governments are proactive in their response to 
                                                
1179 Wendy Davis, AOL Won’t Honor Do-Not-Track Requests, MEDIA POST (19 Aug. 2014), 
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/232394/aol-wont-honor-do-not-track-
requests.html. 
1180 Olga Kharif, The Cookies You Can’t Crumble, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK (21 Aug 2014), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-08-21/facebook-google-go-beyond-cookies-to-
reap-data-for-advertisers. 
1181 Yahoo, supra fn 1175. 
1182 Id. 




digital invasive practices. Policy setters have erected privacy infrastructures that, in 
principle, provide a backdrop against which Internet users can react. Until recent 
successes with movement towards some consensus over passage of the EUDR, the gap 
in cooperation between EU and US authorities did not look likely. Industry leaders have 
begun to comply with the implementation of the EU model, however, due in large 
measure to their impatience with the lack of progress with the federal US model, 
coupled with the forceful Google Spain characterization of Internet companies as 
“controllers” with direct liability.  
One potential outcome of the EU-US differences in data protection policies is for 
each jurisdiction to go its own way. That do-nothing option appears practically 
unworkable for a few reasons. One of the practical impediments to perpetuating the 
status quo involves the expense and frustration of the simple act of getting disclosure for 
litigation. In cases involving the cross border transmission of personal data, US 
requirements are much wider, calling on litigants to produce any requested information 
under their control without regard to whether the information originated in the US or 
elsewhere or to whose private information they are disclosing.1184  EU regulations, 
meanwhile, prohibit the transfer to the US of data on its citizens that originates within 
its borders because it has determined that the US lacks adequate data protection 
standards. 1185  The resulting EU-US safe harbor arrangement, 1186  by which US 
companies may voluntarily increase their level of data protection in order to conduct 
data exports involving EU citizens, creates problems for a smooth and predictable 
sharing of disclosure.  Legal compliance in one jurisdiction means noncompliance in the 
other.  
 Another impediment is the difference in evidence gathering for private law cases. 
Under the common law (US), evidence is gathered by both parties and presented to the 
opponents during pre-trial discovery. In civil law jurisdictions, including many EU 
Member States, the judge determines which evidence is necessary and collects that 
evidence, including taking witness statements. While those differences are not 
                                                
1184 Carla L. Reyes The U.S. Discovery –EU Privacy Directive Conflict: Constructing a Three-Tiered 
Compliance Strategy, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 359 (2009). 
1185 95 Directive, supra fn 667. 
1186  U.S. Dep't Of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (July 21, 2000), 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_Privacy.asp. 
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insurmountable, they give fundamental messages about who conducts the release of 
personal information in each legal system and call on special procedures that are not 
automatic and hence that create uncertainty, additional costs, and frustration for the 
parties.     
US adoption of the EU model would clearly provide the least expensive answer 
to the compliance issue. The EUDR is in the final preparatory stages: it has been 
approved by the European Parliament and awaits final amendments. One proposed 
change by the Italian EU Presidency that is being given serious consideration adds 
further enticement for US authorities to consider adopting more EU-like practices. It 
involves the granting of binding decision-making to a centralized EU data protection 
Board with arbitration powers if data protection measures cannot be worked out at the 
local level by Member State authorities.1187  US Internet industries look upon this as 
streamlining their information flow activities into “one stop shopping”. That means 
businesses operating across the 28-nation EU would have to deal only with the data 
protection authority in the country where they are headquartered, even if alleged 
mishandling of data affects citizens in another country. That new feature makes the 
EUDR more palatable to US companies in terms of cost in data mobility, a factor that 
could be quite persuasive as the US DNT model founders.1188. 
In introducing its Privacy Bill of Rights in 2012 that urged a comprehensive 
nationwide DNT program, the White House indicated America’s intention of pursuing 
its own course in regulating the flow of personal data.1189 Less than two years later, the 
                                                
1187 Julia Fioretti, EU mulls conferring binding powers on body of data privacy regulators, REUTERS (14 
Nov. 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/14/us-eu-dataprotection-
idUSKCN0IY1LR20141114. 
1188 US Consumer Bill of Rights, Draft 2015, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-
discussion-draft.pdf (upholding ISP exemptions stated in s. 230 of Communications Decency 
Act); Editorial: Should US Adopt the Right to be Forgotten Electronic Data Collection Raises Privacy 
Issues, Conn. L. Trib. (3 Oct. 2014), 
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Be-Forgotten-Electronic-Data-Collection-Raises-Privacy-Issues?slreturn=20141014150309. 
1189 We Can’t Wait: Obama Administration Unveils Blueprint for a ‘Privacy Bill of Rights’ to Protect 




program is perceived as seriously log-jammed.1190 The formal mechanisms are in place: 
the Commerce Department has been tasked with creating enforceable policies, the FTC 
has queued up as nationwide enforcer, and the advertising industry has agreed to 
support DNT.1191 The inherent flaw in moving DNT forward is that, even with DNT 
technology as part of online systems, users might still need to initiate them, a 
requirement that calls for user understanding of the basic mechanics of opting out and 
privacy settings. In some ways we are back to the notice and choice model whose 
uneven application led to the formation of DNT policies in the first place. In the vacuum 
created by the slow development of a federal DNT regime, state legislators are devising 
their own privacy laws in many sectors, a development that localizes the law on data 
privacy in the US, just as national laws in EU Member States have threatened to 
‘balkanize’ Internet regulation across the EU.1192  
As Thierer observes more broadly, “information control has always been 
complex and costly”,1193 increasingly so as expanding ways to steal, invade, and 
manipulate stores of personal data or posted content challenge government efforts to 
maintain free access and minimum regulation of online spaces.  
 
5.2 New Legal Responses 
  
a Internet Companies as Controllers: Google Spain  
 
With the long-awaited Google Spain decision, the CJEU achieved two things that 
had a major impact on individual control of online personal information. It judged 
Internet companies to be “controllers” of such information with respect to data 
                                                
1190 Sandra Fulton, One Year Later, Consumers are Still Waiting on a Do Not Track Standard, 
ACLU.org (24 Apr. 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/one-year-later-
consumers-are-still-waiting-do-not-track-standard; Somini Sengupta, No U. S. Action, So States 




1192 State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, National Conference Of State Legislatures (NCSL) (23 
Jan. 2014) http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/state-laws-related-to-internet-privacy.aspx (outlining how schools can collect 
student data, how websites post privacy policies, how to protect readers’ online purchasing 
choices, how to get personal information held by ISPs, how to require employers to give notice 




involving EU citizens or for Internet companies offering services in EU Member States. 
Being identified as a controller meant liability for data misuse that threatened individual 
user’s reputational privacy. It also granted unprecedented autonomy to individuals 
regarding the collection, processing, leakage, and mobility of that information.  
Prior to the CJEU decision, take-down requests were limited. The head of 
Google in the United Kingdom admits they were only successful if they referred to 
information deemed illegal by a court (such as defamation), pirated content (once 
Google was notified by the right's holder), malware, child sexual abuse imagery and 
other things prohibited by local law (such as material that glorifies Nazism in 
Germany).1194 The large number of US victims of data mishandling had no recourse; 
FTC sanctions against major offenders did not have any impact on individual cases of 
exposure and litigation would have been far too expensive unless class actions were 
pursued, a long and costly undertaking with uncertain outcomes. 
Control of the individual over her personal information was limited in other 
ways. People did not know what data identifying them was being collected, profiled, or 
shared with other institutional third parties.  For example, medical information from 
laboratory tests or clinical trials is frequently sold to pharmaceutical companies in 
formats that can be de-anonymized. That practice has received legal recognition by the 
US Supreme Court in its 2014 Sorrell decision.1195 People also were unaware of all the 
agencies and businesses that were collecting their data or when their stored data was 
subjected to hacking, loss, negligent handling, or other activities that jeopardized their 
privacy. If leaks, exposure or loss occurred, there was little recourse that compensated 
the data subject. If a victim of negligent or ruthless data use became aware of such 
exposure, there were no intermediaries she could appeal to for information, damage 
control, or compensation.  
This lack of transparency hid the extent and acceleration of the exposure 
problem: an IBM study in 2013 revealed that American companies are attacked an 
average of 16,856 times a year, and that many of those attacks result in a quantifiable 
                                                
1194 David Drummond, We need to talk about the right to be forgotten, GUARDIAN (10 July 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/10/right-to-be-forgotten-european-
ruling-google-debate. 
1195 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011), where the US Supreme Court held that a 
Vermont statute that restricted the sale, disclosure, and use of records that revealed the 
prescribing practices of individual doctors violated the First Amendment. 
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data breach.1196 A pictograph of the world’s biggest breaches and hacks (see APPENDIX 
B, pictogram 2) indicates the size of such breaches in 2014 alone: Adobe (152 billion 
accounts); JP Morgan Chase (76 billion); Ebay (145 billion); Target (70 billion); Gmail 
(5 billion); and AOL (2.4 million). 1197  With today's data moving freely between 
corporate networks, mobile devices, and the cloud, data breach statistics show this 
disturbing trend is rapidly accelerating. Affixing ISP and Internet company liability, 
along with a more structured and international data collection regulatory regime, is one 
answer being pursued on the international level.  
 
 b          Reputational Injury as a Tort 
 
 The creation of a new tort of reputational injury has definite appeal. It might 
more adequately provide remedies for personal exposures.1198 A new reputation law 
might serve several needs: 1) it could force courts to clarify reputation as a societal 
value and a legal concept; 2) it would sharpen distinctions between various types of 
reputational harm (exposure versus disclosure) so that suitable remedies might be more 
adequately fashioned; 3) it would allow courts to more closely monitor the means-end 
relationship between harm and liability; 4) it might clarify the distinction, if any, 
between defamation and the false light privacy cause of action. The latter would 
particularly reduce the amount of claims pleaded in the alternative and hence reduce 
court costs and delays. Such a proposal could also increase the seriousness with which 
reputational suits are perceived and call for clearer thinking on the discrete nature of 
online reputational damage. A new law of reputational injury could also expand legal 
analysis on how the First Amendment might be modified in its application for new 
media cases in view of a lack of institutional mediation and other indications that digital 
speech might be a unique species of communication.  
 
 
                                                
1196 1.5 million monitored cyber attacks in the United States in 2013, IBM Data Breach Statistics, 
(April 2014), http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/en/it-services/security-services/data-
breach/. 
1197 World’s Biggest Data Breaches, Information Is Beautiful pictogram, 
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/. 
1198 Heymann, supra fn 174 at 1424 (suggesting such a tort could clarify the overlap between 
defamation claims and those brought using the false light privacy tort.) 
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c A Discrete Law for Digital Speech  
 
i A Critical Need 
 
Creating a separate legal space for digital speech is another response that 
addresses the unique ability of online messaging to put another person’s reputation at 
risk. Such a proposal recalls the contrary opinions of Justice Frank Easterbrook of the 
US Court of Appeals1199 upon the emergence of the law of the Internet: that it made 
about as much sense as creating a law of the horse.1200 He found such a proposal 
frivolous because the need would be based on technology, not on norms or industry.1201  
Easterbrook’s objection was the unattainability of legal principles for a subject that is so 
rapidly evolving:  
[W]hat I do know will be outdated in five years (if not five months!); and my 
predictions about the direction of change are worthless, making any effort to 
tailor the law to the subject futile.1202  
He also objected on the grounds that the law of the computer smacked of dilettantism:  
it was without serious subject matter and was an attempt to use clairvoyance to 
decipher the future: 1203  
Beliefs lawyers hold about computers, and predictions they make about new 
technology, are highly likely to be false. This should make us hesitate to 
prescribe legal adaptations for cyberspace. The blind are not good 
trailblazers.1204  
Lawrence Lessig rebutted Easterbrook’s objections stating that, essentially, cyberspace 
was a discrete entity and the need for cyberlaw an example of legal exceptionalism as 
                                                
1199 Frank Hoover Easterbrook has been a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit since 1985. The US Courts of Appeals are considered among the most 
powerful and influential courts in the United States; only 1% of their decisions are heard by 
the US Supreme Court. 
1200 Cyberlaw, IT law, computer law and the law of Internet have been used interchangeably in 
this dissertation. 
1201 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 
(1996); see also; Andrew Murray, Looking Back at the Law of the Horse: Why Cyberlaw and the Rule of 
Law are Important, 10 SCRIPTed 310 (2013), http://script-ed.org/?p=1157. Examples of law 
based on industry are space law or railroad law. 
1202 As cited in Murray, id. at 313. 
1203 Later developing into cyberlaw. 
1204 Murray, supra fn 1200 at 313. 
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determined by the intricacies of computer code and the digital market.1205 Andrew 
Murray of the London School of Economics believes we have not met Easterbrook’s 
objections head on because we continue to use “the language and rhetoric of social 
policy, sociology and political philosophy,” such as the literature of communications 
theorists like Manuel Castells and the philosophical thinking of Michel Foucault. In 
other words, “[w]e become social scientists not lawyers.” 1206   
 Despite those objections, the Internet has several idiosyncrasies that recommend 
separate legal treatment for the language used in digital spaces, most of which reference 
technological capacity but all of which shape human behavior online. New media 
communications can be, for example, immediate and spontaneous; truncated and filled 
with digital semaphore, 1207  unmediated; internationally accessible; consensually 
anonymous and interactive;1208 archived in perpetuity and with no entry costs.1209 Of 
those qualities, three particularly raise issues of free speech – the spontaneity of 
messaging that results in fragmented speech; the anonymity of messages that 
encourages incivility; and the ability for permanent archiving with indeterminate third 
party access. All three factors can exacerbate our reputational risks that warrant direct 
legal protection. For example, posted or texted content can inform, alert, persuade, or 
convert. Those are positive attributes that advertisers and reputational management 
firms count on. On the other hand, content can confound the recipient or judge in that 
translation is needed to decode the cryptic terms of regular users. It is its own language.  
  The very complexity of determining whether offending content is defamatory, a 
breach of confidentiality, or a privacy offence within traditional categories of law 
illustrates the non-traditional nature of online communications. For example, is a 
YouTube video that harms your good name actionable as libel or slander? What about 
the reader commentary displayed below the video? If you did not post the video but are 
the subject of its contents, can you claim a proprietary interest in the video? Is texting 
an abbreviated form of writing or speaking?  
                                                
1205 Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw might Teach, HARV. L. REV. (1999) 
1206 Id. 
1207 Employing terms such as “btw” or “by the way”, lmao or “laughing my ass off”, all of which  
need context and cultural cues to determine intent. 
1208 Karniel, supra fn 433 at 220 confirms anonymity is well accepted by cyber culture. 
1209 This paragraph is an expansion of ideas introduced in section 4.4 supra. 
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Linguist John McWhorter of Columbia University suggests texting and other 
digital messaging is more speaking than writing. “Texting isn’t written language,” he 
claims, “[i]t much more closely resembles the kind of language we’ve had for so many 
more years: spoken language.”1210 Why not write like we speak, McWhorter proposes, 
— looser, more casual, telegraphic, and less reflective? Primarily, he answers, because 
we haven’t had the right tools. Pencils, typewriters, even computers were too slow to 
keep up with the pace of human speech. The speed and convenience of the mobile phone 
or tablets could achieve it. “Fingered speech” is developing its own form and vocabulary; 
it does not measure a decline in written speech but an evolution of a new means of 
communication. McWhorter gives as example the changing nuances of the acronym 
“lol”. Its original literal translation was “laughing out loud,” but with use it has adopted 
a subtler meaning as demonstrated in a texting exchange McWhorter observed between 
two 20-something college students: 
Susan: lol thanks gmail is being slow right now  
Julie: lol, i know  
Susan: i just sent you an email  
Julie: lol, i see it 1211 
 
McWhorter sees “lol” becoming something far subtler than laughing out loud or 
“loving you lots”. “It’s a marker of empathy of accommodation,” he notes, what linguists 
call a “pragmatic particle,” like the word “yo.” Another practicality is the recently 
minted acronym “TLDR” which is a disclaimer-type reference to a text that is “too long, 
didn’t read” or the use of a forward slash (/) to indicate the author is changing topic. In 
some ways, texting resembles Pitman shorthand, an American transcribing system from 
the 1950s that few would argue should be taken for a written code, not a standard form 
of communication. It was semaphoric in style and economic in its abbreviation of words 
through symbols. For judges or jurors to be tasked with finding criminal intent or the 
civil standard of liability in such fragments would seem akin to deciphering a unique 
code or language.  
As well as exhibiting a different form and more nuanced messaging, digital 
speech contains its own cultural coding. Words or images that might not offend in one 
                                                
1210 Michael V. Copeland, Texting isn’t Writing; it’s Fingered Speech’, WIRED (1 Mar. 2013) 
http://www.wired.com/2013/03/texting-isnt-writing-its-fingered-speech/. 
1211 Txting is killing language. JK!! TED2013 YouTube  (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.ted.com/talks/john_mcwhorter_txtng_is_killing_language_jk?language=en.  
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culture or religion could vilify in another. That provides another challenge for anyone 
who attempts a legal response to impulsive, emotionally charged digital speech. Take-
down requests of Internet companies track that standard setting most frequently. For 
example, the Turkish government demanded YouTube remove videos posted by Greek 
soccer fans who claimed Turkish player Kemal Ataturk was gay; YouTube agreed to its 
removal from Turkish access but allowed its dissemination in other countries where 
wider tolerance of sexual practices is the norm. France and Germany outlaw any speech 
that even hints at holocaust denial or that promotes Nazism; America seems more 
tolerant of hate speech as long as it is not dangerous or incites violent behavior. As 
Jeffrey Rosen summarizes,  
the American First Amendment tradition…allows speech to be banned only 
when it is intended—and likely—to incite imminent violence or lawless action. 
By contrast…European law draws a tighter line, prohibiting so-called group 
libel, or speech that offends the dignity of members of a protected class and 
lowers their standing in society.1212 
 
Rosen characterizes decisions regarding protected online speech differently from one 
side of the Atlantic to the other: Americans, he observes, are guided by democracy, 
Europeans by civility.  
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the provision in the EUDR that places 
erasure decisions in the hands of Internet company staffers effectively bestows judicial-
like power. Such “delete squads” 1213  are tasked with vetting takedown requests 
primarily by studying the language used in all its nuances and interpretations.1214  
Jeffrey Rosen has studied the basis for such takedown decisions and has determined they 
are based on arbitrary criteria that are not necessarily conveyed to the individual 
applicant.  He reveals that delete squads have settled on accepting content that targets 
institutions, such as churches and governments, but not groups or their members. To 
                                                
1212 Rosen, Delete Squad, supra fn 970.  
1213 Id. Jonathan Zittrain sees the self-appointment of Google staff to vet deletion requests as 
usurping the sovereignty of European powers and suggests the task is better placed with EU 
Data Protection Authorities: “It turns a rights problem into a customer service issue, and one 
that Google and others in its position no doubt rightly disdain. If Google can process 70,000 
requests, so can and should the data protection authorities.” See further Jonathan Zittrain, The 
Right to be Forgotten Ruling Leaves Nagging Doubts, FINANCIAL TIMES (13 July 2014). 
1214Google Transparency Report, (14 Nov. 2014) 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/ (claiming it receives over 12 
million URL takedown requests from its search engine each week). 
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state “I hate the Pope” is acceptable under those guidelines; to say “I hate Muslims or 
Jehovah’s Witnesses” is not.1215 In essence and practice, then, those new delete squads 
are a law unto themselves.1216 Further, they need not give reasons for their decisions, 
other than to ensure that they align with internal policies and data retention laws. 
Devising a law of digital speech would mean expanding on all of the above 
possibilities of language, a feat that could call on linguists and other language 
specialists. It would find resources in a variety of experiences, from UN debates to 
cryptography practices, from those who analyze hate speech to interpreters of signing 
or online flaming. All participants in such a legal system would need to keep an open 
mind regarding the cultural histories that certain words carry. As the ECtHR advised in 
the 1976 British obscenity case, Handyside v. United Kingdom,  
Freedom of expression...is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but 
also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the 
population.1217 
 
A law of digital speech might be as obscure as a law of the horse. In the spirit of 
innovation that spawned the cyberworld, however, we could engage those in the 
emerging field of social media studies with constitutional experts, linguists, systems 
languages, and others with a professional interest in decoding social media speech. An 
auspicious starting place would be the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for its 
pronouncement that, 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 






                                                
1215 Id.  
1216 With the exception of executive or court orders, with which they must comply. 
1217 Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 737 (1979), para 49. The court did 
not, however, decide for Handyside who was charged with publishing obscene materials in The 
Little Red Schoolbook. 
1218 Universal Declaration Of Human Rights, supra fn 619. 
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 ii Aim, Scope, and Form of Digital Law 
 
If we were to design a law to deal with digital speech vis a vis the protection of 
reputation, what features would it have? We would have to ensure, firstly, that such a 
law acknowledges that individual reputation has social capital, that is, worth in the eyes 
of one’s entire community and that its misuse would have has implications both societal 
and personal. In terms of the scope of the law, the model would focus on human activity, 
not technological possibilities. Unlike the myriad EU regulations and directives, as well 
as the various national and state laws in the US that focus on digital technologies, a 
critical feature of a Digital Speech Law would be its regard for individual rights (to 
Internet access, to free speech online, to speech format) while setting out responsibilities 
(to self-educate regarding the legal limits of self speech, to consider digital spaces in the 
spirit of community stewardship, etc).  It would address conduct beyond what ethical 
guidelines would do but would stop short of regulating the particularities of speech 
defined by culture or geography. Available defences or excuses would arise from those 
limits. Such a law could incorporate national, regional, and international laws 
addressing those rights and responsibilities.   
In terms of the particular aim and scope of the law, the mandate of judges, 
mediators or other directing figures would be to seek a deeper understanding of what 
constitutes a welcoming and respectful online communicative environment, to place that 
determination as much as possible in the hands of the individual participants, and to 
create a tone of edification and leniency, not one of exacting retribution so prevalent in 
today’s private law solutions. They could achieve this objective by pursuing clarity of 
meaning over certainty of word choice.1219 Context would be critical. In order to avoid 
dictating that context, lawmakers would need to take a page from their policymaking 
colleagues who strive for technologically neutral language when drafting technology-
                                                
1219 cf. Chris Reed, How to Make Bad Law: Lessons from Cyberspace, 73 MOD. L. REV. 903-932 
(2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1696691  (promoting a law that 
encourages individual inhabitants of cyberspace to determine whether their behaviors have 
met limits set by computer and communications law).  A program of research to tap the precise 
capabilities of each media is also critical: see, for example, Dhiraj Murthy, Twitter and elections: are 
tweets predictive, reactive, or a form of buzz? 18 INF. COMM. & SOC. 816 (2015), (examining almost 
350,000 tweets about the 2010 US primaries and found they served a ‘buzz’ or reactive rather 
than a predictive function.) 
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focused law: they would use “linguistically neutral” or “culturally neutral” language as 
much as possible. This law would foster a certain expertise in digital speech for judges, 
mediators, or other facilitators who direct the process. There is precedent in arbitrators 
of labour disputes or jurists involved in drug courts or mental health courts who accrue 
special knowledge. This law, and those professionals, would not address immoral or 
treasonous acts already captured through criminal laws or insult laws. They would not 
concern themselves with reputational risks posed by government institutions that are 
already addressed by government oversight bodies. They would deal with offending 
behavior between individuals, not between individuals and commercial entities as is the 
object of data protection and anti-tracking laws. In furtherance of that aim, the law 
would be silent on the role of Internet or Web companies regarding their respective 
liability for the content they transmit.1220 That would avoid a judge or mediator having 
to deal with duties to disclose anonymous contributions and sources.   
In terms of procedure, the model would require cheap and quick entry into the 
legal process so that reputational damage could be speedily suppressed to stem 
unending or unquantifiable third party regeneration online. We would frame the 
problem within the private law system, distinct from so-called cybercrimes against the 
state that are already addressed by national laws in western states. Determination of 
choice of law and jurisdiction issues up front would be important in reducing 
uncertainty and expense. A hierarchy of non-acceptable online behavior might be 
devised, correlated with the risk or loss to which the plaintiff has been subjected. 
Alternatively, the judge or mediator could work in each case to have the parties 
determine their own hierarchy within their particular normative circumstances.  
Remedies would incorporate the reasonable wishes of the plaintiff, modified by 
input from community sources or other expertise. While aiming for a speedy resolution 
to diminish cost and the further publicity affecting reputation, the law would canvass a 
variety of remedies that do not commodify reputation by placing a dollar on one’s good 
name. There would be the recognition of aggravating circumstances for a defendant 
trying the plaintiff in the court of public opinion prior to legal process. One innovative 
remedy would be to have the defendant pay for reputational management services of the 
                                                
1220 That issue is currently addressed through the Communications Act in the US and the 95 
Directive within the EU as interpreted by the Google Spain decision of the CJEU.  
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plaintiff if the online damages so warranted. Another would be to order the defendant to 
produce an online posting that not only recanted his offending accusations but that 
extolled the particular virtues or successes of the maligned plaintiff, all subject to the 
plaintiff’s consent and review. Such remedy would meet the concern of privacy scholar 
Helen Nissenbaum that personal information ought to be distributed and protected 
according to norms governing distinct social contexts, whether it be workplace, health 
care, schools, or among family and friends.1221  
With respect to the function of the law in relation to other laws involving 
cyberspace, the lawmakers might consider Karniel’s more liberalist position that the 
Internet is a new playing field for freedom of expression and such spontaneous, 
anonymous expression has very little significance or reliability in proving harm to one’s 
reputation in the absence of a consideration of the “totality of circumstances”.1222  
  
5.3 Extra-legal Responses 
 
 a Online Civic Monitoring 
 
Ideally, Internet content hosts could serve a function similar to real time social 
conveners or impresarios of information. University of Cornell communications 
professor Tarleton Gillespie is advancing a similar idea when he speaks of Google and 
MySpace as “curators of public discourse” in that their technologies mediate between 
various sectors of online community. Those sectors include individual users, advertisers, 
major media producers it hopes to have as partners, and policymakers.1223 “Community” 
is used here in its broadest sense to indicate an interacting population of various kinds 
of individuals considered collectively, especially in the context of social values and 
responsibilities. 1224  Content hosts serve as intermediaries in assembling those 
communities, by intervening in the delivery of content, cultivating relationships, 
                                                
1221  HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2009). 
1222 Karniel, supra fn 433 at 232. 
1223 Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of Platforms, 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC. 347-364 (2010) 
https://dspace.library.cornell.edu/bitstream/1813/12774/1/pop.pdf ;  see also Ardia supra note 10 
at 321 (suggesting that the term ‘platform’ has a variety of context-dependent meanings 
including computational (something to build upon), architectural (open and egalitarian, not an 
elitist gatekeeper of expression), figurative (accommodating abstract ideas), and political 
(providing a podium from which to be heard) 3.    
1224 Oxford Dictionary Online. 
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serving advertisers, and distinguishing between user generated content and advertising 
content - all the while striving to remain neutral.1225 Its services must be simultaneously 
specific and flexible, “anticipatory but not causal”,1226 and must appeal to all users as 
egalitarian and democratizing in order to garner wide participation.1227 It is that 
neutral, anticipatory role that web hosts can fulfill by monitoring what serves civic 
interests without defaming them or exposing their most personal data.  
Alternatively, web hosts can provide a platform for such communities to 
comingle amongst those of like interest without host intervention. Ardia points out 
that, even in the absence of legal liability, many online communities are “experimenting 
with various forms of dispute resolution procedures and reputation management 
systems”.1228 No longer confined to a shared space or time, but acting in a decentralized 
and independent manner to safeguard a shared value, such community members need 
not know one another, subscribe to larger ideologies, share a language, or identify 
themselves to each other in order to effectively monitor online space to protect 
reputations. Communities can also be fluid, coming together once, over one issue, and 
then dissolving.  
A prominent example of such ad hoc communities is a large group of Facebook 
subscribers who united online to protest changes to privacy terms of service by both 
Facebook and the photo sharing website Instagram.1229 Those two companies had 
introduced into their privacy policies their intention to connect users with each other, or 
with advertisers, in order to promote wider advertising potential.1230 In 2009, without 
forewarning subscribers, Facebook executives decided to advance that scheme by 
claiming ownership of personal content posted on its site that had been provided by 
subscribers when they first created a personal profile.1231 Facebook justified its move as 
                                                
1225 Gillespie, supra fn 1222 at 3. 
1226 Id. 
1227 Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52 DUKE 
L. J. 1245-1276 (2003). 
1228 Ardia, supra fn 10 at 321. 
1229 A photo sharing site. 
1230  Kevin Systrom, Thank you, and we’re listening, Instagram Blog, 
http://blog.instagram.com/post/38252135408/thank-you-and-were-listening. 
1231 Marshall Kirkpatrick, Facebook Management Has Lost its Grip on Reality, Readwrite.Com, (26 
Feb. 2009), http://readwrite.com/2009/02/26/facebook_managment_has_lost_it; see also dana 
boyd, Facebook’s Privacy Trainwreck: Exposure, Invasion, and Social Convergence, 14 CONVERGENCE 
13, 13-14 (2008), http://www.danah.org/papers/FacebookAndPrivacy.html (explaining the 
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an attempt to intensify subscribers’ social networking by linking users who shared 
interests, birthplaces, consumer tastes, and other indicators of community. The ad hoc 
community of protesters held Facebook to account for invasion of privacy and 
manipulation of its informational property. 1232  Facebook retreated under that 
community’s pressure.  
Instagram, now owned by Facebook, tried a more far-reaching strategy in 2012 
when it sold images posted by its subscribers to advertisers without users’ consent. 
Many photographs contained images of children. Users objected to the loss of privacy 
and disclosure of personal information.1233 In response, Instagram initiated an opt-out 
privacy setting that relied on user initiative to set privacy boundaries.  Instagram CEO 
Kevin Systrom explained the company’s strategy through an example: Instagram might 
promote a brand X and show Facebook visitors which of their friends already follow 
Brand X, blurbs that could include their user name and avatar. Systrom reassured 
Instagram subscribers that they still “own their content and Instagram does not claim 
any ownership rights over your photos.” 1234 Instagram followed that gaffe with a 
verification scheme in 2014: subscribers were notified that, unless their posted 
photographs were to be accompanied by an arrow, they would be deleted. The arrow of 
“verification” was obtained by clicking on an icon that, when clicked to reveal a drop 
down page, displayed accounts similar to theirs. That scheme appeared to have little to 
do with deletion prevention and much to do with trying to generate a list of users with 
shared interests, presumably to sell to advertisers.1235   
Both examples illustrate the potential of communities to change industry 
practices where their privacy is concerned. Such communities of power might be  
                                                                                                                                            
2009 virtual assembly of interest groups like “Students Against Facebook News Feeds” that 
totaled 700,000 Internet users to protest Facebook’s launch of News Feeds. That feature 
presented a start page listing of every act undertaken by a Facebook subscriber’s friends each 
time the subscriber logged on to the system.)  
1232 Juan Carlos Perez, Facebook tweaks Beacon again, Zuckerberg apologizes, Computerworld UK, 
(7 Dec. 2007), http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/security/6592/facebook-tweaks-
beacon-again-zuckerberg-apologises/. 








limited in their influence, however, due to economies of scale. As an analyst with a 
private research group advising on disruptive technologies comments, “There’s not a lot 
of portability. Where would you go?”1236 To its credit, Facebook is presenting the 
incident as a learning moment, and has committed to a set of Principles it created and 
submitted to subscribers for comment. The company pledges to let its community of 
members vote on contentious practices that affect them.1237  
Former Microsoft social media researcher dana boyd sees these movements as 
far more complex and involving several communities of interest. In the following 
excerpt, for example, she identifies five such communities that have been affected by 
Facebook’s 2009 gaffe:  
The disconnect between average users [community #1] and the elite [community 
#2] is what makes this situation different, what makes this issue messier. 
Because the issue comes down to corporate transparency, informed consent, and 
choice…I think that it’s important that the techno-elite and the bloggers 
[community #3] and the journalists [community #4] keep covering this 
topic…[W]e also have to contend with the fact that most people being screwed 
don’t speak English [community #5] and have no idea this conversation is even 
happening. Especially when privacy features are only explained in English. 
[content in brackets added]1238 
 
Boyd makes a call to arms to each of the above communities to “challenge Facebook to 
live up to a higher standard, regardless of what we as individuals may gain or lose from 
their choices.”1239 She also takes it upon herself as an elite user “to make sure that 
everyone is informed and actively engaged in a discussion about the future of 
privacy.”1240 
The community David Ardia envisions has no need of a formal legal apparatus to 
protect online reputation. Community players assume a central role in community 
governance because they are often in a position to recognize and respond to reputational 
harms, a more engaged and influential force than individual subscribers acting alone. 
Ardia suggests that we enlist their help, through social incentives, to mitigate 
                                                
1236 Rebecca Lieb as cited in Wortham, supra fn 1232.  
1237 Tom Spring, Dawn of a Facebook Democracy? Users Invited to Shape Site’s Policies, PCWORLD, 
(26 Feb. 2009) http://www.pcworld.com/article/160314/facebook.html. 
1238 Dana boyd, Quitting Facebook is pointless: challenging them to do better is not, Apophenia Blog  





reputational harm while maintaining an environment “conducive to public engagement 
and vigorous debate.”1241 
 
b Online Reputation Ranking Systems  
 
Another community-based approach to safeguarding reputation is to ensure the 
reliability of reputational information we read online rather than trying to impose legal 
liability. There exists a community of websites devoted to that task: large-scale word-
of-mouth networks.1242 EBay, for example, was designed with a built-in review system 
so that its buyers and sellers could review or assess each other and hence build trust in 
certain participants and in various products. 1243  Within that system, by adding 
commentary as either buyer or seller, we designate select websites as our online 
communities for that particular purpose. Amazon, another reputational rating system, 
goes one step further by permitting buyers to rate the choices of others. Netflix 
provides similar rating opportunities, for either one’s own movie choices or for those of 
other users within the same household. Xbox Live, a gaming site, rates gamers against 
the performance of other gamers using scoreboards in order to reward them and help 
them find opponents with similar skill levels. Until the summer of 2014, the website 
Technorati served as a rating system for blogs in various subject areas.1244 Rating 
systems have been democratized in the sense that many online activities in which we 
participate call for user ratings: examples include rating requests (Rate and Review your 
shopping experience, service experience, viewing experience, etc.) sent to purchasers of 
e-books through Google and Amazon, recipients of online technical help at Apple, and 
online conferences, podcasts, or courses we experience.  
Chrisanthos Dellarocas of Boston University’s School of Management suggests 
such reputation management systems fulfill four primary roles: 1) they build trust in the 
reputation of another person by encouraging positive behaviors and discouraging 
                                                
1241 Ardia, supra fn 10 at 264. 
1242 Chrisanthos Dellarocas, The Digitization of work-of-Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online 
Feedback Mechanisms, 49 MGMT SC. 1407-1424 (Oct. 2003). 
1243 E.g. The Technorati system of ranking weblogs as outlined by Ardia, supra fn 10 at 321, 
note 393. 
1244 Greg Finn, RIP Technorati Blog Search & Rankings: The Once Popular Blog Tools Have been 
Sunset, Search Engine (26 June 2014), http://searchengineland.com/rip-technorati-blog-
search-rankings-popular-blog-tools-sunset-195186 (A decline in blogging and a concurrent 
rise in social media use forced its demise.) 
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negative ones within a site; 2) they filter high quality content from lesser content; 3) 
they attempt to neutralize or even out a wide array of subjective contributions or 
products; and 4) they “lock in” users who have established a reputation and loyalty 
through their contributions to a particular site.1245 A reputation system must decide 
which behaviors it wishes to feature; that will determine the information it will collect 
to promote that message. For a professor, for example, those behaviors relate to the 
three components considered for promotion and tenure: teaching, research, and service. 
Institutions such as universities employ websites to build both institutional and 
individual reputations. They participate in a reputation system that evaluates their 
ranking and value system among professors. The choice and placement of information 
on faculty websites signal what factors are of most value to the university or faculty. 
For example, a professor’s degrees are usually listed prominently on her homepage, as 
are areas of research and courses taught. Should the professor hold a particular research 
chair or have been granted a major funding allocation, additional esteem is signaled 
within the professional community by announcements on the website. Individual faculty 
webpages list a professor’s publications; research areas are also listed. Both build the 
professor’s scholarly reputation while building institutional reputation. Similar benefits 
accrue from lists of industry and professional awards, scholarship funds, and 
endowments. Faculties frequently post the rankings of their school in comparison to 
others if favourable (QS World University Rankings, for example). Teaching awards 
bestow additional prestige, indicating an elevated trust component amongst students. 
By posting such achievements on the institutional website, school and faculty receive 
reciprocal benefit.  
The home page of the law faculty at Stanford University is exemplary of those 
features. 1246  It presents, at center page, a column of most recent publishing 
contributions from the entire pool of faculty. While building institutional reputation, 
that listing also elevates a particular professor above her peers and serves to urge others 
to follow suit that, in turn, will build the institutional reputation even higher. Faculty 
are also encouraged to tweet about publications authored by themselves and their 
colleagues and include a link for a more interactive experience.  
                                                
1245 Chrisanthos Dellarocas, Designing Reputation Systems for the Social Web, Boston U. School 
Management Research Paper 2010-18, (June 13, 2010) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1624697.  
1246 Stanford University, Home Page, https://www.law.stanford.edu/. 
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Customer or peer ratings, another online reputational measurement, can work 
either for or against an individual or institution and so calls for serious deliberation 
before choices are made. Review of a professor’s work for example, by publishers or 
colleagues or students, can bolster her reputation; it can also carry bias or inaccuracies 
that will persist and be globally available.  One way to reduce those risks is to 
implement a rate-the-rater mechanism into the system, as is used in restaurant or book 
reviews where readers of reviews comment on their usefulness or credibility. One can 
usually “game the system” as was revealed at an American university where a professor 
was found to have negatively rated a colleague on the <ratemyprofessor.com> website 
whom he found particularly threatening due to his comparatively greater 
achievements.1247 
A prominent reputation system for the academic world is offered by the Social 
Science Research Network (SSRN), an online publishing and rating service.  All 
submissions are made available to anonymous readers despite the article’s publication 
history. A reputation service is provided through the compilation of statistics that track 
the number of times the abstract has been accessed, the number of downloads of the full 
article, and how that statistic ranks with other downloads. The number of footnotes is 
provided, as well as the number of citations from those sources. Similar works of other 
authors are promoted in a sidebar. A feedback function allows users to make 
suggestions regarding their selections. The contact information of each author is 
provided, as well as the institution where she teaches. A “top paper” and “top author” 
ranking is also provided, as is a listing of “top organizations” that rates universities and 
law schools by country and on an international scale. Authors, in turn, are encouraged 
to email or tweet announcements of upcoming publications, an endeavor that can boost 
both individual and institutional reputation. The concept of rating systems for law 
practitioners is receiving academic interest; one such article points out the additional 
layer of complexity brought to the reputational issue when considering the professional 
obligation of confidentiality.1248 
                                                
1247 Mike Resnick, Professor Fired for Trashing Colleagues on Professor Ratings Site, Techdirt, (22 
Feb. 2006), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20060222/221239.shtml. 
1248 Angela Goodrum, How to Maneuver in the World of Negative Online Reviews, the Important Ethical 
Considerations for Attorneys, and Changes Needed to Protect the Legal Profession, Expresso   (2015) 
http://works.bepress.com/angela_goodrum/ . 
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The above discussion establishes that design choices for a reputational system 
can profoundly affect a community’s culture, with potential to make either a  
collaborative and cordial community or “a competitive and even combative space.”1249 If 
used with careful deliberation, however, it can also generate user loyalty, mutual 
respect, institutional pride, and lasting impressions for the reader. 
 
c) Expiry Dates 
 
In 2009, Victor Mayer-Schönberger offered expiry dates as an extra-legal 
solution for users’ data protection online.1250 This technical default system would 
trigger the dissolution of personal information at a user’s pre-set date. Such external 
mechanisms would remind us of the “finiteness of information”,1251 hone our skills at 
data conservation, and instill an appreciation for the data minimization thinking akin to 
that promoted by the EU agenda for harmonization. Mayer-Schonberger maintains 
such a technological solution would compel us to decide how long our information 
remains relevant and valuable. He urges that data cleaning, just like fridge cleaning of 
foods past their expiry dates, reinforces the importance of forgetting: it “shifts the 
default back from pervasive remembering to human-controlled forgetting.”1252 
The debate over the technological realities of the persistence of data is not 
resolved and provides a complication to Mayer-Schonberger’s practical suggestion.1253 
Jeffrey Rosen warned in 2010: “[T]he Internet records everything and forgets nothing 
… every online photo, status update, Twitter post and blog entry by and about us can 
be stored forever.”1254 As discussed earlier, several Internet scholars point out that, if 
only through a plethora of technological glitches and errors, online content does have a 
                                                
1249 Dellarocas, supra fn 1244 at 8. 
1250 Mayer-Schonberger, supra fn 161 at 171. 
1251 Id. 
1252 Id at 172. 
1253 Meg Ambrose, It’s about Time: Privacy, Information Life Cycles, and the Right to be Forgotten, 16 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. (Winter 2013), 121-125 (ably setting out both sides of the 
permanence/ephemerality debate). 
1254 Jeffrey Rosen, Forgetting, supra fn 172. 
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life span. The permanence argument might just have met its match in the data 
ephemerality discourse.1255 
 
d  A Bifurcated Space for Online Speech 
 
 
One high-risk feature of the Internet is its ability to take gossip that is scattered, 
forgettable, and localized and transform it into a form that is permanent and infinitely 
searchable.1256 The defining attributes of gossip are that it is conversational, often 
unattributed, casual or unconstrained, and about other members of our community. Due 
to its details that cannot be confirmed as true or false, gossip cannot become the subject 
of a legal action such as defamation or breach of confidence.1257 Nor does it rank as 
opinion, because gossip is a social currency I pass to others, not a commodity I routinely 
create. As gossiper, my function would be to merely keep it in social circulation. 
Synonyms such as rumours, tittle-tattle, whispers, carnards, scandal, hearsay, dirt, buzz 
or scuttlebutt suggest that, while neither good nor evil, gossip is still unfavourable to 
its subject and hence potentially harmful to reputation.1258  
In democratic regimes, the law takes only a tangential interest in gossip. It is 
concerned with protecting speech but only to the extent it does not wipe out any future 
chance I have for advancement or social engagement.1259 The rationale is to avoid one of 
two extremes: the triggering of a chill of expression if too harsh, or the enabling of 
circulation of one’s secrets if too lenient. If the latter, the gossip subject might find it 
harder to engage in self-exploration if “every false step and foolish act is chronicled 
                                                
1255 Ambrose, supra fn 1252; see also Mary Rumsey, Runaway Train: Problems of Permanence, 
Accessibility, and Stability in the Use of Web Resources in law Review Citations, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 27, 35 
(2002); Mary K. Taylor & Diane Hudson, “Linkrot” and the Usefulness of Web Site Bibliographies, 
39 REF. & USER SERVICES Q. 273 (2000); ROY ROSENZWEIG, CLIO WIRED: THE FUTURE 
OF THE PAST IN THE DIGITAL AGE, 8 (2011). 
1256 Solove, Future supra fn 97 at 4.  
1257 Oxford English Dictionary (2014), 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/gossip. Truth is an absolute 
defence to defamation but not to gossip: the nature of gossip denies the speaker the ability to 
confirm its truth or falsehood.  
1258 Id. 
1259 Daniel Solove, A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in the Blogosphere, 84 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1195, 1198 (2006) (Two Bloggers). 
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forever in a permanent record.”1260 US First Amendment law is clear that not all speech 
is deserving of equal protection.1261 As expresses by the US Supreme Court, as a society 
we have determined that speech of private concern should merit less protection than 
speech of public concern.1262  
One solution to the dual nature of online speech, ie speech that contains 
references that are more reliable in one space and spontaneous, emotional, graffiti-like 
speech in the other, is to create a bifurcated online space. As such, one space would 
foster the perpetuating of good speech and articulate debate while the other would be 
more of a verbal mosh pit or gossip fest. Both spaces would call for some sort of 
standard of care, a measurement of responsibility to one’s neighbor under privacy law. 
Using false names and locations, for example, when engaging in either space would 
have to be agreed upon or eliminated. While the notion of regulation of the spaces 
would be discouraged as defeating the objective of free expression, creators and users of 
each space would have to reach consensus on the gradients of speech permitted: hate 
speech would not be treated in the same way as extortion or blackmail; gossip might be 
redefined or lower standards of proof required. Any disputes would call on more 
“nimble remedies” as Solove suggests.1263 Particularly for digital natives who have 
experienced the freedoms of online speech without the censures of defamation, a process 
of accountability could be created, in the vein of ethical review that would generate a 
spirit of responsible stewardship towards a shared digital environment.  
Anonymous defamation is an online behavior that ethical review could 
effectively address. Blogging that has an anonymous author/publisher or that does not 
identify the target of a defamatory remark is particularly menacing because it implants 
cues to guarantee identification of the target by the viewer but escapes judicial review 
for three main reasons:  1) most bloggers lack deep pockets;  2) actual malice is difficult 
to prove, and 3) speedy corrections are more easily achieved in blogs than in other 
                                                
1260 Id. 
1261 In fact, the Fair Credit Reporting Act was devised to address the unreliable, salacious material 
that was contained in credit rating agencies without official substantiation. 
1262 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).  
1263 Solove, Two Bloggers, supra fn 1258 at 1199 (noting current laws addressing Internet 
speech lack “nimble ways to resolve disputes.”) 
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media.1264 One legal approach is to treat blogging as its own culture and hence 
deserving of more lenient court treatment. 1265  Dr. Glenn Reynolds recommends 
litigation but with a higher standard of proof for claimants of anonymous defamatory 
blogs, taking into account the context and highly idiosyncratic speech they use.1266 
Daniel Solove argues a counter view, that bloggers should have greater accountability 
because, although we tend to think of blogs as “something that enhances the freedom of 
the little guy”, the countervailing freedom from privacy invasion is equally 
important.1267 That view is supported by S. Elizabeth Malloy of the University of 
Cincinnati who cites the permanence of such online postings and the lack of Internet 
regulation that could be of assistance to the defamed plaintiff.1268 This chapter argues 
that a bifurcated space with extra-legal, ethical review could address the vulnerability of 
defamation victims to anonymously generated content that can undeservedly destroy 
their carefully maintained reputation. 
In the concluding chapter I examine how the introduction of man-machine 





 Previous chapters have analyzed the most prominent discrepancies between the 
policies of the EU and US regarding informational privacy. In this chapter we have 
examined two initiatives that expose those differences in haut relief: the EUDR 
represents a European-led, uniformly enforced, institutional approach to privacy 
protections that, with the accelerating penetration of the Internet market calls for a 
meeting of minds and political will in order for the digital economy to thrive. It is 
                                                
1264 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Libel in the Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1157 (2006).  
1265 Id. 
1266 Id at 1187. 
1267 Solove, Two Bloggers, supra fn 1258, 1195.  
1268 S. Elizabeth Malloy, Anonymous Bloggers and Defamation: Balancing Interests on the Internet, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1187 (2006) (criticizing the case of Doe v. Cahill 884 A. 2d 451 (Del. 2005) 
for setting too high the requisite proof for disclosure of the name of the defendant blogger: that 
the claim is brought in good faith; that attribution is materially related to their claim; and that 
disclosure could not be obtained from any other source.) 
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crafted as a protectionist and punitive legal mechanism to provide EU residents with 
higher standards of protection than those of ‘adequacy’ accepted under the previous US 
Safe Harbor agreements. EU legislators aim to balance protecting the individual with 
generating a vibrant digital economy that includes digital access in all its benign uses. 
The result of such harmonization will be predictably beneficial for one-stop-shopping 
compliance for industry as well as the development of human rights to access, erasure, 
and transparency of data handling. Enforcement of such rights has been promoted by 
the European Commission as swift and effective.  
For America, policy aims are more industry driven and constitutionally focused 
on free speech including economic speech. Data protection and privacy legislative 
initiatives are sectoral, decentralized, and based on a self regulatory, user notice-and-
choice model. Data minimization objectives held by EU regulators do not fit 
ideologically with commercial tracking practices of US Internet companies that 
generate and foster behavioural advertising. Recent efforts by the FTC to bring a 
federal hand to personal data protection have met with considerable industry resistance.  
Despite such protectionist steps as the US Speech Act to shield journalists from 
US enforcement of foreign libel judgments, and the finding in the Google Spain decision 
that Internet companies are data controllers with respect to information involving EU 
citizens, there is considerable interest and effort at higher levels in collaborating on 
what all western states agree is a privacy crisis. As suggested elsewhere in this 
dissertation, precedent for EU/US collaboration exists in the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, a regime of bilateral consensus on trade, and agreements to 
share information systems between states to facilitate the digital compatibility of the 
flow of data, money, and goods. Transnational and international organizations continue 
to meet and debate the contours of an Internet future, particularly as defined by the 
pressing Internet governance issue, including the World Summit on Information 
Society (WSIS+10), Article 29, Transparency International, and the Internet Society. 
For the most part, participation is voluntary and enforcement potential is sorely 
lacking. 
Several quasi-judicial or extra-legal systems are emerging to deal with data 
breaches and reputational harms that are escalating at an alarming rate, if takedown 
requests of Internet companies are any indication.  One such judicial-type authority is 
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the administrative staff of Web and Internet companies like Google and LinkedIn that 
autonomously devise their takedown standards. Another is the corps of legal experts 
who craft terms of use contracts between social media providers and subscribers that 
comprises a mini-system of obligations and liabilities all its own.  
Of increasing promise for addressing reputational protections are extra legal 
activities such as the ad hoc assemblage of online communities to lobby for user interests 
where unilateral actions by companies and institutions threaten reputational privacy. 
Another emerging practice is that of online review and ranking systems where positive 
accomplishments or services of individuals can be promoted and false claims can be 
unearthed. This chapter has also proposed a more formal adjudicatory two-tiered 
system addressing harms caused by social media language that is stripped of context 
and body cues to assist interpretation.   
In the concluding chapter, I consider those dynamics in light of the web 3.0 era 
of man-machine co-functioning that is already making our lives easier but culturally, 























CHAPTER VI  CONCLUSION & FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
  
6.0        Summary of Major Findings 
 
            This chapter concludes this study and makes recommendations for further 
research. In this dissertation, I have examined the effectiveness of legal and extra legal 
responses to breaches of what I call reputational privacy in the current era of new 
media. This era is comprised of both web 2.0 uses of digital media (marked by human 
generated communications) and web 3.0 uses (integrating human communications with 
computers, sensors, and other non-human elements). Both web uses are evolving 
simultaneously, web 2.0 primarily for interpersonal and informational exchange, and 
web 3.0 for ‘smart’ technological functions such as efficient heating of our homes, 
driverless vehicles, and automatic piloting of aircraft. As I shall discuss in this closing 
chapter, however, Web 3.0 technology is evolving so quickly that the automation it 
provides is moving well beyond inter-human communications and further into the inter-
functioning of human and computer cognition. That development will call for even 
more finely tuned legal and extra-legal responses for tomorrow’s intellectual and 
technological academies.   
               I have organized the inquiry of this dissertation around three research 
questions: 1) how well do existing legal mechanisms address loss of reputation and 
informational privacy in the new media environment; 2) can new legal or extra-legal 
solutions fill any gaps; and 3) how is the role of law pertaining to reputation affected by 
the man-computer interoperability emerging as the Internet of Things. I will 
summarize my findings under each title. 
 
1) how well do existing legal mechanisms address loss of reputation and  informational privacy 
in the new media environment? 
                We have seen that there exists a distinct gap between the broad ranging 
stigma we can suffer to our reputations through posted content and online data leaks 
and the effectiveness of extant legal responses. One reason is that many of our laws are 
designed to respond to real world time, geolocations, political boundaries, and 
physiologically identifiable persons, all the while dealing with intangible property that 
ignores those constraints. For example, in order to make a property claim for lost 
reputation, our common law system still requires some element of control over that 
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property by the claimant. Proof of content or data control is often unsuited to digital 
behaviour around reputation because it is the societal nature of reputation to reside in 
the control of others.  Our social, financial, and professional worth can be magnified or 
reduced through our own actions, but its ultimate measure is out of our hands. That 
situation can be distinguished from copyright law where control over intellectual 
property is the critical element of the claim. As well, law cannot deliver the satisfaction of 
recovery in the straightforward manner of intellectual property claims: a stained 
reputation can rarely be exchanged for a sterling one, a fundamental shortcoming that 
removes much reputational injury from law’s purview.  
             For the persistent litigant in a defamation or breach of privacy suit, challenges 
also arise with the cross-jurisdictional unevenness of laws, legal definitions and 
standards of proof. Litigants must choose a system of law and a jurisdiction most 
historically sympathetic to their case, a need that drives libel tourism.  Those additional 
procedural steps increase the uncertainty of outcome and compound the time, cost, and 
emotional freight of litigation for the individual.  
              With new media, we are in unexplored legal terrain where every user can be a 
generator and publisher of her own content, where publisher or reader or both prefer 
anonymity that defies attribution, and where the reflexive state response is to tighten 
local laws regarding access to online content, thereby exacerbating our sense of 
vulnerability by increasing the sheer quantum of proof we must marshal in our case. 
Such national laws produce a “balkanization” of the Internet, an insertion of legal and 
code-architectured firewalls around individual jurisdictions to enable distinct real world 
societies to deal with Internet exposure as their political ideologies dictate. 1269 As a 
result, jurisprudence tends to follow national precedent, and be influenced by cultural 
distinctions, rather than reaching across jurisdictions for collaboration.1270  
               I have noted that a significant number of international legal conventions, like 
the UNDR and the ICCPR, are rich in their references to reputation rights in the 
context of family life and privacy. My review of particular cases, sadly, reveals a lack of 
                                                
1269 The term is used by Marshall W. Van Alstyne & Erik Brynjolfsson, Global Village or 
CyberBalkans: Modeling and Measuring the Integration of Electronic Communities, MGT. SCI. 
(forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=756445; see also David Kurt Herold, An Inter-nation-al 
Internet: China’s Contribution to global internet governance? SSRN,  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1922725. 
1270 Herold, id.   
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reference of those instruments in regional and domestic law (EU) or federal and state 
law (US). Their influence on local legal norms as revealed in judicial decision making is 
therefore much diminished.  
              I also note that judges, primarily in the US, are cautious and sometimes 
uninformed regarding new media; they often prefer to resolve a case focusing on 
traditional legal principles that do not consider new conditions of sociality brought 
about by emerging communications technologies and our interaction with them. I have 
noted the challenge to judges of learning about the disruptive realities of such 
technologies and attempting to balance their capabilities with legal principles that 
evolve incrementally. I observe their preference for technologically neutral language in 
order to appear consistent with what has gone before and to avoid having to revisit 
their decisions in the future. I conclude, in terms of judicial practice, that there is a 
judicial preference for cobbling traditional reasoning onto new media issues without 
thinking further about how digital technology actually works or whether certain 
principles of law have any utility or relevance in cyberspace at all.  
               Such findings are particularly apt for defamation claims. One example is the 
preference of judges to look for the same elements of proof, to the same standards, when 
dealing with cryptic, almost fractured, social media speech. Another is applying literary 
or grammatical standards of interpretation for written correspondence to spontaneous 
and ephemeral digital messaging. I suggest that digital speech might be a discrete form 
of communication requiring a unique branch or system of law, or at minimum a separate 
court staffed with new media experts, such as the Tokyo IP model or the historic equity 
court based on fairness rather than on black letter law. I further note cases involving 
defamation being framed in breach of confidentiality, insult or criminal defamation law 
or other obliquely related causes of action, a practice that further muddles the 
conceptual and procedural patchwork of legal reasoning regarding individual 
reputation.   
                 More promising, however, is the emergence of cross-Atlantic interest in new 
mechanisms to address reputational privacy: a focus in Europe on gatekeeper liability 
(ISPs primarily) to give individual Internet users control of what gets collected and 
disseminated online (through the EUDR) and a reworking in the US of the light 
regulatory approach to user protection through do not track policies. Countering those 
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initiatives are prominent examples of the nationalization trend, such as the new Speech 
Act in America to protect US journalists and online publishers from the enforcement of 
foreign judgments in defamation, and the strong data protectionism for EU residents 
offered by the EUDR. I will follow a description of the Speech Act with a discussion of 
political initiatives that indicate growing international interest in more open but 
informal collaborations regarding reputational challenges for individuals.  
       The 2010 Speech Act renders unenforceable any foreign defamation 
judgments against US journalists, unless they are consistent with US laws and 
procedures, including the US Constitution (including the First Amendment), section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act, 1271  and US standards of due process.1272 In other 
words, foreign judgments must be “consistent with that which a U.S. court would have 
reached on the facts, if the defamation had been in the United States.”1273 “Defamation” 
is defined in the Act as “any action or other proceeding for defamation, libel, slander, or 
similar claim alleging that forms of speech are false, have caused damage to reputation 
or emotional distress, have presented any person in a false light, or  have resulted in 
criticism, dishonor, or condemnation of any person.”1274 That definition incorporates 
traditional torts of privacy, infliction of emotional harm, and defamation. Reference to 
the Communications Decency Act 1275 exempts from legal liability any online intermediaries 
such as individual users, ISPs, and publishers who post third party content as 
journalists, ie stories of public interest. In theory the legislation and policy framework 
exempts from enforcement US citizen publishers who post news stories on YouTube, 
their own blogs, third party blogs as guest contributors, and even social media sites like 
Facebook if the general public has access to such sources. The Speech Act does not 
cover other user generated content.1276 The Speech Act applies to both state and federal 
                                                
1271Communications Act Of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 230 (as amended and called Communications Decency 
Act Of 1996), supra fn 939 (providing immunity for online web host services regarding content 
created by other companies.)  
1272 Securing The Protection Of Our Enduring And Established Constitutional Heritage (Speech) Act, Part 
VI, Title 28, (Pub. L. No. 111-223), 124 Stat. 2480 (10 Aug. 2010). (SPEECH Act).  
1273 Emily C. Barbour, The SPEECH Act: The Federal Response to ‘Libel Tourism’, CRS Report For 
Congress 7-5700 (16 Sept. 2010,  https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41417.pdf 
1274 S. 4101(1) [emphasis added]. 
1275 S. 230 states, "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider".   
1276  Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230. 
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courts and marks a rigorous policy objective of creating a uniform national response to 
foreign judgments involving the issue of journalistic free speech.1277  
              Contrasting sharply with the wide berth granted free speech in the US Speech 
Act and Communications Decency Act is the Google Spain decision. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, the CJEU decision identified ISPs and Internet content hosts as controllers of 
content with legal liability and pro-active responsibilities to individual data subjects 
regarding privacy-sensitive content. The ruling was specific to the Spanish context in 
which the facts unfolded, although legal principles regarding rights of erasure, for 
example, are instructive for other Member States. One analyst of the CJEU decision 
concluded that, “America is rigidly ideological about free speech, while Europe is 
pragmatic and flexible.”1278 That conclusion might be too categorical for these digital 
times, as we have seen in the conclusions to Chapters IV and V that the controversy 
raised by Google Spain and its implications for reputational privacy are generating 
robust debate in both EU Member States and in the US. Those jurisdictions are coming 
closer to consensus regarding the two initiatives that will change the laws on personal 
and data privacy as it affects reputation: DNT policies1279 and the EUDR.1280  
            On the macro stage, there is ongoing dialogue at high levels: the Hague 
                                                
1277 Barbour, supra fn 1273 at 14 (arguing that “Although the SPEECH Act lacks an explicit 
pre-emption provision, it applies to all “domestic” courts and defines a “domestic court” to 
include both state and federal courts, notwithstanding any other provision of state law.”) 
1278  Eric Posner, We all have the right to be forgotten, SLATE (14 May 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/the_european_ri
ght_to_be_forgotten_is_just_what_the_internet_needs.html (commenting that the judgment is 
“hugely more protective of privacy interests than American law, which nearly always prevents 
people from winning anything from search engines and publishers who have spread personal 
information about them far and wide.”)  
1279 Neelie Kroes, Why we need a sound Do-Not-Track standard for privacy online, Europa.eu, (11 
Mar. 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-
2014/kroes/en/blog/donottrack.html; see contra, Richard Beaumont, Do Not Track Gets Thumbs 
Down from EU, The Cookie Collective (12 June 2014), 
http://www.cookielaw.org/blog/2014/6/12/do-not-track-gets-thumbs-down-from-eu/ (reporting 
that the Article 29 Working Party with EU Data Protection Authorities could not agree on its 
European adoption that balanced user control and business interests). 
1280 See, for example, Should the US Adopt the Right to be Forgotten? Video Debate, Berkman Center 
For Internet & Society At Harvard University (11 Mar. 2015), 
http://intelligencesquaredus.org/debates/past-debates/item/1252-the-u-s-should-adopt-the-
right-to-be-forgotten-online (featuring Paul Nemitz and Eric Posner arguing for adoption and 
Jonathan Zittrain and Andrew McLaughlin arguing against. The latter team won the debate.) 
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Conference on the role of private international law in cross border data flows;1281 the 
UN Resolution on a Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations;1282 the Declaration Of 
Principles By The World Summit On The Information Society (WSIS);1283 as well as the 
creation of privacy principles by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization 
(APEC).1284   
                  Despite the lack of enforcement bite of international legal conventions, there 
has been a show of faith in the worth of the individual through broader recognition of a 
human right to Internet access. For example, the parliament of Estonia passed 
legislation in 2000 declaring Internet access a basic human right;1285 the Constitutional 
Council of France effectively declared Internet access a fundamental right in 2009;1286 
the constitution of Greece acknowledges the duty of the state to facilitate digitally 
transmitted information;1287 Finland’s Ministry of Communications and Transportation 
passed a decree in 2009 setting minimum standards of user access;1288 the special 
rapporteur to the UN, Frank Le Rue, designated Internet access a human right in 
                                                
1281 Cross-border Data Flows and Protection of Privacy, Report, Hague Conference On Private 
International Law (March 2010), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2010pd13e.pdf. 
1282 Global Agenda For Dialogue Among Civilizations, G.A. Res. 56-6, U.N.Doc. A/56/L.3 and 
Add/ 1, Nov. 21, 2001, Article 9: “Utilization of communication technologies, including audio, 
video, printed press, multimedia and the Internet, to disseminate the message of dialogue and 
understanding throughout the globe and depict and publicize historical instances of constructive 
interaction among different civilizations”. [emphasis added]  
1283 Declaration Of Principles By The World Summit On The Information Society, WSIS-
03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (Paris: UNESCO & Geneva ITU (Dec. 12, 2003) (to build “a people-
centered, inclusive, and development-oriented Information Society”). 
1284  APEC Privacy Framework, http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-
Investment/~/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.ashx . 
1285 Colin Woodward, Estonia, where being wired is a human right, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., (1 July 
2003) http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0701/p07s01-woeu.html . 
1286 Ian Sparks, Internet access is a fundamental human right, rules French court, DAILY MAIL (12 
June 2009) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1192359/Internet-access-fundamental-
human-right-rules-French-court.html. 
1287 Hellenic Viii Revisionary Parliament, Constitution Of Greece, Article 5A, as revised by 
parliamentary resolution (27 May 2008), 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156 
aggliko.pdf. 
1288 Decree Of The Ministry Of Transport And Communications On The Minimum Rate Of A 
Functional Internet Access As A Universal Service,” FINLEX, 732/2009, (22 Oct. 2009), 
http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2009/en20090732 (emphasizing that “Every Internet 
connection within the country must have a broadband speed of at least one megabit per 
second, increasing to a speed of 100 megabits per second by 2015”). 
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2011;1289 and a survey by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in March 2010 
determined that almost 80% of participants from 26 countries believe that Internet 
access is an inherent fundamental human right.1290 In a separate calculation, 85% of BBC 
participants who do not have Internet access believe it should be a protected human 
right.1291 Each of those activities could lead to lobbying at high levels for more 
dedication of resources to the digital divide problem.1292 
 In his 2011 report to the UN Council on Human Rights, Frank La Rue identified 
the Internet as an enabler of other human rights because it “vastly expands the capacity 
of individuals to enjoy their right to freedom of opinion and expression”, and it boosts 
economic, social and political development, “thereby contributing to the progress of 
humankind as a whole”. 1293  One of those “other human rights”, the right to 
communicate, was promoted by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan in his message 
on World Telecommunication Day:1294 he reminded the international community of the 
millions of people in the poorest countries who are still victimized by the digital 
divide.1295 
The above illustrations support our ideological intention, as an international 
community, to promote our human entitlement to reputational protection through our 
                                                
1289 Frank La Rue, Report Of The Special Rapporteur On The Promotion And Protection Of The Right To 
Freedom Of Opinion And Expression, UN Council on Human Rights, 17th Sess. agenda item 3, 28-
59, UN Doc./A/HRC/17/27 (2011) 28-59, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf. See also 
Nicolas Jackson, United Nations Declares Internet Access a Basic Human Right, ATLANTIC (3 June, 
2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/06/united-nations-declares-
internet-access-a-basic-human-right/239911/. 
1290 Four in five regard Internet access as a fundamental right: global poll, BBC NEWS (8 Mar 2010),    
http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2010/03_march/07/poll.shtml   
(explaining there were  27,973 adult participants including 14,306 Internet users, ethnology 
included face-to-face or telephone interviews between 30 November 2009 and 7 February 
2010 or urban samples, and polling was conducted for BBC World Service by GlobeScan.)   
1291 Id.  
1292 ‘Digital divide’ can be defined as ‘inequality of access to the Internet’.  Manuel Castells, 
The Internet Galaxy 248 (2001). 
1293 La Rue, supra fn 1289 at para 67. 
1294 17 May 2003. 
1295 Bruce Girard, Sean O Siochru, Communicating in the Information Society, Paper for 
Information Technologies and Social Development Project, United Nations Research Institute 




our Internet access. In practice, however, more violent or physically damaging acts 
against human rights garner the headlines and the attention of those who apply the 
UNDR and the ICCPR. Although technological innovation promises democratic 
participation in the digital economy through education and healthcare, this dissertation 
has identified several factors that create a risk of exclusion from those conversations: 
state censorship;1296 realistic fears of cyber-terrorism and digital attacks; and the 
perceived tyranny of aggressive surveillance techniques by the state in the name of 
national security. Each of those risks soundly affects the participation of the individual 
in life online. 
 
2)         Can new legal or extra-legal solutions fill any gaps?  
In response to this research question, I have provided several tenable 
possibilities such as emerging legal initiatives or less formal responses altogether. I 
have reviewed the proposed EUDR that will require all exporters of personal data of 
EU citizens to comply with stringent guidelines regarding the cross-border use of 
individual personal data. That regime calls for closer collaboration between US Internet 
companies and EU data authorities.  
I have compared the EUDR regime with the US policy agenda for do not track 
mechanisms that could become law for all Internet content carriers. At present, DNT 
initiatives work on a notice-and-choice basis that requires the active decision making of 
individual users. American regulatory agenda, steer-headed by the FTC, would see all 
US-based Internet companies embed DNT mechanisms into its designs, thereby taking 
the initiative for non tracking policies off the shoulders of individual users by creating a 
federal regime. The active interest of the European Commission and Article 29 
Working Party of data retention authorities suggests trans-Atlantic collaboration over 
DNT policies is possible.  
 I have also proposed several extra-legal responses to protect reputational 
privacy. Those suggestions include creating 1) project-specific monitoring communities, 
                                                
1296 See further Aendrew Rininsland, Internet censorship listed: how does each country compare? 
GUARDIAN (16 Apr 2012) 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/datablog/2012/apr/16/internet-censorship-country-list 
(indicating which national governments are involved in filtering and the different levels of 
formal activity). 
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such as Facebook subscribers, to address intrusive practices of industry; 2) reputational 
rating and review systems that build individual and institutional reputations and 
informally weed out harms by unfounded attacks on reputation;1297 3) educational 
programs for new media users regarding online citizenship, beginning with pro-active 
self-regulation;1298 and 5) an inter-disciplinary mechanism for the ongoing study of the 
epistemological nature of digital speech to more accurately distinguish risk causing 
verbal behavior from mere socially offensive  conduct.  
I propose that legal and extra-legal solutions are not mutually exclusive but 
collaborative; some of the latter already exist as suffers of reputational stigma take re-
building into their own hands. There is a need for more individual awareness of the 
Internet industry’s own system of reputational privacy law: its Terms of Use provisions. 
I suggest a formalized study of those terms might reveal a layer of legality for 
individual Internet use that provides additional issues regarding reputational control or 
that suggests areas of consensus. Similarly, access to the criteria for successful take 
down requests devised by Internet companies like Google could assist in arriving at a 
list of ‘fair practices’ for removing harmful content. In that way, industry need not 
always be an adversary in our quest for reputational integrity. 
 
3)    How is the role of law pertaining to reputation affected by the man-computer 
interoperability emerging as the Internet of Things? 
This dissertation has shown how not all reputational effects relate to the privacy 
of our home and family life. Much exposure of the identifying data we leave behind 
during our online activities renders us vulnerable to its collection, retention, sale, and 
analysis by authorities or commercial entities without our consent or even knowledge. 
Those activities are included in this dissertation because, as I have illustrated, their 
manipulation robs us of the control over our reputations that we need in order to 
maintain the high esteem of our society.  
The theme of user control gains complexity with our entry into the age of 
human-computer integration, what we increasingly refer to as the Internet of Things. 
or  the connection through the Internet of devices or sensors that are sold to consumers 
                                                
1297 As first proposed by Ardia supra fn 10 at 321.  
1298 See further Gillespie, supra fn 1222. 
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to communicate information between them.1299 When computers are connected to 
sensors and activators in order to assist human comfort, security, health, mobility or 
access to information, data and images are produced that threaten to expose our 
reputations and self-presentation in a host of new ways. Such augmentation of our 
human capabilities poses questions regarding the role of law that we have only begun to 
ponder. Future research, therefore, is needed to extend beyond this exploratory study 
and develop recommendations for dealing with those increasing risks to reputation, as 



















                                                
1299 See further Tim O’Reilly, IoTH: The Internet of Things and Humans, Oreilly.Com YouTube 
video, http://radar.oreilly.com/2014/04/ioth-the-internet-of-things-and-humans.html 
(suggesting the more inclusive descriptor ‘human-computer’ to replace more historical  
references to ‘man-computer’.)   
1300 See further Internet Of Things: Privacy And Security In A Connected World, FTC (Jan. 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2013/11/internet-things-privacy-security-
connected-world; and also The Internet of Things is transforming everything from Formula One to 
driverless cars, Internet Of Things Council, http://business.financialpost.com/2015/03/11/how-
the-internet-of-things-is-transforming-everything-from-formula-one-to-driverless-cars/. 
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6.1 Future Research  
One place to start is to develop research threads introduced in this paper, such as 
the construction of a methodology for measuring and comparing reputational harm. 
While this dissertation has illustrated the intangible aspects of such injury, it has also 
shown how those harms can be translated into loss of opportunity in the economic, 
social, and professional sense. Those opportunities enable our contributions to the 
society we entrust with our reputations. Unlike in Brandeis and Warren’s time, we now 
recognize intangible harms in many areas of law. By devising a gradient of expressible 
harms, for example, we could work towards recommendations for law reform that 
would deliver more effective legal responses to personal reputational injury. Once harm 
can be systematically measured, we can begin to assess the adequacy of our existing 
responses through laws of defamation, privacy invasion, and data retention. Another 
fertile area of research includes deconstructing digital speech to test this paper’s 
proposal for a bifurcated space of legal and non-legal responses to communications that 
result in online reputational damage. Further development of the quasi-adjudicative 
function of Google personnel regarding take-down requests is warranted as well in 
light of mounting pressure by US and EU authorities to formalize such processes. All of 
those topics hold promise for more clearly defining the control of the individual over 
personal reputation as we move into the human-machine interconnectedness of the Web 
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Appendix A   Acronyms 
 
AES    Advanced Encryption Standard  
ARPANET   Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 
ARPS/DARPA  Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Administration  
CNIL    National Commission of Informatics and Freedom (Fr) 
DIR 2000/31/EC Directive On Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society 
Services, In Particular Electronic Commerce, In The 
Internal Market (E-Commerce Directive ) 
DIR 2006/24/EC Directive On The Retention Of Data Generated Or 
Processed In Connection With The Provision of Publicly 
Available Electronic Communications Services or of Public 
Communications Networks (E-Privacy Directive) 
DHS   Department of Homeland Security 
DoD   Department of Defense (US) 
DPA   Data Protection Authorities  
DPI    Deep Packet Inspection 
ECPA    Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
EEC    European Economic Community 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights (formerly 
‘Charter of Fundamental Human Rights’ until Treaty of 
Lisbon was entered into force 1 December 2009 
establishing the EU)  
ECtHR   European Court of Human Rights 
ENISA    European Network and Information Security Agency  
EUDR    Proposed General Data Protection Regulation 2012/0011  
FCC    Federal Communications Commission  
FRA   Fundamental Rights Agency 
FTC    Federal Trade Commission  
IACHR   Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
ICJ    International Court of Justice 
ICO    Information Commissioner’s Office (EU)  
ICCPR    International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
ICT    Information and Communications Technology 
IDENT   Automated Biometric Identification System  
IRA    Internal Revenue Agency  
ISP    Internet service providers  
ITU     International Telecommunications Union  
LICRA   La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme  
95 DIRECTIVE Directive On The Protection Of Individuals With Regard 
To The Processing Of Personal Data And On The Free 
Movement Of Such Data (Dir 1995/46EC) 
NORDUNET   Nordic Council of Ministers Network 
NSA    National Security Agency 
NSFNet   National Science Foundation Network 
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OAS    Organization of American States  
OECD    Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development  
OSCE    Organization for Security and Co-operation 
PII    Personally identifiable information  
PRC    People’s Republic of China 
P2P    Peer-to-peer 
SNS    Social Networking Service 
TFEU    Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UGC    User-generated content   
UNHR   Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
W3C   World Wide Web Consortium 






































Appendix    B  Maps, Charts, Pictograms 
 
 
Map 1            Internet Population and Penetration  
Source: Mark Graham & Stefano de Sabbato, Oxford Internet Institute 
using World Bank data. The 2011 data are visualized with a hexagon-
shaped cartogram in which the size of each country is drawn based on its 
population of Internet users.  






















Pictogram       World’s Biggest Data Breaches 
   
            Source: Information is Beautiful (partial screenshot) 
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-



























Map 2 Out of Balance:  Defamation Law in the European Union, a comparative overview for 
journalists, civil society and policymakers (January 2015). 
 



















Chart 1      Criminal Offences related to the Protection of Honour, EU Member  
                        States and Candidate Countries  
 
Source: Out of Balance: Defamation Law in the European Union and Its Effect 











































Appendix C            Lexicon  
 
Algorithm  a self-contained set of operations to be performed in a particular 
sequence by a computer. Algorithms exist that perform 
calculation, data processing, and automated reasoning. 
 
Anonymization:          a process of removing personally identifying information obtained  
from cookies as well as from the IP address that could identify the 
user. 
 
Bandwidth  the available capacity for transmitting online information, 
expressed in bit-rates (bits/second). One byte per second (1 B/s) 
corresponds to 8 bits/s. 
Big Data data sets so large in volume, speed, or variety that they are 
difficult to process, analyze, search, share, store, or transfer.   
Caching  the automatic storage of data or content that duplicates original 
values stored elsewhere on a computer. It generally represents a 
search or search history of a user. 
 
Cookies:  data sent from a website a user has viewed; they are stored in a 
user's web browser while the user is reading or viewing that 
website. Every time the user loads that website, the browser 
sends the cookie back to the server to notify the website of the 
user's previous activity (HTTP cookie, web cookie, Internet 
cookie, or browser cookie).  
 
Cyborg a technologically enhanced human featured in children’s comics 
and videogames. 
  
Dark Net net-speak for the hidden underbelly of the Web, home to both 
rogues and political activists, and accessed only with the help of 
specially designed anonymizing software.  
 
Deanonymization:   the insertion of sufficient identifiers (address, birth date) into data 
so that disclosure of an individual is achieved.  
 
Deep packet inspection:  a form of filtering that examines data packets as they pass an  
inspection point; it is used to locate activity such as protocol non-
compliance, viruses, spam, or other unauthorized intrusions and 
re-route it to a different destination, such as a spam file, or 
collected for statistical analysis.  
 
Deindividuation:   a psychological state arising from a lack of attention of others and  





Domain Name:  a name used to establish a unique online identity. Organizations, 
governments, institutions, etc. can choose a domain name that 
corresponds to their name, helping Internet users to reach them 
easily (eg: yorku.ca). There is a hierarchy of names: top-level 
domain names can be assigned to countries [ca (Canada), ch 
(china)] or other entities [gov, edu, .ocm, org, net]. ICANN 
assigns domain names. 
 
DNS server  (Domain Name System) a naming system for computers or other 
resources connected to the Internet that offers a translation 
(resolution) of human-memorable domain names into the 
corresponding numeric Internet Protocol (IP) addresses needed 
for the purpose of computer services and devices worldwide. It 
serves as an Internet directory service.  
 
Disinhibition    The de-inhibiting effect of behavior prompted by anonymity; it 
can  
present as a more aggressive or punitive level of human activity. 
 
Dropbox  a file hosting or cloud storage service operated by Dropbox, Inc. 
to allow users to create a special folder on their computers that 
can be accessed by the user from any computer.  
 
Hacktivism   indicates anonymous group action to convey a political message  
through manipulation of a website. 
 
HTML  (HyperText Markup Language) the standard language used to 
create web pages, written in the form of tags enclosed in angle 
brackets (eg: <html> ).  
 
IP address  (Internet Protocol address) a set of rules or standards that are 
used by computers to communicate with each other across a 
network, such as the Internet. A DNS server is used to convert a 
URL (york.ca) to an IP address, which is a number 
(209.191.93.52) that routers use to direct bits of information to its 
destination. 
 
Internet Service Provider:   (ISP) a commercial entity that provides services for 
accessing, using, or participating in the Internet (commercial, 
community-owned, not-for-profit, or private). Examples include 
Bell, Rogers, Shaw, Orange, AOL, or AT&T. 
Layers of the Internet:  often described as the physical layer (computer device, computer  
wires that connect devices), the logical layer (layer of code or 
computer language that enables the physical layer to function); 




Mainframes a high performance computer used for large data compilation and 
storage, historically considered to involve a centralized as 
opposed to the later distributed method of computing.  
 
Metatags  provide metadata about an HTML document. It is located within 
the <head>. It will not be displayed on the page, but will be 
machine decipherable. Metatags are used to specify page 
description, keywords, author of the document, when it was last 
modified, etc. Metadata can be used by browsers (to illustrate how 
to display content or reload page), search engines (keywords), or 
other web services. 
 
Operating system:  software that manages the computer's memory, processes, and  
all of its software and hardware in a computer. For example, the 
Apple IOS system. 
 
OSI    (Open Systems Interconnection) a computer protocol or set of  
guidelines for implementing networking communications between 
computers. For example, TCP/IP (Transmission Control 
Protocol and Internet Protocol), HTTP, and FTP.  
 
Platform  the environment or underlying system that software needs for its 
operation. The operating system of a computer is an example, 
such as Windows 2000, Mac OS X or IBM’s S/390.  
 
Protocol  a set of guidelines for enabling network communications between 
computers. The system of protocols which was developed over the 
initial development of the Internet became known as the TCP/IP 
Protocol Suite, after the two initial protocols developed: 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP).  
 
Pseudonymization:   the process of substituting one ingredient, such as a name, for 
numbers or other characters that can mask direct identification of 
the user. 
 
Router  the traffic-directing device that forwards data packets between 
computer networks. For personal computers, a router can be used 
to transmit emails, log onto various Internet sites, or stream 
videos.  
 
Selfie a self photograph taken with a mobile phone or hand-held digital 
camera. 
 
Sharding the automated procedure of breaking up data into fragments for 
storage in different storage facilities or locations. 
 
 378 
Streisand Effect:    the phenomenon, named after American entertainer Barbra 
Streisand, where the publicity engendered by an invasion of 
privacy lawsuit far exceeds the original intrusion 
 
Social networking service:    (SNS) web-based services that allow individuals to create a  
public profile and a list of similar-interest users with whom to 
share connections, and view and cross the connections within the 
system.  
 
Tagging  device to identify persons in an online photograph. It occurs in 
two ways: through a user that is then locked into the memory of 
networking sites through facial recognition software; and using 
the insertion of single words on a site that provides a link to that 
photograph. 
 
Twibel   Libel using the Twitter social media platform. 
 
URL  (Uniform Resource Locator) indicates the location of a file on the 
web (Yahoo.com). It is expressed in English, designed for people 
to remember. 
 
Web browser        a software application used to retrieve or present information on 
the Web.  Examples include Safari, Mozilla Firefox, Internet 
Explorer, and Google Chrome. 
 
Web 2.0 The second generation of the World Wide Web that is focused on 
the ability of people to collaborate and share information online. 
Also known as the generative Internet. 
 
Web 3.0 The third generation of Internet-based services characterized by 
intelligent or smart functions that link computers to sensors or 
the Internet to complete a function without direct human 
intervention.  
 
Wireless (Wi-Fi) any type of computer transmission of information that 
uses wireless (cable-less) data connections, such as radio 
communications.  
World Wide Web  (the Web) an information system of online documents accessed  
via the Internet using software installed on the user’s computer as 
a web browser. 
 
 
 
 
